My SAIS colleagues Aylin Unver Noi and Sasha Toperich launched the Center for Transatlantic Relations’ Challenges of Democracy in the European Union and its Neighbors yesterday. Here are the remarks I prepared on my chapter, which deals with Serbia, where I’ll visit next week (after a stop in Montenegro):
Let me give you the bottom line up front: I think Serbia is headed in what I consider the right direction. Ten years from now, I expect Serbia to be a far more prosperous, established democracy ready for EU membership and clearly aligned with the West, even if not a NATO member. I also think it will have taken major steps in the direction of normalizing relations with Kosovo.
That may shock some of you. Right now, Serbia is still struggling to complete its April 24 early parliamentary election, with repeat voting at 15 polling stations and still no clarity about the overall result.
It is clear however that nationalist, Russophile forces have done relatively well, while Western-oriented liberal democrats did poorly, not least because they are fragmented. Some harbor suspicions that the government is manipulating the results. Many would say the election was free but not fair, with the incumbents using their privileged position to gain unfair advantage.
Even apart from the election it is easy enough to find well-founded criticism of Serbia’s still largely unreformed security services, government influence on its media and lack of independence and effectiveness of its court system. These are all serious long-term problems.
But I would be far more worried if there were no criticism.
It seems to me Serbia is struggling with what I would regard as the difficult middle period of its democratic transition.
The initial period from the defeat of Milosevic to the end of President Tadic’s second term was a slow, and slowing, march toward the West.
Prime Minister Vucic in the past couple of years accomplished a great deal, settling at least some issues with Kosovo, accelerating the opening of accession negotiations with the EU and signing a partnership agreement with NATO.
But at the same time he faces a serious challenge on his nationalist right, including from President Nikolic and other anti-Western politicians determined to find in Moscow a counterbalance to the EU and NATO.
The question we need to answer is what to do to keep Serbia moving in the right direction and prevent a relapse. Let me offer some ideas.
The EU accession process is vital to curing what ails Serbia’s security services, its media and its judicial system.
Beyond that, infrastructure and interconnectedness is important. Serbia is highly dependent on Russian gas and energy technology. With the cancellation of South Stream, there are lots of long-term options out there. Serbia’s road network needs better connections to the Mediterranean, both through Montenegro and through Kosovo and Albania.
Regional issues are also important. Serbia needs to demarcate its boundary/border with Kosovo and establish a flexible regime for residents who need to cross it frequently. It also needs to fully implement the many technical agreements with Kosovo as well as make a clear break with Milorad Dodik’s ambitions of holding a referendum in Republika Srpska.
Also important are improved and enhanced relations with NATO and American forces. That should come now from deployment, in a natural disaster area if not in a war zone, likely with the Ohio National Guard.
It’s not clear that the door to the EU will be open when Serbia is ready to enter. The euro and migration crises, as well as Europe’s own turn to nativism, are all to evident.
Serbia’s last challenge in transition will be convincing the 28 member states to ratify the accession treaty. That will not be the easiest of the tasks ahead, but it will be the most satisfying if it can be accomplished successfully, sometime after 2020 but I hope before 2025.