Big trouble brewing

President-elect Trump’s cabinet appointments were not moderates from the first. With the exception of Defense and Homeland Security, he has appointed people who oppose the missions of the departments they have been named to lead. Rick Perry famously couldn’t even remember that Energy was one of the departments he said as a candidate he wanted to abolish. Ryan Zinke, named to Interior, opposes the conservation that department is entrusted with.

On domestic issues, we can anticipate that Congress will present a roadblock to some of the more outrageous proposals from the new administration. Abolishing Obamacare without providing an alternative isn’t going to happen, for precisely the reason Republicans opposed it in the first place: there are a lot of people enjoying its benefits. Depriving 20 million people of health insurance is not a winning political maneuver. The Energy Department isn’t going away, if only because it makes our nuclear weapons and manages nuclear waste. I’ll bet the national parks will still be the national parks four years from now, even if they will be open to more commercial activity than today.

On foreign policy, there are fewer constraints. The beneficiaries are not so well defined and presidential powers are dominant. Trump shook the One China policy with a single phone call, precipitating bellicose rhetoric from Beijing about the South China Sea. He has named as ambassador to Israel an advocate of Jewish settlements on the West Bank who opposes the two-state solution and looks forward to moving the embassy to Jerusalem. His bromance with Putin is already shaking allied confidence in NATO. Trump is a master at upsetting apple carts with small gestures.

His nominee for Secretary of State, Exxon CEO Rex Tillerson, is not at first sight the same type. By all reports, he has been a capable, maybe even an outstanding, manager of a gigantic energy company, which under his guidance even accepted that global warming is real and caused in part by human activity. But he too has been willing to defy expectations and do business not only with Russian President Putin but also a non-sovereign state like Iraqi Kurdistan as well as with petty dictators in weak states who need Exxon to exploit their resources so they can steal the revenue and keep themselves in power. It is hard to picture Tillerson supporting democratic reforms after a career of ignoring regime abuses, as Rachel Maddow ably made clear last night in an interview with Steve Coll:

Perhaps the most important foreign policy nomination has not yet been made: the US Trade Representative is presumably the person who will need to fulfill Trump’s campaign promises by renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), withdrawing from the Trans Pacific Partnership negotiations, and ending the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). If he follows through, these moves will make Europe, Asia and Latin America doubt America’s longstanding commitment to free trade and investment, present the Chinese and Russians with opportunities to fill giant gaps, and undermine the World Trade Organization.

That however is not my biggest concern. Trump is an ethnic nationalist with an extreme ethnic nationalist, Steve Bannon, as his chief strategist. They will be sympathetic to ethnic nationalist reasoning, which is what Russian President Putin is offering as an explanation for his aggression in Crimea, Donbas, Transnistria, South Ossetia, and  Abkhazia. “Just trying to protect ethnic Russians,” Putin says. How many of these places will Trump be willing to concede to Russia in order to consummate his bromance with Putin? The Trump administration may also be more sympathetic than Obama has been to Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence ambitions, setting off a series of partitions in the Middle East (Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, even Turkey and Iran are potential candidates).

Four years is a long time. I don’t think it will be more than a month before some of Trump’s international moves brew the United States big trouble.

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The still growing Sunni-Shia divide

The Atlantic Council yesterday introduced a book by a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center, Geneive Abdo, titled A New Sectarianism: The Arab Spring and the Rebirth of the Sunni-Shia Divide. Abdo was interviewed by Joyce Karam, Washington Bureau Chief of the Al-Hayat newspaper, and the conversation was broadcast on CSPAN.

Abdo‘s book focuses on the aftermath of the Arab Spring and how the divide between Sunni and Shia factions has widened since 2011. She specifically studied Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The divides undermine already unstable states and may lead to more conflict in the future.

Abdo explained that while many of the revolutionaries of 2011 were optimistic that all the various factions would come together to build a better government—particularly in Egypt—in reality, every faction wanted dominance more than peace. Radical factions took advantage of the chaos to take power and left more moderate factions behind. The competition for dominance over religious messaging is still increasing.

The Sunni-Shia divide has increased as Saudi Arabia and Iran have tried to co-opt the respective Sunni and Shia causes throughout the region. This rivalry between Saudi and Iran comes at the expense of the majority of Sunnis and Shias in the region, who identify more with their own unique brand of Shiism or Sunnism rather than the Iranian or Saudi brand. For example, many Arab Shias feel that Iran controls the Shia who dominate the Iraqi government, which therefore does not represent the Iraq’s interests. The divide between Sunnis and Shias is further exacerbated by intra-Shia and intra-Sunni conflicts throughout the Arab world.

Abdo considers Saudi and Iranian meddling in regional affairs highly detrimental to the pursuit of peace in the Middle East. For example, the Arab Spring in Bahrain was initially a joint Shia-Sunni effort against the government. However, once Saudi Arabia intervened, the conflict became Sunni Bahranis and Saudis versus Shia Bahranis. As a result, Shia Bahranis are virtually silenced in public discourse, to the detriment of the country.

Despite the general animosity between Sunnis and Shias in the region, many governments have avoided uprisings by warning their people that their country could become like Syria. In Morocco, Abdo met individuals who were unhappy with their government, but do not dare protest for fear that Morocco could become the next Syria. Even the Syrian government has been using this tactic. Bashar Al-Assad has often reminded Syrians that as bad as his rule is, it’s better than ISIS rule—if Assad were to leave, the alternative could be much worse.

Too often, according to Abdo, Washington analysts overlook radical tweets and Facebook posts because they are in Arabic or because they are not considered to be reliable. However, radical anti-Sunni or anti-Shia tweets are widely disseminated and significantly contribute to sectarian hatred. The anonymity of social media allows information and ideas to spread without the burden of individual responsibility.

Though Abdo was hesitant to speculate on how a Trump administration would affect the Sunni-Shia divide, she expects Trump to be much tougher on Iranian interventions than Obama was. But his hyper-focus on countering violent extremism will not leave much room for paying attention to sectarian reconciliation in the region.

When asked if she sees any room for Saudi-Iranian reconciliation, Abdo said that a real peace between these two countries is unlikely. Both Saudi and Iran benefit from the regional rivalry, so it is unlikely that either country will take any steps towards rapprochement. Additionally, there is little that the US can do to encourage these regional rivals to reconcile—the best that we can do is work with them and around them.

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You get what you vote for

Washington is in a tizzy today because President-elect Trump is naming Exxon Chief Executive Rex Tillerson to be Secretary of State. Former Secretary of State Baker and former Defense Secretary Gates are reputed to be among his advocates. He has a good reputation at Exxon, where he spearheaded negotiations with Russia and resisted sanctions imposed on Moscow after its annexation of Crimea and invasion of southeast Ukraine (Donbas). Much is being made of his supposedly good personal relationship with President Putin, which was presumably a prerequisite of the multi-billion dollar business Tillerson did with state-controlled companies in Russia.

The whining from the Republican side of aisle is loud: Senator McCain and others regard Putin as a butcher because of what he has done in Syria, Ukraine and elsewhere. Democrats are no less exercised. The Russians are currently bombing civilians in Aleppo to smithereens. They have also failed to implement the Minsk 2 agreement in Ukraine, which would require a ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons, as well as eventual reintegration of the region into Ukraine.

Dramatic as the situations in Syria and Ukraine are, the alleged Russian intervention in the US election is overshadowing them for the moment. President-elect Trump not only refuses to take his daily intelligence briefing but also doubts the CIA’s reported conclusion that Moscow’s cyberhacking was intended to get him elected.

Throwing Tillerson into this maelstrom is precisely the kind of provocative and daring move that Trump is famous for and promised during the electoral campaign. While unpredictable on many issues, Trump is absolutely consistent on Russia: no matter what Moscow is doing at home and abroad, the President-elect wants to befriend Putin and make him, if not an ally, at least a partner in key issue around the globe. The irony of course is that this is precisely what Hillary Clinton attempted as Secretary of State. Her reset with Moscow failed.

Trump and Tillerson seem far more willing to meet Putin three-quarters of the way. Trump has indicated he is prepared unilaterally to abandon support for the Syrian opposition, which President Obama has kept at lukewarm even as the Russians and Iranians up the ante by intervening directly on behalf of Bashar al Assad. My guess is Trump would also be willing to accept Russian annexation of Crimea. He hasn’t really said anything on that subject, except to claim it wouldn’t have been permitted on his watch. But the Russian ethnonationalist claim to Crimea will resonate with the Steve Bannon faction surrounding Trump.

The arguments against surrendering Crimea to Russia are based on international norms that Trump has shown little or no interest in. Tillerson won’t be much interested either. Unlike General Mattis, who as Defense Secretary can be expected to put the brakes on Trump’s worst instincts, Tillerson at State will more likely press Trump to meet the expectations his campaign created for closer relations with Putin’s Russia, including dropping sanctions.

The implications are vast. The NATO allies already doubt that Trump will fulfill America’s obligations. Acceptance of the annexation of Crimea would pull the rug out from under the Article 5 collective defense guarantee, even though it does not of course apply to Ukraine. Unraveling NATO will lead quickly and inexorably to a world in which the norm against taking territory by force is trashed.

Americans may not have realized it, but this is what they voted for. Tillerson may have been a fine Exxon CEO, but his confirmation hearings should do a deep dive into his views on Crimea, Donbas, Syria, and Putin.

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Peace Picks December 12-16

  1. US Security Assistance and Human Rights | Monday, December 12 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Brookings Institution | Click HERE to Register  Understanding the linkage between U.S. security policy and human rights policy is a complex and difficult challenge, but critical to ensuring that U.S. national interests in promoting stability and peace are properly served. While protection of human rights is integrated in U.S. security policy through such mechanisms as the Leahy Law and international military education and training, large gaps exist in both policy and practice. As a new Congress convenes and the Obama administration prepares to pass the baton to a new administration, the time is ripe to examine the effectiveness of the tools at hand and how they can be strengthened.On Monday, December 12, the Project on International Order and Strategy at Brookings will host a discussion on the complex issue of understanding how U.S. assistance to foreign security forces is linked to U.S. human rights objectives, with particular attention to cases like Afghanistan, Colombia, and Mexico. Assistant Secretary of State Tom Malinowski will offer opening remarks, followed by a discussion with Brookings Senior Fellows Daniel Byman and Ted Piccone.
  2. The Arab Spring and the Shia-Sunni Divide | Monday, December 12 | 12:00pm | Atlantic Council | Click HERE to Register
    Nearly six years after the Arab uprisings began, the dream of a pan-Islamic awakening is now more elusive than ever. The wave of unrest has deepened ethnic and religious tensions between Sunni and Shia, pushing them once again to the fore. Religious differences and how Muslims define themselves have emerged as salient characteristics within Arab society, rivalling the broader conflict between Muslims and the West as the primary challenge facing Islamic societies of the Middle East.The New Sectarianism considers the causes of the growing Sunni-Shia animosity in key countries such as Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. This renewed sectarianism is particularly corrosive in the face of generally weak states, which today characterize many countries in the region. The event will illustrate how Shia and Sunni perceive one another after the Arab uprisings, and how these perceptions have affected Arab life. Featuring Ms. Geneive Abdo, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Ms. Joyce Karam, the Washington Bureau Chief for Al-Hayat Newspaper.
  3. The Tribes of Israel: Diversity, Cohesion and Conflict | Tuesday, December 13 | 2:30pm – 5:00pm | Brookings Institution | Click HERE to Register
    Israel is undergoing a profound transformation, from a society with one politically and socially dominant group—secular Jews—to a society of several groups of roughly similar size. Israeli President Reuven Rivlin has gone as far as to describe four “tribes” of Israeli society and has proposed the creation of a new social compact among these groups. Others argue that Israel should resist institutionalizing identity-based politics, and should focus instead on society-wide concerns.On December 13, the Center for Middle East Policy will convene a public event to explore these social rifts and what Americans might learn from the Israeli experience about managing diverse societies and about the proper role of group identities in national politics. The event will feature two sessions titled: “Visions of Israel: Citizenship, common cause, and conflict” and “Secularism, religion, and the state.”This event is part the center’s series on “Imagining Israel’s Future,” which is designed to help Washington audiences engage with voices from today’s dynamic Israeli society.Featuring Martin S. Indyk, Exective Vice President of the Brookings Institution, Natan Sachs, Fellow for Foreign Policy at the Center for Middle East Policy, Stav Shaffir, Member of Knesset, Labor, Mohammad Darawshe, Co-Executive Director at The Center for a Shared Society at Givat Haviva, Yehudah Mirsky, Associate Professor of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies  at Brandeis University, Shibley Telhami, Nonresident Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy, at the Center for Middle East Policy, U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Ksenia Svetlova, Member of Knesset, Hatunah, Rabbi Dov Lipman, Former Member of Knesset, Yesh Atid, Noah Efron, Senior Faculty Member, Department of Science, Technology & Society at Bar-Ilan University, Elana Stein Hain, Director of Leadership Education at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America.
  4. The Annual Michael Van Dusen Lecture on the Middle East: Syria, Sectarianism and ISIS, Where are we Heading? | Wednesday, December 14 | 4:00pm – 5:00pm | Woodrow Wilson Center | Click HERE to RegisterFeaturing Joshua Landis, Director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma’s College of International Studies and Henri Barkley, Director, Middle East Program at the Wilson Center.
  5. Polling Middle Eastern Views: Current Conditions and the Road Ahead | Thursday, December 15 | 11:00am – 12:30pm | Middle East Institute | Click HERE to RegisterThe Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Arab-American Institute (AAI) are pleased to host James Zogby (AAI and Zogby Research Services) for the presentation of fresh polling results from across six Arab countries, Iran, and Turkey. With the public release of the report Middle East 2016: Current Conditions and the Road Ahead, Dr. Zogby will examine views about the war in Syria, the roles of the United States, Russia, and Iran in the region, and causes of extremism, violence, and instability.Commentators Steven Cook (Council on Foreign Relations), Ellen Laipson (Stimson Center), and Hassan Mneimneh (MEI) will provide their analysis of the poll’s findings in a discussion with Dr. Zogby moderated by Gerald Feierstein (MEI).The poll and resulting report were commissioned by the Sir Bani Yas Forum, convened annually in the United Arab Emirates on the initiative of H.H. Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the U.A.E. Foreign Minister. The findings are being made available for use by the public; print copies of the report will be available.
  6. Long Game or Gamble? Middle East Policy from Obama to Trump | Friday, December 16 | 10:00am – 11:15am | Bipartisan Policy Center | Click HERE to Register  The Middle East continues to challenge U.S. policymakers. From the rise of ISIS, to the spread of ethnosectarian violence, to dealing with Iran, the region played an outsize role in President Obama’s foreign policy and is one of the top concerns for President-elect Trump. Two recent books, the first by an outspoken critic of Obama’s foreign policy, the second by one of its most articulate defenders, examine how presidents have defined and pursued U.S. interests in the Middle East.Michael Doran’s (Former Senior Director in the National Security Council and Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute) Ike’s Gamble retells the story of President Eisenhower’s handling of the Suez Crisis in 1956, suggesting that many of the same pitfalls encountered then still plague policymakers today. And in The Long Game, Derek Chollet (Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
    Counselor and Senior Adviser for Security and Defense Policy, German Marshall Fund) describes how President Obama – seeking to model himself on Eisenhower – transformed U.S. foreign policy to overcome the obstacles of the Middle East.Please join us for a debate between Chollet and Doran about the lessons learned from Eisenhower and Obama about U.S. Middle East policy and how President-elect Trump might apply those lessons.
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Jihad and the next administration

USIP’s discussion today of “Getting Ahead of the Curve: the evolving threat of violent extremism” was a study in contrasts. The first panel, of experts who contributed to The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al Qaeda and Beyond was devoted to hard-nosed analysis. The second, which discussed both CSIS’ Turning Point and Communities First: A Blueprint for Organizing and Sustaining a Global Movement Against Violent Extremism, was devoted to right-minded but airier policy propositions, at least until I left about 45 minutes before it ended.

The analysis panel, ably chaired by Robin Wright of USIP and the Woodrow Wilson Center, offered a gloomy picture: each generation of jihadis is larger than the last, mobilizes faster, draws on more diversified sources of foreign fighters, gets more extreme, and spreads to more locations and causes.

That said, Brookings’ Will McCants noted that ISIS has lost perhaps half its territory as well as 50,000 killed, Raqqa and Mosul are under attack, and its finances are under pressure. It won’t disappear but will return, as it did during the near-defeat in Iraq in 2008/10, to terrorist tactics and prison breaks. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies concurred that the ISIS star has fallen, because of its brutal tactics and readiness to make enemies of too many people. But Al Qaeda is reviving and spreading, especially in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Mali and Somalia. It is even controlling territory, it financing has become more open, and it is embedding Al Qaeda Central cadres, like the Khorasan Group, with its franchisees.

The franchises are increasingly important, Carnegie Endowment’s Fred Wehrey concurred. Al Qaeda has been more successful than ISIS in establishing durable franchises, partly because it focuses on “Dawa” (proselytizing), is relatively “moderate” in behavior towards the local population, and integrates more effectively with local forces. Egypt is particularly fertile ground, as is Yemen.

Hassan Hassan of the Tahrir Institue for Middle East Policy underlined that jihadism is not going away any time soon. Its narrative and appeal are increasingly entrenched. Al Qaeda and ISIS share the objective of creating a caliphate, but Al Qaeda is the more dangerous as it often works quietly  and is more successful at “marbling” (interweaving) local and global strategies.

McCants views state failure as fuel for the protean diversified jihadist resurgence we are witnessing. The diversification and rapidly shifting organizational landscape are big problems, as they make prioritization difficult. Gartenstein-Ross believes the Middle East states will continue to weaken, as they face dramatic challenges like lack of water and parlous finances. Internet penetration in the region is still low, so jihadi mobilization is likely to become more effective and quicker as it expands. Social media are particularly adapted to boost secret identities across boundary lines. Hassan concurred, noting that ISIS in defeat will retreat into the desert, as it did in Iraq in 2008, leaving sleeper cells who will kill its enemies in newly liberated areas. Sunni disenfranchisement, alienation, and lack of leadership make ISIS a viable political option.

Wehrey concluded the first panel by underlining that terrorism is a political strategy and requires in part a political response. Jihadism is not really about religion but about the need for reform. Governance issues are central, vastly compounded by population displacement and Western intervention.

The second panel chaired by USIP’s Georgia Holmer focused, far less decisively, on non-military responses to jihadism.

The National Security Council’s Amy Pope underlined that countering violent extremism (CVE) is now established as an important part of the response to terrorism focused on its root causes in particular communities. She and State Department Under Secretary Sarah Sewall were confident that this community-focused approach, based on civil society and holistic investments, is the right one. We need to be able to tell this story across the security and human rights communities.

Shannon Green of CSIS cited the “measured security response” advocated in Turning Point, noting that anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment reinforces extremism. So too have some of America’s traditional partners in the Gulf, who have financed extremists. We need to be able to levy punitive sanctions in response, undertake a global educational partnership to ensure that extremism has no place in curricula, and review assistance to oppressive governments. She also thought an assistant to the president for CVE would help the cause.

The Prevention Project’s Eric Rosand emphasized community-level engagement that recognizes communities have many problems other than violent extremism and offers them incentives to engage locally in CVE. Law enforcement should have a limited, not a dominant, role.

Asked about what they would advise the incoming Trump Administration, Sewall emphasized the need to coordinate military and intelligence counter-terrorism with civilian CVE and the relative lack of resources for the latter (amounting to no more than .1% of the total). Pope also thought the balance out of whack. CVE needs to grow much bigger. There is lots of evidence that democracy and inclusion work and that alienation and exclusion don’t.

Asked to adduce some concrete examples of CVE that has worked, Pope cited a roundtable in The Hague, Sewall an ongoing project pilot project in East Africa and an AID project in Pakistan. Rosand noted that all too often autocrats readily take up the anti-messaging banner, as it enables them to crack down on dissident voices. That, he suggested, does not work.

My bottom line: Little in this discussion gave me any reason to believe that the incoming Trump Administration will take up the cause of CVE, which would require it to drop its anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric, agree to support reformist and more democratic states rather than autocratic ones, invest in aid that is difficult to distinguish from conventional development assistance, accept evidence-based indications of effectiveness, and increase funding for civilian rather than military efforts. #fatchance

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Trump’s bromance

Of Trump’s many vices, his bromance with Putin is arguably the worst, at least from a foreign policy perspective. Putin has not only restored autocracy to Russia, he has invaded Ukraine, annexed Crimea, and intervened ferociously against the non-extremist opposition in Syria, not to mention his sponsorship of a foiled coup in Montenegro, his threats to Baltic and Scandinavian states, and his continued occupation of Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. Let’s not forget his exploitation of Wikileaks to intervene in the US election on Trump’s behalf.

Trump’s response so far has been to propose we make common cause with Putin, in particular against ISIS in Syria. The President-elect refuses to acknowledge Russian hacking, despite what the firm consensus of American intelligence agencies, whose briefings he has been refusing to listen to. He now seems intent on appointing as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the chief executive of Exxon and one of Putin’s favorite Americans. He will unquestionably want to lift sanctions on Moscow. John Bolton, a skeptic of Russia, is apparently slated for the often powerless number 2 job, where he will be subordinate to Tillerson’s russophilia.

Trump seems blissfully unaware of Russia’s decline, which is apparent in many different dimensions. Its economy and government revenue are largely dependent on hydrocarbons, whose price collapse in 2014/15 left it in a severe recession. Its private sector is shrinking. Its large companies are increasingly controlled by Moscow. Its health and life expectancy are declining. Its once-vaunted athletes have been reduced to massive, state-sponsored doping. Only its military, nurtured with big doses of funding, appears in good shape, but that is true only for its elite forces.

So why would the president-elect choose to align himself with Putin? Trump says the Russians are needed to defeat the Islamic State in Syria. The difficulty with that point of view is that Russia has never expended much ordnance against the Islamic State but has instead concentrated its fire on non-jihadi fighters, whose destruction has strengthened rather than weakened the extremists. The main Islamic State stronghold in Syria today is Raqqa, which the Russian air force has only occasionally targeted.

I think it far more likely that Trump views Putin as an effective and admirable leader, one who does the things the president-elect would like to do: control the media, enforce draconian law and order, shut down dissent, vaunt nationalist pride, crack down on Muslims, and run a foreign policy committed exclusively to enhancing his own country’s gains without regard to any international norms or multilateral constraints. The bromance really is a bromance, at least on Trump’s part.

This spells peril, not only for the Syrian opposition but also for all those whose interests the US has supported during the past 10 years or so of Russian aggression. Ukraine can kiss Crimea good-bye. Trump is unlikely even to support reintegration of Donbas. The Baltics, Finland and Sweden, Montenegro, and others in Putin’s crosshairs are going to find little solace in Washington. At best, Trump will give them a hand if they pay for it.

Trump’s admiration for Putin will embolden the latter and whet his appetite for more successes with which to stave off the inevitable realization among the Russian people that they have been driven down a cul-de-sac. Putin is running a Ponzi scheme of foreign policy aggression, with each “success” enabling the next.

If Trump wants to try to do business with Putin, the deals he strikes should be judged on the transactional basis the President-elect prefers with everyone else: what does he get in exchange or what he gives? If he gets a serious political transition away from Bashar al Assad in Syria, full implementation of the Minsk II agreement in Ukraine, and an end to harassment of Russia’s neighbors, I’ll be the first to applaud. Until then, I’ll sit on my hands.

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