Day: January 26, 2013

A state in search of itself

Laurentina Cizza, the second of my Middle East Institute interns this semester, makes her peacefare.net debut with this piece on Libya:

The environment of near-anarchy in Libya is expected to get worse before it gets better. That was the general conclusion of Thursday evening’s Middle East Policy Forum at George Washington University, “Libya: a state in search of itself,” moderated by Ambassador Edward “Skip” Gnehm.

The Library of Congress’ Chief of the African and Middle Eastern Division, Mary Jane Deeb opened with a theoretical overview of the current situation in Libya. She focused on one question in particular: How do we categorize Libya today? A mere political ouster? A civil war? A proper revolution? She argued for the last: Libya is currently undergoing phase two of Huntington’s conception of the western revolution. With the fall of the Jamahiriya and the emergence of new political actors, Libya has done away with the old political institutions and produced new political actors who promise to build a new order.

She categorized Libya’s current political actors in three, not necessarily mutually exclusive, groups:  (largely urban) youth, tribes, and Islamists. She expressed optimism for Libya’s long-term prospects. Young Libyans span across the political spectrum, but they represent the most educated generation in Libyan history (under Qadhafi, Libya boasted some of the highest literacy rates in North Africa). Libya’s current chaos represents a side effect of the new political actors’ struggle for equilibrium.  But Deeb also forecasted that the instability would continue. After all, the establishment of any self-respecting political order takes time. Bottom line:  from an academic standpoint, Libya is exactly where political scientists expect it to be.

Karim Mezran, a Senior Fellow at Atlantic Council’s Rafiq Hariri Center for the Middle East, opened his commentary with this disclaimer: “Being both Italian and Libyan prevents me from being optimistic.” Having set the tone, he focused on two questions: How was the revolution possible and what are the revolution’s chances today?

Regarding the first question, he distinguished between an official and an unofficial narrative of the revolution. The sardonic unofficial narrative postulates that Western powers hold more of the credit for the success of the Libyan revolution than the Libyan people, and not only for NATO’s role. An intensive four-day Al Jazeera campaign did more to prompt Sarkozy’s condemnation of Qadhafi as a war criminal than a 40-year record of human rights violations. Western powers’ withdrawal of support for Qadhafi did more damage than a protracted struggle between the regime and rag-tag rebels ever could. Case in point: Syria. He also took care to acknowledge that Libya’s revolution was also a civil war. Qadhafi had his supporters, who are now a marginalized portion of the population that is all but twiddling its thumbs as the new government struggles to its feet.

Regarding the prospects of the Libyan revolution, time is of the essence. The government’s inability to ensure security is breeding a climate amenable to militias, terrorist networks and criminal organizations. Mezran described the eastern part of the country, the site of Ambassador Stevens’ death, as “near-anarchy.” The current delay in the constitutional process is countering the progress made by the smooth General National Council elections. As instability continues, political tensions boil and the risk of the constitutional process exploding into violence increases.  He offered two solutions:

1) That Libya recognize the importance of Western support, particularly in training of security forces and dealing with the militias;

2) An international agreement or treaty providing security for the southern border, which is porous to terrorist and criminal networks.

While a theory-oriented Deeb focused on the promising long-term, a realist-oriented Mezran focused on the painful short-term. Libya has to get through the latter before it enjoys the former.

 

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An exclusive club, not the movies

Danijela Milinkovic at Belgrade daily Vecernje Novosti asked me some questions.  I responded a week ago.  I gather they published the interview yesterday.  Here is the interview in English:

Q:  Wanting to achieve its strategic goal – joining the EU – Serbia faces numerous demands on Kosovo, which, it seems, getting bigger and bigger as we progress in integration. Is our path towards the EU charged masochism and do you believe that giving up on Kosovo for Serbs will be the ticket for entry into the European track?

A:  As I understand it, normalizing relations with Pristina is the EU’s current requirement in order to give Serbia a date to begin accession negotiations.  It has been understood from the first that this “normalization” includes reaching mutually satisfactory agreements with Pristina on northern Kosovo.

But Serbia will not become an EU member without going further.  It will have to establish diplomatic relations with Kosovo and exchange ambassadors, because becoming a member will require agreement of the 28 existing members.  More than one will insist on diplomatic relations between Pristina and Belgrade, even if the EU as a whole does not.  Nor is that the only thing Serbia will have to do:  it will have to meet the many other criteria for membership.  There is no single “ticket” for entry into the EU.  There are many tickets.

Accession to the EU is a long and complicated process of conforming Serbia’s laws and practices to European norms.  It will take at least a decade.  Once you get finished with one chapter, there will be another one.  There are currently 35 chapters of the acquis communitaire, which form the basis of the accession process.  There may be more by the time Serbia completes the process.

I would not regard preparation for EU accession as “masochism.”  Countries do these things because they want rule of law, security, prosperity and social well-being.  There are enormous rewards.  If you enter the process feeling nothing but pain, maybe you are in the wrong process.  You are not going to the cinema; you are joining a privileged and highly selective club that will enable all of Serbia’s citizens to enjoy far better and freer lives.

Q:  Whatever Serbia does, it seems that is not enough to change the attitude of the great powers towards our country us? Where are we wrong?

A:  While I often hear this complaint, it seems to me that both Europe and America are today respectful and friendly towards Serbia.  Once Milosevic was gone, sanctions were lifted, Serbian leaders were welcomed in Washington, Brussels and European capitals, and substantial resources were made available, mainly through the IMF and private channels. There is ample cooperation on many issues:  drugs, organized crime, nuclear technology.  There are really only two issues that give people in Washington pause about Serbia:  Kosovo and Bosnia.  On those, I would describe the pressure from Washington as firm but relatively light-handed.  The two governments disagree on Kosovo and on Milorad Dodik, but this is not affecting their basically friendly relations on many other issues.

The EU is taking a tougher attitude right now on Kosovo, largely due to German initiative. From my perspective, that is a good thing:  if the issues in the north can be resolved, Kosovo will certainly benefit but so too will Serbia.

Q:  Would you say that Serbia is today at a turning point?

A:  No.  It seems to me Serbia is still clinging to romantic notions about its ties to Russia, the Non-aligned Movement and the claim to sovereignty over Kosovo that have nothing to do with its future in the European Union.  Serbia will not be at a turning point until it makes a decision to turn.  Even then, it will have a long process of negotiation and adjustment of its laws and practices before entering the EU.  Even once fully prepared, it may have to wait for the 28 members to arrive at a convenient political moment.

Q:  Do you think that decomposition of the Balkans is over or we will see new changes of borders in the future?

A:  The changes that have occurred so far have been in the status of borders (from internal boundaries to international borders), not where the borders are drawn.  I would describe this not as “decomposition” but as dissolution of former Yugoslavia.  I see no possibility of additional changes of borders, which won’t be acceptable to either Europe or the U.S.

Q:  The European Council has decided to grant Serbia a “conditional date”, in other words, to determine the beginning of the pre-accession negotiations with the EU for March. What does Serbia need to do until then, in order to make the next step in the integrations?

A:  This is a question for the EU, not for me.  But my understanding is that the EU wants to see normalization of relations with Kosovo, including a settlement of the main issues in the north, before it starts accession negotiations.

Q:  Is Serbia going to face with the new conditions regarding Kosovo in the coming months?

A:  Yes, in coming months and years.  Kosovo will be an issue in many of the 35 chapters of the negotiations, unless there is a comprehensive solution early in the process.

Q:  How do you comment on the platform and Kosovo resolution, adopted by the Government and the Parliament? Will this document contribute to the solution of the Kosovo issue or contrary?

A:  I don’t believe the platform is a step forward:  it reiterates Serbia’s claim to sovereignty over all of Kosovo while proposing separate governance of the Albanians, who would become second class citizens inside Serbia.  They won’t accept that, and no one in Europe or the United States will ask them to do so.  But let’s see what happens in the talks between Dacic and Thaci.  That is more important than what it says in the platform.

Q:  You said that this platform is “Milosevic`s dream”. Could you, please, explain that?

A:  I don’t think I need to say more:  my previous answer explains fully. Milosevic would have been delighted with sovereignty over all of Kosovo and second class citizenship for Albanians.

Q:  What is, in your opinion, the most disputing in the platform for the international community and Kosovo Albanians?

A:  For the moment, northern Kosovo is the big issue, but in the future it will be something else:  protection of monasteries and religious sites, military forces or who can go where for Christmas.  Underlying all the issues are questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity.  When you reach agreement with Pristina on those issues, the story will be over.

Q:  Serbia is required to withdraw from the institutions in northern Kosovo, and our government has consistently refused this request as inadmissible. Will the proposal for broad autonomy of the Serbian community in Kosovo be acceptable to the West and Pristina?

A:  I see no problem if Serbia will accept the autonomy provided for in the Ahtisaari plan.  That is already accepted in Pristina, Washington and Brussels, all of which will be prepared to see additional agreements reached to implement the Ahtisaari arrangements.

Q:  What do you expect to happen in the next few months in the Balkan region and can we expect new instabilities and conflicts?

A:  Troublemakers can always make trouble.  But I hope to see the leaderships in Belgrade and Pristina make a real effort to come to terms with each other, for mutual benefit. I see some indication that Prime Ministers Dacic and Thaci are headed in the direction of a comprehensive resolution of issues. That would be a good thing.

 

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