Tag: Iraq

Yes, Virginia, there is a Syrian opposition

A colleague writes in reaction to the news of Syrian rebel groups abandoning the exile Syrian Coalition in favor an alliance with Islamist extremists:

Can it get any worse for the opposition?  Can anyone provide a serious, authoritative read out on the opposition?  Is there any ‘there there’?

Authoritative, no, but I’ve met with quite a few Syrian opposition people over the past couple of years.  And I’ve supervised an effort to begin mapping Syrian civil society, which is varied, sincere and energetic if not robust.

There is a there there.  Secular Syrian civil activists started the rebellion against Bashar al Asad and they have continued it, even as violence engulfs them.  They have thought long and hard about the “day after.” They have examined options for governing Syria.  They have formed political parties, councils and coalitions.  They have lobbied for stronger US and other Western support.  They have formed a Supreme Military Council and a political Coalition. Read more

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Peace picks, Sept 30 – Oct 4

Fine, timely events this week in DC:

1. Reform Under Rouhani: Assessing Positive Change in Iran

Monday, September 30, 2013, 9 – 10.30 a.m.

The Stimson Center, 12th Floor

1111 19th Street, NW, Washington , DC

Speakers:

Ramin Asgard, former U.S. diplomat and former director of the State Department’s Iran office in Dubai

Arash Ghafouri, consultant to presidential candidates in 2013 election

Opening remarks

Klaus Linsenmeier, Executive Director, Heinrich Boell Foundation North America

Moderator:

Geneive Abdo, Fellow, Middle East Program, Stimson Center

To RSVP for this event, please click here.

The election of President Hassan Rouhani has led Iran’s political leadership to indicate that reconciliation between the Islamic Republic and the United States could be a distinct possibility.

In the immediate aftermath of talks at the U.N. General Assembly, please join the Heinrich Boell Foundation North America and the Stimson Center for a discussion on the positive social and political changes in Iran, the role of the Iranian youth in changing the political culture, and the implications of the Rouhani presidency on the future of US – Iran relations. Read more

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Moscow can deliver Damascus

Edward P. Joseph, my colleague here at SAIS and in the Center for Transatlantic Relations, offers:

US policy towards Syria rests on the premise that Russia can deliver the Assad regime to surrendering its chemical stockpile and to hoped-for talks in Geneva for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. While much has been said about Russia’s willingness to press Damascus, Moscow’s ability to bring its influence to bear has received less scrutiny.

While the subject is clouded in secrecy, there is every reason to believe — based on the dynamics of patron-client relationships — that Moscow does, in fact, command substantial, even decisive influence in Damascus.

Consider America’s own relationship with a Middle East client: Egypt. As was abundantly clear during the military’s ouster of then-President Morsi, Washington danced an awkward line, refraining from labeling the military action a “coup” because this would trigger a mandatory cut in substantial US foreign assistance to Egypt. Instead, Washington expressed its concern over Cairo’s anti-democratic direction in gingerly fashion, by delaying the delivery of four F-16.  This was a symbolic step, but hardly one that inflicted serious hardship on the military-led government. Egypt faces serious internal security issues, especially in the Sinai, none of which are amenable to attack by the latest fighter aircraft.

There was no mystery why Washington didn’t take a harder line. Had it cut foreign assistance, Cairo could plausibly have turned to Saudi Arabia for more assistance. The Saudis — animated by the departure of the despised Muslim Brotherhood — pledged to make up any cuts to Egypt by both the US and EU. Riyadh proved to be as good as its word, putting together a total aid package with other Gulf States topping $12 billion. In other words, the client, Egypt, held an (oil) barrel over the head of its American patron, thanks to the availability of an alternative, namely, Gulf states flush with cash.

Who can Damascus turn to if Moscow decides to amp up the pressure or ramp down support? Answer: no one, including Iran. Tehran is itself  attempting to emerge from international isolation and internal weakness.  Besides, it does not hold a permanent seat on the Security Council. Iran can continue to supply cash, personnel, materiel and regional support (directly through Hezbollah and indirectly through Baghdad), but in no way, shape or form can Tehran substitute for the support that Russia can provide. Russia provided Syria this spring with advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, designed to complicate potential Western military action such as a no-fly zone. Russia is the ‘sole source protector’ of Syria at the strategic level; Iran operates mostly at the regional level.  

Cautious China has shown no willingness to overstep Moscow’s high-profile role on Syria, preferring to follow its lead in the Security Council.  Beijing shares Moscow’s allergy to military intervention, particularly where democratic uprisings are involved.  But Beijing does not share the array of compelling interests that make Syria a significant Russian client.

Therefore the regime in Damascus, which is locked in a fight for its life, must listen carefully to the directions of its Russian patron. Does that necessarily translate into absolute, instant remote control from Moscow? Of course not. Perhaps like President Karzai in Afghanistan, Assad understands that his patron’s interests are tethered to his or at least his regime’s survival. But unlike either Cairo or Kabul, Assad has in Moscow a patron far less encumbered than Washington. Vladimir Putin does not need to worry about congressional oversight or even public opinion in his dealings with a petty foreign client like Syria. Indeed, Putin has shown utter ruthlessness dealing with domestic opponents, so why would he suddenly find scruples in dealing with Assad?

Syria is a long-standing client of Russia’s. This means that Putin, who hails from the KGB, has penetrating insight into the dynamics within the regime and what they mean for Assad’s own internal vulnerabilities, facilitating the exercise of Russian influence.  Moscow can avoid clumsy threats in favor of a more precise pressure points. If we believe that Moscow has, in certain instances, been demonstrably unable to get the Assad regime to do what it wants, we should ask if and how it pressured him to do so.

To believe that Moscow cannot, in the end, have its way in Damascus is to call into question the whole rationale of partnering with the Russians in the first place. If Russia cannot deliver the Syrians, then we are engaged in a colossal waste of time and effort. Empirical evidence tells us that this is not so. Assad himself in the span of 24 hours went from evading the question of chemical weapons with Charlie Rose to accepting (nominally, at least) international control of his stockpile after an apparent snap Russian decision.

While we must remain ever vigilant about Russian intentions, we should presume — remaining open to well-founded evidence to the contrary — that Russia does indeed hold sway in Damascus. When it comes to Syria, the general rule should be that what counts is Russia’s will, not its ability, to direct its Syrian clients.

 

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Still on the roller coaster

The Russia-US agreement on a Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons is certainly a breakthrough with respect to chemical weapons, if it is implemented with anything like the thoroughness and timeliness specified.  John Kerry has delivered on paper what President Obama has wanted:  an end not just to the use of chemical weapons in Syria, but destruction of Syria’s capability to make them and use them by the middle of 2014.

But the agreement, even fully implemented, does nothing to solve three other problems:  Bashar al Asad’s continued hold on power and attacks on Syria’s civilian population, radicalization of his opposition and his supporters, and destabilization of the region.  The number of people killed in chemical weapons attacks is no more than 2% of the total casualties in the past 2.5 years.  While the August 21 attack is said to have killed more than 1400, which would almost surely make it the most horrific single incident of the war, that number are killed more or less every week by more conventional means.

There is no reason to believe that this agreement, even if fully implemented, will reduce the overall level of violence and casualties. The agreement makes Bashar al Asad indispensable.  Neither Russia nor America will want to see him deposed until the job is done.  That of course gives him a license to kill and good reason to delay implementation as much as possible.  There has already been an uptick in regime violence.  He will certainly try to dawdle.  The Chapter VII threat of military intervention in the agreement is clear, but not automatic or unilateral: Read more

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Peace picks, September 16-20

A busy week ahead in the Nation’s Capital:

1. Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and the American Strategy

Monday, September 16, 2013 | 2:30 PM – 4:00 PM EDT

Brookings Institute, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20036

REGISTER TO ATTEND

Lying behind the turmoil over Syria is another, greater challenge. It is the challenge of a nuclear Iran, which already haunts our Syria debate. President Rouhani’s election has revived the hope of many that a negotiated resolution of this issue is still possible. However, the history of U.S.-Iranian relations leaves room for considerable skepticism. Should these negotiations fail too, the United States will soon have to choose between the last, worst options: going to war to prevent a nuclear Iran or learning to contain one. A nuclear Iran is something few in the international community wish to see, but many fear that a choice will have to be made soon to either prevent or respond to that reality. Can the U.S. spearhead a renewed international effort to prevent a nuclear Iran, or will it be forced to do the unthinkable: to determine how to contain a nuclear Iran?

In his new book, Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy, Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Kenneth M. Pollack tackles these daunting questions. Pollack delves deeply into what the U.S. can do to prevent a nuclear Iran, why the military options leave much to be desired and what the U.S. might have to do to make containment a viable alternative. On September 16th at 2:30pm, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host Senior Fellow Kenneth M. Pollack to discuss these sobering issues. Robin Wright, a United States Institute of Peace distinguished fellow and author of several highly-regarded books on Iran, will moderate the discussion, after which the author will take audience questions. Copies of the book will also be available for sale at the event.

 EVENT AGENDA

  •  Introduction

Tamara Cofman Wittes

Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy,Saban Center for Middle East Policy

@tcwittes

  •  Featured Speaker

Kenneth M. Pollack

Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy,Saban Center for Middle East Policy

  • Moderator

Robin Wright

Distinguished Fellow, United States Institute of Peace

Read more

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What Congress should do

I have resisted comparisons between Syria and Bosnia, or Syria and Kosovo, as the global and regional circumstances are different.  It does no good to draw conclusions that just don’t apply in a distinct situation. Bashar al Asad is not Slobodan Milosevic, the Middle East is not the Balkans, Yeltsin’s Russia is not Putin’s Russia, Obama’s United States is not Clinton’s.  Distinct times and places make for dicey comparisons.

But as the Congress considers what to do about Syria, some of its members will no doubt want to think about the Balkans, where American bombing campaigns twice ended wars that seemed interminable.  So better to help them get it right than to suggest they ignore the precedents.

My starting assumption is that Bashar al Asad did in fact use chemical weapons against Syria’s civilian population on August 21 and several other occasions.  If like Vladimir Putin, you think this “utter nonsense,” stop reading here.

If Congress decides to authorize military action, it needs to understand what President Obama has known for a long time:  we stand on a slippery slope.  How Bashar al Asad will react is anyone’s guess, but we know that Milosevic reacted to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia by escalating his effort to ethnically cleanse Albanians from Kosovo.  Likewise, the Bosnian Serbs reacted to the red line known as the “Gorazde rules” intended to protect UN designated safe areas by attacking Sarajevo.  NATO responded by escalating in turn.  If Bashar al Asad repeats chemical attacks, or sponsors terrorist attacks against American assets around the world, Washington needs to be prepared to escalate.

But bombing and escalation are not a policy.  Nor is a well-targeted and time-limited bombing campaign an appropriate response to mass murder of civilians with chemical (or any other) weapons.  Bashar al Asad is not a military problem.  He is a political one.  The military is a blunt instrument that should be wielded within the context of a broader political strategy to end his rule in Syria, block an extreme Islamist takeover, and put Syria on course towards a more open and democratic society.

The bombing in Bosnia was extensive, eventually reaching the communication nodes of the Bosnian Serb army. It was those tertiary targets that changed the course of the war, because the Serbs were unable to protect their long confrontation line with the Federation forces once they lost their classified communications capability.  But even this extensive bombing might have been fruitless, or borne bitter fruit, had it not been accompanied by a diplomatic strategy, which today we associate with the Dayton agreements and Richard Holbrooke but at the time was associated with President Clinton and National Security Adviser Tony Lake.

Likewise in Kosovo, the NATO bombing followed on Yugoslav rejection of the Rambouillet agreement.  The war ended with UN Security Council resolution 1244, which was the political counterpart of the military-technical agreement providing for withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from Kosovo.  Resolution 1244 imposed UN administration on Kosovo to develop democratic institutions and rule of law, with a view to an eventual political decision on Kosovo’s final status.  NATO did not set removal of Milosevic as a war objective.  But he was gone within one and a half years as the result of an election he called and a mass nonviolent movement that demanded he accept it.

I am not privy to the Administration’s military planning, but a serious political strategy would continue to aim for a power-sharing arrangement that shoves Bashar al Asad aside.  The diplomacy would likely benefit from broader military action (against the Syrian air force, Scuds and artillery) than is currently contemplated, especially if it aimed at tilting the battlefield in the opposition direction.  I don’t know if the Congress is willing to point in that direction, as it might require deeper American commitment than we can afford at present.  But at the very least Congress should insist on stronger support for the Syrian opposition.

Is there an American interest in getting more deeply involved?  Continuation of the war will likely cause state collapse in Syria as well as weaken Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and possibly Turkey.  Al Qaeda affiliated extremists in both Iraq and Syria will be the beneficiaries.  Kurdish irredentism is a likely consequence.  The Syrian war has the potential to reshape the Levant in ways that are inimical to American interests.  If Congress is going to worry about military action in response to chemical weapons use by Syria, it should also worry about a political and military strategy to counter longer-term threats to Middle East peace and stability with potentially gigantic costs to the United States.

 

 

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