Month: August 2015
In late July, it was announced that the US would be allowed to use Incirlik airbase in Turkey to conduct airstrikes against ISIS. This move came immediately after ISIS claimed responsibility for a bombing in Suruç, Turkey that killed 33 people. It has been widely reported that the US/Turkey deal also included a provision for some sort of safe zone, or ISIS-free, zone along the Turkish-Syrian border.
US officials have denied that this zone would be a true safe zone or no-fly zone, but rather that the US and Turkey would collaborate to clear a zone from ISIS control and look to man it with moderate opposition fighters. According to Foreign Policy, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has said that the zone will not be an official no-fly zone but will have US air support. President Erdoğan has stated that the zone could allow for 1.8 million Syrian refugees to be repatriated.
News sources are generally in agreement that the zone would extend west along the Syrian border from Jarablus on the Euphrates. Some reports state that the zone will extend as far as Marea, while others state that it will extend as far as A’zaz. The depth of the zone is less certain, but reports indicate that it will be 40-50 km deep. Assuming a depth of approximately 45 km, the zone would look like this if it extends to Marea:
Here is a larger zone extending to A’zaz:
While the jury is still out, the best tally I’ve seen lately says that of 28 Jewish members of Congress 11 back the deal, 7 oppose it and 10 are undecided (or at least unannounced). This is roughly consistent with the more credible polls of Jewish popular opinion.
But it is dramatically different from the Israeli government position as well as Israeli popular opinion. Something like 70% of Israelis oppose the deal. So does the major opposition, which backs Netanyahu’s hard-line governing coalition on this issue.
Disagreements between the US and Israel have occurred many times. But I don’t remember any time at which American Jews parted ways with Israel on a major issue so dramatically. Israel is losing the American Jews.
This is a good development. I’m not with those urging unity among Jews in the US on this issue, or between Jews in Israel and in the US. I see no reason why people who are almost 6000 miles closer to Iran than I am and listening daily to its belligerence against their country would necessarily agree with me. Nor do I see any reason why I should agree with those in the US or Israel who not only oppose the agreement but also think the Jews have a right to all the land west of the Jordan River.
Yes, we should be civil to each other. Certainly the President was that in his meeting with Jewish community organizations Friday. Civil and terrifically disciplined in the logical and uncompromising way he argued for the agreement:
He wisely did not follow Shadi Hamid’s advice to open up the containment option or to talk about support for the agreement from pro-democracy advocates in Iran. The former would have suggested he is prepared to live with an Iranian nuclear weapon and likely caused a serious negative reaction in Congress. In any event, the containment option is a truly lousy one, since it relies on a degree of mutual confidence in an opponent being a rational actor and intercommunication that simply does not exist between Iran and Israel. The later would have painted Iranian pro-democracy advocates with an American brush, which is a really bad idea. Far better would be Shadi’s third notion: stronger pushback against the Iranian-supported regime and Hizbollah in Syria, which would garner strong support in Congress, including among opponents of the nuclear deal, as well as in Israel.
The President has, however, no chance of converting hardline opponents. Neither Republicans nor Israelis will waver. They are determined to go down fighting on this one, as they have on so many other things lately.
There is some hope however that he may have convinced a Congressman or Senator. It isn’t going to be good for any Democrat running next year to suffer a defeat and then have to rely on the President’s veto to prevent the deal from falling through. It would be far better to filibuster in the Senate, thus avoiding a vote there altogether. The Republicans are already preparing for that eventuality.
But either way, it looks as if the Republicans will lose in trying to block the President from doing what he can to lift sanctions. They and Netanyahu will then strike up a chorus in favor of vigorous enforcement of the deal’s provisions. If they do, we should all join in. Failure of Iran to live up to the agreement would be even worse than failure of the President’s efforts to prevent it from being blocked in Congress.
There are still a few weeks before the Congressional votes are completed September 17 on the Iran nuclear deal, but it looks as if President Obama will win enough votes to prevent his veto of disapproval from being overridden. He will have then hit a political grand slam: I am counting as the first three wins gay marriage, Obamacare and Trade Promotion Authority, which opens the possibility of completing negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and continuing negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.
Let’s leave aside the reopening of full diplomatic relations with Cuba, a win in the Supreme Court on housing discrimination, executive action to limit greenhouse gases that cause climate change, and half a dozen other less visible items.
The latest GDP growth number, a revised 3.7% in the second quarter, is icing on the cake.
Whether you agree or disagree with him, this has been a remarkably successful few months for the lame duck. He is on a roll.
But his approval rating is down.
The biggest reasons are apparently his handling of the Islamic State (ISIS) and Iran. The Administration clearly underestimated ISIS, which has proven far more dangerous and resilient than anticipated. It poses a serious threat to US and European interests, for the moment mainly in the Middle East and North Africa. Post-deal Iran, with its pockets full of old sanctions money and new revenue from increasing oil exports, will also pose a serious regional threat to US and European interests. Even a supporter of the deal like me should recognize that.
Syria is where those two issues combine. ISIS has thrived on the ongoing civil war there. Iran has invested enormous resources in supporting Bashar al Assad. The United States has engaged from the air against ISIS but not against Assad’s forces.
This isn’t working. It can’t, because Assad is an important part of the reason that ISIS thrives in Syria. He is pummeling the country’s civilians. Sunnis are perhaps 75% of the population. The pummeling by an Alawite-based regime is radicalizing some small portion of that community, which is all ISIS needs to fill its ranks with young fighters. Iran, which has good reason to fear ISIS, responds with ever more support for the regime, including providing it with Lebanese Hizbollah forces Tehran controls.
This escalation is bad for Syria, bad for the region, and bad for the United States and Europe, where refugees are flooding in unprecedented numbers. President Obama needs to rethink his standoffish attitude toward Syria and his single-minded focus on countering only ISIS there. He has good reason to be concerned about what comes next in Syria if Assad falls suddenly, but there is little prospect the inevitable succession will move Syria in a positive direction from the American perspective if the US does not engage.
There are basically two ways to do so: militarily and politically. The best approach will combine the two. Washington is already talking with Turkey about creating a so-called “safe zone” along Syria’s northern border, extending from the Euphrates west for close to 70 miles. That could provide the Syrian opposition with an opportunity to govern and Syrians an opportunity to seek refuge. Widening US air strikes to respond to regime barrel-bombing of civilians or to respond to Hizbollah attacks on civilian population centers is another option.
The diplomatic effort has to focus on the transition from Bashar al Assad to a successor regime that excludes Islamic extremists like the Islamic State and Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nustra but includes a wide spectrum of Syrian political perspectives. This is critical: no one should want Syria to fall into the hands of a regime that presents the West, the Gulf, Russia and Iran with even greater problems than Bashar al Assad has done.
It makes sense for the pushback against both Iran and ISIS to come in Syria. Two birds with one stone.
Michael Makovsky, CEO of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), sent me a fund-raising letter today. As a supporter of the Iran nuclear deal, I won’t be responding with money (I’ve sent that on to J-Street, which is lobbying in favor). But I would like to examine Michael’s arguments against the deal. Obama’s deal, he says,
- Does not deprive Iran of nuclear weapons capability – as President Obama promised he would do during the last election – but legitimizes Iran as a nuclear power.
- Depends heavily upon a woefully inadequate inspections regime – indeed, Iran gets to inspect some of it’s own sites!
- Does not require Iran to close ANY of its nuclear facilities.
- Allows Iran to continue operating a significant number of centrifuges – devices essential to producing the high-grade fissionable material required to make bombs.
- Ignores Iran’s program to develop ballistic missiles that will be able to deliver nuclear warheads to the United States.
Let’s examine these assertions one by one.
- Iran has nuclear capabilities, but so far as anyone knows it has no nuclear weapons capability, unless you regard being able to enrich uranium as conferring it. But that would mean non-nuclear weapons countries like Australia, Brazil, Argentina, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Spain also have nuclear weapons capability. There is no international prohibition on enriching uranium. Nor do I know of any way to get a country to unlearn uranium enrichment. JINSA might prefer that Iran not do it, but wishing won’t make it so. Nor will rejecting the agreement.
- The international inspections regime Iran has accepted in the nuclear deal is the most intrusive ever imposed on any state. The claim that Iran will inspect its own sites is based on a leaked, draft document whose authenticity the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has denied. No state has ever developed nuclear weapons with materials monitored by the IAEA. It isn’t likely under an unprecedented, full fuel cycle inspection regime like the one Iran has accepted.
- Closure of nuclear facilities is not required, but the number of centrifuges Iran is allowed is cut by two-thirds, its stockpile of enriched uranium by even more and its heavy water reactor will be completely redesigned to produce less plutonium.
- A lot of things are essential to producing fissionable material, but under the agreement no high-grade fissionable material is allowed. Nor is the uranium and plutonium metallurgy required to make nuclear weapons. That prohibition is permanent.
- That’s right: an agreement on the nuclear weapons program does not directly address the missile program, though sanctions against selling missiles or missile technology to Iran will continue for five to eight years. Had we introduced missiles into the negotiation, we would likely have gotten less on nuclear technology. Is that what JINSA would have preferred?
What people don’t say is often as important as what they do. Michael’s letter claims the deal is “a threat to Israel and a threat to America.” But he fails to argue how either Israel or America would be better off without the deal. He offers no alternative at all.
But the consequences of rejecting the deal are clear enough. Either Iran will
a) likewise reject the deal, continue to accumulate centrifuges and highly enriched uranium, and complete a plutonium-producing reactor, as they did for the ten years before the P5+1 opened the negotiation with Tehran, or
b) uphold its end of the bargain in exchange for European, Chinese and Russian lifting of sanctions, thus reducing American leverage and gaining resources for more trouble-making in the region, just as they will with the nuclear deal.
Yes, the US could try to impose “secondary” sanctions on the Europeans, Chinese and Russians who do business with Iran, but that will not be 100% effective and will not improve relations with countries whose cooperation we need on other issues (Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya–just to name a few).
Note that Iran, not the US, will determine which option is taken. That alone should make the advocates of a strong America hesitate about rejection of the deal.
Democratic members of both houses of Congress, who are JINSA’s principal lobbying objective, appear to be rejecting Makovsky’s arguments, including a majority of the Jewish members. The Administration is on track to gain enough votes to uphold the President’s veto of a legislative attempt to block implementation of the deal. The straw men won’t stand.
I’m not often an enthusiast for videos, but this one seems to me to do a good job on the complicated relations of Iran and the US in the Iraq context. It is important to keep in mind, however, that in Syria the US and Iran come out more definitively on different sides (Iran with Bashar al Assad and the US at least nominally against), even though they both seek to defeat the Islamic State.
People were asking me what I think almost before the ink was dry on the five pages agreed yesterday between Belgrade and Pristina on the general principles/main elements of the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo. The answer is: it all depends.
It depends on your frame of reference:
- If you want to know whether it is consistent with the Ahtisaari plan and previous agreements between Pristina and Belgrade, that is one frame of reference. It looks to me as if it is.
- If you want to know whether the general principles will ensure the Association/Community is formed consistent with Kosovo law, that is another frame of reference. It looks to me as if it will be.
- If you want to know whether it is consistent with practices in other situations where a minority in one country looks to a neighboring “mother” country for support, that is still another frame of reference. I think you likely can find precedents elsewhere.
- If you want to know whether allowing Belgrade to assist in providing education, healthcare and urban planning to Serbs in Kosovo is wise, that is another frame of reference. It at least might lower burdens on the government in Pristina that it would find difficult to carry.
But if you ask me whether it looks like a good idea that Kosovars will have no reason to regret, I confess to doubts. Those doubts originate with the Ahtisaari plan, not with this latest iteration of its most dubious provisions. Kosovo’s negotiators have done well to make it clear the Association/Community will be formed in accordance with Kosovo’s constitution and laws, verified by its constitutional court. It is also clear the Association/Community is supposed mainly to exercise overview and provide services only consistent with Kosovo law. On paper it looks like an ethnically defined version of the Democratic Governors Association (DGA) in the United States. How can I object to that?
I can, because it is ethnically–not politically or geographically–defined and could become the kernel of separate Serb governing structures in Kosovo. That of course is the fear: a separate Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina has rendered that country dysfunctional. It is bringing up the rear in the regatta for European Union membership in the Balkans.
Unfortunately, Ahtisaari left the door open for that to happen in Kosovo too, specifically in article 9.1 of Annex III of his proposal:
Based upon the principles of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, municipalities shall be entitled to cooperate and form partnerships with other Kosovo municipalities to carry out functions of mutual interest, in accordance with the law.
9.1.1: Municipal responsibilities in the areas of their own and enhanced competencies may be exercised through municipal partnerships, with the exception of the exercise of fundamental municipal authorities, such as election of municipal organs and appointment of municipal officials, municipal budgeting, and the adoption of regulatory acts enforceable, on citizens in general;
9.1.2 Municipal partnerships may take all actions necessary to implement and exercise their functional cooperation through, inter alia, the establishment of a decision making body comprised of representatives appointed by the assemblies of the participating municipalities, the hiring and dismissal of administrative and advisory personnel, and decisions on funding and other operational needs of the partnership…
This notion of “partnerships” to carry out municipal functions might be perfectly sensible and workable in a normal European context. We’ve got some analogies in the US, like the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. But with due respect to the European Charter of Local Self-Government, it could be a nightmare in the Balkans.
Some colleagues have said there is not so much to worry about, because the divergent interests between large and small municipalities, and between those north and south of Ibar, will limit what the Community/Association is able to do. That could be correct, provided the municipalities are driven by their own interests.
But if Belgrade cracks the whip and insists that the Serb municipalities obey its lead–which the flow of its resources may be able to ensure–that argument could be moot. Combined with the disciplined clout of Serb members of the Kosovo parliament, the Community/Association could become a real hindrance to Kosovo’s further institutional development. It will almost certainly become a source of contention within the Albanian community, parts of which will see perfidy even if there isn’t any.
Might Belgrade recognize that a functional Kosovo state is in its interests and a dysfunctional one is not? After all, a weak or collapsed state in Kosovo could create real problems on Serbia’s southern border. I think that is true, but I wouldn’t want to bet on Serbian democracy to come to that conclusion easily. It has been a long time since Belgrade cared much about governance of the Albanians in Kosovo. America isn’t the only democracy that tries all the bad options before doing the right thing.
Do I think the other things agreed yesterday outweigh the risks associated with the Community/Association? No, I don’t. I wouldn’t surrender my kingdom these days for either a horse or an international dialing code, though I might trade a dialing code for allowing a Serbian telecomm provider to operate.
But really the Pristina government had no choice: it was obligated to implement the Ahtisaari plan. Too bad that plan wasn’t better articulated on this issue.