- Leverage the US government’s close relationship with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi of Yemen to strongly encourage his government meet the reform benchmarks to which he has committed and address human rights violations
- Support the National Dialogue in ways that empower independent voices—not only political party elites—and include more extensive outreach to Southerners and Yemenis outside of Sanaa and other urban areas
- Work within the Friends of Yemen group to ensure that the generous pledges committed to Yemen are delivered and that the government of Yemen has the capacity and resources it needs to implement projects
- Implement a more robust public diplomacy strategy to demonstrate that US interests in Yemen are not limited to counterterrorism and security issues
- Reevaluate reliance on drone strikes with the recognition that this approach generates significant anti-American sentiment and could strengthen the appeal of extremist groups
- Ensure that security restructuring achieves a unified command structure under civilian leadership and that US military assistance does not perpetuate the same mistakes made during former President Saleh’s tenure
- Increase economic assistance and draw upon regional funds to support Yemen, in addition to a bilateral assistance package
There are other ideas out there worthy of consideration. The well-meaning letter I signed does not provide a clear strategy for dealing with Al Qaeda, which is a serious threat to both Yemeni and American interests. Daniel Green over at the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs advocates a tribal-based approach to countering Al Qaeda, generated in the upcoming National Dialogue:
- A comprehensive political and security strategy to pacify al-Qaeda safe havens. Due to the centralization of the Yemeni state, local political authority has often been limited, creating a democracy deficit and prompting excluded tribes to use violence to achieve their goals. The United States should encourage participants in the National Dialogue Conference to discuss greater local political autonomy and authority within a more democratic framework.
- Efforts to legitimize tribal Popular Committees. Pacifying AQAP havens will require the assistance of tribal “Popular Committee” units, not just Yemeni army and police forces. As has been demonstrated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and even Yemen itself, a part-time tribal security force that is defensively oriented but recruited, trained, paid, and logistically supported by the state is central for enduring security. Tribes will support such an effort because it can provide security, employment, and a means of checking any abuses of power by expanding government forces. Washington should encourage Sana to legitimize these local units.
- Full accounting of al-Qaeda abuses. A great deal of emphasis has been placed on documenting abuses that Saleh’s forces perpetrated against protestors in 2011-2012. A similar effort must be undertaken to document al-Qaeda’s abuses, and to investigate whether security organizations colluded with the group when it expanded its presence in Yemen in 2011. The United States should encourage a full accounting on both fronts, including responsible prosecution of any security personnel who helped al-Qaeda.
- Working group of tribal and security leaders. Washington should urge conference participants to establish a working group of tribal, political, and security leaders from the areas most affected by al-Qaeda. This forum would help them share lessons learned in confronting the group, present a united reform agenda to the wider conference, and promote improved cooperation on shared goals after the conference.
While I might have some reservations about part-time tribal forces and their behavior, these recommendations have the virtue of dealing directly with the security issue.
These quite different approaches to Yemen have in common a sense that the drone war there is not working and may even be counter-productive. Former Yemen White House guru John Brennan, who has just become CIA Director, has long claimed that was not our strategy. Show me.