Too broad is too narrow

Some of my most respected colleagues (read Fred Hof) are exorcised beyond reason by President Obama’s two week delay in going to war to punish and deter Syrian chemical weapons use. They are conveniently forgetting a lot of history.

Let’s leave aside FDR’s more than two-year delayed entry into World War II, after Germany had conquered a large part of Europe and only in response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. There is also Bill Clinton, now regarded as a great success because of the Dayton agreements. He delayed 3.5 years after promising he would intervene in Bosnia and only did it once Senator Dole, his re-election opponent, started making political hay on the broken promise. The march to war in Kosovo was a circuitous one, marked by spineless and failed diplomatic initiatives and the undying hope of bringing the Russians on board, who eventually did give us a wink and a nod.

Famously, George W. Bush rushed to war, first in Afghanistan with good early results (but not the same longer-term outcome) and then in Iraq, with well-known and less than satisfactory consequences.

There is nothing unusual, or inherently bad, with delay in going to war. The delays are often forgotten.  The results are always remembered.

The real question is what use the Administration makes of the time it has given itself.  So far it has chosen to focus on a narrow goal:  deter, disrupt, prevent and degrade the ability to use chemical weapons.  But it proposes a wide military mandate, unlimited in time and even permitting boots on the ground.

Here I agree with Fred: a broader strategy is in order.  A broader strategy starts with broader goals.  Use of chemical weapons is not the only US interest in Syria.  We also have an interest in regional stability, which is at risk if the war goes on much longer.  The outflux of Syrian refugees threatens the stability of Lebanon, now the unfortunate recipient of more refugees per capita than any other country in the world, Jordan, Iraq and possibly Turkey.  And we need to ensure that the war does not end with Syria providing help and haven either to Al Qaeda or their Shia analogues like Hizbollah.  None of these goals are achievable with Bashar al Asad in power.

Getting him out will require diplomatic as well as military means, including tighter sanctions, support for the democratic opposition, closer coordination with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and negotiations with Russia and Iran.  Military means, which are a blunt and potentially counterproductive instrument, may nevertheless also be useful, if they tilt the battlefield back in the direction of the opposition.  The Congress can make a real contribution:  by insisting on pursuit of an early political solution, using the full spectrum of instruments of American power to achieve US interests going beyond the goals associated with chemical weapons.

The military mandate the Administration has proposed may be too broad, but its goals, and the means needed to achieve them, are too narrow.