Tag: Qatar
Goodies but mostly oldies
President Biden’s first trip to the Middle East took him to Israel and the occupied territories of the West Bank and East Jerusalem as well as Jeddah and Riyadh. So what difference will this much-anticipated trip make?
Israeli security first
In Jerusalem, Biden reaffirmed, for the umpteenth time, US commitment to Israeli security. He promised, again for the umpteenth time, that the US would use all necessary elements of national power to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. He also reiterated support for the Abrahamic accords and for an (eventual) two-state solution for the Israel/Palestine conflict. The Israelis did not join that commitment. Both Lapid and Biden favored improvement of the Palestinian economy and quality of life. They opposed anti-Semitism and BDS (the peaceful boycott, divest, sanctions movement against Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory).
The only novelty was a new dialogue on technology. That is a natural extension of the decades-long, fruitful cooperation on air defense. Also new to me was reference to India/Israel/UAE/US (I2U2) cooperation of a vague sort.
Notably missing was any reference to Israeli repression in the occupied territories. Biden ignored the killing in May by Israeli security forces of Palestinian American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh.
Palestine not even a close second
President Biden’s visit to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Bethlehem was low key. Biden made it clear the two-state solution is not for now. But he announced hundreds of millions in assistance to hospitals in the occupied territories (without of course calling them that).
The only novelty was a visit, without an Israeli escort, to a Palestinian hospital in East Jerusalem. The Palestinians hope it will some day house the capital of their state. But that sop did not do anything to reduce Palestinian disillusion with American policy. The Americans support the Palestinian Authority’s repressive security apparatus but fail to press Israel for meaningful concessions on Jewish settlements in the West Bank
Riyadh reconnected
Biden’s objective in Saudi Arabia was to get past a years-long rough patch in US/Saudi relations. Despite Trump’s sword-dancing with the Saudis at the beginning of his term, his Administration was a disappointment to the Saudis. They thought it did not do enough to respond to Houthi attacks on the Kingdom’s oil infrastructure. Biden as a candidate labelled Saudi Arabia a pariah, because of the murder of Washington Post journalist and Saudi citizen Jamal Khashoggi in the Kingdom’s consulate in Istanbul. But oil prices are peaking as a result of the Ukraine war and Israel is anxious to extend the normalization process to Saudi Arabia. Washington decided continuing friction was not advisable.
So with a fist bump and a private complaint to Mohammed bin Salman about the murder, Biden sought to reset relations. Their immediate reciprocal gesture was minimal. The Saudis will allow Israeli civilian aircraft to fly over the Kingdom, as Biden’s did from Tel Aviv. There was no public commitment on oil production. The Saudi Foreign Minister made it clear the opening of airspace was not a gesture only to Israel and that the Saudis will continue to insist on a peace settlement with the Palestinians before diplomatic recognition of Israel. Riyadh and Washington agreed however on a long agenda for US/Saudi cooperation.
Normalization is a process. It appears to be proceeding in internal security and air defense, even if the Israelis exaggerate that cooperation in public. Three years ago I was sitting in the business class lounge in Riyadh hearing nothing but Hebrew around me, spoken by mostly men carrying the kind of cases that contain electronic equipment. When I asked why the somewhat cold-eyed response was clear enough: if I told you, I’d have to kill you.
Notable, but little noted
Notable, but not much noted, is that the US will withdraw its multinational observer force from the strategically important island of Tiran. It sits just outside the Bab al Mandeb at the entrance to the Red Sea. Egypt has agreed to transfer sovereignty over Tiran and another small island to the Kingdom. US withdrawal wouldn’t be happening without Israeli concurrence, as the observers were put there in fulfillment of the 1979 Egypt/Israel peace treaty.
Horror vacui
Biden met in Jeddah Saturday with leaders of the six GCC states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait) as well as Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan. This was a first for an American president. He also held bilateral meetings with Egyptian President Sisi, Iraqi Prime Minister Kadhimi, and United Arab Emirates President Sheikh Zayed. The Americans were keen to underline that they do not want to leave a vacuum in the Middle East that China and Russia can occupy.
Even if they don’t, Moscow and Beijing will be more present in the region than in recent decades. Russia is OPEC’s partner in maintaining oil prices, a protector of the Syrian regime, and increasingly an arms supplier in the region. Moscow is seeking drones from Iran to use in Ukraine. Beijing is the major consumer of regional oil and gas and supplier of manufactured goods.
Bottom lines
Only time will tell how the geopolitical rivalry in the Middle East will work out. So far, the perception of reduced American commitment has led to a process of rapprochement in several directions. Saudi Arabia has been busy improving relations not only with Russia and China but also with Turkey, Qatar, and Iran. Normalization with Israel may not be in the cards anytime soon, but Israel’s technology is welcome because it comes with few strings attached. The Americans are not going to find it easy to press the case for democracy, which Biden vowed to do, while their proxy befriends the autocrats.
Here is the event on the trip I did with Gulf International Forum and a great lineup of speakers on Monday, after the trip:
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Stevenson’s army, February 1
– Summits lead to deals. Qatar’s leader met with Biden and won “Major Non-NATO Ally status” CNN has background. Qatar promised help with the Taliban.
– Archives confirmed what Politico and others reported previously: President Trump often shredded documents which by law should have been preserved; so they’ve been taped together.
– There’s also more evidence that Trump sought DOD or DHS to seize voting machines.
– North Korea is bragging about its missile tests.
– NYT looks for patterns in recent African coups.
– [This came up in class Monday] FT analyzes German internal debates over Russia and Ukraine.
– Location matters.Both Boeing and Airbus promise to build new tankers in US.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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US withdrawal makes everyone in the Middle East recalibrate
I have long believed the US is overcommitted in the Middle East, given its declining interests in the region, and needed to draw down. I confess I did not anticipate how clumsily we would manage to do it. I also did not fully anticipate how others would react. The American withdrawal has set off a cascade of efforts at improving relations both within the region and with external powers, mainly China and Russia. Not all the improvements are in the US interest, but several are interesting.
First example: the Abrahamic accords. The Saudis, Emiratis, and Bahrainis have understood for some time that the American commitment to their autocracies was weakening. The failure of Washington to react to the drone attack on Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019 confirmed that perception. They needed to think about replacing Washington’s security guarantees, which in any event were aimed at external enemies, while the main threat is in these three countries increasingly internal. They have turned to Israel for the technology required to guarantee that their monarchies remain stable.
But, you may object, Saudi Arabia hasn’t yet recognized Israel, as the UAE and Bahrain have. On that, I only have anecdata, but it is compelling. Sitting in a business class lounge in Riyadh some 2+years ago, I found myself surrounded by 40-something males speaking Hebrew. They carried an unusual number of hard-sided cases. When I asked the Israeli next to me why I was hearing so much Hebrew in Riyadh, he smiled coldly and said: “If I told you, I would have to kill you.” I concluded they were techies carrying lots of electronics after providing assistance to Saudi internal intelligence agencies. I suspect Israel’s improving relations with Egypt have a lot to do with internal security as well, inaddition to President Sissi’s attitude toward the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.
Second I would cite the response to Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter plane in 2015. It initially caused tension in the bilateral relationship, but Turkey had a problem: the US and NATO were not backing Ankara up and instead the Americans were beginning to ally with Kurds, whom President Erdogan regards as terrorists and mortal enemies. Soon Ankara was apologizing, relations between Ankara and Moscow were improving and Turkey was participating in the Russian-sponsored Astana process for ceasefire/surrenders of the Syrian opposition to the Assad regime. Russian and Turkish troops have even patrolled together in both Idlib and northern Syria, though the relationship remains parlous.
Third are the tentative efforts by Saudi Arabia and Iran to come to some sort of modus vivendi. This has included high-level meetings in Baghdad as well as trips to Tehran and Riyadh. The Saudis and Iranians have no territorial dispute and many symmetrical interests, including not allowing an adversary to rile their respective Shia and Sunni minorities and maintaining their theologically-based and increasingly nationalist autocracies. A mutual stand-down from bilateral tensions could benefit both.
Fourth is the at least partial resolution of a conflict internal to the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Saudis and Emiratis have essentially given up on their latest effort to bring Qatar to heel. Doha weathered the embargo and other sanctions better than the Kingdom and the Emirates anticipated, with assistance from Turkey, Iran, and the US, which wasn’t (yet) interested in abandoning its largest base in the region, Al Udeid. There was no point in continuing a fruitless campaign whose only real impact was to weaken the Gulf Arabs.
Fifth example: OPEC+. After a price war in 2020, the Saudis and Russians found common cause in maintaining higher oil prices, which are essential to both their national budgets. Riyadh and Moscow would prefer prices around $100/barrel, but they can’t push much above $70 or so because that would bring on unconventional sources in the US and elsewhere, especially in a low-interest-rate environment. So they are more or less content to leave prices where they have lingered for much of the epidemic, hoping that stronger growth later will bump up both interest rates and oil prices.
There are other examples: rapprochement between Turkey and the UAE, the UAE push for reconciliation with Syria, and Turkey’s sometime courting of Iran. The point is that US withdrawal is causing everyone to recalibrate and look for alternatives to American support that seems increasingly unlikely. I might like recalibration to push Israel into a more positive attitude toward Palestine, but that seems a bridge too far. Still, US withdrawal is getting the Middle East pregnant with possibilities.
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Parsing the Afghanistan quandary: humanitarian aid now, nothing more
The UN is anticipating that virtually the entire population of Afghanistan will soon require humanitarian assistance. The country’s economy is imploding. The new Taliban government is broke. The neighbors currying favor with the new authorities in Kabul are not traditional sources of aid: Pakistan, Iran, China, and Russia, not to mention Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekhistan, and Tajikistan. The UN and non-governmental relief organizations will be willing, but they depend on financing from the usual suspects: the US, the EU, Japan, and other developed countries. The one willing Gulf donor is presumably Qatar, which played a role in the negotiations between the US and the Taliban and now runs Kabul airport.
The humanitarian imperative is clear: provide the aid to those in need, no matter what the politics. Life with dignity is everyone’s right. But this is an odd situation: the Taliban just ousted the internationally recognized government, they have not fulfilled the minimal requirements the UN Security Council has levied, and the countries now expected to provide aid are those the Taliban spent twenty years fighting. American taxpayers, having just witnessed the humiliation of the US withdrawal, are now expected to ante up in ways that will make the Taliban regime sustainable?
The problem extends beyond humanitarian assistance. At least that can be done without putting cash in Taliban pockets. The Taliban will still benefit, as otherwise the burden of feeding the population would fall to them. But assistance with government expenditures, including so-called “early-recovery” and reconstruction, will directly help the Taliban to hold on to the power they gained by force, as will unfreezing of Afghanistan’s foreign currency reserves and allowing the Taliban to cash in the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights. The Taliban will be no less clever than the previous government in skimming off some percentage.
American interests in this situation need to be parsed. Collapse of Taliban rule and the likely subsequent civil war would be awful from Washington’s perspective. An Islamic State (Khorasan) takeover would be worse. The Americans want what the UNSC resolution specified: exit of those US citizens and supporters who want to leave, access for humanitarian relief, respect for human rights (especially those of women and girls), and an inclusive transitional government. The Taliban have already disappointed by naming a government of their own militants, including people linked to Al Qaeda. While it is early days, they have not demonstrated respect for human rights. Nor have they allowed the exit of more than a minimal number of people.
So do we discount the Taliban failures so far and go ahead with humanitarian relief? I’m afraid we don’t have a lot of choice, both as a matter of principle and pragmatic policy. Humanitarian relief may not save the Taliban government from collapse, but it is the right thing to do and could help to stave off civil war or an IS takeover. We should provide the funds with eyes wide open, trying to verify that access is unhindered and that food and other assistance flows to those in need and is not monetized or otherwise pocketed by Taliban-connected warlords.
There is an argument for at least partially unfreezing reconstruction assistance and Afghanistan’s hard currency assets, because that too could help prevent civil war or worse. Certainly the Taliban will try to extract hard currency with promises to fight the Islamic State. The Pentagon may be sympathetic to this argument. Here I would be far more cautious. The Islamic State is a rival of the Taliban: a jihadi group that wants to govern Afghanistan (and more). The Taliban have their own reasons for wanting to crush IS (Khorasan). I’d prefer to see them doing it for their own good reasons.
As for Al Qaeda, it is clear from inclusion of the Haqqani network, an Al Qaeda affiliate, in their government that the Taliban are not prepared to treat it as an enemy. There is still a question whether a government that includes Sirajuddin Haqqani as “interim” Interior Minister will allow the use of Afghan territory to plot or organize attacks on the US. It is arguable that it is better to have Al Qaeda in the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in. I wouldn’t buy it though: it really doesn’t matter that much where Al Qaeda plots its next attack against the US–9/11 may have been conceived while Osama bin Laden was in Afghanistan, but most of the plot was organized and conducted elsewhere. Wherever the Haqqani network helps Al Qaeda, the US interest is clear: weaken both.
Bottom line: Humanitarian assistance yes, but nothing more until it is clearer how the Taliban will govern and whether they will cooperate with those who target, or allow others to target, the United States. Hoisting their flag over the presidential palace in Kabul on 9/11 was not a good omen.
PS: What Ahmed Rashid has to say is always interesting:
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The Americans are out, but conflict will persist
Wisely, the Americans left Afghanistan at the beginning of the August 31 deadline, not its end. The 3:29 pm departure of the last flight from Kabul took off at 11:59 pm Afghanistan time, which is 7.5 hours ahead of Washington. Hanging on until the last moment would have invited another suicide bomb, a heat-seeking missile attack on a departing plane, or other spectacular move by ISIS Khorasan.
More than 120,000 people were evacuated, but hundreds of eligible people are known to have been left behind. The Biden Administration has pledged to continue to try to get people out. That should prove possible from regional airports or by land, but it will likely be done as covert action rather than in public. The Taliban have pledged to allow anyone out who wants to leave, but I wouldn’t believe that until we see it.
The UN Security Council passed a resolution today, with China and Russia abstaining. The resolution asks that the airport be kept open for both evacuations and incoming humanitarian assistance. The French wanted a “safe zone” around the airport, but they didn’t get it. Turkey and Qatar, both more inclined towards Islamist rule than many other countries, have been volunteering to keep it open with private companies, but the Taliban have not accepted that proposition yet. The UNSC resolution also formalizes international community demands that the Taliban not support international terrorism, respect human rights (in particular those of women and girls), and reach an “inclusive” political settlement.
None of that is likely without enormous international pressure. The main leverage derives from money, not legitimacy. The Taliban regard themselves as legitimate and most of the people of Afghanistan have no choice. What the Taliban need more than anything else to solidify their legistimacy is hard cash. Afghanistan’s assets abroad are frozen and the International Monetary Fund distribution of “Special Drawing Rights” (to obtain hard currency) have not been transferred. The Taliban are saying they will block poppy and opium production, which has been a main source of their income. Moscow is already calling on the IMF and World Bank to send reconstruction aid. The West will want to see conditions at least partly met first.
There is a real prospect fighting will continue in Afghanistan, not only between the Taliban and ISIS-K but also between the Taliban and their most vigorous opponents, especially in the Panjshir Valley. In addition, Taliban forces may not be as completely unified as they appeared when fighting the Afghan government. Falling out among revolutionaries is more the rule than the exception. Odds are we’ll see more than one violent conflict emerge in the aftermath of the American withdrawal.
That will not be good news for the people of Afghanistan. They have suffered mightily not just for twenty years since the American invasion but for more than 40. While it is commonly said that the Americans accomplished nothing, I think that simply isn’t true. While the American military assistance can be labelled a complete failure, civilian assistance enabled girls and women to get education, a mostly free press to flourish, health standards to rise, and civil society to emerge. Only time will tell, but my guess is the Taliban are in for a roughter ride than when they took over power in the 1990s. They will have difficult choices to make between brutal repression, their usual habit, and the kind of inclusion that could win popular support.
The Americans are well out of the picture, even if their chosen mode of departure was unnecessarily chaotic and destabilizing. President Biden deserves credit for abandoning a war that no longer made sense but also criticism for the failure to do it in an orderly way. The likelihood of stability in the aftermath is not high. The Americans are out, but conflict will persist.
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I hope we’ve learned unilateral withdrawal is a bad idea
Judging from my inbox, a lot of people around the world are thinking the US withdrawal from Afghanistan could be prelude to withdrawal elsewhere. I think the opposite is true. The Afghanistan debacle will make it difficult to discuss withdrawal almost anywhere for at least two and likely three years.
President Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan completely, thus fulfilling (four months late) the terms of President Trump’s agreement with the Taliban, has strong support across the political spectrum in Washington. But the way it was done was shambolic. Biden failed to ensure either a negotiated “decent interval” from the Taliban or a commitment of the Afghan security forces to defend the country’s government. There appears to have been no serious transition plan. The Americans literally withdrew from Bagram air base, the biggest in Afghanistan, in the dark of night, without consulting or informing the local Afghan commander.
It may well be that this was done to prevent panic, as President Biden has implied. But that was an ill-considered plan. Did anyone really think things would go more smoothly without Afghan cooperation?
The “Saigon in Kabul” scenes will inoculate the Administration against any further withdrawals, at least until a second Biden term. There will of course be force adjustments for operational reasons, some of them potentially major, like getting the American aircraft out of Al Udeid in Qatar. They are exposed to Iranian missiles and will need to be moved if there are going to be hostilities, or even the threat of hostilities, with Tehran. I wouldn’t mind seeing fewer US troops committed in autocracies like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, but those would need to be carefully considered and well-executed. We may not like their style of governance, but replacements could be worse. I would expect no major drawdowns in places like Iraq, Kosovo, Cuba (Guantanamo), Japan, South Korea, or Europe, unless they are negotiated and agreed with the local authorities.
The only major US commitment under discussion in Washington these days is to Taiwan. China is growing in military strength. Taiwanese, watching Hong Kong and Xinjiang, are less interested in reunification and increasingly interested in independence. It is no longer as clear as it once was that the US has both the means and the will to defend against a Chinese attack, even if it is eminently clear the Taiwanese would make a takeover difficult for Beijing. But there are no deployed American ground forces in Taiwan, so no question of withdrawal. I assume the US Navy will continue to make its presence felt in Western Pacific and seek to improve its posture in defending the first island chain.
It has been clear for two decades that the US does not want to be the world’s policeman, patroling worldwide. I doubt Americans even want to serve as the world’s fireman, reacting to conflagrations as a first responder. The arguments for retrenchment are strong. But the consequences of withdrawal, especially when unilateral, can be catastrophic. I hope we’ve learned that much.
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