The referendum gambit

Serbian President Nikolic and his “progressive” party compatriot Deputy Prime Minister Vucic have been suggesting that a referendum might be called on the first Pristina/Belgrade “normalization” agreement.  It would be held in northern Kosovo as well as Serbia proper only on condition that everyone, including northern Kosovo Serbs, promise to comply with whatever the result will be.  It is not clear to me whether the Serbs living south of the Ibar in Kosovo would be able to vote.

The European Union and the United States do not want this to happen.  The Serbian (and Kosovo) parliaments have already voted to approve the agreement.   Adding another step to the process would not be welcome in Brussels and Washington, which want to pocket success and move on to implementation.

A referendum would certainly be a gamble.  If the agreement were disapproved, the consequences for Serbia would be serious:  an indefinite delay in getting a date to start negotiations on EU accession, including a delay in the financing that comes with the date decision.  Disapproval would essentially lock Serbia into pursuing partition, making Belgrade non grata with the EU and the US.

If, however, the agreement were approved, that would presumably end resistance to implementation.  It might even be the end of Serbia’s quixotic claim to sovereignty over Kosovo, since the agreement is clear about Kosovo’s territorial integrity and implies its sovereignty.

Vucic is betting that a referendum would approve the agreement and the northerners will therefore back off.  He has threatened to resign if the agreement is not approved.  Despite terrible socioeconomic conditions, he figures that most of Serbia is pleased with this government and in particular with him, as the leader of a popular anti-corruption campaign.  Vucic has given the northerners until Tuesday to accept the agreement, or face a referendum 15 days later.  That doesn’t sound practical to me, but maybe the election machinery in Serbia is better oiled than I imagine.

Polling suggests 50-60% of Serbia supports the agreement, but those who oppose it are much more committed than those who are favorable and far more likely to go to the polls.   A simple up or down referendum to approve the agreement could lose.  A referendum on disapproving it might have a better chance (of failure), in particular if a “double majority” is required.

This was the requirement for Serbia’s 2006 constitutional referendum:  50% had to approve, and 50% of registered voters had to vote.  There is no way the second requirement can be met if the Kosovo Albanian voters on the register are counted.  They were not for the 2006 referendum, but the constitution was adopted anyway.  I’ll be glad to hear from someone who knows whether the “double majority” requirement is permanent or only used for the constitutional referendum.

If the northerners call Vucic’s bluff, how the referendum question is formulated and the requirements for it to pass are going to be decisive.  But I wouldn’t yet bet on a referendum being called.

PS:  Milan Marinkovic provided some of the material in this post, but the views here are not necessarily his.  They are mine.