Calms before the Balkan storms

In both Bosnia and Serbia, storms are brewing at the presidential level. The outcomes are uncertain. But neither Serbian President Vucic nor Republika Srpska (RS) President Dodik can be sure of holding on to their rickety presidencies.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the issue is a judicial one. A Sarajevo court has convicted the President of the Serb-controlled 49% of the country of defying orders of the international community High Representative. He is responsible for implementation of the Dayton accords that ended the Bosnia war in 1995. Dodik’s lawyers are appealing, but a decision is expected by the end of summer. He has three options, assuming failure of the appeal:

1. Stay in the country and defy the court.
2. Leave the country for haven in Dodik-friendly Serbia, Hungary, or Russia.
3. Surrender to the authorities.

If he stays, the Sarajevo authorities will eventually attempt an arrest, with consequent physical risks to Dodik and others. If he leaves, his brand of ethnic nationalist defiance will fall into discredit, at least for a while. The main opposition in RS is not defending him. If Dodik surrenders to the authorities, he will become a martyr to his cause. His jail time is only a year, but he would be barred from public office for six years.

I’d bet on his leaving. Dodik is no hero or martyr. Serbia won’t want him, as that would further complicate its relations with the US and the EU. Hungary might take him, as it did a former North Macedonian Prime Minister. But I imagine him most appropriately joining Syrian President Assad in some presumed Moscow suburb. Dodik is not a killer like Assad, but he is an autocrat and merits an autocrat’s fate.

Serbia

In Belgrade, the issue is a political one, albeit rooted in the failure of the state’s prosecutors to do their jobs properly. Massive demonstrations protesting against an increasingly autocratic President Vucic. The demonstrators hold him responsible not just for an incident that killed 16 people, but also for a corrupt system of governance that ignores the rule of law. For full documentation, see this report of an ad hoc, nongovernmental group.

The demonstrations have weakened Vucic, but there is no alternative in sight. He has held on for months, sacrificing a prime minister but still keeping his own position. In power as Deputy Prime Minister, Prime Minister, and President since 2012, Vucic has survived several previous rounds of popular protest, relying in part on Russian help against “color revolution.” He sacrifices a minister or two and eventually calls early elections, which he uses patronage and ballot stuffing to win.

This time could be different. The EU and US appear less inclined now than previously to regard Vucic as better than any conceivable alternative. The Trump Administration, which I had assumed would support him if only to protect the Trump family building plans in Belgrade, has said little. The EU is also reluctant to back him. Vucic’s support for Dodik in Bosnia may be one reason, and his solicitude towards Russia another. In both Brussels and Washington, officials seem to have awakened to what Balkan experts have been saying for some time: Vucic is irremediable.

What’s next?

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the judicial decision on Dodik’s appeal will be the next predictable action-forcing event. In Serbia, the students have started to call for early elections, which otherwise wouldn’t be due until 2027. The key questions there will be whether the political opposition can united against Vucic and mobilize even broader support than the protests. And whether the election will be truly free and fair.

Democracy and rule of law in both Bosnia and Serbia are in the balance. The US and EU should be preparing to do their utmost to ensure they gain.