Serbia, Kosovo and 1244

1244 is the UN Security Council resolution that ended the NATO/Yugoslavia war over Kosovo in 1999.  Today in Brussels, Pristina and Belgrade agreed that Kosovo would be represented internationally as Kosovo, with a footnote referencing both UNSC resolution 1244 and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision that found no prohibition (in 1244 or anywhere else) on its declaration of independence.

Belgrade is anxious to portray this as a victory.  B92 quotes President Tadic:

Kosovo will not be presented in regional fora and institutions as an independent country, but in line with UN Resolution 1244 on Kosovo and the opinion of the International Court of Justice.

He is entitled to his interpretation of the agreement, but mine is different.  Let me explain.

Belgrade has long been anxious to drag 1244 into all discussions of Kosovo because it makes reference in the preamble to Yugoslav sovereignty.  But preambular language is not legally binding and the substantive text of the resolution clearly foresees a political process to decide Kosovo’s status.  It is the claim of those states that have recognized Kosovo as independent and sovereign that the Marti Ahtisaari-led negotiations, in which Russia and Serbia participated fully, constituted that political process.  The terms of 1244 have therefore been fulfilled, even if no new UNSC resolution has passed.  Last year’s ICJ opinion advised that Kosovo’s declaration of independence breached no international law, confirming that 1244 does not prevent Kosovo from sovereignty and independence, despite the preambular reference to Yugoslav sovereignty.

So I see no loss to Kosovo in a footnote requiring reference to 1244.  To the contrary, it seems to me Kosovo’s right to a political process that would determine final status is rooted in 1244–that is what makes Kosovo different from all those other provinces around the world that would like independence.  Coupled with the ICJ decision, the footnote should be read as a clear and unequivocal statement that Kosovo is entitled to seek recognition as a sovereign and independent state.

It now has that recognition from more than 85 other sovereign and independent states, which is more than have bilaterally recognized many other states on earth.  Bilateral recognitions generally stop once a state is a member of the United Nations.  That is the next hurdle for Kosovo.  It needs membership in the UN General Assembly, which requires a positive recommendation by the Security Council.

So far, Russia has put its veto at the disposal of Serbia to prevent Kosovo’s UN membership.  But I’ve got to wonder out loud how long that will last.  Russia’s recognition of Abhazia and South Ossetia deprives its stance of any moral rectitude.  Once Kosovo is accepted in Balkans circles, including by the five non-recognizing European Union states, as Kosovo* {that * is meant to represent the footnote referencing two things that together confirm Kosovo’s right to seek international recognition}, why would Moscow continue to block membership under the same formula in the UN General Assembly?

There is another aspect to this agreement that is positive for Pristina.  It opens the door to a “contractual” relationship between Kosovo* and the EU, one that should certainly include an agreement on trade, visas and other key items.  Pristina has good reason to celebrate, even if no one can enjoy having their state identity footnoted.