Vice President Vance has confirmed that Iran still has its significant stockpile of 60%-enriched uranium. But he also asserted that Tehran no longer has the capacity to enrich. That is dubious. Tehran has no doubt squirreled away some of its more advanced centrifuges as well. We don’t know their number. The breakout time will be much greater if there are only a hundred rather than a thousand or ten thousand.
It is only reasonable to assume that the dash for nuclear weapons Ken Pollack feared is now a reality. The sterling military prowess displayed in the US attack on Iran has amplified, not diminished, Iran’s incentive to go nuclear. That is true even if the attack has reduced Iran’s means.
Options
The military option is not exhausted. If the Americans or Israelis can find the enriched uranium and the remaining centrifuges, their destruction will be a priority. The Israelis will no doubt try. Their intelligence has been superb. The Americans will help, if need be.
If the enriched uranium and centrifuges can’t be found, or aren’t found soon, regime change becomes the de facto objective. The Israelis will continue pummeling Iran in hopes of producing a change at the top. They may even kill the Supreme Leader. The problem with this approach is uncertainty that any successor regime will abandon the nuclear program. The only well-organized forces in Iran capable of taking over seem more inclined to continue it. That is certainly the case for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The diplomatic option was open before the US attack. It is now more difficult. The Iranians already had good reason to distrust President Trump. Now they view him as having misled them twice. First he used the scheduled sixth round of talks as a cover for Israel’s initial attack. And then he said he would postpone a decision for two weeks, during which the US attacked Iran. Not to mention his withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.
Difficult conditions
The conditions are daunting, even apart from the lack of trust. The Israelis have killed the Iranian chief negotiator as well as many IRGC and military leaders. The Supreme Leader is in hiding and avoiding any electronic communications. All his remaining lieutenants will be doing likewise. Unreliable and slow communications are not good for diplomacy.
The Supreme Leader’s logic and vitality are dubious (see the video above). But somehow the Iranians warned the Americans and Qataris about today’s attack on the US base in Qatar. Was that done on orders from the Supreme Leader, or by an Iranian officer trying to gain some credit with the enemy? However that may be, it was a piddling effort that fizzled. It may signal that the Iranians are ready for de-escalation.
For the Iranians, it’s about regime preservation
The Supreme Leader’s first concern is regime preservation. The obvious means at this point is a nuclear weapon. We don’t really know how far the Iranians have already gone in that direction. It would be prudent to assume they have at least thought about weapon design and integration with a delivery missile.
But how would Iran use a nuclear weapon? It can’t bomb Jerusalem with a nuclear weapon, as it is the third holiest place in Islam. Mohammed rose to heaven from the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif during the Night Journey. The Iranians could bomb Tel Aviv, but even there they would kill a lot of Muslims. And any perceived effort to ready a nuclear weapon for launch would prompt the Israelis to attack first. If nevertheless Iran managed a surprise attack, the Israelis could still launch massive retaliation in kind from their submarines.
The only real use of a nuclear weapon to Iran comes from not using it. Then it might be wielded for regime preservation, as North Korea has done. I’m not sure that will work with the Israelis, but the North Koreans have made it work with the Americans.
For the Israelis, it’s about regime change
The Israelis understand that Iran can’t actually use a nuclear weapon, but they don’t want to share power in the region with a nuclear Iran. They have fought their way through Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. That would have been far more perilous if Iran had been threatening to back them up with nukes.
Prime Minister Netanyahu wants regime change. He isn’t going to trust the Iranians after three decades of personal and institutional enmity. Nor will he want this war to end in an agreement like the Iran nuclear deal he opposed when it was signed and convinced President Trump to ditch. Netanyahu is looking for the unconditional surrender President Trump demanded, likely at Netanyahu’s behest. That would make him a big hero in Israel.
What about the Americans?
Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, aka @ArmsControlWonk concludes that the real objective is regime change also for the Americans. He comes to this conclusion from a careful examination of the bombing targets:
Why am I so unimpressed by these strikes? Israel and the US have failed to target significant elements of Iran’s nuclear materials and production infrastructure. RISING LION and MIDNIGHT HAMMER are tactically brilliant, but may turn out to be strategic failures. 1/17
Netanyahu’s justification for conducting this strike was that “Iran has produced enough highly enriched uranium for nine atom bombs — nine.” He refers to Iran’s stockpile of ~400 kg of 60% U-235 which, if further enriched, would be enough for 9-10 weapons. Let’s consider. 2/17
The 400 kg of HEU was largely stored in underground tunnels near the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. Despite extensive Israeli and US attacks the facility, there does not seem to have been any effort to destroy these tunnels or the material that was in them. 3/17
No one even knows where the HEU is now! @rafaelmgrossi says Iran moved it. Lil’ @marcorubiosays nothing can move in Iran. But trucks are moving in Iran. Trucks and heavy equipment showed up at least two days ago to seal the tunnels to protect them. @planet took a picture. 4/17
Trucks also showed up at the Fordow FEP the day before the strike, possibly to relocate sensitive equipment, and certainly to cover those entrances with dirt. Iran just isn’t a no-drive zone at the moment. 5/17
To be fair, some Trumpkins acknowledge Iran still has the material. @JDVance says they’re going to “have conversations with the Iranians about” it. The talking point is that the US has knocked out Iran’s ability to further enrich it and convert it to metal, so its fine.
IT’S NOT FINE. Yes, the strikes on the enrichment plants at Qom (Fordow FEP) and Natanz (PFEP and FEP) appear successful. But there has been no effort to strike the enormous underground facility next to Natanz where Iran can make more centrifuges and maybe do other things. 7/17
In 2022, Iran moved a centrifuge production line to “the heart of the mountain” there. This facility is huge — we estimated 10,000 m2 or more — and we don’t really know what else it might house (like enrichment or conversion). 8/17
FYI: Iran has been digging a UGF not far from Natanz that is too big for its stated purpose. It’s also 80-100 m under a mountain. @madwonk made a model of what it *might* look like. The new centrifuge facility could be here; could be somewhere else. https://sketchfab.com/3d-models/underground-tunnels-near-natanz-2022-3e7414f8461c47ddadcce5fa04b
Also, Iran recently announced a “new enrichment facility in a secure location” and told the @iaea it was ready to start installing centrifuges. The @iaea was set to inspect the facility, near Isfahan, before the bombing. It hasn’t been bombed AFAIK. 9/17
Let me say again: Iran said it had a new enrichment facility. The @iaeaorg was about to go see it. But before that could happen, Israel struck other facilities in Iran — but not the new one. See the problem? 10/17
This means Iran has retained 400 kg of 60% HEU, the ability to manufacture centrifuges, and one, possibly two underground enrichment sites. That is also to say nothing of possible secret sites, which opponents of the JCPOA used to invoke all the freaking time. 11/17
Let’s say Iran decides to rush a bomb. Iran can install ~1.5 cascades a week. In six weeks, it could have 9 cascades of IR-6 machines. It would take those machines about 60 days to enrich all 400 kg to WGU. Altogether that’s about five months although IMMV. 12/17
Look, I get it. Watching bombers conduct an >11,000 km precision bombing raid is awesome. I am the sort of wierdo who happily read a 528 page book about the first Black Buck raid of the Falklands War in 1982. I really do get it. 13/17
But what does it say of two of the most amazing military operations in modern memory are still unable to fully eliminate Iran’s nuclear program? I think that’s proof that this is tactical brilliance may be in service of a foolhardy strategy. 14/17
RISING LION and MIDNIGHT HAMMER have not slowed the Iranian program nearly as much as the JCPOA. We hold diplomacy to much higher standards than bombing. The same people who endlessly complained about the JCPOA “sunsetting” are now happy to delay Iran’s bomb by much less. 15/17
This is why I said the strike is about regime change. As late as May, @DefenseIntel said Iran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program. When asked about that, @marcorubio said intel was “irrelevant.” It’s only irrelevant if the problem is the regime, not the program. 16/17
·We ought to judge this strike by its real purpose, not the legal camouflage of preemptive self-defense. If the strike leaves the current regime, or something very much like it, in power with a nuclear option then it will have been a strategic failure. 17/17
PS: I obviously wrote this before learning of the announced ceasefire. I stick by it. But it does look like Trump did one thing I had suggested. He made the US bombing contingent on Israel accepting a ceasefire. So far it has done that in word, but not entirely in deed.