Day: September 9, 2014
War, politics and law
The seven week conflict between Hamas and Israel, dubbed Operation Protective Edge by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), began in early July and reached a ceasefire in late August. It left over 2,000 Palestinians and 70 Israelis dead. While the media fervently covered the battle, the international community stood relatively silently on the sidelines. Hamas and Israel remain distrustful of each other. The bill for reconstruction will amount to $8 billion. The implications of the conflict have had far reaching consequences for Israeli and Palestinian domestic politics as well as their human rights records.
At Friday’s Middle East Institute panel on the way forward, Mathew Duss, President of the Foundation for Middle East Peace moderated the discussion with Khalid Elgindy, a Fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Michael Koplow, Program Director at the Israel Institute, and Joe Stork, the Deputy Director at Human Rights Watch in the Middle East and North Africa Division.
Discussing the impact of the conflict on Palestinian domestic politics, Elgindy said that Hamas’ popularity was dwindling before the conflict. The group gained “new-found popularity” with Palestinians both in Gaza and the West Bank during the conflict. Hamas’ popularity came largely at the expense of support and confidence in the Palestinian Authority, whose President Abbas was already perceived as ineffective in peace negotiations with Israel and over-reliant on US-led peace negotiations. The Palestinian national movement is in “crisis” with “chronic dysfunction” in Palestinian political parties, Elgindy said. The priority needs to be cooperation between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.
Koplow described the political atmosphere in the Israeli government pre- and post-conflict. Before the incursion into Gaza, the political dynamic was “relatively stable,” with Prime Minister Netanyahu “firmly in control” and the left largely disorganized. Netanyahu commanded almost unconditional support from the public, which was then challenged by the kidnapping and killing of 3 Israeli teens in June 2014. During the war, support for “staying the course” dwindled from over 80% to 30%. Following the ceasefire, the far right has garnered support as the Prime Minister faced pressure from his own party to reoccupy Gaza. Instead, Netanyahu announced plans to expand settlements in the West Bank in order to appease not only those in his own party but also those farther right.
Although Human Rights Watch has been unable to confirm its impressions due to Israel and Egypt blocking access, Stork sketched Israel’s and Hamas’ compliance, or lack thereof, with the laws of war. The 2014 operation in Gaza showed patterns of indiscriminate hostilities that date back to 2009. One of the most pressing issues is whether or not the parties distinguished between combatants and civilians. What constitutes a legitimate target has become subjective. Human Rights Watch does not define “terrorist operatives” as those who belong to a particular political party while Israeli law does. The IDF has also been cited in a number of cases for using force in areas where there were no military combatants. Rockets fired from the Palestinian side are categorized as war crimes because the targets are indiscriminate, failing to distinguish between civilians and combatants.
In the end, Duss posed a difficult but crucial question, “how can we avoid getting here again?” As both sides continue to dig in their heels, it becomes increasingly difficult to reach a compromise on the critical issues that must be reconciled before there is lasting peace.
PS: Here is the C-span video of the event.
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Deck chairs on the Titanic, or…
Iraq’s new Prime Minister Haider al Abadi got most of his cabinet through parliament yesterday. The Americans are celebrating. Abadi’s government has enough Kurds and Sunnis in it to be pronounced “inclusive” and worthy of support in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL):
But the clouds on the horizon are all too apparent. The Kurds are in, but only if they are paid the billions they say they are owed within a week. That may be more likely than it sounds, as a Kurd is the new finance minister (Rowsch Shaways). No new Interior or Defense minister was named, so Abadi will keep those portfolios for the moment. Sound familiar? That’s what outgoing Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki did for the better part of his most recent, 4-year mandate. It was a source of major complaints about his concentration of power in the hands of the prime minister.
New faces? Not so much. Maliki, his archrival Ayad Allawi and former Parliament Speaker Osama al Nujaifi get vice-presidential positions, which are well-paid sinecures that don’t happen to exist in the constitution any longer. Former Prime Minister (that’s almost ancient history–it was 2005/6) Ibrahim al Jaafari replaces Foreign Minister Zebari, who becomes a deputy prime minister, along with Saleh Mutlaq, who was also a deputy PM to Maliki and Sadrist member of parliament Baha al Arajji. Adel Abdul Mehdi, formerly a vice president, becomes oil minister.
There may be some newer faces farther down the list, which I haven’t seen yet–but it is clear that this is no great leap in the inclusive direction. All these leading lights are part of the group that has been governing Iraq for the last decade. None have emerged recently. It is tempting to suggest that Captain Abadi has rearranged the deck chairs on the Titanic, without replacing the first mates.
It could also be wrong. Iraqis voted for these people, including Maliki. There was no way to displace them entirely. Giving a sinecure and a security detail to a former prime minister is not the dumbest thing that has been done in Iraq. It may even help to restrain Maliki from stirring the kind of trouble former prime ministers are inclined to stir. Ditto the others: they might have caused more trouble out than in.
The big question is whether this new government will be able to confront ISIL more effectively than its predecessor. That depends on two things:
- The effectiveness of the Iraqi security forces, which is unlikely to improve quickly.
- The attitude of Sunnis in ISIL-controlled areas.
It would have been nice to see a few new faces from Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al-Din provinces, which are the ones that rose against Maliki. That might have suggested a real deal to share power in the making. And it really is important that Iraq get effective Defense and Interior ministers, whose behavior will be key to both 1. and 2.
Still, it is better that Iraq get a new government in a timely way than for the process to drag on much longer. And carping about the lack of new faces won’t do much good. The question now is whether there is a real deal here to share power and mobilize Sunnis as well as Shia and Kurds against ISIL. If Iraqis join the fight in a serious way, ISIL will be sent packing back to Syria in short order. There will still be a problem, but it won’t then be Abadi’s ship at risk. It will be Bashar al Asad’s.
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