What most American Jews think

I received this note from J Street President Jeremy Ben-Ami yesterday. It may be important to note that American Jews on the whole favor Democrats and support a two-state solution as well as the Iran nuclear deal.

Since our founding over ten years ago, J Street has battled to overturn the false “conventional wisdom” that American voters want their leaders to take a conservative, right-leaning approach to Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This old school playbook argued that candidates for president should not in any way criticize Israeli government policies, sympathize with the legitimate needs of Palestinians alongside those of Israel or talk about the need to end the occupation.

For years, our election day polling of Jewish voters has demonstrated that this way of thinking is completely out of touch with the reality in our community.

Now a new, first-of-its-kind nationwide poll that we’ve commissioned of likely Democratic primary voters across the country shows that the outdated conventional wisdom doesn’t apply to them either.

While there’s been a great deal of media hype about a major Democratic division on Israel, our poll demonstrates that there is actually a clear consensus among the large majority in support of pro-Israel, pro-peace positions and a proactive, even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Here are some of the key takeaways:

  • Democratic voters are supportive of Israel — but not its current leadership; and these two positions aren’t mutually exclusive. While Israel had a strong +25 percent favorability rating, Prime Minister Netanyahu is underwater at -27 percent. An overwhelming 81 percent believe that “someone can be critical of Israeli government policies and still be pro-Israel.”
  • They reject the false dichotomy between “pro-Israel” and “pro-Palestinian.” In addition to their positive views of Israel, voters are mostly favorable towards Palestinians as well (+13 percent). The vast majority (75 percent) said they would be most likely to vote for a candidate who supported both Israelis and Palestinians, rather than one who sided exclusively with either.
  • Voters want the US to act as a fair and impartial broker to achieve peace — and push both sides to make compromises and stop harmful actions. 74 percent said they want the US to act as a fair and impartial broker for peace negotiations. 61 percent said they were less likely to support a candidate who believes that the US “must stand behind all of [PM] Netanyahu’s policies.”
  • The Iran deal remains very popular. While the Trump administration continues to dangerously increase the prospects for a new war of choice, 72 percent of Democratic voters support the US re-entering the JCPOA nuclear agreement.
  • Most voters have never even heard of BDS — but they oppose legislation designed to penalize BDS supporters. While the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement has received a ton of media attention, only 36 percent of voters have even heard of it, and only 12 percent support. Voters are also clearly against heavy-handed attempts to pass legislation that punishes BDS supporters and infringes on free speech rights — 54 percent oppose, while just 22 percent support.

…These results are invaluable for J Street as we work to shape our national foreign policy conversation for the better and permanently bring an end to the old, outdated playbook.

We’re sending a message to 2020 hopefuls: Pro-Israel, pro-peace, diplomacy-first positions are very popular politically. Democratic voters want to see their next president embrace constructive, diplomatic solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iranian nuclear threat.

If candidates can make clear that they respect the legitimate rights and needs of both Israelis and Palestinians, that they support Israel but not Netanyahu and that they won’t give a free pass to destructive actions by leaders on either side, they can unite their party behind them and help chart a bold and effective new course for American leadership in the Middle East.

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“Maximum pressure”

Mohammed Ataie published this interview with me in the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA):

  1. Today, President Rouhani declared that the remaining signatories to the nuclear agreement–the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China and Russia –had 60 days to implement their promises to protect Iran’s oil and banking sectors from US sanctions. How do you see Rouhani’s carful statement which reiterated Tehran’s continued commitment to the JCPOA and NPT?

A: Rouhani is trying hard to avoid taking the blame for the collapse of the JCPOA and to project an image of reasonableness, in particular to Europe, Russia, and China.

2. President Rouhani said that if the Europeans fail to compensate for the unilateral American sanctions, in 60 days Iran will end the limits on the enrichment of uranium. Do you think that within this period the European signatories to the nuclear agreement would take practical steps to counter Trump administration’s unilateral sanctions?

A: I doubt there is much the Europeans can do. Their companies are not willing to buck the US sanctions, because there is so much more business for them to do in the US than in Iran.

3. The European Union has vowed to counter Trump’s renewed sanctions on Iran, including by means of a new law to shield European companies from punitive measures. Do you think that France, Germany and Britain have done enough in the past 12 months to save the agreement?

A: They’ve done what they can, but more slowly than required. It is virtually impossible to shield the European companies from punitive US measures if those companies want to do business with and in the US.Reuters has quoted French officials that the EU would impose sanctions on Iran if Tehran announces actions concerning the JCPOA.

4. How do you see this French position in the context of the EU powers’ inaction to protect Iran’s economic interests against the US unilateral sanctions?

A: The French are warning that Tehran could drive the Europeans back into the arms of the US. Iran is trying to signal moderation in its response to the sanctions, while insisting on getting the benefits promised in the deal. It is not an easy road to go down, not least because of criticism from those inside Iran who would be happy to restart the nuclear program.

5. President Trump claims that the JCPOA is not able to prevent Iran from developing a military nuclear program. Do you think that his maximum pressure policy would prevent Iran from developing a military nuclear program?

A: The maximum pressure policy is far more likely to give Iran incentives to restart the nuclear program and proceed as rapidly as possible to acquire all the technology needed for building nuclear weapons. Of course the sanctions limit the availability of financial resources to Tehran, but top priority programs will always get the resources they need. The result will be further weakening of the Iranian economy, but little impact on the nuclear and missile programs or Iran’s interventions in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Those programs will get priority, not least because the sanctions strengthen the political position of hardliners in Tehran.

I would add that the Trump Administration is begging for talks with Iran. So far, Tehran is signalling that it is unwilling unless and until the US rejoins the JCPOA. I don’t really see that happening, as Trump has boxed himself in, but some kind of secret communication is possible, and perhaps even likely.

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Bluff to talk

Claiming that it is responding to Iranian attack planning, the Trump Administration has added military threat to its “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran. The President has denied what I take to be intentional leaks of a plan to deploy more than 100,000 troops, saying that he would deploy many more if it comes to that. Another American official suggested that Trump might rain 500 cruise missile per day on Iran for an extended period. Non-essential US government personnel have been ordered out of Embassy Baghdad. A carrier battle group and B52s have been deployed to the Gulf.

So far, this is escalatory bluff. The B52s flew from Al Udeid airfield in Qatar, which is too close to Iran to serve as a wartime facility. The war craft are serving statecraft: sending a signal. The Iranians, if they are planning attacks, won’t limit their targets to Iraq. Al Udeid would get its share of incoming. Real war preparations would require removal of aircraft from Al Udeid as well as withdrawal of at least families and other non-essential embassy personnel from throughout the Gulf. Deployment of 100,000 troops is far too many if the plan is for cruise missile strikes and far too few to mount an invasion of even part of Iran, a country of more than 80 million people. It would require months of visible and extensive logistical preparation.

Nor is there any sign at home that Trump is preparing for war. He might try to ignore the requirement for Congressional approval, but you can be sure the Democrats would be making much more noise if they thought he would attempt that. The stock market would also be signaling concern. American public opinion will not favor war with Iran, which would be a much bigger enterprise than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The President was elected because he pledged to end US over-commitment in the Middle East, not expand it.

So what is all this about? Trump and Secretary of State Pompeo have made themselves clear for months: they want Tehran back at the negotiating table. The President has even offered to send his telephone number through the Swiss, who represent US interests in Tehran. National Security Adviser Bolton prefers war, but he has lost that debate on North Korea and Venezuela. He is likely to lose again.

The Iranians are reluctant to talk with the Americans, as they want the US back in the nuclear deal before agreeing to talk with the Americans again. Their internal politics require it. I spent a couple of hours yesterday on news outlets discussing the situation with Iranian thinktankers. They are unconcerned with the American military threat an recognize it as bluff.

So what will happen?

War could happen, more by accident rather than intention of the President or the Supreme Leader. Both the Iranians and the Americans have friends who might create an incident. The Iranian-backed Houthis have allegedly launched a drone attack on a Saudi pipeline. The Saudis have responded with belligerence. The attack on four oil tankers off the coast of the UAE’s Fujairah coast elicited a softer response. The Emirates have extensive trade and financial exchanges with Iran and have not identified the perpetrators. Israel could escalate its attacks on Iranian assets in Syria or elsewhere in ways that Iran might think require a response.

It is also possible the Americans and Iranians will do what they have done in the past: talk in secret. That is how the Obama Administration began its push for the nuclear deal. Tehran might prefer it that way, since otherwise it will be seen as abandoning “resistance” and giving in to the Great Satan. Such secret talks might leak, so anyone in Tehran who conducts them should anticipate being fired if they do. But if they lead to some relief from sanctions, the Supreme Leader might be prepared to run the risk.

Trump speaks loudly and carries a little stick. He is bluffing. He wants to talk.

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Confusion and distrust

The Trump Administration is in a remarkable period of serial failures. Denuclearization of North Korea is going nowhere. Displacement of Venezuelan President Maduro has stalled. The tariff contest with China is escalating. Even the President’s sudden shift to backing Libyan strongman Haftar’s assault on Tripoli seems to have fizzled.

The domestic front is no better: Trump is stonewalling the House of Representatives but must know that eventually the courts will order most of what the Democratic majority is requesting be done. Special Counsel Mueller himself will eventually testify and be asked whether his documentation of obstruction of justice by the President would have led to indictment for any other perpetrator. A dozen or so other investigations continue, both by prosecutors and the House. These will include counter-intelligence investigations, which Mueller did not pursue, with enormous potential to embarrass the President and his close advisers.

The result is utter confusion in US foreign policy. Secretary of State Pompeo today postponed a meeting with President Putin and is stopping instead in Brussels to crash a meeting the UK, Germany, and France had convened to talk about how to preserve the Iran nuclear deal. This is happening on the same day that President Trump is meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán, whose anti-democratic maneuvers have made him unwelcome in London, Berlin, and Paris.

Pompeo will be pitching hostility to Iran, based on the presumption that it is responsible for attacks on tankers over the weekend off the coast of Fujairah, one of the (United Arab) Emirates located outside the Gulf of Hormuz. Tehran has denounced the attacks, which may or may not indicate something. The perpetrators are unknown. While concerned about the attacks, the Europeans will want the US to tone down the hostility towards Iran, with which they want to maintain the nuclear deal from which the US has withdrawn.

Germany is likely to be particularly annoyed with the Americans, not least because Pompeo last week canceled at the last minute a scheduled meeting with Chancellor Merkel in order to go to Iraq, where he failed to convince Baghdad to join the sanctions against Iran. She has become the strongest defender of liberal democracy and the rules-based international order that President Trump has so noisily and carelessly abandoned, while at the same time displeasing the US Administration by continuing the Nord Stream 2 natural gas deal with Russia.

In diplomacy, holding on to your friends is important. Washington under Trump has elected not to accommodate the more powerful Europeans and Iraq but rather to support the would-be autocrats in Hungary and Poland, as well as the Brexiteers in the UK and the Greater Israel campaigners who also advocate war with Iran. All of this was completely unnecessary, since it would have been possible to pursue additional agreements with Iran on regional and other issues without exiting the nuclear deal.

The Administration has thrown away the friends it needs and acquired a few it does not. It has lost the key Europeans and has nothing whatsoever to show for it. It has gotten nowhere with Putin, despite the President’s obsequious fawning. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are both crying foul about the tanker attacks, are unreliable. They have been known to purvey fake news in the past (especially in initiating their conflict with Qatar), so might they be doing so again?

The result is monumental confusion and distrust. America’s friends are offended. Her enemies are encouraged. Elections have consequences.

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It’s all about him

Rarely has an Administration compiled a clearer record of losing than this one is doing right now:

  1. President Trump’s best friend Kim Jong-un is busily launching short-range missiles while the US holds the door open for negotiations.
  2. The push to replace Venezuelan President Maduro with Interim President Guaido has stalled after several attempts.
  3. The “maximum pressure” policy on Iran is pushing Tehran towards restarting part of its nuclear program while alienating America’s European allies.
  4. The “Deal of the Century” between Palestinians and Israelis is stillborn.
  5. The tariff war with China is escalating.

The Administration knows only one negotiating tactic: squeezing hard to cause pain, while offering economic benefits if only the adversary will give in. Other peoples’ national pride, interests, and values are not taken into account. It is just assumed that “they” are just like us and want all the same things, mainly nice hotels.

That’s not how diplomacy works. To change an adversary’s behavior, you have to consider not your own value function but theirs. Kim Jong-un doesn’t want foreign investment or economic benefits he cannot control. Maduro isn’t interested in leaving Venezuela, even if the Americans leave him an escape route to Cuba. Iran has withstood sanctions before and will do so again. The Palestinians won’t take money instead of a state. Chinese President Xi Jinping isn’t going to weaken the Communist Party’s grip on the economy to please Donald Trump.

Of course Donald Trump will never admit defeat on any of these issues. Whatever happens, he’ll announce victory, exaggerating his own prowess and role. It really doesn’t matter what the truth of the matter is. After lots of sound and fury, Trump readily settles for half a loaf or less, as he did on the “renegotiation” of the North American Free Trade Agreement. His primary concern is not getting a good deal for America but rather ensuring that he looks strong to his domestic constituency and can count on them to go to the polls. It’s not about America. It’s all about him.

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Advantage Iran

President Trump and Secretary of State Pompeo are both begging for talks with Iran and have been for months. Now they are ratcheting up the pressure by deploying a carrier battle group (which had been slated to head for the Gulf a bit later) and toughening sanctions against Iran’s oil and metals industries. Washington’s theory of the case is that more pain will bring Tehran to its senses, maybe even to its knees.

Meanwhile Iran is heading in the opposite direction. It is planning to begin a phased withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that the US left a year ago. Without the economic benefits of the deal, there is little reason for Tehran to stick with it. The harder-line voices there never liked the constraints on the nuclear program and view the US withdrawal from the agreement as an opportunity, not a disincentive. It proves the hardliners correct in their assertion that the Americans can’t be trusted and gives them momentum in seeking to restart the nuclear weapons program that the JCPOA rolled back and suspended.

Washington and Tehran are engaged in a classic turn toward what conflict management folks call their “Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Solution” (BATNAs). Each is trying to demonstrate that it has a better one. The escalation is of course dangerous, but it could eventually lead towards a mutual recognition that the situation is ripe for a negotiation. If, as both assert, neither wants to go to war, which could have catastrophic outcomes, the escalation might generate the incentive each side needs to negotiate.

It is not clear however that both sides do in fact want to avoid war. The Americans are simply unpredictable: National Security Advisor Bolton has long advocated war to end Iran’s nuclear program, but President Trump seems reluctant and in any event is unreliable. The Iranians also have a divided command structure, but in the end it will be the Supreme Leader who decides whether to go to war, likely by attacking Americans in Iraq or Syria and possibly even using terrorist sleeper cells in the US. Pompeo and other American officials have warned as much and claimed that is why they are accelerating the deployment of the carrier battle group. Quid pro quo strikes could escalate quickly.

If I had to guess, Trump will flinch before the Supreme Leader does. A new war in the Middle East isn’t what he should want to try to sell to the American people. It would disrupt a growing economy and belie the President’s many declarations of intent to leave fighting in the Middle East to others. Even a flim-flam man knows his limits. Iran is a country of 81 million people long hardened by war (with Iraq) and sanctions. While discontent is rife, the Supreme Leader can be certain that the Americans won’t invade. A carrier battle group, plus some bombers, does not an invasion make. A cruise missile strike on elements of the nuclear program would set it back but free Iran from any JCPOA constraints.

The Americans served first by withdrawing from the JCPOA and reimposing sanctions without lining up multilateral support. The Iranians are responding with their own phased drawdown from their commitments under the agreement, while trying not to drive either the Europeans or the Chinese into the arms of the Americans. Some sort of mutual accommodation could still be possible, but if this were a tennis match, the score would be “ad out.”


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