Tag: Russia
The best president Russia never had
I don’t often watch two-hour videos. But a couple of years ago I did watch this one. It helps to explain today’s news that Alexei Navalny died in a Russian prison. May his memory be a blessing. Radek Sikorski, once again Poland’s Foreign Minister, said it well on NPR this morning: Navalny will be remembered as the best president Russia never had.
The relevance of Boris Godunov
I also enjoyed, so to speak, a performance of Mussorsky’s Boris Godunov at the Bolshoi opera about 10 years ago. In it, Godunov is elected Tsar after murdering the rightful heir. That may be historically accurate or not. But it is hard not to see in this most Russian of Russian operas parallels to Putin. That too tells you something about Navalny’s death.
As with Godunov, it really doesn’t matter whether Putin ordered Navalny murdered. It is possible Navalny succumbed to the harsh conditions in a Siberian prison. He should not have been there. A classical political prisoner, Navalny challenged Putin’s legitimacy and might have competed in a fair election to displace him from power. That was enough to earn him a decades-long sentence and eventual death.
How the West should react
There is little the US and Europe can do to respond directly to Navalny’s death. A few sanctions maybe on prison and security officials? A week or two of badmouthing Putin?
Putin won’t care about any of that. What he cares about is Ukraine. And what he understands is power. He has enjoyed for months now watching Washington twist itself into knots over military assistance for Kyiv. The time has come to straighten that out. One way or another, the House needs to take an up or down vote on the aid package. There is no doubt now that it will pass if the Speaker allows it to be voted on.
But that should not be the end of the story. The US needs to remove the qualitative limits on what it ships to Ukraine. Washington should be supplying whatever weapons Kyiv needs to win the war this year. Nothing short of that will bring about a quick end to a war that has already gone on far too long. Russian defeat is a sine qua non for peace.
What should Russians do?
His own guilt and a pretender combine to bring down the operatic Godunov. That isn’t a likely outcome for Putin. The presidential election there is but a month off (March 15-17). Putin has already eliminated any serious rivals, but there is always ballot destruction or I suppose write-ins that could at least embarrass him.
Another possibility is a palace coup. AP has identified a few possible replacements if Putin were to disappear. But that isn’t likely either. If nothing else, Putin has made sure that he faces no serious rival or risk of rebellion, including among people close to him. .
Putin is 71. That is already above the life expectancy at birth of the average Russian male. Of course he has lived a privileged existence as a KGB officer and politician. But that may not lengthen his years. Holding power seems to keep people alive more often than it kills them.
More than likely…
So more than likely we’ll have to put up with Putin for a while yet. But we shouldn’t put up with jackasses in the US who support his geopolitical objectives, his invasion of Ukraine, or his claim that life is better in Russia than in the West. Donald Trump, Tucker Carlson, and others in this category need to be shown the exit.
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Serbia is the problem, Serbs the solution
Where did they get this nice photo in my living room?
I did this interview for Arlinda Rrmoku of Pristina outlet Sinjali yesterday:
Dialogue
1. What progress has been made towards the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia in recent years?
A: Very little. Acceptance of documents and license plates. Payment of electricity bills. Good things that should have happened long ago.
2. What are the main obstacles hindering the normalization process between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: The main obstacle is Serbia’s resistance. But Kosovo has also failed to do all it could to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb citizens, which is a vital part of normalization.
3. How do you assess the role of the European Union in facilitating dialogue and reconciliation between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: The EU has failed to use its leverage with Serbia. It has used leverage with Kosovo, but inappropriately and without results.
Politics are an obstacle
4. What impact could the recent political changes in Kosovo and Serbia have on the normalization process?
A: Not much. In Serbia, Vucic remains very much in charge. In Kosovo Kurti and Osmani remain in charge.
Washington has been too
5. How do you see the role of the United States in promoting stability and peace in the Western Balkans, particularly regarding Kosovo-Serbia relations?
A: Washington has done poorly in recent years. It was a serious mistake to prioritize the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, which in my view can only come with recognition.
6. What steps should be taken to address the remaining issues in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, such as the status of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo?
A: Pristina should be taking unilateral action to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb citizens, as indicated above. This will require much greater effort to meet their needs, allow Serbia’s legitimate subsidies to flow, and protect their property, in particular at the monastery in Decan/Decani.
As is Russia
7. How do you view the involvement of other regional actors, such as Russia and Turkey, in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process?
A: They don’t really play directly, but Russia is supporting Vucic’s illiberalism at home and irredentism with his neighbors. Turkey I see as a relatively minor player, though it occasionally will weigh in.
8. What are the potential implications of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue on the broader stability of the Western Balkans?
Security is at risk
A: The dialogue as conducted in recent years has not been a factor for stability. Its difficulties have echoed in the region.
9. How can economic cooperation and integration initiatives contribute to the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: I believe it can: having populations and companies that prosper could lessen hostilities and open new possibilities. But Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo makes this difficult.
10. How do you assess the security situation in the Western Balkans, particularly in light of recent developments?
A: It’s shaky, due mainly to Serbian malfeasance.
11. What are the main security challenges facing the region and how can they be addressed?
A: Serbia and Russia are the main security challenges in the region.
12. How do you see the role of NATO and other international organizations in ensuring security and stability in the Western Balkans?
A: NATO is the guarantor in Kosovo, Croatia, Montenegro, and Macedonia as well as the backup guarantor to the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That makes it pretty important to the region. The EU has the primary role in Bosnia.
13. What impact could unresolved disputes and ethnic tensions have on the security situation in the region?
A: I don’t worry about a big war or a long one, but localized instability and ethnic cleansing is a serious threat in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro.
Borders need improvement
14. How do you assess the effectiveness of border management and security cooperation among Western Balkan countries?
A: More would be better. Trade delays at the borders are too long, migration and trafficking too easy, and the border between Serbia and Kosovo too porous.
15. What role can the European Union play in promoting security sector reform and institution-building in the Western Balkans?
A: You’ll have to ask the EU, but my understanding is that the EU does a great deal on border management.
16. How do you see the potential for increased cooperation between Western Balkan countries and neighboring EU member states in addressing common security challenges?
A: I’d like to see more, especially between Croatia and Bosnia as well as Bulgaria and Macedonia, but political issues make that sometimes problematic.
Reciprocal reassurance is key
17. What are your recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders to promote peace, stability, and reconciliation in the Western Balkans, particularly between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: Kosovo needs to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb population, Serbia needs to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Albanian population, and the two countries need to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. When they do those things, peace, stability and reconciliation will be far easier than today.
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Stevenson’s army, February 11
– Opposition wins in Pakistan.
– Senate resumes voting today on foreign aid package
– WSJ reports Hamas tunnels beneath UNRWA HQ
– Egypt threatens end of Camp David accords
– WaPo has background on Abraham Accords
– Venezuela builds troops on Guyana border
– Trump questions NATO treaty, encourages Putin
—
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, February 9
– Zelensky fired his top general. Eliot Cohen seems sympathetic to Zelensky
– Senate may miss Super Bowl for foreign aid fight
– Russia spreads disinformation in Africa
– Russia messages US civil war
– Biden stresses international law from aid recipients
– Army cancels helicopter program
– Europeans tell how to Trump-proof Europe
– Treasury sanctions some Ecuadorans
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Time to turn the policy around
There is no exaggeration in what Albin is saying. President Vucic financed, supported, and orchestrated the terrorist attack of September 24. The Kosovo police the EU wanted (and continues to want) withdrawn from northern Kosovo responded professionally, killed three of the perpetrators, and prevented worse from happening. Washington and Brussels know this but won’t say it. They prefer to allow Vucic to get off scot-free.
They are likewise allowing him to avoid responsibility for the unfair national and fraudulent Belgrade elections of December 27. The European Parliament has called for a commission to investigate. But so far the European Commission, the Council, and most of the Member States are keeping their mouths shut about an election that wouldn’t pass muster in any EU country. It didn’t come close to the relatively free and fair elections in recent years in Kosovo, including two that installed Kurti in office.
See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil
Why this “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” approach to someone who is taking an EU candidate country into ever closer alignment with Russia and China? Many tell me the ammunition Serbia supplies to Ukraine is a factor. But Belgrade surely ships as much ordnance or other military supplies to Moscow as it does to Kyiv. It is unlikely Vucic would cut off Kyiv out of spite for Western criticism. Inat only goes so far when it is a question of profits for your arms manufacturer friends.
Support for “stability” is another possible explanation. But Vucic has no viable opposition, either on the liberal democratic side of Serbian politics or the ethnic nationalist side. Serbia’s problem is a lack of political competition, not an excess of it. He is the destabilizing force both in his country’s politics and in its relations with its neighbors.
The internationals are part of the problem
Lack of international political horsepower is another explanation. EU negotiator Miroslav Lajcak is exhausted and at the end of his rope. The dialogue he has led for more than three and a half years has played out. Belgrade has repeatedly and loudly renounced supposed “legally binding” agreements reached there. Yesterday he refused to sign them at the Security Council. Without real progress on de facto if not de jure recognition, Pristina refuses to create the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities that Lajcak and American negotiator Gabe Escobar unwisely made their top priority.
Many hope things will improve with Assistant Secretary of State O’Brien in charge. He has been appropriately blunt with the Bosnians. But it is not clear whether he is prepared to dial up the heat on Vucic about the Serbian elections, the dialogue with Pristina, Belgrade’s September 24 terrorist attack, or the kidnapping of three policemen on Kosovo territory. Jim recognizes the difficulty of any political settlement and tries to steer his efforts in the economic direction, hoping to flank the recognition issue.
So who cares?
None of this is a big problem, at least as seen from Washington or Brussels. But it isn’t a big problem until it is. Vucic is increasingly serious in his efforts to destabilize the neighboring countries with irredentist and self-victimizing claims on behalf of their Serb populations. The Russians will be pushing him in that direction, to echo and amplify their own claims in Ukraine. The atmosphere in Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo is increasingly tense. It would not take much effort to provoke instability even in all three, then justify the movement of Serbian tanks to protect the local Serb population from false rumors of ethnic cleansing and genocide.
Even without revanchist moves into his neighbors, Vucic can exploit the Serbian domestic scene to promote violence. His security forces have been arresting and beating dissenters who dare to apologize for Serb atrocities in the 1990s. They have even lain flowers on the grave of a young girl killed by Serb security forces in Kosovo. The repression intimidates the Serbian opposition and ensures it will not retreat from hard-line Serbian nationalism on Kosovo. It is admittedly inclined not to do so anyway, but Vucic wants to make sure no one gets any fancy ideas about acknowledging the malfeasance of the Milosevic era. As Information Minister then, he was a mainstay of that regime.
What is to be done?
The right approach to this situation is to recognize failure and turn the policy around. I thought when he first came to power Vucic might be the guy to take Serbia in a democratic direction. He has chosen not to be. He instead decided not to befriend the West but rather to ally with the East. He dishes out just enough goodies to Washington and Brussels to keep them from calling his bluff. It doesn’t take much.
It is time to call him out, loudly and clearly. The US should insist on the transfer of the September 24 perpetrators to Kosovo for trial. As the European Parliament has proposed, the EU should stop its ample financing of Serbian efforts to prepare for accession until new elections are held, at least in Belgrade. The dialogue should be refocused on the economic issues O’Brien prefers. The EU and US should call out high-level corruption in Belgrade. The EU should lift the “consequences” it levied on Kosovo and acknowledge Pristina’s anti-corruption efforts. That would be a Balkans policy worthy of President Biden’s claims to supporting democracy.
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How to counter the Serbian world
Last week I said Europe will not be whole and free anytime soon. Serbia has chosen to be on the eastern side of a line that will be drawn through the Balkans. The question then is how keep the other Balkan countries on the western side of the line.
This is in part a question of what they should do about the ethnic Serb populations within their borders. Serbia is pursuing a “Serbian world” strategy intended to gain as much leverage on the neighbors as possible. Belgrade is also positioning itself so that it could demand secession of neighboring Serbs if geopolitical conditions in the region and the rest of the world would permit it.
Bosnia on the spot
This puts Bosnia and Herzegovina in a difficult spot. Forty-nine per cent of its territory constitutes “Republika Sprska” (RS). Serbs make up perhaps 37% of Bosnia’s population, most of them in the RS. Many of their political leaders since the 1992-5 war have promised to separate, either de facto or de jure, from the other 51% of the territory. Milorad Dodik, who currently holds the presidency of the RS, has dominated the entity’s politics for more than 15 years. He has salami-sliced RS to within a centimeter of independence. He has also stolen a lot of its revenue and sought to cooperate with Belgrade in making the “Serbian world” a reality.
Dodik also cooperates with ethnic nationalist Bosnian Croats, in particular Dragan Covic, in his anti-constitutional political, and corrupt economic, enterprises. The Bosnian Croat political leadership seeks to echo the RS. It wants a “Third Entity” that would provide to Croats whatever de facto or de jure separation the RS achieves. This would split the Bosniak-Croat “Federation,” which occupies 51% of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory. It would also leave a rump Muslim entity that would create serious problems for its neighbors, Europe, and the US.
The risk is clear: if either Dodik or Covic secedes, the Bosnian state would be fragmented in three. Instabiliity and likely war would decide the lines between them. The State Department’s Assistant Secretary for Europe, Jim O’Brien, has made it crystal clear that the US opposes these secession ambitions. He hopes the latest European Union cash will prevent it and promote meaningly reform. But there is a long history of ethnic nationalists in the Balkans pocketing the money and doing the opposite of what the EU would like. We’ll have to wait and see whether future implementation can match O’Brien’s clarity and forcefulness on the main issue. Bosnia must remain a single, multiethnic, democratic state.
Montenegro is already in Serbia’s maw
Close to 30% of Montenegro’s population regards itself as Serb. Belgrade has successfully parlayed recent elections there into formation of pro-Serbia national governments. This has happened despite the country’s entry into NATO in 2017. The trick was to use avowedly pro-EU politicians against a dominant political party and politician, former President Djukanovic, who had governed for too many decades, with support from ethnic minority allies. The Serbian Orthodox Church and Russia’s security agencies pitched in to help. They have reaped handsome rewards, the former church property and the latter influence.
Though much-criticized for supposed corruption, President Djukanovic presided with dignity over the alternation in power. His successors have not proven their corruption accusations against him. It remains to be seen whether the more liberal democratic coalition that he formed can revive and regain power. Its pro-EU credentials were stronger than those who are now participating in a coalition that includes explicitly pro-Serbian and pro-Russian politicians, who improbably claim also to be pro-EU. Their failure to deliver what Jim O’Brien terms “benefits to citizens” could lead to another alternation in power.
Kosovo needs its Serbs
In Kosovo, the Serb population is the largest minority, but only constitutes at most 6% of the population. The Kosovo constitution provides the Serb minority with extensive protection and powersharing arrangements. But most Kosovo Serbs remain separate from the majority Albanians. Their languages (unlike the dominant languages in Bosnia and Montenegro) are incompatible. The Serbs south of the Ibar River live mostly in Serb-majority enclaves. But they appear to have made their peace, at least for now, with the Albanian-dominated institutions in Pristina. Like Albanian-majority municipalities, Serb-majority ones have extensive powers over local governance.
The northern four Serb-majority municipalites contiguous with Serbia are far less integrated than those south of the Ibar. Using its military, economic, and political leverage, including intimidation by its secret services and their organized crime partners, Belgrade has successfully ensured that they refuse to accept Pristina’s authority. The northern Serbs have boycotted municipal elections and withdrawn from Kosovo institutions.
Serbia wants the Serb-majority municipalities to form an Association. That would enable them to govern jointly and separately from Pristina, as in the RS. In the right geopolitical environment, the Association might also act as a vehicle for the four northern municipalities to secede from a state Belgrade still does not recognize. It was a similar association of provincial authorities that led to the formation of the RS before its attempted secession in 1992 from Bosnia.
What to do about Kosovo
Countering this requires a difficult maneuver from Pristina. It needs to convince the northern Serbs that they will be better off as Kosovo citizens (even if they retain their Serbian citizenship as well). Some are moving in that direction, as suggested by their increased willingness to get Kosovo license plates, identity papers, and passports. But many of the Serbs in the north have been among the most belligerent, and sometimes violent, opponents of Pristina. Belgrade has succeeded in making outreach to the northern Serbs far harder than outreach to Serbs in the municipalities not contiguous with Serbia.
Prime Minister Kurti is making a point of speaking more in his fluent Serbian. All Pristina authorities should be more careful than they have been in the past to display the country’s ethnically neutral flag, rather than the ethnic Albanian flag (also the flag of Albania) many of them prefer. Implementing the many power-sharing arrangements in the constitution is not easy, but still necessary. So too is financial support for the Serb communities and implementation of the Constitutional Court decision on the Decan/i monastery, which Pristina has refused so far.
While I don’t know the merits of the specific issues cited here, it certainly sounds like the police action described is counterproductive:
What to do in Montenegro
In Montenegro, only the constitutional political process can decide whether to allow Serbia to continue to dominate political outcomes. But NATO will need to protect itself if Russian penetration of Podgorica’s security establishment continues. With war still raging in Ukraine, the US and EU need to be far more attentive than in the past to Moscow’s use of Montenegro to compromise NATO security. The West should redouble support to truly independent civil society in Montenegro, ensuring that it exercises the same vigilance over the current government that it did over the previous one.
What to do in Bosnia in Herzegovina
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is no substitute for ridding the political leadership of those who oppose the country’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The EU and US have waited too long for the Bosnians to do it on their own. They need help. No more international funding should go the RS while Dodik is in charge. The High Represenatative should be ready to remove him from office if he continues illegal RS moves. Brussels and Washington should be pressuring Zagreb to facilitate bringing Dragan Covic to justice for corruption. Strengthening EUFOR’s troop presence in the northeastern town of Brcko is also vital. No Serb secession can occur without Brcko.
Bolder and better are the right directions for the international judges in Bosnia and the High Representative. While maintaining the Dayton peace settlement is vital, it will not suffice for EU accession. A recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights is where Bosnia should aim to go: towards a civic state rather than ethnonationalist powersharing. Moving it in that direction should be the EU and US objective.
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