Tag: Iran
Obama’s Syria options
Russia has in the last ten days deployed a forward operating base and ground troops in Syria, bombarded opposition forces the US supports, intentionally attacked hospitals, repeatedly violated a NATO ally’s (Turkey’s) air space and has launched long-range cruise missile attacks from the Caspian Sea. Russia is at war in Syria and signaling determination to win at any cost.
How should the US react?
Let’s assume direct military action (destroying the Russian base near Latakia, for example) is out. The United States does not want to go to war with Russia over Syria. Great power wars have a way of spinning out of control, with unintended consequences not likely to be worth our while. What else can Barack Obama do?
- Nothing. Or more precisely he can continue to denounce the Russian behavior as self-defeating and counter-productive, as well as likely to put Moscow into a quagmire from which it will find it difficult to emerge without costly consequences. The main difficult with continuing this policy is that it risks projecting an image of weakness and inviting more Russian aggression. It isn’t likely to do much for Barack Obama’s legacy either.
- Push the Syrian opposition into a negotiated solution that leaves Assad in place. This is what some close to the current administration have argued for. It is the most likely result of current UN mediation efforts. It would amount to surrendering Syria back to Bashar al Assad and solidifying Moscow’s and Tehran’s hold on the country. The problem with this idea is that it is unlikely to end the war, because a large part of the opposition will continue fighting, led by its most extreme elements. The Sunni world would regard this outcome as confirming America’s bad faith, dramatically reducing Washington’s influence in the Middle East.
- Mirror Russian behavior in Ukraine. Moscow has installed a forward operating base in a third country and is acting against forces we support at the request of a friendly government in Damascus. The US could install a forward operating base in Ukraine and even act against the rebel forces Russia supports, at the request of the friendly government in Kiev. This would risk a direct clash with Russian forces, but it is noteworthy that Moscow calmed the war in Ukraine before striking in Syria, suggesting that it doubts its own capability to act in both places at the same time. The US military should not have the same problem.
- Mirror Russian behavior in Syria. Like Moscow, Washington could strike against people it considers terrorists inside Syria: Hizbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps are both designated by Washington as terrorist organizations and both operate inside Syria. There is no logical reason to limit US action to Sunni extremists. The Shia variety is no more appetizing. Moscow’s action will make it an enemy in the Sunni world. The US is already an enemy in Iran and has little to lose there. Some Iranians would be happy to see the more extreme parts of their Islamic Republic forced to withdraw from Syria.
- Ratchet up sanctions. Putin is upping the ante in the hope of proving himself indispensable to a solution in Syria and using a political solution there to wriggle out of sanctions. We don’t need to allow him to do that, but could instead work with European allies, whose interests in stemming the flow of refugees will be hurt by the Russian military action, to “see” him and double down. Moscow is feeling the pinch of both sanctions and lower oil prices. If the Europeans and Americans can stick together, either Putin will break or the Russians will break him. Popularity doesn’t last forever even in an autocracy if the autocrat can’t deliver.
- Prevent Syrian helicopters from flying. The Syrian Air Force drops its “barrel bombs” on civilian areas from a relatively few remaining helicopters. Such attacks violate international humanitarian law. The UN Security Council has asked that they stop. Making clear that if they fly they will be destroyed, either in the air or on the ground, would be a relatively easy move and would signal a willingness to rebalance the military equation in the opposition’s direction.
- Increase support for the Syrian Interim Government. The war in Syria is unlikely to be won or lost on the battlefield. Who governs best will win in the end, both at the negotiating table and in the hearts and minds of the Syrians. Our allies in the Syrian opposition need a much more concerted effort to help win the civilian contest. Their capabilities have improved. But support arrives fragmented and irregularly. It should be constant and unified. The amounts may sound big–I would guess they need hundreds of million per year to make a real impact–but that is a lot cheaper than war.
Note the absence from my list of increasing humanitarian aid. We are already spending billions on it. The time has come to expect Russia, which is now causing humanitarian problems in Syria, to step up. Washington should tell Moscow that a contribution of $1 billion per year to UN relief in Syria is the minimum expected.
The trouble with writing an “options” post like this one is that someone will inevitably claim that I supported one or the other of these ideas. So I need to be explicit: I am inclined toward 5, 6 and 7, though I confess to thinking 4 is also appealing.
We should be thinking about all of them and not crossing them off the list too soon. If Putin keeps pushing, sooner or later we’ll need to push back. Force may need to be a last resort, but it should not come too late to make a difference.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace picks, October 5-9
- Toward a “Reaganov” Russia: Assessing trends in Russian national security policy after Putin | Monday, October 5th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | During their recent speeches before the United Nations General Assembly, Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama traded strong words on issues from Ukraine to arms control to Syria. The exchange between the two presidents unfolded as questions about Russia’s long-term foreign policy ambitions and grand strategy return to the forefront of policy debate. To better understand what lies ahead in Russian foreign and security policy, analysts must explore variances between Russian strategic culture and the agenda put forward by President Putin. Disentangling these differences will be crucial for U.S. policy planning of the future. Brookings Senior Fellow Clifford Gaddy joins Michael O’Hanlon, author of “The Future of Land Warfare,” to discuss their research on the issue, focusing on five possible paradigms for the future of Russian grand strategy. Former ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer, presently the director of the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative at Brookings, will also participate in the panel.
- United States and China: Trends in Military Competition | Monday, October 5th | 12:00 – 1:00 | RAND Corporation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Over the past two decades, China has poured resources into upgrading its military. This modernization, coupled with China’s increasingly assertive position in the waters surrounding the mainland, has caused concern in Washington and capitals across Asia. Recently, a team of RAND researchers led by Eric Heginbotham released The U.S.-China Military Scorecard report. This study is the broadest and most rigorous assessment to date of relative U.S. and Chinese military capabilities based entirely on unclassified sources. Join us to discuss the evolution of Chinese military capabilities in specific domains (air and missile, maritime, space, cyber, and nuclear) and the overall trend in the regional military balance over time; how Chinese relative gains could affect the strategic decision-making of Chinese leaders; steps the United States can take to limit the impact of a growing Chinese military on deterrence and other U.S. strategic interests. Eric Heginbotham is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation specializing in East Asian security issues.
- Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East | Tuesday, October 6th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join The Center for Transatlantic Relations in a discussion on nuclear Middle East. This discussion with feature Yair Evron, professor emeritus, Department of Political Science, Tel-Aviv University and senior research associate for the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel-Aviv. Additionally, Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, senior fellow for Center for Transatlantic Relations will participate in the discussion.
- The Pivotal Moment: How the Iran Deal Frames America’s Foreign Policy Choices | Tuesday, October 6th | 12:00 – 1:00 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | At the core of the debate over the Iran deal are two distinct visions of what American foreign policy should be. In contrast to the politicized efforts to frame foreign affairs as a choice between isolationism, regime change, or some nebulous choice in between, the controversy over the efficacy of the Vienna Agreement represents the real difference between the alternatives being offered to the American people. This discussion aims to frame the distinctions between progressive and conservative foreign policy and the choice they represent for the nation as it considers what kind of statecraft to expect from the next administration. Speakers include: Colin Dueck, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute, and Kim Holmes, Distinguished fellow, The Heritage Foundation.
- Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators | Tuesday, October 6th | 1:00 | Institute of World Politics | REGISTER TO ATTEND |Have you ever wondered what it would be like to be the child of a Stalin or Hitler, a Mao or Castro, or Pol Pot? National Review’s Jay Nordlinger asked himself this. The result is Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators, an astonishing survey of the progeny of 20 dictators. Some were loyalists who admired their father. Some actually succeed as dictator. A few were critics, even defectors. What they have in common, Nordlinger shows, is the prison house of tainted privilege and the legacy of dubious deference.
- India and Pakistan: From Talks to Crisis and Back Again | Wednesday, October 8th | 8:30 – 10:00 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The last few months have witnessed nascent efforts to restart high-level bilateral talks between Delhi and Islamabad dashed again by political maneuvering in both capitals. In addition, there has been an uptick in violence along the Line of Control in Kashmir and muscular signaling from both sides. Why has the latest effort between India and Pakistan to talk about the myriad issues between them fallen apart? What can we discern about the approach of Indian Prime Minister Modi toward Pakistan? How do civil-military politics in Pakistan inform its approach toward India? Are the two states doomed to a perpetual state of ‘not war, not peace,’ or is there hope for a way forward? Huma Yusuf , Wilson Center, and Aparna Pande, Hudson Institute, will discuss. Carnegie’s George Perkovich will moderate.
- What can Myanmar’s Elections tell us about Political Transitions? | Wednesday, October 7th | 9:30- 11:00 | Advancing Democratic Elections and Political Transitions consortium | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Elections are critical junctures in many transitions, providing clarity on whether a political transition is advancing or retreating – and Myanmar’s November 8, 2015 parliamentary elections promise to be such a watershed moment for the country’s potential democratic transition. Speakers Include: John Brandon, Senior Director at The Asia Foundation, Jennifer Whatley, Division Vice President, Civil Society & Governance at World Learning, Robert Herman, Vice President for Regional Programs at Freedom House, Jonathan Stonestreet, Associate Director of the Democracy Program at The Carter Center, Eric Bjornlund, President of Democracy International.
- A Saudi Arabian Defense Doctrine for a New Era | Thursday, October 8th | 10:00 – 11:30 | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Saudi Arabia has in recent years consolidated its place as the preeminent Arab leader, regional stabilizer, and critical bulwark against terrorism and a nuclear Iran. The Kingdom’s growing security responsibilities require rapid and substantial military investments. Prince Sultan bin Khaled Al Faisal and Nawaf Obaid, visiting fellow and associate lecturer at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, will outline a comprehensive Saudi Arabian Defense Doctrine for a new era and explain why the Kingdom is likely to double down on defense and national security capabilities in the next decade.
- The EU Migration Crisis | Thursday, October 8th | 2:30 – 4:00 |Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND |Dean Vali Nasr and The Human Security Iniative of the Foreign Policy Insitute Invite you to a panel discussion on The EU Migration Crisis. Speakers include: Michel Gabaudan, president, Refugees International, Reka Szemerkeny, Ambassador, Hungary, Peter Wittig, Ambassador, Germany.
- Democracy Rebooted: The Future of Technology in Elections | Friday, October 9th | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As technology plays an increasingly dominant part of our lives, its role in elections has come under scrutiny. We are at a crucial moment to review the policies that influence elections and the technology we use to execute them. Why can we call a car, book a hotel, and pay bills on our phones, yet elections are often still implemented with pen and paper? Legitimacy, access, credibility, and trust are the issues that will require policymakers and technologists to carefully script the implementation of technology in our elections. Speakers include: Governor Jon Huntsman, Chairman Atlantic Council, Secretary Madeline Albright, David Rothkopf, CEO and Editor-in-Chief FP Group, Pat Merloe, Director, Electoral Programs, National Democratic Institute, Mark Malloch Brown, Former Deputy Secretary General, UN, Matthew Masterson, Commissioner, Electoral Assistance Commission, Tadjoudine Ali-Diabacte, Deputy Director, Electoral Assistance Division, UNDPA, Justice Jose Antonio Dias Toffolio, President, Supreme Electoral Court, Brazil, Manish Tewari, Former Minister of Information, India.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
More Russia in Syria
Hamid Bayati a few days ago asked some questions about Syria for publication by the Iranian Mehr News Agency in Farsi and in the Tehran Times in English. This was before the Russian strikes. I answered:
Q: According to recent developments it seems new era begins in Syria to bring peace to this country and Iran and Russia leading the efforts to kick out terrorist groups from Syria, how do you evaluate this issue?
A: From my perspective, the problem is more complicated than kicking terrorist groups out of Syria. The key question is what comes next. Most analysts here think Bashar al Assad will not be able to reestablish his authority over areas that have been in rebellion. If this is correct, political transition and countering terrorism have to proceed at the same time. President Rouhani’s notion that the terrorists can be defeated and only then will it be possible to talk about political reform is unrealistic.
Q: Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned that any attempts to overthrow the government in Syria could lead to a failed state like Iraq or Libya, what is your idea about this view?
A: It could, but it needn’t. A negotiated political transition could provide the legitimate authority required to avoid a failed state. If a political solution does not happen, Syria will continue fragmenting into a patchwork of areas of control, with Kurds along much of the northern border with Turkey, relatively moderate insurgents in the south, extremists in the center and east, and the regime in Damascus and the west.
Q: In recent weeks we saw different news about Russia and China military activity in Syria, how do you evaluate this issue?
A: Chinese deployment is still a matter of speculation. Russia has already deployed
I doubt a couple of thousand Russians will be more effective than a similar number of Americans or Europeans. Russian air attack capabilities are significantly less accurate and effective than those of NATO countries. Collateral damage and the political backlash are likely to be greater.
The Russians can also expect to be targeted by suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices and other terrorist weapons. My guess is that Moscow has put itself on a slippery slope to much greater involvement in Syria, which cash-strapped President Putin can ill afford.
Q: Some experts say US agrees with Russia’s new approach in Syria? Is it true? If true what reasons led to West agree with Russia on Syria?
A: Washington unquestionably agrees that the Islamic State must be defeated, but the Americans are unlikely to align themselves openly with Russia in Syria, if only to avoid alienating the majority Sunni population there. US forces are not attacking Bashar al Assad’s forces, but Washington sees no solution in Syria without a commitment that he leave power. Moscow and Washington do however have to deconflict their military operations, to avoid any unintentional clash.
Q: What do you think about Iran, Russia, Iraq and Syria agreement on cooperation against Islamic State?
A: I think Iraq should get help from wherever useful help can be gotten. I doubt they will get much from Moscow, but that is for Baghdad to decide.
Russia will have to be cautious about appearing to align itself with Shia forces against Sunnis. President Putin is quite rightly concerned about Chechnyan and other Russian extremists. He should be expecting them to strike back not only in Latakia but also inside Russia. The notion that he can kill them all abroad and thereby prevent attacks at home echoes a line used by George W. Bush when the US invaded Iraq. It wasn’t true then and it is not true now.
In general, I don’t think enhanced Russian involvement in Syria and Iraq will make much difference to the course of the war there. Moscow deployed its troops because the Assad regime had weakened to the point that extremists were threatening western Syria, which is the heartland of the Alawite community and also hosts the Russian naval base at Tartous. The relatively modest deployment may block the insurgent advances, but it is unlikely to change the military balance much beyond that.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Protecting civilians as a strategic necessity
The Atlantic Council hosted an event Wednesday afternoon on “Protecting Civilians in Syria: Parameters of the Problem and Policy Options.” Congressman Ed Royce, chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Medical Director Rola Hallam, of Hand in Hand for Syria, Executive Director Valerie Szybala of the newly established Syria Institute, and the Atlantic Council’s Fred Hof argued that civilian protection is a vital strategic necessity in the Syria conflict.
Royce said 90% of attacks in Syria are on civilian locations such as markets, schools and hospitals. He quoted Congressman Engel’s 2013 statement predicting that lack of US engagement would generate chaos in Syria. Responsibility falls on policy makers who, he suggested, have dragged their feet.
Royce highlighted use of chemical weapons, involvement of organizations like Hezbollah and ISIS, and the activities of Russia and Iran. The Syrian Government is by far the largest abuser of chemical weapons. Chlorine and mustard gas are dropped from helicopters, which only the government operates. The purpose is trauma and terror, generating ethnic cleansing. It is a mistake to allow chemical weapons use to go unpunished.
Russia and Iran have further complicated the situation. Russia is bringing aircraft and tanks into Syria. Both Iran and Russia have increased diplomatic tension in the region with the suspicious “eleventh hour” efforts to lift the arms embargo on Iran in the nuclear deal.
Royce urged decisive action against Assad: “Assad must go.” Working to eliminate his deliberate targeting of civilians is an important step in ending the the conflict and slowing the advance of ISIS, especially the influx of individuals from outside Syria who have transpired from the “Virtual Caliphate” to physical fighters. He also supported a safe-zone to protect the Syrian civilians.
The second half of the event was a discussion on medical neutrality, sieges and barrel bombs. Hallam gave a moving statement on the reality of grassroots medical efforts. Her organization has established six hospitals in northern Syria. Rather than picking locations by supply routes or most demand, the organization unfortunately must choose places with the least risk of bombing. Safety is the number one priority. Over 300 hospitals have been specifically targeted, 90% by the government.
The crisis is political and military rather than humanitarian. Food baskets and stethoscopes do not stop barrel bombs. “Humanitarians are fattening up the cow before the slaughter” one Syrian told her. What is needed is strong political leadership to stop the bleeding. This will be remembered as the biggest catastrophe of the century.
Szybala shed light on besieged individuals in Syria in hopes of inspiring smarter policy options. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians are living under siege surrounded by armed actors who intentionally block the supply of aid over an extended period of time. Sieges are a “method of punishment” classified by Szybala as an “invisible crisis” under-reported by the UN. Besieged populations are targets of excessive violence and chemical attacks.
Hof concluded that the Security Council must take action. Civilian protection is a strategic necessity. What is happening is no longer mass murder but genocide, which requires an international response. Diplomacy has to focus on getting Russia and Iran to abandon their Syrian client.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Uncensored
Iran’s Fars News Agency asked me some good questions. Parts of the interview were included in this article, but parts were also cut, as one might expect. I am publishing here the full text, which I hope will find its way into print also in Iran:
Q: What is your opinion about Iran’s plan to resolve the Syria tension?
A: As I understand Iran’s “plan,” it involves 1) a ceasefire, 2) formation of a national unity government, 3) a rewritten constitution and 4) national elections. This is an outline many can accept, even if some might quarrel with the order.
But “the devil is in the details” we say in English:
1) How does the ceasefire come about? Who monitors and enforces it? What sanctions are there against those who violate it? What if some armed groups refuse to participate in it?
2) Who participates in the national unity government? Does Bashar al Assad step aside or remain as president? How is the security of opposition people participating in a national unity government ensured?
3) Who rewrites the constitution? Within what guidelines? How is a new constitution approved?
4) Who calls elections? Who supervises them? Who ensures a safe and secure environment for the campaign as well as the elections? Who counts the votes?
I suspect there will be many more differences over these questions than over the four-point “plan.”
Q: The UK recently announced that the conflict in Syria will not be resolved unless Russia and Iran use their influence on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to help reach a political solution. What do these signals mean?
A: I’m not sure what the UK meant. It is certainly the consensus in Europe and the US that there is no political solution in Syria if Bashar al Assad insists on staying in power. His opposition won’t stop fighting as long as he is there. Iranian and Russian support enables him to remain. I see no sign that either Moscow or Tehran is prepared to risk losing their influence in a post-Assad Syria, which will surely resent the enormous support they have provided him.
Q: What are Turkey’s roles in Syria and the region? Do you confirm its policy in the Middle East?
A: Turkey has four main interests in Syria: it wants Bashar al Assad gone, it wants Kurds in Iraq and Syria to stop supporting the Kurdish rebellion in Turkey, it wants defeat of the Islamic State, and it wants Syrian refugees to return to Syria. The proposed “safe zone” in northern Syria and the Turkish attacks on the Kurds and Islamic State aim to achieve all four objectives, though success is still a long way off.
Q: We know that Turkey had zero foreign policy sometime and it had gains some achievements but today it has taken distance from that. What were and are their problems?
A: As noted above, it has problems with Bashar al Assad, with the Kurds, with the Islamic State and with refugees.
Q: Why is the west silent on Turkey’s support for Daesh?
A: The West has longed implored Turkey to close its border to Daesh fighters and supplies. They have tightened up a lot since ISIS attacked inside Turkey.
It is a figment of Tehran’s imagination that the West is silent. Or maybe a creation of Iran’s propagandists. One of the things most resented in the West is Iran’s implication that the West is not really opposed to Daesh. Nonsense is the polite word we use for that allegation.
Q: Has the US-led coalition succeeded against Daesh?
A: No, but it has had some successes, taking back about one-quarter of the territory Daesh once controlled, depriving it of some of its revenue and killing quite a few of its commanders.
That one-quarter is mostly Kurdish-populated territory. Taking back Sunni-populated territory, especially in Iraq, is proving far more difficult.
Q: How can Muslim countries across the region led by Iran stand against Daesh?
A: The Sunni Muslim countries of the region don’t want to be led by Iran. They are fighting Daesh, but as part of a Western-led Coalition. Iran is also fighting Daesh, but coordination is difficult so long as Iran fails to distinguish between Daesh and more moderate Syrian fighters. From the Western and I think Arab perspectives, it looks like Iran is fighting to defend Assad for sectarian reasons more than it is fighting Daesh.
Q: Let’s go to Iraq. How do you evaluate the ongoing Iran/ Iraq relation? What about the future?
A: Iran has supported Iraq’s response to Daesh quickly and effectively, fearing Daesh success in Iraq would mean trouble sooner or later also for Iran.
But it has used the opportunity in particular to support Shia militias (Hashd, Popular Mobilization Units). That is a mistake, because it exacerbates sectarian tensions in Iraq and increases the likelihood of a breakup of the Iraqi state that Tehran says it does not want.
It seems to me that a strong but non-threatening and unified Iraq is what Iran should be aiming for. I don’t see it doing that at present. Instead the IRGC is pursuing a less wise policy of arming and otherwise supporting sectarian forces that will make keeping the Iraqi state together very difficult.
Q: What is your opinion about latest Russia military developments and build up in some parts of Europe and the Arctic? I do not mean Ukraine at all.
A: The Russians have legitimate interests in the Arctic. But past experience suggests they will try to bite off more than they can chew. They are already overextended in Ukraine and the Middle East. Putin has strong domestic political support, but he lacks the money and military capacity to sustain his aggressive foreign policy.
Q: And thank you for your participating. Could you please explain about Iran/West relations after the deal?
A: I don’t see Iran/West relations much changed, except for the prospect of much greater trade and investment, especially between Europe and Iran, once sanctions are lifted. But Iranian authorities have reiterated their hostility to the United States, which always gets a lot of coverage here.
Washington doesn’t care much about that but wants Iran to stop threatening Israel’s existence and subverting Gulf neighbors through a highly sectarian policy of supporting Shia forces (sometimes political, sometimes military), especially in Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon and Kuwait. Iran and the US share an interest in defeating Daesh, but active cooperation on that requires that Iran stop subversion of American friends and allies in the region. As we know only too well, subversion breeds resentment, not influence.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace picks September 14-19
1. Iran’s Regional Role After the Nuclear Deal | Monday, September 14th | 2:00 – 3:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | An internal debate is occurring within Iran about its regional role in the aftermath of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear program. Nasser Hadian will present the findings of his new paper which argues that Iranian policymakers are divided between those who believe Iran must act more forcefully to help stabilize its neighbors and those who advocate a more minimalist approach– contrary to perceptions that Iran is solely determined to expand its intervention in regional conflicts, particularly as they formulate their own JCPOA posture, US policymakers should be aware of this debate, seeking ways, where possible, of working with Iran to decrease conflict and to prevent traditional US allies from exacerbating instability. The Iran Task Force, chaired by Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat, seeks to perform a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s internal political landscape and its role in the region and globally, and explore opportunities for an improved relationship with the West. It is supported generously by the Ploughshares Fund. Speakers include: Nasser Hadian, Professor, University of Tehran, Bilal Saab, Senior Fellow, Middle East Peace and Security Initiative, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council. Moderated by:
Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council.
2. Addressing Nontraditional Security Threats in South Asia | Tuesday, September 15th | 9:30 – 10:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | India is positioning itself to play a leading role in Asia and globally. The Modi administration is investing in strengthening security relationships, accelerating economic growth, and increasing trade to champion this new outlook. However, India faces several nontraditional security threats, which may limit its power trajectory if not addressed effectively. Latha Reddy will discuss the policy implications of these threats- including water security, climate change, and cyber warfare- and how India will play a leading role on these issues within and beyond its borders. Speakers include: Latha Reddy, Former Deputy National Security Adviser of India and Huma Haque, Atlantic Council Associate Director, South Asia Center.
3. Development policies to foster stability in West Africa | Tuesday, September 15th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | West Africa is making impressive progress in economic growth, democratization, and regional cooperation. While the recent rise in violence and conflict as well as drug trafficking, piracy, extremism, and other emerging threats have sparked concerns over its future development, efforts to prevent conflicts have also improved, contributing to overall stability. In a new report, ‘The Challenge of Stability and Security in West Africa,’ the World Bank examines the diverse drivers of fragility-from issues related to land ownership, to a growing youth population with expectations for inclusion, to accelerated development of the extractives industry-and suggests development interventions that can contribute to peace and stability. Countries in West Africa such as Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia offer lessons in building resilience, highlighting the important role of development policy to address these challenges. On Tuesday, September 15, the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative and the World Bank will co-host a discussion about these dynamic trends in West Africa. After a brief presentation by the report’s author Alexandre Marc, chief specialist of the World Bank’s Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Group, Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon will moderate a discussion among Marc, Amadou Sy, director and senior fellow of the Africa Growth Initiative, and Raymond Gilpin, dean of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, exploring the nature and reality of these threats as well as potential for development solutions to address them.
4. Post Agreement: The Role of Natural Gas in Iran’s Energy Future | Tuesday, September 15th | 12:00 – 1:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join us for a panel discussion on the future of Iranian energy, particularly natural gas, in a post-sanctions world. The panel of Atlantic Council fellows includes Dr. Sara Vakhshouri, President of SVB Energy International, Barbara Slavin, Washington Correspondent for Al-Monitor, and Dr. Brenda Shaffer, Visiting Researcher and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University. Yeganeh Torbati of Reuters will moderate the interactive discussion on the following issues and more:
- The latest insight on the Iran agreement in light of the pending US Congressional vote
- Iran’s energy policy priorities in the near and medium term, particularly as it relates to natural gas
- The outlook for foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector
- The geopolitical implications of Iranian natural gas development.
5. Protecting Civilians in Syria: Parameters of the Problem and Policy Options | Wednesday, September 16th | 11:30 – 1:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Images of dead Syrian children washing ashore in Turkey may serve to overcome that which is charitably described as “Syria fatigue:” widespread American and international apathy in the face of a grotesque and growing humanitarian abomination in which civilians are deliberately targeted for murder. This is a catastrophe with policy consequences. What are its dimensions and what options exist for mitigation? UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon reported that the United Nations and its partners were unable to deliver food and aid to over 422,000 people in besieged areas in July. On August 13, US Representative to the United Nations Samantha Power decried the Syrian regime’s dropping of over 2,000 barrel bombs over a six-week period; the following weekend barrel bombs killed over 100 people in the Damascus suburb of Douma. Meanwhile, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Chief Antonio Guterres said the number of refugees is forecasted to reach 4.27 million by year end. While the United States expands its coalition with new partners to fight the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL), the Assad regime atrocities answered with words but no action bolster ISIS in its worldwide recruitment. Please join Ambassador Frederic Hof of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and a panel of distinguished experts for a discussion centering on the protection of Syrian civilians: the parameters of the problem and policy options for its mitigation. Panelists include: The Hon. Frederic C. Hof, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Rola Hallam, Medical Director, Syrian Civil Defense, Valerie Szybala, Executive Director, Syrian Civil Defense, and Raed Saleh, Head, Syrian Civil Defense.
6. Serbia’s future: Challenges and opportunities for regional stability, reconciliation, and integration |Wednesday, September 16th | 4:00-5:00 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On September 16, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings will host Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić for a public address on Serbia’s outlook, and how the country can enhance political and economic stability and cooperation in the region and reaffirm its European perspective. In his remarks, the prime minister will explore challenges and opportunities for the country and the continent as a whole, including the rapidly-growing influx of migrants and refugees and the importance of reconciliation in overcoming the difficult legacies of the past. Vučić became Serbia’s prime minister after his party’s victory in the March 2014 elections. Previously, from 2013 to 2014, he served as first deputy prime minister in charge of the fight against corruption and crime, and as minister of defense from 2012 to 2013. He is also the leader of the Serbian Progressive Party, which he helped to found in October 2008. Brookings Senior Fellow Fiona Hill will provide introductory remarks and moderate a question and answer session following Prime Minister Vučić’s remarks.
7. Iran in Central Asia and the Caucasus | Wednesday, September 16th | 5:00 – 7:00 | SAIS-Rome Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Discussion of Iran in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
8. Anwar al-Awlaki, Yemen, and American counterterrorism policy | Thursday, September 17th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On September 30, 2011, the U.S.-born radical Islamic cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, was killed by an American drone strike in Yemen, marking the first extra-judicial killing by the United States government against a U.S. citizen. Placed at the top of a CIA kill list in 2010 by the Obama administration, al-Awlaki was known for his intimate involvement in multiple al-Qaida terrorist plots against U.S. citizens, including the 2009 Christmas Day airline bombing attempt in Detroit and the 2010 plot to blow up U.S.-bound cargo planes. His calls for violent jihad remain prominent on the Internet, and his influence has turned up in many cases since his death, including the Boston Marathon bombing of 2013 and the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris early this year. In a new book, “Objective Troy: A Terrorist, A President, and the Rise of the Drone” (Crown, 2015), The New York Times national security reporter Scott Shane, drawing on in-depth field research in Yemen and interviews with U.S. government officials, charts the intimate details of the life and death of al-Awlaki, including his radicalization, his recruiting efforts for al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and the use of drone strikes by the United States to prosecute its counterterrorism goals. On September 17, the Intelligence Project will host Shane to examine the roles played by al-Awlaki in al-Qaida plots against the United States, al-Awlaki’s continued influence on terrorism, and the current state of al-Qaida today. Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion. Following their remarks, Riedel and Shane will take questions from the audience.
9. U.S. Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East: Priorities and Challenges | Thursday, September 17th | 1:00-2:00 | SAIS – Nitze Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Dean Vali Nasr and the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS invite you to join them for: U.S. Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East: Priorities and Challenges with Ambassador Anne Patterson, assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs and Ambassador Shirin Tahir-Kheli, senior fellow, Foreign Policy Institute.
10. Veiled Ambition: A Simulation of Iranian-American Relations in the Middle East | Saturday, September 19th | 11:15-6:00 | George Washington University, Philips Hall | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant broke onto the international stage, terrifying millions and forcing the United States to re-examine its policies in the Middle East. Since that time, the United States has successfully brokered a nuclear deal with Iran, Yemen has fallen to Shia rebels, and the Islamic State has continued to wreak havoc throughout northern Iraq. The Middle East possesses an undeniable strategic interest to the United States: both for its natural resources, and for the valuable allies the United States has made in the region. With Shia influence increasing throughout Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, the National Security Council must once again analyze its strategic priorities: is the United States willing to work with Shia militias to counter the threat of the Islamic State? Can, or should, the United States convince Saudi Arabia to work with a Shia Yemen to eliminate the al Qaeda threat in the region? How should western actors approach the Syrian Civil War, an unending crisis for nearly four and a half years.
RSS - Posts
