This rigged election counts

Donald Trump is right. This election is rigged, but in his favor. Here is some evidence:

  1. Grossly excessive media coverage in Trump’s favor, including failure to press him for his tax returns and documentation related to his wife’s immigration.
  2. Concerted efforts in swing states like North Carolina and Pennsylvania to suppress minority voting.
  3. Russian hacking and Wikileaks publication of Clinton-connected emails.
  4. FBI statements about Clinton-connected investigations with not a whisper of investigations of Trump, whose malfeasance is publicly documented.

I suppose it is possible the FBI and IRS have no ongoing investigations of Trump, but that would prove rather than disprove the point.

Clinton has other disadvantages: she is a woman in a political world that men still dominate, she has a long public record that necessarily displays mistakes, and she is brainier than she is warm and fuzzy, which is a combination that makes people more envious than admiring. The campaign has done nothing to make her more popular with some of the American people, especially those who are less educated and more rural.

She is still likely to win. Best guess is that she will have only a few percentage points advantage in the popular vote, but the electoral college will give her a far wider margin. She has run a mostly successful campaign in swing states, while holding on to all those she could count on from the start.

Will Trump concede? Who knows. It doesn’t really matter. Concession is more a traditional ceremony than a politically or legally important act. If the election is close enough for him to pursue one or two states in court, that will be a problem. But his appearance on TV to accept a clear defeat is irrelevant.

Clinton will nevertheless start her mandate with two strikes against her: she’ll face continued FBI investigation and she’ll likely not enjoy Democratic control of Congress. Even if the Republicans lose their majority in the Senate, the Democrats are not likely to have the 60 votes there required to get things done. The House will likely have a reduced, but still effective, Republican majority.

What a Republican majority means will be an open question. Trump has moved the Republican party far from traditional conservatism: he wants colossal infrastructure spending, limits on immigration, and less free trade, in addition to the more conventional increase in defense expenditures, tax reductions, and the repeal of Obamacare. Will part of the Republican party stick with his platform, or will it revert in defeat to a more conventional conservative posture? Will at least part of the Republican caucus be prepared to cooperate on immigration reform and Obamacare improvements, thus reaching out to minority voters, or will they continue across-the-board obstruction?

Much of the world is looking to Tuesday’s election as if it were their own. What America does matters worldwide. But it will be weeks or even months before we know whether we are about to break out of our current cycle of difficulty in governing, or spiral deeper into the abyss. Liberal democracy needs to demonstrate its effectiveness if it wants to survive and shine a light the rest of the world will want to follow. As appalling as it is to me that more than 40% of my fellow Americans will vote for an unqualified, dyspeptic, racist, misogynist xenophobe, his defeat will be a re-assertion of commitment to liberal democracy and a freer world.

If Trump wins, all bets are off. More than anything else, the uncertainty will create havoc on world markets and in international relations. His success in rigging the elections will tarnish liberal democracy for a generation and encourage the worst instincts of ethnic nationalists all over the world. This rigged election counts.

 

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Mosul yes, Raqqa not yet

As the Iraqi offensive on Mosul progresses and Kurdish forces encroach on ISIS territory in Syria there is an eagerness to finalize the destruction of the ISIS caliphate. An Atlantic Council panel yesterday examined the complex realities on the ground in an attempt to clarify the “day after” issues.

Hassan Hassan of the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy considers the Mosul offensive to be an important moment for the Iraqi army and its coalition of forces: it offers a historic opportunity to resolve deep Iraqi wounds. But Mosul poses greater challenges than cities already liberated from ISIS due to the complex political environment and number of stakeholders in the coalition. We are likely to see ISIS attempt to prolong the Mosul fight rather than fleeing immediately for Raqqa, hoping that rising tensions among coalition members will lead to dysfunction.

These concerns were echoed by Jessica Lewis McFate of the Institute for the Study of war, who agrees that the longer the battle rages the more fragile the coalition will become. We can also expect ISIS to accelerate attacks in other areas of Iraq where they have already established a presence, such as Kirkuk and Baghdad, in order to undermine the Iraqi army’s progress and distract from the Mosul battle. Unaddressed Sunni grievances will make it difficult for the Iraqi government to reassert authority in troubled regions. As ISIS is chased out, we are likely to see Al Qaeda pick up the cause of Sunni disenfranchisement. Its affiliates are reportedly already active in Anbar province. The Iraqi government must therefore address the grievances, a move the US should support. 

Turning towards ISIS in Syria, Howard Shatz from RAND Corporation noted that the Iraqi coalition in Mosul is stable for now, but a coalition in Syria with Kurdish forces in the lead is a dicey proposition, making the impatient calls for a simultaneous attack on Raqqa risky. Hassan agrees that Washington generally underestimates the fear and suspicion of Syria’s Kurds among the Arabs, who perceive Kurdish ambitions of establishing dominance and depopulating areas to allow the settlement of Kurdish families. This is not an accurate reflection of Kurdish aims, since no one believes they intend to stay in Raqqa, but the fear will be exploited by Jabhat al Nusra and other Islamist groups. McFate agrees that the Arab-Kurd dynamic must be considered in the fight against ISIS, and noted that following Kurdish liberation of Shaddadi in 2015 much of the population fled to territory still held by ISIS.

This leads to what McFate identifies as a fundamental gap in American policy. Due to the current composition of Syrian opposition forces, the defeat of ISIS empowers Al Qaeda affiliates such as Jabhat al Nusra. If alongside the Turkish-backed coalition, which includes Al Qaeda affiliated groups, Kurdish forces liberate Raqqa and then retreat to Kurdish areas, this will leave Al Qaeda in a dominant position to reassert influence over Raqqa. Indeed it was Jabhat al Nusra and affiliated groups who held the Raqqa area prior to the ISIS blitz. Hassan agrees, arguing that unless an appropriate coalition has been built the expulsion of ISIS forces will only open new conflict. The US has been hesitant in supporting appropriate forces, but this must be the priority if we do not want to open another conflict within the Syrian civil war.

All panel members agreed that defeating ISIS in Iraq is more a political and governance issue than a military issue. They were reasonably optimistic about the opportunity for Iraq to rebuild, but the international community must remain engaged in Baghdad to encourage governance improvements. However they would urge patience in confronting ISIS in Syria if we do not want to see renewed violence and even greater Al Qaeda empowerment.

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Managing South China Sea conflicts

I enjoyed some time with some smart colleagues yesterday discussing the South China Sea conflicts, unfortunately under Chatham House rules. Below are my own notes for the occasion. 

Two points stand out in my memory of what others said: 

  1. Oil and gas resources in the South China Sea are not promising and fish stocks are declining; 
  2. The Chinese might well challenge the next president, or undisciplined pilots or naval captains might do so. 

There were lots of other excellent points made, but I’ll have to hope that one of the students present might offer up their notes. I find it difficult to take notes while participating on a panel. 

1. I’m truly honored to sit on a panel with distinguished colleagues. My advice to the students in the room is to listen carefully to them, as they know a lot about the South China Sea disputes and the legal background.
2. I don’t, but I was asked to talk about the conflict management implications of the recent arbitration and the outlook for resolving future maritime disputes in the region, including alternative methods of dispute settlement that China Studies and Conflict Management students will be exploring this fall and during a study trip to Beijing in January.
3. Let me begin with the bad news: if in order to ensure peace we need to settle the various claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea, I think there is very little chance of success.
4. Sovereignty claims are all too often resolved by force.
5. China has the advantage there. For the foreseeable future Beijing will be able to deploy force superior to any of the other individual claimants. Without US assistance, none of the South China Sea claimants would win a naval clash with China.
6. With US assistance, they might win, but only after causing incalculable damage to world order, the world’s economy, and international relations throughout the Pacific.
7. War would be a really bad way to resolve any of the South China Sea disputes.
8. Fortunately, other means are available. Arbitration is one.
9. But arbitration is a method that decides who is right and who is wrong. If it goes in favor of the less powerful state, the more powerful state is unlikely to accept the outcome. That is pretty much what we’ve seen in response to last summer’s arbitration decision.
10. But we’ve also seen another classic conflict management response: China is trying to buy off the Philippines, with at least initial indications of some success.
11. Billions are unlikely to make Manila cede completely, but it may render the arbitration decision ineffective, postponing rather than resolving the issue.
12. There are ample precedents for simply letting sovereignty claims slide. There are still more than five outstanding maritime boundary disputes between the US and Canada. They are mostly ignored in practice, even if neither country is willing to concede legally.
13. There are also ample precedents for cooperative regimes that do not necessarily decide the sovereignty question, or decide it without prejudicing economic interests, thus enabling disputants to gain at least some of the benefits that they think are rightfully theirs.
14. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia share production from a once-disputed oil field; Iran and Qatar share production from a disputed gas field.
15. Such cooperative arrangements are relatively easy where resources are concerned but particularly difficult where security issues are involved, since security is often regarded as a zero sum game.
16. China’s militarization of various non-islands in the South China Sea is perceived in Washington as a threat to US freedom of navigation there. So we send ships and aircraft to traverse locations that we believe are permitted, even if the Chinese think not.
17. In particular, the Chinese think military vessels and planes conducting espionage are not entitled to passage even in its Exclusive Economic Zone, so they may respond by declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone, or by challenging US naval ships or military aircraft. Read more

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Nukes in the next administration

Yesterday, the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative held an event discussing how the next presidential administration should approach nuclear arms control and deterrence. Brookings scholar Michael O’Hanlon interviewed fellow Brookings scholar Steven Pifer on his recent report about this topic.

Although there are many nuclear states that we need to keep an eye on, Pifer explained,the primary concern for the next administration should be Russia due to their large arsenal and our quickly deteriorating relationship.  Russia has also expressed a desire to modernize their arsenal, and the US needs to keep a close eye on that. Given that Russia and the United States have more warheads than any other country, if the two great nuclear powers reach a strong reduction agreement, it will serve as an example for the rest of the world. Additionally, the New START treaty will expire in 2021—the next administration needs to take a long, hard look at the existing treaty and decide whether they want to renew it or renegotiate the terms.

In many respects, conventional weapons have become almost as deadly as traditional nuclear warheads; perhaps conventional arms reduction should be considered as well. Pifer recommended that while the US should maintain the existing defense triad of submarine launched domestic missiles, ICBMs and bombers, the next president should consider reducing their numbers. Maintaining all these warheads is very expensive. The US doesn’t really need 700 deployed missiles—they could get by on 550 and save. In fact, nuclear parity with Russia is not a strategic concern but rather a political one. Having as many or more warheads than Russia reassures US allies that the United States is capable of defending them and gives the US a better position at the negotiating table.

The US has pledged to use its warheads if the homeland or one of its allies is attacked with nuclear weapons, but foreign allies are nervous that Washington will only use its nuclear capabilities if attacked at home. Indeed, Pifer said, no president would be willing to risk Chicago for a small city in South Korea. Current US policy also gives room for US enemies to attack the homeland with conventional weapons without fear of nuclear reciprocation. Pifer believes that despite these issues, the policy contributes to nuclear deterrence and can be strengthened by improving communication with allies that depend on the US for nuclear security.

Pifer advises that the US should push hard for other nuclear states to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty. The US has no need for further testing at the moment, since it conducted so many nuclear tests in the second half of the 20th century. In fact, the US conducted more tests than the rest of the world combined. As a result of these extensive tests, US knowledge about nuclear weapons far surpasses the rest of the world. Therefore, by encouraging others to sign the treaty, the US keeps the knowledge it gained from its own nuclear tests while ensuring that the rest of the world never catches up.

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Peace picks, October 31-November 4

  1. Nuclear Arms Control Choices for the Next Administration | Monday, October 31 | 2:00pm – 3:00pm | Brookings Institution | Click HERE to Register

    Nuclear arms control has been a feature on the U.S.-Soviet/Russian agenda for nearly five decades. While discussions between Washington and Moscow currently are at a standstill, the limitations, transparency, and predictability provided by agreements such as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty are more important than ever in times of tense bilateral relations. The next U.S. president and her or his administration will face a number of choices about nuclear weapons, nuclear policy, and arms control.On October 31, theBrookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative will host a discussion on nuclear arms control choices for the next administration.  The panel will feature Brookings scholars Michael O’Hanlon and Steve Pifer. Following the discussion, the speakers will take questions from the audience.

  2. Enhancing the US-Georgia Security Partnership | Monday, October 31 | 12:30pm – 2:00pm | Elliott School of International Affairs | Click HERE to Register

    For several decades, Georgia has been one of the most important economic and security partners of the United States. The US is the largest bilateral aid donor to Georgia, having provided several billion dollars since 1991. This support has always enjoyed bipartisan backing.  Since 2009, Georgia and the United States have had a Strategic Partnership through which both parties pledge to further Georgia’s democratization, economic development, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Georgia is the highest per capita contributor to the U.S.-led military coalition in Afghanistan. Despite Washington’s efforts, however, Georgia has not yet received membership in NATO and finds itself in a challenging neighborhood. The next U.S. presidential administration will need to move decisively to strengthen this critical partnership.Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. His current research includes regional security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East Asia as well as U.S. foreign and defense policies. Dr. Weitz is also an Expert at Wikistrat and a non-resident Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).

  3. Iran, Israel and the United States: What to Expect Next? | Monday, October 31 | 1:30pm – 2:30pm | Woodrow Wilson Center | Click HERE to Register

    Is the JCPOA—now one-year-old—a vehicle for reducing Israel-Iranian tensions in the medium term? How will the outcomes of the impending U.S. and Iranian presidential elections affect both Iran and Israel’s security perceptions? Join us for a discussion with a panel of experts on what foreign policy adjustments we can expect from Iran, Israel, and the United States vis à vis each other in 2017 and beyond. Featuring Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, David Menashri, Professor Emeritus, Tel Aviv University and Senior Research Fellow, Alliance Center for Iranian Studies and the Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University (TAU) and Henri J. Barkey, Director, Middle East Program

  4. How Should the Next President Counter Violent Extremism | Tuesday, November 1 | 8:15am – 9:15am | Brookings Institution | Click HERE to Register

    The next U.S. president will come into office in an era of dramatic disruptions around the globe. Violent extremism is spreading, in the Middle East and elsewhere. Adding to the friction, tensions over immigration, trade agreements, and globalization are giving rise to nationalist political movements across the Western world. While the next president will have to grapple with immediate questions of military and national security strategy, he or she will also have to set in motion a long-term strategy to counter the threat of violent extremism at its root cause.On November 1, veteran journalist Indira Lakshmanan of the Boston Globe will conduct a live podcast taping with two Brookings experts as they examine how America’s role in the world will change as the new administration takes office next year. As part of the Brookings-wide Election 2016 and America’s Future project, this event is the fourth in a series of live recordings distributed by the Brookings Podcast Network. Brookings Senior Fellow and Vice President of Governance Studies Darrell West recently published the book “Megachange,” focused on the proliferation of major, unexpected changes around the globe, and will talk about violent extremism as a social and political phenomenon. Brookings Visiting FellowRobert McKenzie is an expert in U.S-Islamic relations, and recently published a policy brief on how the next president can fight violent extremism in America.We hope you can join us for a lively conversation in which each expert will deliver a concrete course of action for the next president, and will be pressed by the moderator on alternate perspectives on the issue and the realistic obstacles the next administration will face.

  5. ISIS: The Day After Defeat | Wednesday, November 2 | 12:00pm | The Atlantic Council | Click HERE to Register

    Iraqi and Kurdish forces are closing in on Mosul, a major Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) stronghold in Iraq. Taking the city would seriously degrade ISIS territorial control in northern Iraq and force the organization to fall back into Syria. Meanwhile, ISIS is also experiencing rapid territorial loss in Syria to the Syrian Kurds, who recently captured Manbij, and to elements of the Free Syrian Army, which recently took Dabiq with Turkish support. In addition, there has been talk about an offensive on Raqqa, the Islamic State’s de-facto capital city in Syria.With the territorial defeat of ISIS apparently approaching, one key question stands out: What will become of ISIS after military defeat? The panelists will discuss the current developments in the war against ISIS and the tactics the group may adopt after it is ousted from Mosul and challenged in Raqqa.Hassan Hassan is a resident fellow at TIMEP focusing on Syria and Iraq and the co-author of ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. Before joining ISW, Jessica Lewis McFate served as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Army including deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. Howard J. Shatz is a senior economist at the RAND Corporation and director of RAND-Initiated Research where he specializes in international economics. He is the co-author of Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005-2010. Aaron Stein is a resident senior fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, where he focuses on US-Turkey relations, Turkish foreign policy, the Syrian conflict, nonproliferation, and the Iranian nuclear program. He is the author of the Atlantic Council report, Islamic State Networks in Turkey.

  6. A View of the US Election from Iraq | Friday, November 4 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Click HERE to Register

    With the U.S. election less than 10 days away and a new presidential administration less than 90 days away, what changes can be expected for U.S. policy in Iraq? A centerpiece of current U.S. policy in Iraq is the ongoing fight against the Islamic State. The conflict reached a new stage earlier this month as coalition forces launched the offensive to retake Mosul and began planning the Raqqa Offensive. Beyond the current operation, how should the incoming administration approach the region’s challenges as internal and external powers exploit the sectarian rift in the northern Middle East? What strategy should the next president pursue to dismantle ISIS and, more importantly, prevent its resurgence?Hudson Institute will host a discussion on the implications of the election for U.S.-Iraq policy, including the critical operation in Mosul. On November 4, former Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations Feisal Istrabadi will join Hudson fellows Michael Doran and Michael Pregent for a timely discussion of this important partnership and what lies ahead for U.S.-Iraq relations and the ongoing fight against ISIS.

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Emails imperil both candidates

I am a former Foreign Service officer who worked for 21 years in the State Department and used to handle large volumes of classified material, including the specialized compartmented variety (SCI). The rules about this stuff are clear: it must be handled in protected channels and certainly not in personal email accounts or on unclassified servers (even if they are in your own house). Virtually all information going to and from the Secretary of State is normally classified at the “confidential” level or above, often including purely logistic stuff that for anyone else might be public.

Once upon a time, when I was an office director in State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, I would write analytical pieces for the Secretary of State’s “Morning Summary” based entirely on open source material. The editor, who was the last person to see them before publication, would always classify them confidential. I objected and asked for an explanation. “You wrote it,” he said, “and it is going to the Secretary of State, so that makes it at least confidential.” We compromised: the texts got classified, but the titles did not. I still list them among my publications.

So there is a lot of what a reasonable person would regard as over-classification of materials going to the Secretary, including stuff that becomes useless the day after a trip to say, Moscow, because it concerns arrival procedures and hotel room numbers. It should not be assumed that mishandling of classified material necessarily compromises national security. That is particularly the case for emails on a private server that was apparently never hacked, or we would have heard about it by now.

The real problem arises when an official takes highly classified material (especially SCI), tries to purge or obscure its origins, and puts it into an unclassified channel. There is some evidence this was done with a few previously discovered materials, but the FBI concluded that the violations did not meet the threshold for a reasonable prosecutor to proceed against Hillary Clinton on that basis, which requires intent to make information available outside classified channels.

The new emails discovered since then won’t meet the threshold for prosecution either if Newsweek is correct:

There is no indication the emails in question were withheld by Clinton during the investigation, the law enforcement official told Newsweek, nor does the discovery suggest she did anything illegal. Also, none of the emails were to or from Clinton, the official said. Moreover, despite the widespread claims in the media that this development had prompted the FBI to “reopen” of the case, it did not; such investigations are never actually closed, and it is common for law enforcement to discover new information that needs to be examined.

I would be the first to admit that FBI Director Comey was put in a tough spot: he had to investigate these newly discovered emails. Doing so without informing Congress, when he had already testified that the case was not going anyplace, would have been risky. But in saying that he was pursuing the investigation further (not reopening it, as the press has reported, echoing the Trump campaign) without the clarifications Newsweek provides, Comey erred in a way that has huge political ramifications that he certainly should have anticipated. I can only imagine the political pressures brought to bear.

Hillary Clinton showed poor judgment in using a private email server, as Comey has charged and she has admitted. Just as important: Clinton aide Huma Abedin was a disaster waiting to happen. Her grossly excessive private employment while a government official and her husband’s dreadful sexting obsession should have been ample warning that she was accustomed to both abusing and abuse. Clinton would do well to sacrifice her to the gods of public opinion.

Should Americans be concerned about the compromise of national security information? Yes, of course. But there is no clear evidence of that in either the earlier stage of the investigation or in the effort just now beginning. They should of course also be concerned about the hacking of private emails by the Russian government, which is using them to help Donald Trump’s campaign after he appealed for Moscow’s help in publicizing Clinton’s staff emails. They don’t prove much other than the high competence of some of the staff and Bill Clinton’s willingness to work for foreigners who also gave donations to the Clinton Foundation, which isn’t what I would call the worst idea he ever had. President Obama could be making much more of the Russian connection than he has so far. Emails imperil both candidates.

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