Tag: Syria

The Gaza war in regional context

While the news media is mainly focused on the exchanges of rocket and air attacks between Israel and Gaza, my guess is that the broader regional picture will be decisive in determining the course and outcome of this latest outbreak of war in the Middle East.  Here is a rundown of that broader picture:

1.  Egypt:  Cairo is trying to broker a ceasefire, with rhetorical support from the Arab League, but the Egyptian Prime Minister’s visit to Gaza Friday made it clear that the Muslim Brotherhood-led government will be more sympathetic to Hamas than Hosni Mubarak.  Still, Egypt is in a tight spot:  continuation of the war will attract militants to Gaza and the Sinai as well as send an already weak Egyptian economy into a tailspin.  While Hamas has roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, a democratic regime in Egypt has to worry that Egypt’s citizens, sympathetic as they are to the plight of the Palestinians, will not want to sacrifice too much on their behalf.  A ceasefire could restore Egypt’s role as a key regional player.

2.  Syria:  There has already been an exchange of artillery fire between the Syrian regime and Israel, something that hasn’t happened in a long time.  Bashar al Asad may well look to military action on the Golan front in an effort to rally his remaining support and try to divert attention from his war against the Syrian revolution, now more than a year and a half old.  The Syrian army won’t have a lot of spare capacity to challenge Israel, but it won’t want to be left out of the fight if the war continues.

3.  Jordan:  The protest movement against the rule of King Abdullah has intensified.  The monarchy will not want to divert security forces to a fight against Israel, with which it maintains good if not warm relations.  If the protests are successful, the king will be weakened further.  A more constitutional monarchy might well be less friendly to Israel, but still unwilling to risk conflict.

4.  Hizbollah:  On the Lebanese front, Hizbollah is the main military force.  It is already heavily engaged fighting against the revolution in Syria, but it could presumably make Israel’s situation more difficult by joining in the rocket barrage.  Its record fighting Israeli ground forces is significantly better than Hamas’, so the Israelis would hesitate to engage on both fronts.  But Hizbollah will be reluctant to aid Hamas, which has fallen out with the Syrian regime Hizbollah is supporting.

5.  Gulf Cooperation Council:  The Saudis and the other GCC states have not generally engaged directly against Israel, but the visit last week of the Emir of Qatar to Gaza (and his promise of financing) suggest that they may play a behind the scenes role bankrolling Hamas and others willing to challenge Israel.  This could significantly attenuate the quiet but growing accommodation between Israel and the Sunni Arab world.

6.  Turkey:  Turkey and Israel seemed headed for rapprochement that would cure the 2010 rift over the Israeli attack on a Turkish aid flotilla headed for Gaza.  This now seems much less likely.  Turkey’s Islamist government will have to give at least verbal support to Hamas and hesitate to appear to paper over its differences with Tel Aviv.

7.  Iran:  Many of the larger rockets in Hamas’ arsenal come from Iran, which must be enjoying watching the Israelis engage in Gaza rather than carrying out the threat to destroy Tehran’s nuclear facilities.  Iran will no doubt provide Hamas, Hizbollah and Syria as much assistance as it can spare in its sanctions-weakened state, hoping to keep the Israelis preoccupied.

8.  The wider Arab world:  Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Yemen and Sudan all have their own problems that preclude more than rhetorical engagement in the Palestinian cause.  Marc Lynch notes that mobilization in the Arab world so far is limited but could well intensify.  The Arab street, which presumably has a louder voice today than before the Arab awakening, is certainly sympathetic to the Palestinians.   And it is far more likely to support Hamas’ more aggressive military approach to Israel than the Palestine Liberation Organization’s diplomatic push for membership for membership in the United Nations.

Bottom line:  Egypt likely has the decisive role in determining whether this war remains, like the one in 2008/9, a bilateral affair or turns into a wider conflict with more permanent consequences.  But Iran, Hizbollah, and Turkey are also important players.  If Israeli ground action lines up all the regional forces in favor of Hamas, the unintended consequences could be dramatic.

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Stay tuned

With Hamas rockets striking near Jerusalem and Israel bombing Gaza and mobilizing ground forces, it looks as if another Gaza war is in the offing.  It is hard to understand how this will benefit either Palestinians or Israelis, but I credit foreignpolicy.com with trying to provide answers.  On the Israeli side, the answer comes in an interview with former general Shlomo Brom, who sees the answer in deterrence:

What I mean by deterrence is manifesting to Hamas and other armed groups that the costs they will pay much outweigh the benefits that they are deriving from the launch of these rockets. And for that, you need from time to time a Cast Lead Operation.

Cast Lead was the name of the last Gaza ground invasion, in the winter of 2008/9.

On the Hamas side, the answers come from Hussein Ibish:

The [rocket] attacks are part of the case for the transfer of paramount leadership away from the exiles and to the Hamas political and military leadership in Gaza, which portrays itself as doing the ruling and the fighting.

He adds:

If the PLO goes forward with its initiative at the United Nations [to push for membership] and Israel and the West react with significant punitive measures, Hamas is better positioned than ever to be the direct political beneficiary. Indeed, it will never have been closer to its cherished aim of seizing control of the Palestinian national movement — and possibly even the PLO itself — from its secular nationalist rivals.

So what we’ve got here is an Israeli need to restore credible deterrence in the lead-up to a January 22 election and a Hamas Gaza interest in gaining political ground, vis-a-vis both its own “external” leadership and the PLO.

War rarely goes according to plan.  The current situation in nearby parts of the Middle East is so fluid and volatile–especially in Egypt, Syria and Jordan–that it is easy to anticipate that there will be unexpected consequences.  Already we’ve seen two supposed taboos–against rocket attacks on Jerusalem and against Syria firing into Israel–violated.  There may be a lot more surprises in store, not only for Israelis and Palestinians but also for Americans and Europeans. Stay tuned.

 

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Balkan lessons

I spoke at a European Council on Foreign Relations/Ministry of Foreign Affairs conference last week here in Pristina, Kosovo about lessons learned in the Balkans interventions.  Bosnia and Kosovo were by no means model efforts, and the first lesson of intervention is that context matters.   It would be a mistake to think what worked and did not would necessarily be the same in, say Syria, as in the Balkans.

But I do think there are some things worth thinking about when contemplating intervention in other parts of the world.  There are three at the top of my list:

1.  Act together.  When the United States and Europe, which are the major players in Balkans interventions, act together, things often go better.  Note that this is not a matter of shared values, which is what diplomats often emphasize, but rather common enterprise.

Europe and the U.S. in fact do not always share values that are relevant to the Balkans.  Europe believes in group (minority) rights that do not exist in the U.S. and are in fact antithetical to American (and French) thinking.  But this did not prevent the U.S. and Europe from cooperating in implementation of the Dayton agreements (based on group rights principles).  There was also good cooperation in negotiating the Ohrid agreement that saved Macedonia from an interethnic war in 2001.  Most recently, the joint trip of Lady Ashton and Secretary of State Clinton to the Balkans sent strong messages to Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo.

2.  Do the right things.  It is not enough to act together with other major intervenors.  You also have to be doing the right things.

The U.S. and Europe acted together to allow Greece to block Macedonia’s entry into NATO, which is a bad thing to have done together.  Likewise, the EU and the U.S. ganged up together to push badly formulated amendments to the Bosnian constitution (the Butmir process, as it was known) in 2009.  By the same token, if the five EU countries that have not recognized Kosovo would do so, thus joining the 22 that have (as well as the U.S.), it would make an enormous difference to eliminating the remaining risks to peace and stability in the Balkans.  The EU’s recent “progress report” on Bosnia’s accession prospects aligns the Union more closely with the U.S. view that the central government in Bosnia is not strong enough to implement the obligations of EU membership.  That could change the calculus of Bosnian politicians in important ways.

3.  Use all the instruments, civilian and military.  If you are going to bother intervening, it would seem natural to use all the instruments of national power pointing in the same directions, but that is in fact the exception rather than the rule.

This is where Dick Holbrooke made his real contribution in the Balkans, because he gained control of all the levers of American power and pointed them in the same direction.  The EU is particularly inept at this:  witness the distribution of its troops in militarily meaningless small units all over Bosnia, and the lackadaisical use of its massive rule of law mission in northern Kosovo, with European troops more interested preventing trouble than in clamping down on organized crime there.  Admittedly, getting 27 countries to agree to use civilian and military instruments with vigor to achieve clear and compelling goals is not easy.  But it is what is needed if Europe is to pretend to be a serious international intervenor in the future.  It isn’t easy to get the State Department and the Defense Department to point in the same direction at the same time either.

These to me are useful lessons for future international intervention, if there is to be any.  Both Europe and the U.S. are trying assiduously to avoid it if possible.  But every president of the United States since the fall of the Berlin wall has tried to avoid state-building missions.  Each has found he cannot without leaving behind a mess that is inimical to American interests.  I have no reason to believe the pattern will change, so a few lessons are in order.

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The next great hope

It is easy to applaud the formation of the “National Coalition of Forces of the Syrian Revolution and Opposition” in Doha yesterday.  It claims to unite 90% of the civilian and military opposition to Bashar al Asad, including America’s last great hope, the Syrian National Council.  Particularly important is its claim to represent both military and civilians inside Syria.  If this turns out to be the case, it will soon gain credibility as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, perhaps even occupying Damascus’ seat at the Arab League.

But the Coalition is only the beginning.  It is essentially a representative body.  The failures of the Syrian opposition so far have been executive, not legislative.  The newly named leader of the Coalition is Ahmad Mouaz Al-Khatib Al-Hasani, a former Imam of the Grand Umayyad mosque in Damascus:

 

This semi-slick Youtube video tells us something of al-Khatib’s relatively moderate Islamist views, but little of his executive abilities.

That is the vital ingredient now.  What the Syrian opposition needs is a relatively small executive group that can take charge of political, military and humanitarian strategy, gaining credibility with donors by moving resources to where that strategy dictates and limiting extraneous efforts.  The key people appear to be secularist Riad Seif, who is credited with laying the groundwork for the Doha success, and human rights activist Suhair Atassi, who were elected vice presidents of the National Coalition, while Syrian National Council member Mustafa Sabbagh was elected the Secretary General.

The U.S. government, while hailing creation of the National Coalition, still seems unready to provide direct military support and is committed to a secularist vision of Syria outlined in documents prepared last summer.  How this will dovetail with Qatari and Saudi military support is not clear, since they are unlikely to be as committed to a secular outcome.  Nor is it clear whether the new entity will be prepared to negotiate with the regime before Asad steps down, something Syrians inside the country have been more inclined to consider doing than those outside Syria.

Still, the National Coalition is the next great hope.  Would that it will work better than the last one.

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This week’s peace picks

1. Secularism, Islamism, and Women’s Rights in Turkey, Monday November 12, 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM, Georgetown University

Venue: Georgetown University, 37th Street NW and O Street NW, Washington, DC 20057, Edward B. Bunn S.J. Intercultural Center, Room 450

Speaker:  Serpil Sancar

Please join us on Monday, November 12 from 12-2pm in ICC 450 for a talk with Professor Serpil Sancar, Visiting Scholar at George Washington University as she discusses Secularism, Islamism and Women’s Rights in Turkey.  Lunch will be provided.

Register for this event here.

 

2. External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse:  A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities, Monday November 12, 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, George Mason University

Venue:  George Mason University, 3301 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201, Truland Building, Room 555

Speakers:  Thomas Flores, Idean Salehyan

While some militant groups work hard to foster collaborative ties with civilians, others engage in egregious abuses and war crimes.  We argue that foreign state funding for rebel organizations greatly reduces the incentives of militant groups to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of civilians because it diminishes the need to collect resources from the population.  However, unlike the lucrative resources such as minerals and petroleum, foreign funding of rebel groups must be understood in principal-agent terms.  Some external principals – namely, democratic states with strong human rights lobbies – are more concerned with atrocities in the conflict zone than others.

Rebels backed by states with theses characteristics should engage in comparably less violence than those backed by other states.  We also predict that multiple state sponsorsalso lead to abuse, for no single state can effectively restrain the rebel organization.  We test these expectations with new disaggregated organization-level data on foreign support for rebel groups and data on one-sided violence against civilians.  The results are consistent with our argument.  We conclude that principal characteristics help influence agent actions, and that human rights organizations exert a powerful effect on the likelihood of civilian abuse and the magnitude of wartime atrocities.

RSVP for this event to Barre Hussen at carevent@gmu.edu.

 

3. Public Diplomacy in the Next Four Years:  A Post-Election Look at American Strategies and Priorities for Engaging the World, Tuesday November 13, 9:00 AM – 11:00 AM, Elliott School of international Affairs

Venue:  The Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602

Speakers:  James Glassman, Judith McHale, Paul Foldi, P.J. Crowley

The upcoming U.S. Presidential election may have a dramatic impact on American foreign policy. On November 13, an experienced panel of international affairs experts will gather at the George Washington University to discuss the course of U.S. Public Diplomacy for the next four years.

Please register for this event here.

 

4. The Procedural and Subtantive Elements of Prosecuting Cases of Trafficking in Persons:  Comparative, Tuesday November 13, 9:00 AM – 4:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS

Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Nitze building, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Kenney Auditorium

Policymakers, attorneys, law professors, and representatives from legal clinics and NGOs will discuss this topic.  For a complete agenda, visit bitly.com/Ublfr6.

Please register for this event here.

 

5. Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum: “Comedy and Conflict”, Tuesday November 13, 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM, Johns Hopkins SAIS

Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Rome building, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue  NW, Washington, DC 20036, Rome Building Auditorium

Speakers:  Yahya Hendi, Elahe Izadi, Craig Zelizer, S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana

Yahya Hendi, Muslim champlain at Georgetown University; Elahe Izadi, comedian and National Journal reporter; Craig Zelizer, associate director of the Conflict Resolution  Program at Georgetown University; and S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana (moderator), visiting assistant professor in the Conflict Resolution Program at Georgetown University, will discuss this topic.

Register for this event here.

 

6. Yemen and the Fight Against a Resurgent al Qaeda, Tuesday November 13, 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM, Brookings Institution

Venue:  Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Saul/Zilkha Room

Speakers:  Daniel L. Byman, Gregory Johnsen, Ibrahim Sharqieh

Rife with political turmoil, Yemen has proven fertile ground for al Qaeda-linked groups in the post-9/11 era.  Until the beginning of 2012, the United States cooperated with the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, but his departure – orchestrated by the U.S. – raises questions for future counterterrorism cooperation.  How much ground has al Qaeda gained in Yemen despite setbacks in Pakistan? Can the United States effectively manage events in Yemen without becoming entangled in another costly ground war?  What more can be done to prevent al Qaeda’s influence from spreading further throughout the Arabian Peninsula?

Register for this event here.

 

7. U.S.-Turkish Relations: A Review at the Beginning of the Third Decade  of the Post-Cold War Era, Tuesday November 13, 10:30 AM – 12:00 PM, CSIS

Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street NW, Washingto, Dc 20006, B1 Conference Room

Speakers:  John Hamre, Bulent Aliriza, Bulent Aras

Please join us on November 13 for the release of “U.S. – Turkish Relations: A Review at the Beginning of the Third Decade of the Post-Cold War Era,’ jointly prepared by the CSIS Turkey Project and the Center for Strategic research (SAM) of the Turkish Foreign Ministry.  The report is the product of a year-long study that included workshops in Washington and Ankara.  It incorporates U.S. and Turkish perspectives on the evolving relationship, examines the opportunities and challenges the alliance has confronted in the past six decades and looks ahead to those it is likely to face in the coming years.

RSVP for this event to rbeardsley@csis.org.

 

8.  A New Deal? Renegotiating Civil-Military Relations in Egypt, Tuesday November 13, 2:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Elliott School of Interntional Affairs 

Venue:  Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602

Speaker: Yezid Sayigh

Yezid Sayigh is a senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where his work focuses on the future political role of Arab armies the resistance and reinvention of authoritaian regimes, and the Israel-Palestine conflict and peace process.

Register for this event here.

 

9.  Middle East Institute’s 66th Annual Conference, Wednesday November 14, 8:45 AM – 5:30 PM, Grand Hyatt Washington 

Venue: Grand Hyatt Washington, 1000 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20001

The Middle East Institute’s 66th Annual Conference is an opportunity for policymakers, government officials, students, the media, and the interested public to come together to discuss the future of the Middle East.  Entitled “New Horizons, New Challenges: The Middle East in 2013,” the conference the conference will convene experts from across the U.S. and the Middle East to examine the momentous political trnsitions underway in the Arab World and forecast the year ahead for a region in flux.  The full-day conference will analyze the obstacles impeding democracy in Egypt and Syria, and the reaction of countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia to the shifting regional dynamics brought about by the Arab Awakening.  It will also look at evolving U.S. policy in the Middle East in response to the new realities on the ground and to the demands of the Arab revolutions.  The conference will include four 90-minute panels on “U.S.-Mideast Diplomacy in Transition:  New Era, New Principles”; “Challenges Ahead for Egypt”; “After the U.S. Election: What’s at Stake for Iran?”; and “Syria and the Regional Implications of the Crisis.”

 

10.  Launch of the Asia Foundation’s 2012 Survey of the Afghan People, Wednesday Novembe 14, 9:30 AM – 11:30 AM, The National Press Club

Venue: The National Press Club, 529 14th Street NW, Washington, DC, 20045, 13th Floor

Speakers:  Andrew Wilder, Sunil Pillai, Palwasha Kakar, Mark Kryzer

The Asia Foundation will release findings from Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of teh Afghan People – the broades, most comprehensive public opinion poll in the country – covering all 34 provinces with candid data gleaned from face-to-face interviews with nearly 6,300 Afghan citizens on security, corruption, women’s rights, the economy, development, and the Taliban. This marks the eighth in the Foundation’s series of surveys in Afghanistan; taken together they provide a barometer of Afghan public opinion over time.

Register forthis event here.

 

11. How to Promote Local Order and Property Rights Under Weak Rule of Law?, Wednesdday November 14, 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS

Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Bernstein-Offit Building, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 736

Speaker:  Chris Blattman

Chris Blattman, assistant professor of international and public affairs and political science at Columbia University’s School of Internatonal and Public Affairs, will discuss this topic.

RSVP for this event to itolber1@jhu.edu.

 

12. Serbia’s Road to EU Accession: Prospects and Potential Pitfalls, Thursday November 15, 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM, Johns Hopkins SAIS

Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Bernstein-Offit Building, 1717 Massacusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 500

Speaker:  Ljubica Vasic

Ljubica Vasic, member of the Serbian Parliament, will discuss this topic.

Register for this event here.

 

13. Benghazi and Beyond:  What Went Wrong on September 11, 2012 and How to Prevent it from Happening at Other Frontline Posts, Thursday November 15, 10:00 AM, The Rayburn House Office Building

Venue:  Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20515, Room 2172 Rayburn HOB

Speakers:  Michael Courts, William Young

 

14.  Protest and Rebellion in the Middle East, Thursday November 15, 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs

Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602

Speakers: Marc Lynch, Wendy Pearlman, Jillian Schwedler, David Patel

Three leading political scientists will discuss opportunities, resources, and emotions in regional social protest movements.  A light lunch will be served.

Register for this event here.

 

15.  The Obama Administration and U.S. Foreign Policy, Thursday November 15, 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS

Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Rome Building, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 812

Speaker:  James Mann

James Mann, author-in-residence at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and author of The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power, will discuss this topic.

RSVP for this event to reischauer@jhu.edu.

 

16. Drafting Egypt’s Constitution, Thursday November 15, 1:00 PM – 2:15 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036

The new Egyptian constitution is surrounded by controversy over who should write it, when it should be drafted, and which principles and values it should embody. With a draft already published, debate is as intense as ever.

Register for this event here.

 

17. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, Thursday November 15, 3:00 PM – 5:00 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036

Speakers: Feroz Khan, George Perkovich, Peter Lavoy

The story of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons developments remains in dispute, with a rich literature of colorful and differing accounts. In his latest book, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2012), Feroz Khan presents a comprehensive picture of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.  What internal and external pressures threatened Pakistan’s efforts? What conditions contributed to its attainment of a viable program in the face of substantial political and technical obstacles?

Register for this event here.

 

18. Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring – A Conversation with Michael Willis, Thursday November 15, 5:30 PM – 7:30 PM, Elliott School of  International Affairs

Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602

Speaker: Michael Willis

Professor Willis will be discussing his new book Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring.

Register for this event here.

 

19.  Lebanon in the Shadow of Syria Civil War, Friday November 16, 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs

Venue: Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, 3307 M Street NW, Washington, DC 20007, Suite 200

Speaker: Irina Papkova

The car bombng that killed Lebanese security chief Wissan al-Hasan last month has raised new concerns that Lebanon is being increasingly drawn into the Syrian civil war.  Indeed, predictions that Lebanon would descend into sectarian violence as a result of the Syrian uprising have abounded since the begining of the conflict. Yet, Lebanon – once a byword for religious civil war – has managed so far to avoid that catastrophic scenario. Irinia Papkova, a Berkley Center research fellow now living in Beirut, will address the current political situation in Lebanon and the threats and challenges facing its leaders in the shadow of the Syrian conflict.

Register for this event here.

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Small war, insha’Allah

Two Middle East problems will grab President Obama’s attention now that the election is over: Syria and Iran.  Both are relevant for Turkey, which might take more of Washington’s attention in the future as a military solution to the crisis in Syria becomes increasingly likely.  Syria and Turkey are already at war, according to Kemal Kaya of Johns Hopkins, the main speaker at a SAIS event on Wednesday about Turkey’s policy on Syria.  It may not have been officially declared, but the violence has already caused security and economic issues that will only get worse unless a solution is found.
Initially, Turkey had a political and ideological perspective on the Arab Spring.  From its moderate Islamist point of view, developments in Tunisia and Egypt, and to some degree Libya, were promising.  Turkey had similar hopes for Syria.  As tensions increased, Turkey began to warn Syria about the consequences of its crackdown.  After months of unsuccessful talks, the Syrian military shot down a Turkish aircraft, marking a turning point for Ankara.  Turkey dramatically increased its assistance to the Free Syrian Army.
The shoot-down, an increase in Syrian-supported PKK violence, and the overwhelming flow of refugees from Syria contributed to changing Turkey’s perspective.  Ankara became primarily concerned with the security and economic ramifications of the Syrian crisis.  The border area is a particular challenge, as it houses mostly Sunni Syrian refugees among majority Alawite Turkish citizens.  The camps themselves are also problematic, because of the risk of violence and the presence of spies.
Economically, this conflict has been so burdensome that the current situation is not sustainable for many more months.  There are roughly 100,000 Syrian refugees in the camps and likely 100,000 to 200,000 more scattered around Turkey.  The massive influx of Syrians fleeing violence has already cost Turkey $300 million.  The U.S. has provided Turkey only about $6 million for refugee relief.
The cost of the refugee crisis is significant, but the real economic impacts of the Syrian violence are felt by business.  Despite the European financial crisis, Turkey has been booming.  But Syria was a significant market for Turkish exports.  Turkey can increase some exports to Lebanon to compensate for its losses in Syria, but that is far from sufficient.  To make matters worse, what Kaya calls an informal Shiite coalition led by Iran is blocking Turkish trade to the south and to Central Asia.
These security and economic burdens force Turkey to look for solutions. Ankara is seeking support for the establishment of safe zones inside Syria along the border, which would require a no-fly zone.  Only the U.S. has the capacity to implement and sustain a no-fly zone on the required scale.
Kaya believes the signs point to an officially declared war, likely a small one.  But the violence is already major.  Escalation could be unavoidable.  Small war, insha’Allah.
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