Tag: Al Qaeda

Reversal of the progress for women and the press in Afghanistan is imminent

Nearly two decades ago, Bernard-Henri Lévy spent a month in Afghanistan shortly after Taliban rule had been removed and wrote an extensive report for the French government. In it he outlined the challenges, but more importantly the opportunities now available for modernizing and improving the lives of Afghans. Now, with the Western presence in Afghanistan drawing to a close, Lévy is publishing a book reflecting on the report and the years that followed. With an introduction by former US General David Petraeus, Lévy assesses the successes and mistakes that occurred in Afghanistan, and reflects on the threats facing it now that renewed Taliban rule seems imminent.

The Middle East Institute organized a seminar July 26 with Lévy, Petraeus and two discussants to discuss the origins of the report and to assess the last twenty years in Afghanistan. The panel agreed that much has been achieved in women’s rights, civil society, and the free press, but that all of these achievements will be reversed as the Taliban returns to power.

The speakers were:

Gen. (ret.) David Petraeus
Former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan;
former director
Central Intelligence Agency

Bernard-Henri Lévy
Philosopher, journalist, filmmaker, and public intellectual 

Javid Ahmad
Ambassador of Afghanistan to the United Arab Emirates;
non-resident senior fellow
Atlantic Council

Marvin Weinbaum (moderator)
Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies
MEI

Paul Salem (introduction)
President
MEI

Lévy’s report 20 years on

Lévy gave a behind the scenes insight into the origins of his remarkable 2002 assignment. “Even in France”, he emphasized, it isn’t normal for a philosopher to be tasked with making a report such as this. It came to be because Lévy had met with Afghan guerilla leader and later Minister of Defense Massoud several times since the 1980s, and had arranged for him to meet French president Chirac in 2001. Massoud was defending the Panjshir Valley from the Taliban at the time. At the last moment, Chirac decided not to meet with Massoud, and he instead met with the French Foreign Minister and spoke to the European Parliament. He warned of the ties between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and of their growing plans against the West. Five months later, Massoud was assassinated and two days later the 9/11 attacks on the United States took place. After victory against the Taliban was achieved, Chirac called on Lévy to write his report and outline how France could participate in building of a new Afghanistan. According to Lévy, this was partially due to his disappointment over failing to meet with Massoud before his death.

In the report, Lévy aimed to encourage France to take up an active role. In his introduction, Petraeus summarized the contents of the report. Its core recommendations were two-fold:

  • Build a centralized state with institutions such as an army, a police force, and public agencies in order to counter the rule of warlords.
  • Circumvent ‘stubborn mullahs’ by forming a sort of ‘Black Hussar’ corps made up of teachers, doctors, civil engineers, and other educated citizens. These should be sent out to the most remote provinces to spread republican values at the grassroots level.

Petraeus reflected that it is difficult to assess to what extent France followed Lévy‘s recommendations because the war effort in Afghanistan became entirely US-led, particularly by the time Petraeus took command in 2010. Nonetheless, his report tells us a great deal about what might have been done by both France and the US.

Missed opportunities and mistakes

All panelists agreed that the occupation of Afghanistan generated many mistakes. Lévy even went so far as to say they’re innumerable and decided to forgo naming them, focusing instead on the now threatened achievements, mentioned below. Ambassador Javid Ahmad did elaborate on two key dependencies established by the US that Afghanistan has been unable to shake to this day.

  • A reliance on ‘warlords’. Ahmad emphasized that this is a broad term that today indicates most of the country’s organized crime, kleptocratic governance, and terrorist financing. In the early days, these warlords and power brokers were seen as the only option for effective governance in Afghanistan. This established an entrenched, toxic, kleptocratic power dynamic which is similar to the situation in the 1990s.
  • Reliance on Pakistan. Ahmad considers this the core of the failure of the mission in Afghanistan. The US has failed to identify Pakistan as either a ‘fickle friend’ or even a ‘clever enemy’. Pakistani activity in Afghanistan consists of a large military force of which the Taliban are one part. It amounts to an effective invasion. Pakistan today doesn’t seek a political settlement. Instead, it aims for a military settlement that recognizes Taliban gains and then builds a political settlement.

Other minor mistakes include starting the training of Afghan forces late and focusing on quantity rather than quality. Additionally, Afghan forces were loosely modeled after the US forces, which rely heavily on air force. However, Afghanistan barely had an air force, and therefore became even more reliant on the United States for success.

Petraeus recognized several of these issues. The US effort failed in combating the Taliban efficiently. The enemy lacked urgency. It had sanctuary in Pakistan. There is a reason that the Taliban leadership is known as the Quetta Shura, not to mention the Peshawar Shura (named for cities in Pakistan). Petraeus describes this as the most challenging issue in the country. The US effort also lagged in resources because of the drain of Iraq. Only in 2010 did Afghanistan receive the appropriate resources.

Achievements

The panel all agreed that there have been many significant successes in Afghanistan. Petraeus emphasized that the original mission was to eliminate Al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan, which succeeded. Afterwards, the continued presence was partially aimed at preventing a return of that sanctuary, which was also successful.

Along with Lévy and Weinbaum, he emphasized the many civil advancements. Women’s rights and education improved massively, as did the spread of modern technology, healthcare, and infrastructure. Lévy is particularly struck by the strength of the Afghan press, particularly TOLOnews. He praised the brave journalists that use a freedom of speech and investigation that would have been unimaginable previously.

Imminent reversal

The key issue that kept returning, however, was that all of these achievements are now likely to be reversed at a rapid pace. The Western withdrawal from Afghanistan has already led to Taliban victories. The panel feared that much worse is to come. Petraeus lamented that America must learn that “endless wars do not end with a withdrawal or drawdown of American involvement.” In Afghanistan the fight is worsening. When fighting Islamic extremism, it is impossible to win in a traditional military sense. Instead, you need to keep pressure on even after the enemy is entirely destroyed. Petraeus therefore argued for a “sustained, sustainable position.” He believes that such a position had been achieved in recent years, and that the U.S. “will come to regret our decision to draw down our forces.” He fears “it will usher back in very violent civil war which will lead to millions of refugees, terrible loss of lives and bloodshed targeting those that helped us during our time in the country, and other challenges.”

Ahmad observed that Afghans tend to be optimistic about the achievements of the last decades. They see Afghanistan as a glass half-full. However, they fear that the glass half-full won’t matter if we’re going to throw the glass away as the Taliban advance. Lévy considers the withdrawal a betrayal by America and the West in general of its allies in Afghanistan. “The progress was considerable. The task well-achieved was huge. We were on the good road. We decided to erase all that and to quit.”

Watch the recording of the event here:

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The problem no one really wants to solve

Ten years after its internal conflict started, Elizabeth Thompson of American University hosted a panel on what the the Biden Administration might be able to do about Syria. Conditions there are dire. US policy has been disappointing. What can a new president do to establish a legitimate government able to rebuild? Mustafa Gurbuz, also of American University, moderated.

Hadeel Oueis of BBC Arabic reminded what has gone wrong in Syria. The Assad regime responded brutally to protests, which pushed them in the the direction of militarization and Islamicization, as militia groups and Islamists had advantages in financing and organization. Peaceful change was quickly ruled out. Today, the best prospects are in the Northeast, where the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control security and the autonomous administration governs in a decentralized way, with strong participation by women as well as checks and balances.

Amy Austin Holmes of the Council on Foreign Relations suggested we don’t know what to expect from Biden about Syria specifically, a subject neither he nor his people have addressed except for humanitarian imperatives, but if he wants to reclaim US credibility and moral authority bold steps are needed on three issues concerning vulnerable people:

  1. ISIS still a big problem, especially at the Al Hol camp. Washington should take back its own citizens from there for trial in the US and establish a timeline for other countries to take back theirs.
  2. Christians and Yezidis still under threat. Hundreds of thousands have fled the Turkish intervention in northern Syria intervention and should be enabled to return home.
  3. Kurds, and in particular Kurdish women, have been excluded from diplomatic talks on Syria. They play strong roles in northeastern Syria in both the SDF forces and in the civilian autonomous administration. Biden has given women important roles in his own cabinet, and it has been demonstrated repeatedly that women’s participation in peace talks leads to improved outcomes.

US forces are likely to remain in northeastern Syria to work by, with, and through the SDF, which has demonstrated significant capacity to overcome Arab/Kurdish tensions.

Dafne McCurdy of CSIS underlined that Syria will not be a top priority for Biden but that its humanitarian crisis ranks high, especially with Samantha Power at USAID. The situation is dire, but the US can have a positive impact because it is the biggest donor. It will need to focus on two priorities:

  1. Renewal of cross-border assistance in western Syria: The UN Security Council will vote in July on whether to keep open the one remaining authorized border crossing for aid to Idlib. If it fails to do so, the US may still be able to use nongovernmental organizations to ship aid across the border, but not at the scale that the UN is capable of.
  2. Reform of aid to regime-controlled areas, which Assad has used to reward supporters.

Humanitarian aid is not political, but stabilization assistance is, especially in an area of geopolitical competition. The US needs to buttress local authorities who stand up to outside meddling. But US goals have not been clear, because they are limited to one part of Syria and therefore disconnected from a nation-wide strategy. President Trump’s erratic policy did not allow stabilization to play its proper role in geopolitical competition.

Aaron Stein of the Foreign Policy Research Institute agreed that Syria is not a high priority for the Biden administration. The Syrian opposition won’t be a strong factor in its decisionmaking. The main issues will be humanitarian assistance and counter-terrorism. Washington needs to be talking with the Russians, who are in a strong position in Syria. Sanctions work to impoverish the Syrian regime, but they have been ineffective in producing a sustained political outcome. Some eventual sanctions relief in exchange for release of political prisoners is a possibility. The proliferation of arms and the large numbers of fighters will be problems for many years.

Idlib is essentially a stalemate, with Russia and the regime on one side and Turkey on the other, along with the HTS al Qaeda offshoot who are trying to soften their image. The best outcome is the status quo from the US perspective, but it leaves the US dependent on designated terrorist groups in both northwestern (HTS) and northeastern Syria (the PKK, which is the core of the SDF). The US is stuck with bad options.

Joshua Landis, University of Oklahoma, views Assad as having won militarily, as he now controls 65-70% of Syria’s territory but he wants it all. Washington wants political change and has used aid as a tool to feed the opposition as much as regime has used it against the opposition. Assad will focus in the immediate future not on Idlib, which is hard, but on northeastern Syria, because it is a soft spot. He may go after Tanf, which is important to trade links with Iraq and Iran. The Syrian people are pawns in larger geopolitical struggle

Trump used Turkey against Iran and Russia, thus limiting what Assad could do in the north. Biden is likely to be less friendly to Turkey but won’t want to undermine the Turks in Syria. Some Americans are talking about a federal Syria, with Idlib and the northeast remaining outside Damascus’ control as the US presses for regime change there. But in the end the big issues for the Americans are pulling Turkey out of Russia’s orbit and dealing with Iran. Biden might toughen on Iran in Syria because of the nuclear deal, where he will need to soften.

Bottom line: Syria is not a problem Washington will focus on, as there are no good solutions. But they are likely to keep troops there. If the Americans were to withdraw, the Kurds would be sitting ducks and would have to make a deal with Damascus. Their civilian and military organizations would crumble. At least now in the northeast there is a military command under a civilian government. In the northwest, military and Islamist forces rule under Turkish control.

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Stevenson’s army, January 13

State Dept says Sec. Pompeo cancelled his planned European trip in order to work on the transition. Reuters said the real reason was that he was denied high level meetings.
FP says Pompeo is ‘bluffing his way to a legacy.”
NYT piles on by reporting but disputing his claims about Iran and al Qaeda.
SASC hearing heard opposition to waiver for Austin.  Hearing recording is here. I was especially impressed by statement from Naval War College Prof Lindsay Cohn on why no waiver is important for civil-military relations.
Smart move: WSJ says Biden will appoint several acting heads of agencies pending approval of nominees.

FT reports on Turkey’s many overseas operations.
FBI tries to explain why warning of Capitol violence didn’t have impact.
Parler users were at Capitol.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Stevenson’s army, January 12

SecState Pompeo seems determined to change many existing policies before January 20
 in order to lock in Trump views and box in Biden. This week he did it with Taiwan and the Houthis. Yesterday he put Cuba on the terrorist supporter list. And today he going to link Iran to al Qaeda.
Meanwhile, Reuters says DOD is violating the new law blocking troop withdrawals from Afghanistan.

Dean Cohen calls for punishment of Capitol rioters.
Interesting case: MD Senators defend head of military medical school. 
Politico warns of extremists in US military ranks.

As the son of a policeman, I’ve long been concerned about the militarization of local police. TNSR has good  article.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Stevenson’s army, December 5

US is ending 5 cultural exchange programs with China, calling them propaganda.
Trump fires Defense Business Board, puts Lewandowski [!] and other loyalists on.
Administration announces US troop withdrawal from Somalia.
New documentary on VPs includes Biden explanation of his doubts on Bin Laden raid.

CRS has newly updated report on Special Operations Forces.

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It wasn’t Colonel Mustard in the study

The New York Times reports that “Israeli operatives” killed Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah (aka Abu Muhammad al-Masri) three months ago in Tehran. He was supposedly Al Qaeda’s second in command (and its number one is rumored to be dead as well).

The killing occurred in such a netherworld of geopolitical intrigue and counterterrorism spycraft that Mr. al-Masri’s death had been rumored but never confirmed until now. For reasons that are still obscure, Al Qaeda has not announced the death of one of its top leaders, Iranian officials covered it up, and no country has publicly claimed responsibility for it.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/world/middleeast/al-masri-abdullah-qaeda-dead.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage

There are other mysteries as well: why didn’t the Israelis or the Americans claim credit? President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu would have had an interest in doing so. How do Israelis or someone in their employ kill people on the streets of Tehran? Why was an Al Qaeda commander doing in living in Tehran? And who is the source of this story now and what are their motives?

Starting with this last question, the Times article refers to intelligence officials without identifying their nationality. Best bet is that they are Israeli, but they could also be American, Gulf Arab, or even Iranian. Each might have an interest in either committing the murder or letting it be known, especially in the transition period to the Biden Administration. There are few better ways to curry favor with the Americans than to kill an Al Qaeda commander. Someone might even hope for indirect credit for killing an Al Qaeda commander by revealing it publicly.

The Times suggests al-Masri had been in Tehran for a decade or more, hosted there either because Al Qaeda conducts operations against American interests that Iran likes or as a hostage to guarantee Al Qaeda would not attack Iranian interests. Both could simultaneously be true.

Murders of this sort in Tehran have happened repeatedly. The victims are often Iranian nuclear scientists whom the Israelis want eliminated. It might be Israelis of Iranian origin doing the killing, though it is hard to imagine that the Islamic Republic doesn’t know when they come to visit. Nor would Jewish Iranians still resident in the country be outside the purview of Iranian intelligence. Could it be the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)? I am told that is one reason why some Americans are soft on them. They however would also be closely watched if they dared to return to Iran. Or it could be some other “resistance” organization. Of course it is also possible that the Islamic Republic itself decided al-Masri’s time was up.

The impact on Al Qaeda is far from clear, even though months have supposedly elapsed. I suppose with Zawahiri on his deathbed Al Qaeda didn’t think it wise to announce that his heir apparent was dead. Decapitation of this sort has an uncertain impact on terrorist organizations. But Al Qaeda has survived decapitation before and it may well again.

Of course we may never know all the answers to all the questions about this assassination. But now we have precious few. All we really know is that it wasn’t Colonel Mustard with the candlestick in the study.

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