Tag: Lebanon
Solid kernels in a not so good idea
My SAIS colleague Ed Joseph and Aaron David Miller earlier this week put forward a proposal for a Union of Arab Democracies that merits examination despite its deep and fatal flaws. There are nuggets therein worth preserving.
The idea in their words is this:
Egypt and its fractious neighbors desperately need a unifying vision that can inculcate respect for democratic norms across glaring differences. Although Arab nations have no interest in joining the European Union or NATO, the Arab world can draw on the model of Eastern European transition, with fledgling Arab democracies devising their own supra-national organization dedicated to advancing democracy. Like the E.U. in its infancy, this Union of Arab Democracies (UAD) could start with limited objectives and evolve toward ambitious goals, including, ultimately, pan-Arab political union.
Waving their magic wand, Ed and Aaron then tell us all the good things that would happen if such an organization were to come into existence, despite the shambolic history of pan-Arab political union proposals.
If Egypt and the other Arab uprising countries were capable of creating such an organization, they wouldn’t need it. The weakness of the proposal is all too apparent when Ed and Aaron get to proposing that Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority (known to me as Palestine) would be the leading democracies, with transitioning countries (Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen) and supposedly “liberalizing” countries (Morocco, Jordan and possibly Oman) tagging along. What a democratic club! Several are more likely to find themselves joining an Islamic union than a democratic one.
Nevertheless, there is a core idea here that is important: transitions need a destination. When the Berlin wall fell, the former Soviet satellites of eastern Europe and the Baltic “captive nations” quickly set their aim on meeting European Union and NATO standards. This gave direction and impetus to countries that would otherwise have wandered as aimlessly as the North African revolutions are doing today.
The way to answer the question “transition to what?” is not to have nascent Arab democracies try to figure it out for themselves. They cannot reasonably aim for membership in NATO or the EU, but they should be able to aim at two easier targets: the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe or, as my Turkish colleague Aylin Unver Noi suggests, the Council of Europe.
OSCE comprises 57 states and plays an important role in the Balkans and the more Asian parts of Eurasia. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia are already among its “cooperating partners.” Several OSCE members are no farther along in democratizing than their Middle Eastern partners. With 47 member states, the Council of Europe regards itself as the continent’s leading human rights organization. It has a human rights court with some real enforcement capacity that could provide minorities in the Middle East with real recourse if their mother countries were to join.
The idea of extending OSCE and the Council of Europe to the southern littoral of the Mediterranean may seem far fetched, but efforts to construct more ad hoc arrangements have not worked well. Neither the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership nor the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative gained much traction before 2011, Aylin says, and their relevance will be further reduced by the Arab uprisings.
Another of the world’s more restrictive clubs, the rich people’s Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) , has opened its doors to newly developed states like Korea and Mexico, much to their benefit and the benefit of the organization. Opening the OSCE and Council of Europe to new Middle Eastern members, who would need to meet clearly defined criteria in order to get in, would be a worthwhile experiment. It would give the Arab uprisings, if they want it, a destination as well as a tough-minded qualification process, which is really what Ed and Aaron were calling for.
So “no” to the Arab Democratic Union. “Yes” to Arab democracy that aims to meet the not too exacting standards of the OSCE and respects human rights as defined by the Council of Europe.
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Chemical reaction
It is difficult to believe that Bashar al Asad’s regime would use chemical weapons in a rural area on the outskirts of Damascus a day or so after the arrival of a UN chemical weapons inspection team. But that is apparently what he has done. Hundreds are reported dead. If this claim proves true, what are the options for the Obama administration?
- Do nothing. The administration has already ignored well-documented reports of chemical weapons use over the past year. Failing to react with anything but verbal condemnation will not stop the practice, but it would avoid a tussle with the Russians and limit US commitments.
- Try to get a UN Security Council resolution authorizing use of force or expanding sanctions. The Russians are unlikely to permit a resolution that goes that far, but it might be possible to get one that denounces the Asad regime and puts it on the diplomatic defensive, whatever good that will do.
- Press harder to convene peace talks. The Administration remains committed to following up the June 2012 Geneva communique by convening peace talks aimed at implementing a negotiated solution in which Bashar al Asad would have to surrender power to an interim government. Prospects for such talks are bleak (and the date has been postponed to the fall).
- Accelerate provision of weapons to the Syrian opposition. Washington, after indicating this spring it would arm the opposition in response to earlier reports of chemical weapons use, seems to have gotten cold feet, largely because of the prospect the arms would fall into extremist hands. Ignoring that prospect is risky.
- Attack Syrian missile and air force assets, even without UNSC authorization. Such an attack could be limited to the facilities thought to have originated chemical weapons attacks, or it could be much wider. Damaging the regime’s capability of reaching out to attack “liberated” areas could help the opposition gain strategic advantage, but doing it without UNSC authorization would trigger Russian responses Washington won’t like.
- Impose a “no fly, no missile” zone over all or part of Syria. This would require constant patrolling by US air assets that would be at risk of attack by Syria’s supposedly strong air defenses (which however have not responded to several Israeli attacks).
None of these propositions are very attractive, especially if you regard Iran’s nuclear program and American withdrawal from Afghanistan as far more important. Both require Russian cooperation that may not be available if the Americans decide to act unilaterally on Syria.
Weighing in favor of US action is the humanitarian situation and its impact on Syria’s neighbors. The US will spend upwards of $1 billion this year on humanitarian relief for the millions of Syrian refugees, internally displaced and needy whom Bashar al Asad has created with his effort to reassert governing authority in a country that has rejected his rule. A billion this year and a couple of billion next year. We are talking real money out of your taxpayer pocket.
More important for US strategic interests is the impact on neighboring countries. Iraq is suffering a sharp rise in Sunni terrorist attacks that stem from revival of Al Qaeda in Iraq, which has extended itself also into Syria. Jordan is facing a colossal burden from hundreds of thousands of refugees, as is Lebanon, whose Hizbollah and Sunni militia forces are battling both inside Syria and sometimes at home. The Kurds of Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey will be meeting August 24 in Erbil to discuss strategy, which for the moment aims at Kurdish federal units within existing states. But if those states start to collapse, can an effort at Kurdish union be far behind?
The notion that Syria is not a priority can only be sustained if the trouble it causes can be contained. It is looking as if that is no longer going to be possible. It is time for the Obama administration to react to the use of chemical weapons, if confirmed. My own preference is number 5 above.
PS: Please do not look at these pictures that purport to be the results of the chemical attack today if you are at all squeamish about seeing dead people.
PPS: To cheer you up, try this from May, via Mike Doran:
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It’s Trayvon Martin’s fault
Murhaf Jouejati, a leading light of the Syrian opposition, complained on Twitter:
I watched ABC “Worldnews” tonight. Despite today’s killing of tens of Syrian civilians by the Assad regime, ABC reported nothing about Syria.
He added:
NBC also had nothing on Syria. Still wondering why American public opinion is so uninformed?
At least in the United States, the horrors of Homs and Aleppo seem to have been driven not only off the front pages but out of the press entirely, presumably because the trial of George Zimmerman for killing Trayvon Martin used up all the ink (and electrons). The exception was this morning’s New York Times, which has a good overview of the Syrian regime’s recent military successes.
I confess to my own fascination with the trial, which is like a Rohrschach test: if you see race as a factor, then the inkblot points toward conviction for something; if you don’t, you might agree with the jurors who acquitted someone who profiled, followed, quarreled with and shot an unarmed seventeen-year-old. How the prosecutors failed to anticipate the racial factor is a mystery to me. And why the press calls a self-appointed vigilante ready to use his firearm a “neighborhood watch volunteer” I cannot fathom.
Though far from our shores, the plight of Homs really is more heinous than this unsuccessful prosecution, which allowed a single sociopath to go free. Those who are watching see mass murder of a civilian population, including even those trying to mediate. In Aleppo, people are starving. Sociopath Bashar al Asad is killing upwards of one hundred Travon Martins, or his parents, every day. Asad’s mostly Alawite and Shia (including Hizbollah) collaborators are busy chasing the Sunni population north and presumably plan to fill in with Alawites and other minorities whenever conditions allow.
The shape of things in Syria is becoming all too clear. The regime is seeking to establish a robust corridor linking Damascus to the relatively concentrated populations of Alawites in the west, which is conveniently adjacent to Lebanon’s Shia population (and Hizbollah fighters). Asad seems intent on pushing north as far as he can: first to Homs, then Aleppo if possible. But his supply lines will be getting longer and help from Lebanon less convenient. At some point the confrontation lines will likely stop moving north, at which point both opposition and regime will turn to their own rear areas and try to mop up any continuing resistance and ethnically cleansing as much as they think necessary.
The result will be de facto, partly sectarianized, partition, likely with opposition-controlled areas both south and north of the regime’s main axis from Damascus to Tartous and Latakia and extending in the east to Deir Azzour. The opposition will have supply lines to Turkey in the north, Iraqi Kurdistan in the east and Jordan in the south. The regime will continue to depend on Russian and Iranian supplies shipped mainly to Tartous.
This partition could persist for a long time. It is now forgotten, but during the Bosnian war the confrontation lines moved little for 3.5 years. Only with the American bombing did the Croat and Muslim forces tip the balance of war and begin to sweep through western Bosnia. A soft partition with fairly clear confrontation lines could likewise last for years in Syria, provided both sides are able to maintain their international supply lines.
This kind of persistent stalemate would push both sides in more radical, sectarian directions. The opposition, many of whose most aggressive fighters are militant Islamists, will likely move more in that direction. Moderates do not fare well in polarized situations. The regime will continue to claim the mantle of secularism and multiethnicity, but in fact its core is increasingly Alawite and Shia, with Christians, Druze and lots of Sunnis trying to duck, or sit on the fence, or whatever you want to call what people do when fear outweighs the desire for freedom.
The American jilting of the Syrian rebels may seem the easiest way out to an Administration that is taking retrenchment seriously. But it isn’t going to be cheap. US expenses for Syria, mostly humanitarian aid, are climbing close to $1 billion. Next year could easily double that figure, especially if the other states (Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq) in the Levant start to collapse. You know: a billion here and a billion there and pretty soon we are talking about real money. I’d prefer we worry about the people, but if that doesn’t grab high-level attention maybe the expenditures will.
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Tabler and Lynch go ten rounds
The Obama administration’s decision to arm the Syrian rebels is controversial in Washington. While some support the decision, others consider it “probably [Obama’s] worst foreign policy decision since taking office.” Last week, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy hosted a debate on Arming the Syrian Rebels: Sliding Toward Iraq or Inching Toward Stability. Andrew Tabler, a senior fellow in the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute, argued for arming the rebels. On the other side stood Marc Lynch, associate professor at George Washington University and editor of Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel. Robert Satloff, executive director and Howard P. Berkowitz Chair in U.S. Middle East Policy at the Washington Institute, moderated the discussion. Read more
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Hezbollah has a Syria problem
Hezbollah has long been esteemed within many circles of the Arab world. The militant group, officially designated as a terrorist organization by the US, comprises one of the best organized and strongest fighting forces in the region. They have grown into a significant political actor within Lebanese politics, and they are one of the main providers of social services for many in the Shi’a community in Southern Lebanon. Add to that their achievements versus Israel – accelerating the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and the month-long war stalemate in 2006 – Hezbollah has acquired a mystique that few other non-state actors (or governments, for that matter) can rival.
Yet, Randa Slim, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and a leading expert on Hezbollah, believes all of that has changed due to Hezbollah’s growing and more visible presence in the ongoing conflict in Syria. According to her, Hezbollah’s participation in Syria has evolved over the past two years: initially Hezbollah leaders denied the groups’ existence in Syria, then some began speaking of protecting the Shi’a community, to finally framing the conflict as part of their resistance narrative against takfirs (non-believers), Zionists, and corrupt Arab and Muslim regimes. Read more
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Hezbollah in Syria is at risk
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria has captured media attention and expert analysis around the world. On Tuesday, the Center for Transatlantic Relations (CTR) at Johns Hopkins SAIS and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) organized Hezbollah After Assad, featuring Bilal Saab, executive director and head of research at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) North America and Jean-Luc Marret, a Senior Fellow at FRS and CTR and associate professor and senior lecturer in multiple French universities. Ambassador Andras Simonyi, the Managing Director of CTR, facilitated the discussion.
Bilal Saab reminded that a conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East is something that Hezbollah has warned against since its own founding. Such a conflict would not only distract Hezbollah from fighting Israel, but could also alienate the Shiite support base for the organization. Despite knowing this, Hezbollah has acted in a way that increases the likelihood of such a conflict. What explains Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria?
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