Tag: China
Trump in a china shop
President-elect Trump has talked by phone with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, breaking a tradition of non-communication at the highest level since the US downgraded relations with Taiwan and recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1979. Beijing has protested to Washington but is blaming Taipei in public.
The specifics of how the phone call was arranged remain murky. Did Trump initiate it, or President Tsai? Who else was involved? Did a Washington lobbyist or politician benefit from it? These things don’t just happen, but how and why in this case is still unclear.
So what?
Trump is claiming it’s no big deal: why shouldn’t he talk with the leader of a state that the US has close security and economic ties with? He is still a private citizen, even if president-elect. He has opted not to use the State Department in arranging for his congratulatory phone calls from overseas, presumably so that he is free to do as he likes. He likes to be unpredictable and not to give anything away for free: the phone call is in Trump’s view a signal to Beijing that it will need to give as well as get.
Part of the background to the phone call is apparently a visit to Trump from former US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton, who advocates closer ties with Taiwan. He is also rumored to be a candidate for Secretary of State in the Trump Administration. Bolton shares Trump’s “take no prisoners” negotiating style: put your opponent off balance and keep him there.
While the Logan Act of 1799 prohibits private citizens from negotiating with foreign governments in disputes with the US, only one person has ever been indicted under its provisions. Private citizens doing business with foreign governments without the approval of the US government is far more the rule than the exception. I could be accused of doing it myself quite often, even if I state explicitly in virtually all my dealings that I don’t speak for the US.
The real issue here is the One China policy, not the phone call. Taiwan in the 37 years since US recognition of Beijing (and de-recognition of Taipei) has become increasingly democratic, secure, and prosperous. President Tsai is no fan of One China, claiming instead that Taiwan is already a state but hesitating to claim independence and sovereignty. Should the US continue with the Nixon-era policy of supporting Beijing’s claim to Taiwan, or should it move in the direction of recognizing what many would regard as reality: that a democratic Taiwan will never freely accept reintegration with the mainland?
I don’t know the answer to that question, even if Hong Kong’s travails under Chinese sovereignty raise doubts. But I’m sure a congratulatory phone call is no way to reformulate a policy with gigantic implications for relations between Beijing and Washington, whose economies will remain locked in an inevitable embrace for decades to come and whose militaries will be competing as well as cooperating worldwide. This may be only the first of many Trump diplomatic maneuvers I doubt, but it is a particularly important one if you look past the phone call.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
My Goldilocks solution for the Middle East
In the final report of their Middle East Strategy Task Force issued yesterday, Steve Hadley and Madeleine Albright say
…the days of external powers trying to orchestrate and even dictate political reality in the region are finished. So is a regional political order of governments demanding obedience in return for public sector employment and related state subsidies.
They paint instead a future of external powers collaborating to help end civil wars, listening to local voices, and interacting with more responsive and inclusive governments. Their sovereignty restored, if need be by military action, these governments would join in partnerships with each other and compacts with external powers to encourage local initiatives, harness human resources, and incentivize regional cooperation. What’s not to like?
It’s that premise, which looks to me wrong. The US decisions not to or orchestrate or dictate a political outcome in Syria and Libya do not mean that the days of international intervention are over. Russia and Iran are for now doing quite well at it, even if in the end I think they will regret it. Egypt has in fact restored its autocracy and Bashar al Assad clearly intends to do so in Syria. Does anyone imagine that the post-war regime in Yemen will be a more inclusive and responsive one? It isn’t likely in Libya either.
I agree with Madeleine and Steve that failing to implement something like the reforms they point to will likely mean continuation of instability, incubation of extremists, and jihadist resurgence, even if the war against Islamic State is successful in removing it from its control of territory in Iraq and Syria. The instability in the Middle East is clearly the result of governance failures associated with the Arab republics, which had neither the direct control over oil resources required to buy off their citizens nor the wisdom to empower them and enable more decentralized and effective governance.
The question, which Ken Pollack rightly asks, is whether the US has the will and the resources required even to begin to end the civil wars and encourage the required reforms. I think the answer is all too obviously “no.” Ken suggests this means the US would be wiser to flee than to fight with inadequate means.
But the way in which we flee matters. It is the US military presence in the Middle East, which represents upwards of 90% of the costs, that needs to draw down, if only because it is a terrorist target and helps them to recruit. It totals on the order of $80 billion per year, a truly astronomical sum. While I haven’t done a detailed analysis, it is hard to imagine that we couldn’t draw down half the US military in the Middle East once the Islamic State has been chased from the territory it controls without much affecting the things Ken thinks we should still care about: Israel, terrorism, and oil.
Oil is the one so many people find inescapable, including Ken. It is traded in a global market, so a disruption anywhere means a price hike everywhere, damaging the global economy. But there are far better ways to avoid an oil price hike than sending a US warship into the strait of Hormuz, which only makes the price hike worse. For example:
- getting India and China to carry 90 days of imports as strategic stocks (as the International Energy Agency members do),
- encouraging them to join in multilateral naval efforts to protect oil trade,
- getting oil producers to build pipelines that circumvent Hormuz (and the Bab al Mandab), and
- encouraging Iran and Saudi Arabia to build a multilateral security system for the Gulf that enables all the riparian states a minimum of protection from their neighbors while encouraging protection as well for their own populations.
I would add that we need to continue to worry about nuclear proliferation, because the Iran deal only provides a 15-year hiatus, and to provide assistance to those in the Middle East who are ready and willing to try to reform their societies in directions that respect human rights.
All of this requires far more diplomatic commitment than we have been prepared to ante up lately, but it is not expensive (for the US) or unimaginable for others. A vigorous diplomatic effort far short of what Madeleine and Steve advocate but far more than Ken’s “flight” is the right formula in my view.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace picks, November 28-December 2
- Can Interfaith Contact Reduce Extremism Among Youth? | Monday, November 28th | 1.30pm – 3pm | US Institute of Peace | click HERE to register
The Pakistani government banned more than 200 groups as extremist or terrorist organizations last year in a significant move to stop the spread of ideological, religious and political extremism that can feed violent conflict. But many ideologically extreme groups still operate openly, especially recruiting young university students. In Sri Lanka, Buddhist ideological extremism fuels negative attitudes about minority ethnic and religious groups. Join a U.S. Institute of Peace Jennings Randolph Fellow Rabia Chaudry and other experts to discuss the findings of her research on these trends.
The panel discussion also will include two USIP experts and Ayub Ayubi, who heads a research organization in Pakistan, the Renaissance Foundation (Mashal-e-Rah), that has been a partner for USIP.
- What’s Next, For America and Israel? Challenges and Opportunities in an Uncertain World| Monday, November 28th | 4.30pm – 6pm | Johns Hopkins SAIS| click HERE to register
Dean Vali Nasr and The Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies cordially invite you to join Ambassador Ron Dermer, Ambassador of Israel to the United States, for a discussion on “What’s Next, For America and Israel? Challenges and Opportunities in an Uncertain World.”
The event will be moderated by Laura Blumenfeld, Senior Fellow, The Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies.
- Domestic Security in the Age of ISIS | Monday, November 28th | 6.30pm | Council on Foreign Relations | click HERE to register
Experts discuss how the United States can better prepare for and protect the homeland with the growing threat of ISIS inspired terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.
Speakers:
Michael Chertoff – Executive Chairman and Cofounder, Chertoff Group; Former Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Christopher T. Geldart – Director, Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency, District of Columbia
Farah Pandith – Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Presider:
Thom Shanker – Assistant Washington Editor, “New York Times”
- Conference: Facing a World in Turmoil | Tuesday, November 29th | 7.30am – 2pm | Women’s Foreign Policy Group | click HERE to register
Join us November 29th for our conference on Facing a World in Turmoil. The conference will include two panels. The first panel, Security at Home and Abroad, will focus on threats and challenges to national and international security and will include a discussion of the role of cybersecurity. The second, A World in Chaos: Challenges for the Next Administration, will address transnational issues like mass migration and terrorism. We are honored to announce that Secretary of State John Kerry will be our luncheon speaker.
- Beyond Borders: Reshaping Media Narratives around Migration | Tuesday, November 29th | 9am – 11am | International Women’s Media Foundation | click HERE to register
The International Women’s Media Foundation invites you to attend Beyond Borders: Reshaping Media Narratives around Migration, a panel discussion at the Newseum on Tuesday, November, 29th.
The Beyond Borders panel will feature Howard G. Buffett and IWMF Reporting Fellows Kimberly Adams, Raquel Godos, and Jika González. The Fellows joined the IWMF on reporting trips to the Mexico-U.S. border and Colombia as part of the IWMF Adelante Initiative discussing media coverage of migration in Latin America. Their reporting has appeared on Marketplace Radio, EFE and Univision.
The panel discussion will be moderated by Maria Hinojosa, anchor and executive producer of Latino USA on National Public Radio.
- What to Do about Russia’s Rising Profile in the Middle East | Tuesday, November 29th |9.30am | Atlantic Council | click HERE to register
Russia’s dramatic intervention in the Syrian civil war, expanding military relationship with Iran and overtures to long-time U.S. partners such as Egypt and Turkey present a new challenge to American leadership in a vital and conflict-ridden part of the world.
A conversation with:
Anna Borshchevskaya – Ira Weiner Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Thomas Cunningham – Deputy Director, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council
Alireza Nader – Senior International Policy Analyst, Rand
Aaron Stein – Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council
- A New Saudi Arabian Regional Policy? | Tuesday, November 29th | 2.30pm| Atlantic Council | click HERE to register
Saudi Arabia is engaged in two simultaneous wars, the first in Yemen, as leader of the Arab Coalition there, and the second, in Syria as a member of the anti-ISIS coalition in Syria. The Kingdom is also challenging the view that its foreign policy revolves around aid: it has cut financial support to the Lebanese Armed Forces while rolling back aid and suspending oils transfers to Egypt. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is witnessing shifting alliances and relationships with traditional partners and adversaries.
In light of the election of Donald Trump, how will Saudi Arabia’s relations with its neighbors and allies change, if at all? On November 29 at the Atlantic Council, the panelists will discuss these and other critical issues including intra-GCC relations, the future of Iraqi-Saudi relations, the war in Yemen, and the growing regional rivalry with Iran.
Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, a businessman and investor primarily active in the defense and security sector, is the Chairman of Shamal Investments and the Chairman of Alliance Services. Mohammed Khalid Alyahya, a Saudi Arabian political analyst and commentator, is also a research fellow at the Gulf Research Center and serves on the advisory board for the Future Trends in the GCC Program at Chatham House. Frederic C. Hof is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and specializes in Syria.
- Should We Fear Russia | Wednesday, November 30th | 10.30am – 12pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | click HERE to register
Please join the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for the launch of Dmitri Trenin’s new book, Should We Fear Russia? (Polity, 2016).
Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, there has been much talk of a new Cold War between Russia and the West. Russian President Vladimir Putin is widely seen as volatile, belligerent, and willing to use military force to get his way.
In this latest book, Dmitri Trenin, the longtime director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, explains why the Cold War analogy is misleading. Relations between the West and Russia are certainly bad and dangerous but, he argues, they are bad and dangerous in new ways. Trenin outlines the crucial differences, which make the current rivalry between Russia, the EU, and the United States more fluid and unpredictable. By unpacking the dynamics of this increasingly strained relationship, Trenin makes the case for handling Russia with pragmatism and care and cautions against simply giving into fear.
- A New Approach for the Middle East | Wednesday, November 30th | 12pm| Atlantic Council | click HERE to register
Under the bipartisan Co-Chairmanship of former US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and former US National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley, the Atlantic Council convened the Middle East Strategy Task Force (MEST) in February 2015 to examine the underlying issues of state failure and political legitimacy that drive extremist violence and threaten fundamental interests broadly shared by the peoples of the region and the rest of the world.
The result of almost two years of intensive study, Albright and Hadley’s final report proposes nothing short of a paradigm shift in how the international community and the Middle East interact. Not only does the report present solutions to the region’s most immediate crises in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, it also puts forward a pragmatic and actionable long-term strategy that emphasizes the efforts of the people of the Middle East themselves, with an eye toward harnessing the region’s enormous human potential.
- China’s Role in the Middle East | Friday, December 2nd | 8.30am – 1pm| Johns Hopkins SAIS | click HERE to register
At the beginning of 2016, President Xi Jinping visited Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt signaling Beijing’s new level of engagement with the Middle East. Chinese state media labeled China’s approach “bright, clear dawn.” But what are Beijing’s goals and how does it aim to achieve them? Focusing on both the security and soft-power dimension as well as energy and infrastructure, the Institute of Current World Affairs and the Johns Hopkins-SAIS China Studies Program will bring together leading experts to illuminate China’s evolving relationship with the Middle East.
SPEAKERS
Keynote: Kent Calder – Edwin O. Reischauer Professor at the School of Advanced Inter-national Studies (SAIS), Director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, Director of Asian Studies Programs
Naser al-Tamimi (from Doha) – Independent UK-based Middle East Researcher, Political Analyst, and Commentator
Jon B. Alterman – Director and Senior Fellow of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
I-wei Jennifer Chang – Program Specialist in the China Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace
Joshua Eisenman – Assistant Professor at the University of Texas at Austin’s Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs and Senior Fellow for China Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC
Chaoling Feng – Senior Research Associate, KNG Health
Sarah Kaiser-Cross (from Dubai) – Works for a private financial institution based in Dubai, focusing on the nexus of contemporary security threats and finance in the Middle East.
Camille Pecastaing – Senior Associate Professor of Middle East Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University
Robert Sutter – Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Let’s enjoy this election evening!
I’m doing a press briefing on the implications of the American election for foreign policy in a few hours. Here are the speaking notes I’ve prepared for myself:
- It is a pleasure to be with you tonight, as America concludes an ugly election campaign and decides on its 45th president.
- I won’t pretend to be neutral: I have supported Hillary Clinton with words, money, and even knocking on doors in West Philadelphia.
- But in these opening remarks, I would like to focus first not on the candidates but rather on the process, which is a complicated one.
- One consequence is that there is little uniformity: as you’ll see tonight, the states will close their polls at different times, starting in just a few minutes at 7 pm with Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia.
- The initial results will likely favor Trump, but swing states North Carolina and Ohio close their polls at 7:30 pm and by 8 pm lots of Clinton states close their polls.
- Key then will be Florida and Pennsylvania, and at 9 pm Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin. Clinton could be in trouble if she doesn’t win there.
- In the meanwhile, you’ll be getting exit polling from many of the “swing” states, those that might go one way or the other. Exit polls in my view are not terribly reliable: sampling errors can be significant, and in many states a significant percentage of people have already voted.
- Not only are rules and procedures decided by the states, but the vote in each state determines that state’s votes in the electoral college that meets in state capitals on December 19.
- Each state has a number of electoral votes equal to its number of Representatives and Senators. Because each state has two senators, this favors less populous (more Republican) states, but the reliably Democratic District of Columbia, which has no senators, gets three votes as well.
- As a result, an election can be close in the popular vote (polling suggests Trump and Clinton are within 3 or 4 percentage points of each other), but the electoral college difference can be big.
- If Trump were to get fewer than 200 electoral votes (and Clinton the remaining 338 plus), that might be considered a landslide, even if the popular vote is close.
- It is also possible for a candidate to lose the popular vote and win in the electoral college. That happened with George W. Bush and Al Gore in 2000. I went to bed convinced Gore had won.
- By morning, the Florida controversy had erupted and the election was eventually decided in the Supreme Court, which allowed Florida’s determination of the winner to stand and Bush to become President without a popular vote majority.
- The lesson here is don’t go to bed too early tonight. It may be late before the outcome is clear and unequivocal. In the last three elections it was past 11 pm.
- What does it all mean for foreign policy?
- First, I think an uncontested and clear outcome is highly desirable. The world does not need another month of uncertainty about who will be the 45th president.
- Second, there are dramatic differences between Trump, who prides himself on unpredictability, and Clinton, who has a long track record well within the post-911 foreign policy consensus.
- Trump is erratic, inconsistent, and hyperbolic. He wants to put America first, which he has defined not only as ignoring others, blocking immigrants, and doubting America’s alliances but also destroying the existing international trading system and illogically pursuing a bromance with Vladimir Putin.
- Clinton is committed, studious, internationalist, all perhaps to a fault. She once pursued a reset with Putin that failed. She wants to maintain the stability of the international system and restore American authority some think President Obama surrendered in his retrenchment.
- A word or two about what this all means in some important parts of the world.
- In the Middle East and Europe, including the Baltics and Ukraine, Clinton is far more likely to push back on Russian aggressiveness than Trump.
- In Asia, Trump has occasionally talked tough about China’s trade policy and suggested that South Korea and Japan might want to get their own nuclear weapons.
- Clinton would certainly not want that but might also be tough with China on trade. She would likely want to continue to build up American alliances in Asia, including with India and Vietnam.
- Both Clinton and Trump oppose the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), but Clinton would likely want to renegotiate parts of it and proceed while Trump would scrap it entirely.
- Presidents do not always get to decide which issues they focus on. I would expect Moscow and Beijing, and perhaps others, to take an early opportunity to test the new president.
- An incident involving China in the South China Sea? North Korean launch of a missile that could reach the US? A new push by Russian-supported insurgents in Donbas? An incident with Iranian ships or missiles in the Gulf? A massive cyberattack?
- Clinton understands the capabilities and limits of American power, as well as the need for allied support. Trump does not. He mistakes bravado for strength and unpredictability for leverage.
- Most of the world understands this and favors Clinton. Moscow may not be alone in favoring Trump, but it is certainly lonely.
- Those of us who enjoy foreign policy for a living—Republicans as well as Democrats like me—will likewise be almost universally relieved if she, not he, becomes president.
- But the evening is young. Let’s enjoy it with some questions!
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Managing South China Sea conflicts
I enjoyed some time with some smart colleagues yesterday discussing the South China Sea conflicts, unfortunately under Chatham House rules. Below are my own notes for the occasion.
Two points stand out in my memory of what others said:
- Oil and gas resources in the South China Sea are not promising and fish stocks are declining;
- The Chinese might well challenge the next president, or undisciplined pilots or naval captains might do so.
There were lots of other excellent points made, but I’ll have to hope that one of the students present might offer up their notes. I find it difficult to take notes while participating on a panel.
1. I’m truly honored to sit on a panel with distinguished colleagues. My advice to the students in the room is to listen carefully to them, as they know a lot about the South China Sea disputes and the legal background.
2. I don’t, but I was asked to talk about the conflict management implications of the recent arbitration and the outlook for resolving future maritime disputes in the region, including alternative methods of dispute settlement that China Studies and Conflict Management students will be exploring this fall and during a study trip to Beijing in January.
3. Let me begin with the bad news: if in order to ensure peace we need to settle the various claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea, I think there is very little chance of success.
4. Sovereignty claims are all too often resolved by force.
5. China has the advantage there. For the foreseeable future Beijing will be able to deploy force superior to any of the other individual claimants. Without US assistance, none of the South China Sea claimants would win a naval clash with China.
6. With US assistance, they might win, but only after causing incalculable damage to world order, the world’s economy, and international relations throughout the Pacific.
7. War would be a really bad way to resolve any of the South China Sea disputes.
8. Fortunately, other means are available. Arbitration is one.
9. But arbitration is a method that decides who is right and who is wrong. If it goes in favor of the less powerful state, the more powerful state is unlikely to accept the outcome. That is pretty much what we’ve seen in response to last summer’s arbitration decision.
10. But we’ve also seen another classic conflict management response: China is trying to buy off the Philippines, with at least initial indications of some success.
11. Billions are unlikely to make Manila cede completely, but it may render the arbitration decision ineffective, postponing rather than resolving the issue.
12. There are ample precedents for simply letting sovereignty claims slide. There are still more than five outstanding maritime boundary disputes between the US and Canada. They are mostly ignored in practice, even if neither country is willing to concede legally.
13. There are also ample precedents for cooperative regimes that do not necessarily decide the sovereignty question, or decide it without prejudicing economic interests, thus enabling disputants to gain at least some of the benefits that they think are rightfully theirs.
14. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia share production from a once-disputed oil field; Iran and Qatar share production from a disputed gas field.
15. Such cooperative arrangements are relatively easy where resources are concerned but particularly difficult where security issues are involved, since security is often regarded as a zero sum game.
16. China’s militarization of various non-islands in the South China Sea is perceived in Washington as a threat to US freedom of navigation there. So we send ships and aircraft to traverse locations that we believe are permitted, even if the Chinese think not.
17. In particular, the Chinese think military vessels and planes conducting espionage are not entitled to passage even in its Exclusive Economic Zone, so they may respond by declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone, or by challenging US naval ships or military aircraft. Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
What the next president will face in the Middle East
On Monday the Middle East Institute hosted the launch of the November volume of The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The event featured a panel of the Special Editors of the edition, Rand Beers, Richard A. Clarke, Emilian Papadopoulos, and Paul Salem, discussing the issue titled The Middle East and Regional Transition, Terrorism, and Countering Violent Extremism: What the Next President Will Face.
Clarke remarked that the next president will face a markedly different Middle East from eight years ago. The volume seeks to make specific recommendations for action as opposed to just a discussion of the issues. Two major and overlapping problems are determining how we see the issues:
- The number and role of failed states in the Middle East, of which there are now six or seven. These will continue to be a source of terrorism for some time.
- The role of ideologies, in particular how to address the violent jihadist ideology that is highly attractive to disaffected youth, not only in the Middle East but across all regions of the world.
Regarding the US role in Syria, Clarke recommends that we must not abandon the principle of ‘Assad must go’, as the US role in the Middle East will be permanently undermined if we do. The US must also take leadership in supporting the stabilization, economic stimulation and return of refugees in post-Islamic State Mosul and Raqqa, as simply removing IS from cities will not resolve any problems. Salem also suggested that the economic rebuilding of conflict zones in the Middle East is an opportunity to coordinate with China, which has demonstrated interest in building infrastructure and ensuring trade relationships in the region.
As former Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to the President, Beers focused on counter extremism measures. Since 2001 the focus has been on preventing the arrival of foreign nationals intending to commit terrorist acts in the US. But the trend has now shifted to radicalized Americans. Ninety-four people have been killed in the US by domestic terrorists since 2001, with 63 of those in the last year alone. The next administration must therefore focus on identifying individuals prior to their radicalization and on redirecting them. As the government itself is not particularly successful in communicating these messages the approach needs broadening beyond law enforcement agencies. Local nongovernmental organizations and religious organizations will be helpful partners in identifying those exhibiting patterns of behavior that suggest a move towards violent extremism.
Clarke remarked that to law enforcement’s credit there has not been a major foreign attack on American soil since 2001, however the next president should identify these successful components of the counter extremism program and cut down the excesses and inefficiencies that also plague the program.
Salem considers the Middle East to be in a perfect storm of dysfunction due to the disrupted regional order, the number of failed and fragile states, and underlying stress factors including demographic issues, climate change, and competing ideologies. He suggests some of the concerns in the Middle East that have dominated administrations in the past, such as Weapons of Mass Destruction and the flow of oil through the Gulf, are largely stable at this point, and Russia and China do not pose a direct threat to US security. Therefore the threat of terrorism should continue to be the primary concern of the US in the region.
The next administration, Salem thought, should continue to address IS and then focus on al Qaeda, try to rebuild the regional order, make more concerted efforts to end civil wars, and help to rebuild failed states. Salem agreed wholeheartedly with Clarke that Syria will not be resolved while Assad is still in power, but while waiting for a political solution the US must address the suffering of civilians. He considers President Obama to have failed in addressing humanitarian concerns. In response to a question on the future of the Sykes-Picot borders, Salem explained that the Middle East’s problems are primarily attributable to poor governance and institutions rather than the borders. The current borders are likely to endure but changes such as decentralization and federalism within states will be important.
The problems the next administration will face in the Middle East are complex, but the volume focuses on realistic recommendations for what can be achieved. The US must balance its military strength with non-military assets and smart power. While the Obama administration has cautiously withdrawn the next administration must reassert American leadership in the region and focus on re-establishing a regional order.
RSS - Posts
