Tag: Kurds

Limits of US-Turkey cooperation in Syria

The panel. PC: Eddie Grove
The panel. PC: Eddie Grove

On Thursday, the SETA Foundation hosted a talk entitled The U.S.-Turkey “Safe Zone” Agreement: What does it mean?.  Panelists included: Sabiha Senyucel, research director of the Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), Mark Perry, independent author, Melissa Dalton, fellow and chief of staff at the CSIS International Security Program, and Kadir Ustun, Executive Director of the SETA Foundation. Kilic B. Kanat, research director of the SETA Foundation, moderated.  The panelists believe that the recent US-Turkey cooperation in Syria will remain limited because Turkey and the US continue to have divergent interests.

Senyucel said that the recent bombing in Southeast Turkey pushed Turkey to take a more active role in the anti-ISIS coalition.  Now the coalition can use İncirlik for bombings.  The Kurdish issue is no longer just a domestic Turkish issue.  The Turkey-PKK peace process is finished for now, but Senyucel hopes it can restart soon.  The roles of the PKK, the PYD and the Syrian Kurdish entity are all linked.  YPG fighters fought ISIS in Kobane, giving the Kurds international legitimacy.  This changed the Kurds’ thinking about what they could achieve regionally.

Istanbul by night, from the air.  PC: Eddie Grove
Istanbul by night, from the air. PC: Eddie Grove

After Kobane, the YPG and PKK demonstrated that they could fight ISIS on the ground and US airstrikes helped them take Tel Abyad.  This concerned Turkey, which has good reason to distrust the PYD because of its links to the PKK. After the Gezi Park protests, the PKK stopped honoring its commitments and asserted de facto control over some parts of Eastern Turkey.  There may have been mistakes from the Turkish side, but the Turkish government also displayed restraint.  The PKK’s mid-July announcement that they were returning to arms was unjustified. Turkey is now reminding the PKK that they won’t achieve their ambitions.  The US has agreed to support Turkey in this, but Senyucel isn’t sure how long this will last.

Kadir asserted that the US and Turkey can’t agree on the big picture in Syria.  Obama believes the US only has limited interests; he isn’t trying to fix Syria.  The PYD is a local actor that can contribute to the US’s non-strategy strategy.  Turkey has tried to protect its border, host refugees, prevent the spillover of the conflict and resolve the Kurdish question.  Necessity has limited Turkish actions.  Turkey can’t ally with the PKK-linked PYD; the PKK has asserted de facto control over some towns in eastern Turkey and hasn’t fully committed to withdrawing guerrillas.

Turkey will allow the US to use İncirlik and will work to create a safe zone in Syria for the moderate opposition.  Ankara wants a broader strategy from the US, but the US is uninterested.  Will planes taking off from İncirlik help the PYD?  The PYD has been reluctant to distance itself from the PKK and stop expelling Arabs from its territory.  The PYD also allows Assad’s air force to overfly the territories it controls.  If these things continue, the US and Turkey won’t come to a real agreement, but both sides need a broader strategy to make lasting progress.

Dalton agreed that the US and Turkey have divergent objectives.  The Turks have called the recent agreement a safe zone, but the US has avoided this term.  The agreement will involve enhanced border cooperation.  The length of this cooperation area will be ~65 miles, but other elements are unknown:

  1. How deep into Syria will it go?
  2. Will Assad’s air force be excluded?
  3. Will there be cover for civilians in nearby cities outside the zone?

Broader US-Turkey cooperation will be needed for a long-term solution, but the anti-ISIS fight and border cooperation are likely to be the focus for now.

Perry highlighted the fact that there is unlikely to be any well-articulated US strategy from this administration, but there are three observable US policy principles:

  1. We maintain relations with allied regional states despite difficulties.
  2. Our enemy is Islamic extremism.
  3. There is no appetite for strong anti-Assad action.

We want Assad to lose, but don’t want his opponents to win.  This is a tough line to walk with Turkey.  The use of İncirlik will allow the US to gather better drone intelligence.  Assad is unlikely to launch air operations in the area of the proposed safe zone because Assad doesn’t want to tangle with the US Air Force.  The Obama administration’s vagueness may not be bad.  The US has made many foreign policy mistakes; doing nothing is a viable option since Syria is so complex.  We can protect our friends, maintain our strength, assist the victims, and remain friendly with Erdogan, without further intervention.

Qasr Kharaneh, Jordan, near the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center,  where the US and Jordan conduct joint exercises.  It is believed that some of the rebels in the train and equip program are being trained in Jordan. PC: Eddie Grove
Qasr Kharaneh, Jordan, near the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center, where the US and Jordan conduct joint exercises. It is believed that some of the rebels in the train and equip program are being trained in Jordan. PC: Eddie Grove

Barbara Slavin, nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council South Asia Center, asked about the US train and equip program.  Many of the 54 rebels that we have trained have reportedly been captured by Jabhat Al-Nusra.  Slavin asked whether the possible safe zone could be an injection point for these rebels. Dalton stated that it could be used for this purpose, because there is currently no other logical injection point.  However, questions about how and at what cost the US and Turkey plan to protect such a zone remain.  Kadir took a similar position, noting the slowness of the program.  Perry discounted the program entirely, noting that the last successful US train and equip program was in the Philippines in 1899.  The US is keeping the fiction of train and equip so that we can keep our hand in the game in Syria.

 

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Insider views on ISIS in Iraq

Screen shot 2015-07-31 at 4.16.02 PMOn Thursday, Stimson hosted a discussion in cooperation with the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani (AUIS) entitled Threat Of ISIS In Iraq: Views From The Ground. Speakers included: Stimson Middle East Fellow Geneive Abdo, , Brookings Non-resident Fellow Christine van den Toorn, AUIS Director of the center for Development and Natural Resources Bilal Wahab.  Three AUIS students, Noaf, Anas, and Khusai were featured in recorded videos. Lukman Faily, Iraqi Ambassador to the US, also spoke.  Stimson President Ellen Laipson moderated.

AUIS was founded in 2006. Students come from many religious backgrounds and Iraqi regions, as well as from neighboring countries.

Van den Toorn, explained that Iraq is more complicated than the discourse in DC.  The students from AUIS explained the situation in their regions.

Noaf is from Sinjar.  He and his 6 brothers all finished college.  He was supposed to study in Mosul after high school but had worked as a translator for US troops and is Yazidi, so he feared for his safety. He got a scholarship to study at AUIS and graduated with a degree in Business Administration.

Noaf (top left) is from Sinjar (top right), Ninewah Province (bottom left), Iraq (bottom right).
Noaf (top left) is from Sinjar (top right), Ninewah Province (bottom left), northwestern Iraq (bottom right).

ISIS still threatens Sinjar and tried to take back his village, Hanasour, two days ago.  The northern part of Sinjar was liberated from ISIS five months ago and many different actors are defending the area.  Military leaders believe a unified force could liberate the rest of Sinjar in 3-4 days. Noaf wants autonomy for Sinjar with NATO protection.  The people of Sinjar have lost trust in both Iraqi and KRG security forces; an international force would allow the IDPs to return.  Sinjar has agriculture and oil, so it could have its own economy.

Anas was born in Samarra, Saladin Governorate.  His father had refused to join the Ba’ath Party, was forced into the military, and died.  He graduated with an engineering degree from AUIS.

Anas (top left) is
Anas (top left) is from Samarra (top right), Saladin Province (bottom left), north-central Iraq (bottom right).

The economy in Samarra is bad because Samarra is controlled by the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs). Last year, ISIS entered half of the city, but left the next day. ISIS is now 20 km away.  Samarra is 100% Sunni, but about 90% of the security forces are Shia.  Some PMUs are good; others are criminals.  Locals are hesitant to join the PMUs because some of those who fought Al Qaeda in 2006 were later arrested by the government.  The PMUs should transfer control to the local police.  Tikrit has been liberated, but most residents haven’t returned because the PMUs have arrested some returnees.  The PMUs, not the government, decide who can and cannot return to liberated areas.  Returnees to some villages have found homes and shops destroyed and Shia flags flying.  There is a misconception that Sunnis support ISIS,  but ISIS destroyed Sunni regions.  ISIS killed two of his uncles.  The problem is that Iraq’s central government treats Sunnis as enemies.

Khusai was raised in Baghdad, but his parents are from Najaf.  He finished high school in 2008 when the security situation was terrible.  He went to AUIS to study in a safe environment.  He works in finance in Baghdad.

Khusai (top left) is from Baghdad (top right/bottom left), central Iraq (bottom right).
Khusai (top left) is from Baghdad (top right/bottom left), central Iraq (bottom right).

The security situation was very bad before Ramadan in Baghdad.  During Ramadan, the situation improved and the curfew was lifted.  ISIS will not invade Baghdad because it is protected by the PMUs. But Baghdadis fear the PMUs because they are armed criminals.  Fortunately, their presence in the city center has recently decreased.

Southern Iraq remains safe, but some residents resent the costly war.  Additionally, the IDPs in the south are causing higher prices and competition for jobs.  But most southerners still believe in one Iraq, and want to liberate the northern cities, because of Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa.

Wahab said that centralization in Iraq has been a failure.  There have been attempts to create an Iraqi identity, through both force and co-optation using oil wealth.  The 2003 invasion offered the opportunity to decentralize, but centralization has been stronger.  In response, the KRG is pushing for statehood.  Basra is also looking for more autonomy and some in Kirkuk talk of a distinct Kirkuk region.

The government controls 50% of the economy.  The economic power of the executive branch makes it hard to hold it accountable.  The collapse of oil prices hurt the economy, which suffers if the government cannot inject enough cash into it.  Government expenses have also increased because of military costs.

Without a comprehensive, international strategy to defeat ISIS, regional powers and domestic players will continue to use the crisis to their advantage, e.g., the PMUs.  Kurdish society is less united than before as it argues over who deserves the credit for holding back ISIS.  Within Iraq, both political and economic reform are needed.

Abdo spoke about how religious identity in Iraq has nearly replaced the identity of Iraqi citizenship.  The fight for a united Iraq is true more in theory than in reality.  Religion is being used for political gain in Iraq, as it has been in Lebanon and Bahrain. Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa asking his followers to take up arms is rare in Shi’ism and shows urgency, but Sistani can no longer control the PMUs.  The Shia have been radicalized too.

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Ambassador Faily

Ambassador Faily noted that all sides in Iraq blame others.  This is a vicious cycle, with no magic solution.  Everyone has agreed to decentralization, but getting there necessitates a dialogue towards a common strategy. ISIS is an existential threat to Iraq and is a problem for all of Iraq’s communities.  Dealing with ISIS will take time, but respect for the integrity of the state is key.  Those who want power at the state’s expense will harm everyone.  The US plays an important supportive role but should give Iraq breathing space to improve its politics.

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The Turkey/Syria conundrum

This discussion of Turkey and Syria on CCTV America yesterday went well. Mike Walter moderated with the following guests: 

  • Cale Salih, from Oxford, is a visiting fellow to the European Council on Foreign Relations focusing on the Kurdish people.
  • Daniel Serwer is a professor in conflict management at Johns Hopkins University.
  • Tulin Daloglu from Ankara is a Turkish journalist and opinion writer.
  • Joshua Walker is a transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, a non-partisan U.S. think tank.

And part 2:

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Energy markets: US up, Middle East down

Screen Shot 2015-07-23 at 4.00.31 PMThursday, the Atlantic Council hosted a talk on energy policy entitled “The Future of Energy Markets: The Other Middle East Revolution.” The event featured Majid Jafar, Chief Executive Officer of Crescent Petroleum as the key speaker. Richard Morningstar, Founding Director of the Global Energy Center at the Atlantic Council moderated the event.

Jafar recounted the changes in the energy markets in the past 15 years. In 2000, the price of oil was in the low teens and natural gas was $10. The US was an importing country, which meant it was building LNG terminals everywhere. The Middle East was relatively stable. More than a decade later, the price of natural gas has plummeted again, but the US has become an exporting country. The shale oil and gas boom has led the US to convert its LNG terminals for export. Equally if not more importantly, the Middle East has become very unstable.

US Private Sector

Jafar also emphasized the power of US private sector. He claimed the energy breakthrough was despite rather than because of government policy and lauded the US for its long-term strategic energy planning. The US has experienced a large drop in carbon emissions while seeing huge job creation in the oil and gas sector. In contrast, European countries, such as Germany, set ambitious targets like zero fossil fuels and made a mad dash for renewable energy sources. This move stifled the Germany economy and inflicted huge costs on Germany households and industries. Ironically, Germany is experiencing rising emissions and is having to import coal from the US.

Lessons Learned

The CEO shared three lessons he had learned from his experience in the energy industry:

  1. Do not underestimate the power of the US private sector, especially in the energy industry. Huge innovation can drive many changes.
  2. Never underestimate the ability of the Chinese public sector to complete their plans. The East-West pipeline is a classic reflection of the Chinese capability in completing large-scale projects.
  3. Never underestimate the ability of the Middle East public sector to get things wrong.

Jafar added that the unique US ecosystem cannot be replicated elsewhere. It includes infrastructure, capital markets, energy trading hubs, many small companies and a system of mineral rights. However, other countries can learn to provide better access to finance, encourage competition and transparency, and expand their private sectors.

The Middle East

The Middle East contains half the world’s proven oil and gas resources but accounts for less than a 1/3 of global oil exports and less than a 1/6 of global gas exports. The region has experienced a declining market share due to numerous conflicts, years of Iran sanctions and poor policies. Energy subsidies in particular pose major problems. The region has lost $225 billion to subsidies, which do not even help the poor people who are supposed to be the beneficiaries. The good news is that the current low oil prices provide many countries the opportunity to reform subsidies, because the gap between the market price and subsidized price is small.

Egypt is a good example. It has committed to reforming energy subsidies, because they are unsustainable and divert money from important areas of investment that create jobs. Egypt’s spending has been divided between debt service, salaries and subsidies, which left the government with little to spend on investment, infrastructure and jobs.

Another problem with the region is the dominance of national oil companies, which hinder competition and positive performance. When an energy minister is also the chairman of the oil company, there is no difference between the regulator and the regulated, which hurts policymaking. Some countries, such as Kuwait, Iran and Saudi Arabia, have realized this and partnered with private investment companies. Jafar said he is not calling for complete privatization, merely a bigger role for the private sector in developing state assets.

Iraq

Jafar also detailed Iraq’s important role in the energy world. The failing state is responsible for 40% of global oil export growth despite failure to pass hydrocarbon legislation, a lack of internal consensus on energy policy and the ISIS presence. Iraq’s production is nevertheless at an all-time high, making it the second biggest producer in OPEC. If Iraq gets its act together, it could produce 6-12 million barrels of oil per day. Iraq may have larger oil reserves than Saudi Arabia—at least 300 undrilled structures lie in the Western desert.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has done well in passing legislation, working with private companies and essentially getting the policy right. But it faces implementation challenges because the Baghdad government is unable to pay the KRG for its oil. In southern Iraq, the latest market methods have been used with transparent bidding rounds involving private companies. However, the decision to sign service contracts was a bad one, because it means southern Iraq has to pay private oil companies a fixed fee regardless of the price of oil. With the oil price collapse, southern Iraq can no longer afford to pay the companies and is discouraging investment. A new contract model is needed where companies receive a percentage of the government’s oil profits, as opposed to a fixed fee. More importantly, a stable security environment is needed to encourage continued investment.

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House of Kurds

On Wednesday, the Middle East Institute hosted a talk by Hemin Hawrani, a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Leadership Council and the head of its foreign relations office, entitled Dynamics in Iraqi Kurdistan.  Randa Slim (director of the Track II Dialogues initiative at The Middle East Institute and an adjunct research fellow at the New America Foundation) moderated.  Hawrani gave a comprehensive presentation about the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)’s role in the fight against ISIS, Iraqi Kurdistan’s prospects for independence, and internal KRG politics.

Hawrani asserted that the war against ISIS will be lengthy because ISIS is the symptom of the problem, not the problem itself.  The KRG has a three- phase strategy to counter ISIS:

1. Stop ISIS- this has been accomplished on the ISIS-KRG front.

2. Roll back ISIS- this has been largely accomplished on the ISIS-KRG front, as the Peshmerga have liberated 20,000 kmfrom ISIS control.

3. Defeat and destroy ISIS- Still a long way off.  Over 1,200 Peshmerga have died in this fight.  ISIS continues to gain ground on other fronts. ISIS has managed to almost fully replenish its killed fighters with new recruits.

Screen Shot 2015-07-09 at 3.09.14 PMHawrani stated that the KRG is a reliable partner in the fight against ISIS, but they need more assistance because ISIS outguns them.  The fighting is different that the Peshmerga has encountered in the past because the majority of casualties are from IEDs and suicide bombers. The Peshmerga need more armored personnel carriers, tanks, and high power rifles. They only have 40 MRAPs but need approximately 400 to deploy their forces. They also need transport aircraft, as well as advisory support to modernize their forces.  The KRG needs direct arms shipments to avoid delays in Baghdad as well as more help supporting 2 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Baghdad, Hawrani said, is doing little to help.  Iraq is broken and cannot go back to the pre-2014 situation.  The KRG supported Abadi to be Prime Minister for all Iraqis and concluded an agreement with him to receive a portion of Iraq’s budget in exchange for oil from Kirkuk.  Baghdad has not kept its side of the agreement, or its promises to Sunni Arabs. Baghdad claims it lacks cash, but it has money for the Shi’ite PMUs. Baghdad must either commit to helping the KRG or not interfere with the KRG.

Hawrani stated that the independence for Iraqi Kurdistan is a process and that it will happen.  The KRG plans to hold an independence referendum for all citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan (Kurds and others) in the next couple of years. The options posed by the referendum will include:

1. A fully independent Iraqi Kurdistan.

2. An independent Iraqi Kurdistan in a confederation with Iraq.

3. The status quo.

The Kurds will discuss independence with Baghdad before any other capitals because they want to pursue this amicably.  The KRG seeks to reassure Ankara and Tehran that their desire for independence is not a threat.  The KRG does not have a pan-Kurdish agenda and seeks a peaceful, internal solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey and Iran.

The KRG has done its part to be part of a pluralistic Iraq, but the Iraqi state has failed and Kurds no longer want to be part of an uncertain future.  Even a fully independent Iraqi Kurdistan would not fully break with Iraq because there would still be economic and defense ties.  There might also be a shared currency and shared oil resources.   An independent Iraqi Kurdistan would add to the number of functioning states in the region.  A referendum will also be held in Kirkuk and other disputed areas to determine if they want to join Iraqi Kurdistan.  Hawrani stated that the capture of Kirkuk and other areas is not territorial expansion because the Iraqi Army abandoned these areas.

With regard to internal KRG politics, Hawrani said that the KDP (his and President Barzani’s party ) is on the same page as its rival, the PUK, with regard to ISIS.  The KDP has proposed three solutions to the dispute regarding the duration of Barzani’s presidency:

1. Barzani could serve for four more years and hold an independence referendum during this period.

2. Barzani could serve until the end of the current parliament’s term in 2017, at which point there will be elections for both the presidency and parliament.

3. The government could resign and call for early elections.

Hawrani also spoke about KRG policy vis-a-vis the Syrian Kurds (PYD).  The KRG does not wish to interfere in Syrian Kurdish affairs or copy and paste Iraqi Kurdistan’s experience onto Syria.  Its main stipulation is that Syria’s Kurds act in a unified fashion.  The KRG and PYD had agreed that there would be a unified force of all Syrian Kurds and a unified political administration.  The PYD has not abided by these terms.

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Two unexpected wars

On Tuesday, the International Institute for Strategic Studies hosted a talk entitled Two Unforeseen Wars: A Military Analysis of the Conflict in Ukraine and the Campaign against ISIS with Brigadier Ben Barry, the Senior Fellow for Land Warfare at the IISS.

Barry discussed the conflicts separately but drew some parallels between them on the level of military strategy.

11720726_10153459894933011_958855888_nBoth the conflict in Ukraine and the war against ISIS came as a shock to the US.  The conflict in Ukraine began with a Russian campaign in Crimea led by elite units and complemented by propaganda.  The Russians made good use of special forces, electronic warfare and deniability. In Crimea, both sides sought not to use lethal force.  The ability of the Russian military to restrain its use of lethal force shows that it is better trained than when it fought in Afghanistan or Chechnya.  The Russian military has a cadre of strategic planners and an aptitude for deception.

According to Barry, the insurgency of pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine has exploited grievances against the Ukrainian government.  The Ukrainian military is suffering from a lack of investment in recent years. They have made little effort to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign against the separatists.  Last summer, they had some success in pushing the separatists back, but were stopped by Russian intervention, including professionally applied indirect fire.  Both the separatists’ own artillery, as well as the Russian artillery that intervened, are skilled.  The Ukrainian Air Force has been stymied by the separatists’ air defenses. The separatists have also made effective use of SIGINT and drone intelligence to call in strikes.  Russia has improved its military readiness, as the conflict in Ukraine attests.

With regard to the fight against ISIS, according to Barry, Maliki’s 2010 election victory was followed by his attempt to consolidate power by marginalizing Sunni and Kurdish politicians. Meanwhile, the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq fought Assad in Syria and renamed themselves ISIS.  They rebuilt their networks in Iraq among discontented Sunni tribes and used sophisticated propaganda to gain volunteers and donations.  They then launched their assault on Fallujah, followed by their capture of Mosul.  In Mosul, the majority of 3 or 4 Iraqi divisions disintegrated in the face of ISIS’s onslaught.  The Iraqi army had suffered from Maliki’s attempt to assert direct control over it and replace capable commanders with politically loyal ones.

ISIS has used both insurgency tactics and conventional forces.  The high water mark of ISIS offensives in Iraq came in the fall of 2014.  After this point, ISIS still counterattacked at vulnerable spots and conducted offensives in Syria simultaneously.  ISIS is now on the strategic defensive in Iraq, but this has been an active defense.  To take Ramadi, ISIS used diversionary attacks to distract the Iraqi forces.  They may have also conducted the attack under the cover of a sandstorm to stymie coalition airstrikes.

Barry described the sequence of an ISIS attack:

1. Indirect fire.

2. En masse suicide bombings.

3. Captured armored bulldozers are used to breach Iraqi army berms.

4. Close assault including cameramen to document the carnage and subsequent executions.

The fall of Ramadi played into ISIS’s narrative of defending the borders of the Caliphate and mounting counterattacks.  These facts on the ground inspire recruits and cause other groups to declare allegiance to ISIS.

According to Barry, ISIS has two main vulnerabilities:

1. In a successful, sustained offensive against it, ISIS would have to move a large numbers of fighters, unmasking them and rendering them vulnerable to attack.

ISIS could, however, move large numbers of civilians at the same time to complicate an attack.

2. If the Sunni tribes in Iraq turn on ISIS, this would be a significant blow.

At first glance, these two conflicts have little in common but Barry drew a few parallels between them:

1. Both conflicts show the importance today of winning the information war.  Military operations will increasingly be used for their propaganda effects.

2. The Russian separatists and ISIS leverage superior military leadership against the Ukrainian government and the Iraqi military, respectively.

3. Without airpower, the anti-ISIS coalition would be far worse-off than it is.  In Ukraine, we can see how the Ukrainian military is suffering from a lack of airpower.

4. Artillery is key in both conflicts.  Indirect fire is normally the cause of the majority of casualties in war, and this is likely true in both Iraq and Ukraine.  Western militaries have reduced their use of indirect fire, but Russia and China still have extensive indirect fire capabilities.

5. Both conflicts demonstrate the need for the US and NATO to assess which of their allies are vulnerable to hybrid warfare.

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