Tag: Turkey
Hope fades
The Syria peace talks, never substantial, are evaporating. The chief negotiator for the opposition has quit. The Russians and the Syrian government continue to bombard pretty much whomever they like in dozens of raids every day, though Administration officials assure me that the Russians insist on some restraint. That wasn’t apparent yesterday in a bombing near Idlib’s main hospital.* Sieges have not been lifted, prisoners have not been exchanged and most humanitarian supplies are still blocked.
On the main issue in the talks–the formation of a transitional governing body with full executive authority (TGBFEA)–there is no progress reported, despite a looming deadline of August 1 for beginning the transition. The Syrian government and the Russians continue to insist that Bashar al Assad preside over the TGBFEA. The opposition rejects that proposition, but its deteriorating military situation gives it little leverage in the negotiation. The Americans have been unable to convince the opposition to yield. Even if some moderates do, they will be unlikely to be able to deliver the armed groups–moderates as well as extremists–to a political solution that leaves Bashar al Assad in place.
The question of Assad is a secondary one for the Americans, who are mainly concerned to pursue the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS). Pentagon equipped, trained and advised Syrian Democratic Forces (mainly Kurdish but partly Arab) are making progress in investing Raqqa, ISIS’s more or less capital. But ISIS has responded with attacks farther west aimed at cutting off a main supply route from Turkey to relatively moderate forces in Aleppo and farther north. If Kurdish forces prove necessary to block this move, Ankara will have apoplexy, since that could give them control of the last remaining portion of the Syrian/Turkish border that they do not already own. ISIS knows how to drive a wedge between the supposed Coalition partners fighting against it.
Things are going a bit better in Iraq, where more or less government-controlled forces have surrounded Fallujah, which ISIS has been using to launch suicide attacks in Baghdad, and are beginning the effort to liberate it. Kurdish forces have also moved towards Mosul, though any effort to liberate what was once Iraq’s second-largest city still seems far off.
Sectarian strife increasingly threatens military success in Iraq, with Iranian-backed Shia militias prominent in investing Fallujah and apparently determined to play a role in its liberation, despite the express wishes of Prime Minister Abadi. He remains under political pressure in Baghdad but has been unable to assemble the parliamentary quorum and majority needed to approve a new, more technocratic government and much-needed anti-corruption reforms.
With the Syrian regime refusing to allow humanitarian convoys into besieged cities, talk has grown of airdropping aid. That’s an expensive and ineffective proposition that should be used only in limited and extreme circumstances. It is no substitute for the truckloads required in major population centers. Nor will it do anything to end the war. Bashar al Assad is happy to tie up the international community in interminable discussions of humanitarian access because it helps him to avoid the search for a political solution and the inevitable end to his rule it would entail.
Hope for the peace talks is fading. Syria is headed for more war. It is at moments like these that sometimes someone does something fundamental to alter the equation. What that might be, and who will act, isn’t at all clear to me.
*I originally said “of Idlib’s main hospital.” Later reporting suggests that was inaccurate.
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Peace Picks May 23-27
- Economic Sanctions on Russia | Monday, May 23rd | 9:30-11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | With the proliferation of new hybrid threats in the global economy, the United States and its transatlantic partners have increasingly used economic sanctions to make broad geopolitical and state-sponsored threats not financially viable. The design and approval of sanctions against globally recognized threats is in the hands of governments that must coordinate on the objective and scope of sanctions, while their implementation relies on the compliance of the private sector that must bear the burden of reduced trade. After a keynote speech on where the United States stand on economic sanctions on Russia, Ambassador Fried will take part in a high-level panel discussion on “US Sanctions Obligations.” Please join the Atlantic Council and Baker & McKenzie for an offsite conversation on Economic Sanctions on Russia, featuring the US State Department’s Coordinator for Sanctions Policy, Daniel Fried. Nicholas F. Coward, Baker & McKenzie Partner, and Caroline Vicini, Deputy Head of Delegation, Delegation of the European Union to the United States, will join the discussion. Anders Aslund, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, will introduce and moderate.
- Belarus in Transition | Monday, May 23rd | 2:00-3:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | With revolutionary changes in Ukraine, great power ambitions in Russia, and falling oil prices paired with sanctions, there are serious challenges to Belarus’ paternalistic model of governance. These challenges, however, may present an opportunity for Belarus to move towards a more modern political ideology and economy. Dr. Larissa G. Titarenko, Professor at Belarus State University, and Dr. Valery Yevarouski, Fulbright Research Scholar at the Kennan Institute, will discuss the current socio-economic situation in Belarus and potential models of transition.
- Challenges Facing Europe: A Conversation with British Ambassador Sir Kim Darroch | Wednesday, May 25th | 10:00-11:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Less than a month before the British referendum on EU membership, and as anti-refugee and anti-establishment narratives fuel forces of disintegration and nationalism across Europe, Sir Kim Darroch, British Ambassador to the United States, will address the geopolitical and economic issues facing Europe and explore a strategic transatlantic response. An experienced and innovative diplomat, Sir Kim became the British Ambassador to the United States in January 2016. Prior to that, he served as National Security Advisor to Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David Cameron. In this capacity, he led the National Security Council in dealing with the rise of ISIS, nuclear threats from Iran, and Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Sir Kim, who also served as Britain’s Permanent Representative to the European Union, is particularly well-versed on the Brussels-centric debates surrounding enlargement, integration, and economic recovery. Frederick Kempe, Atlantic Council President and CEO, will join the discussion.
- Making Sense of Pakistan’s Sectarian Landscape | Wednesday, May 25th | 10:30-12:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Pakistan’s diverse Islamic landscape features Sunni sects, such as the Deobandis, Barelvis, and Ahl-e-Hadith, as well as Shia ones that include Twelvers, Ismailis, and Khojas. While sectarian tensions in Pakistan are commonly seen through a Sunni/Shia lens, significant divides within the Sunni groups tend to receive less attention. Competition between Deobandis, Barelvis, and Ahl-e-Hadith is intense, and understanding this intra-Sunni competition is essential in order to comprehend not just Pakistan’s sectarian dynamics, but also the roots of extremism in Pakistan and how to counter it. This event will examine intra-Sunni divides in Pakistan, and it will more broadly consider how best to understand the current state of the Sunni/Shia divide. It will also discuss how Pakistan’s contemporary sectarian climate is affected by the Saudi-Iranian rivalry and other developments in global geopolitics. Speakers include Farhat Haq, Wilson Center Fellow, and Marvin Weinbaum, Director, Center for Pakistan Studies, Middle East Institute.
- Turkey’s Defense-Industrial Policy | Thursday, May 26th | 10:30-12:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join us for the latest event in the Atlantic Council’s Defense-Industrial Policy Series, featuring a discussion on Turkey’s defense-industrial policy with Dr. Ismail Demir, Turkish undersecretary for defense industries. The Defense-Industrial Policy Series is a platform for senior government executives in defense and aerospace to address the public policies that shape these industries’ markets. By engaging the perspective of government leaders about issues at the interface of defense ministries and industries, the series aims to cultivate a constituency for practical solutions to these problems.
- A Conversation on the Middle East with Congressman Adam Kinzinger | Thursday, May 26th | 11:45-1:00 | Hudson Institute and The Foreign Policy Initiative | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join Hudson Institute and the Foreign Policy Initiative as we host Congressman Adam Kinzinger of Illinois for a discussion with journalist Josh Rogin of Bloomberg View. The focus of the discussion will be the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East, including ISIS and the resulting refugee crisis, the U.S. exit strategy for Afghanistan, terrorist safe havens in North Africa, the Iran nuclear deal, and a way forward in Syria. As a veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a congressional leader on national security and foreign policy, Congressman Kinzinger will share his perspective on these challenging issues and how America can lead in ensuring greater global stability and prosperity.
- China’s Role in a Changing Middle East | Thursday, May 26th | 12:00-1:00 | Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | China is engaged in active, high-profile diplomacy in the Middle East, ranging from presidential visits to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran to a mediation effort in the Syrian civil war earlier this year. Beijing’s One Belt, One Road initiative to connect major Eurasian economies through infrastructure, trade, and investment relies in part on stability across the oil-supplying states of the Middle East. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host Dr. Pan Guang (Chinese Association of Middle East Studies) for a discussion of the drivers and impacts of China’s increasingly complex role in the Middle East, the objectives Beijing and regional capitals are pursuing in their relations, and the implications for the United States. Paul Salem, MEI Vice President for Policy and Research, will moderate.
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Peace picks May 9-13
- Farewell Kabul: From Afghanistan to a More Dangerous World | Monday, May 9th | 10:30-12:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Nearly 30 years ago, Christina Lamb left Britain to become a journalist in Pakistan. From there, she entered Afghanistan as mujahideen fighters were battling the Russians. In 2001, U.S.-led forces entered Afghanistan. Farewell Kabul tells how the West, in Lamb’s view, turned success into defeat—and how a mission that had once been seen as the right thing to do became a conflict that everyone wanted to exit. The book also grapples with a puzzling question: How did NATO, with 48 countries and 140,000 troops on the ground, fail to defeat a group of religious students and farmers? Since 2001, according to Lamb, the West has fought a war with its hands tied, committed too little too late, failed to understand local dynamics, and turned a blind eye as the Taliban enemy has been helped by Pakistan. In Afghanistan, Lamb has traveled from the caves of Tora Bora in the south to mountainous Kunar province in the east, and from Herat in the west to the impoverished province of Samangan in the north. Farewell Kabul illustrates the human cost of political failure but also argues that the short-sighted encouragement of jihadis to fight the Russians, followed by prosecution of ill-thought-out wars, has resulted in the spread of terrorism throughout the Islamic world.
- 2nd Annual Conference: The Future of the U.S.-Turkey Partnership | Tuesday, May 10th | 9:30-4:30 | SETA | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Panels and panelists may be found here.
- Turkey’s Syria Predicament | Wednesday, May 11th | 9:00-10:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Were it not for Turkey, there would not be a serious armed insurgency in Syria. Turkey is also the opposition backer with the highest stakes in what exactly a post-Assad Syria will look like. Yet despite its demographic, economic, and military might, Turkey finds itself beset by enemies and deprived of reliable allies. The Syrian civil war now has Turkey battling the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian regime, and the Islamic State (ISIS), directly or through Syrian proxies. The results are decidedly mixed. In a new Atlantic Council report, “Turkey’s Syria Predicament,” authors Faysal Itani and Aaron Stein argue Turkey’s strategy and policies have profoundly shaped the course of the war in Syria, but not always as Turkey intended. Please join us on May 11 for a discussion with the authors on Turkey’s Syria policy, its implications for Turkish domestic politics, including concurrent peace talks with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), its impact on the Syrian insurgency and course of the war, and the implications for US policy. Frederic C. Hof, Senior Fellow of the Rafik Hariri Center, Atlantic Council, will make introductory remarks. Panelists include Faysal Itani, Senior Fellow of the Rafik Hariri Center, Atlantic Council, and Aaron Stein, Senior Fellow of the Rafik Hariri Center, Atlantic Council. Joyce Karam, Washington Bureau Chief and Columnist, Al Hayat, Al Arabiya, will moderate.
- Parliamentary Politics and Change in Burma | Wednesday, May 11th | 10:00-12:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Back in January 2011, the convening of a new parliament evoked little enthusiasm in the junta-run nation of Burma. Five years later, however, the legislature has arguably become one of the centers of Burma’s post-junta public life. Additionally, the resounding victory of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 2015 elections has rekindled hopes for major democratic transformations. However, Burma’s constitution remains heavily weighted toward the executive branch and provides the Burmese armed forces with key prerogatives. Where does this all leave Burma’s new parliament and, more broadly, what does it mean for the re-emerging legislative branch in a country long characterized by personalized politics, military interventions, and other top-down processes? On May 11, three scholars of contemporary Burma will discuss how the new NLD-led legislature may shape the country’s new politics. Drawing on three years of regular field research in and around Naypyitaw and his forthcoming book, Renaud Egreteau, Wilson Center Fellow, will review the record of Burma’s outgoing legislature and assess its performance, while also identifying weaknesses and constraints that will affect the NLD-led legislature. David Steinberg, Georgetown University Professor, and Christina Fink, George Washington University Professor, will shed light on the complexities of the re-emergence of parliamentary and post-junta politics.
- Iran Human Rights: The Regional Context and Constructive Criticism | Wednesday, May 11th | 2:30-4:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative invites you to a panel discussion on the Iranian government’s human rights record, how it compares with Saudi Arabia, and the constructive steps the United States and the international community can take to persuade these governments to abide by international norms. The panelists will discuss the benefits a less repressive Iran could experience, such as economic gains and fuller re-integration into the international community. This event will also mark the release of a new issue brief entitled, “Will Iran’s Human Rights Record Improve?” by Initiative Acting Director Barbara Slavin, who will moderate the event. Panelists include Ahmed Shaheed, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, UN Human Rights Council, Hadi Ghaemi, Founder and Executive Director, International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, Haleh Esfandiari, Public Policy Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and Sarah Leah Whitson, Executive Director, Middle East and North Africa Division, Human Rights Watch.
- Congo Blues: Scoring Kabila’s Governance | Thursday, May 12th | 9:30-11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center on May 12th at 9:30 AM for the launch of Congo Blues: Scoring Kabila’s Governance. The study, authored by Pomona College professor Dr. Pierre Englebert, assesses the state of democracy, governance, and the rule of law under Congolese President Joseph Kabila. Despite being in power for fifteen years and the relative buoyant recent macroeconomic growth, Kabila has done little to improve the lives of most citizens of the Democratic Republic of Congo. At best, his tenure has been characterized by willful neglect, and, at worst, by adverse and bloody manipulation of the country’s political system. By tracing in detail the different modes of governance used by regime, Englebert makes the case that Kabila’s reliance on confusion, dithering, meaningless dialogue, absenteeism, theft, patronage, violence, and repression has effectively set the country back to the days when the country was ruled by the klepocratic dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko. What’s worse, Kabila doesn’t appear to be finished. Though constitutionally ineligible for a third term, he is now attempting to employ administrative technicalities to delay the election of his successor, scheduled for November 2016. These maneuverings are dangerous, and lay the groundwork for renewed civil unrest led by frustrated political opponents-with potentially catastrophic consequences for both the Congo and the broader Central African region. Richard Gittleman, President and Executive Director of United for Africa’s Democratic Future, will also offer remarks. Dr. J. Peter Pham, Director of the Africa Center, Atlantic Council, will moderate.
- A Rage for Order: The Middle East in Turmoil, From Tahrir Square to ISIS | Thursday, May 12th | 12:00-1:00 | The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host Robert Worth for a discussion of his new book: A Rage for Order: The Middle East in Turmoil, from Tahrir Square to ISIS (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016). In 2011 a series of protests shook the Middle East to its core. Young Arabs, alienated by oppression and economic hardship, took to the streets to demand opportunity and an end to tyranny. Five years later, their utopian vision of revolution has been displaced violently by civil war, instability, and the return of autocracy. With long experience in the region, a keen eye, and the vivid style of a literary journalist, Worth tells the story of the Arab Spring through the eyes and hopes of its protagonists. With diverse portraits and personal accounts from across the region, Worth explains how the Arab Spring gave way to a new age of discord. Kate Seelye, MEI Senior Vice President, will moderate.
- Transforming U.S. Policy for a New Middle East | Thursday, May 12th | 3:30-5:00 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join Carnegie for a discussion of Charles W. Freeman, Jr.’s new book America’s Continuing Misadventures in the Middle East and the policy implications for the United States’ many recent military and diplomatic trials in the Middle East. The discussion will center on the complex consequences of U.S. policy in light of the Arab Spring, the increasing roles played in the region by China and other emerging powers, and the simmering Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Speakers include Charles W. Freeman, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Projects International, Inc. and trustee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and William Quandt Edward R. Stettinius Chair in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia. The moderator will be Michele Dunne, Director and Senior Associate in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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Professors on the Montenegrin coast
Saturday was a recovery day for me after 15-hour trip to Podgorica, where I’ll be speaking Monday at a university event commemorating Montenegro’s tenth anniversary of independence. So naturally Sinisa Vukovic, my Montenegrin colleague at SAIS, and I took in the sights on the coast, in addition to a busman’s holiday morning at a conference on Global Security at Stake–Challenges and Responses that happened to be occurring in Budva.
The first of the three sessions we attended was on the Balkans, featuring the presidents of Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia. The message was clear: they want us to speed up entry of the remaining Balkans countries into NATO and the EU. Their plea is that accession is not only a technical question but a political one as well. It should be conceived as consolidation of Europe rather than enlargement. Montenegro’s entry into NATO is a strong positive signal, but it needs not only approval at the July Warsaw Summit but also quick ratification in the 28 member states. A membership action plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina should follow, as should membership for Macedonia, which had met the criteria for membership before its most recent crisis.
President Borut Pahor of Slovenia was less certain about membership in the EU for Ukraine and Turkey. He thought some sort of special status needed. President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic claimed Croatia is not blocking Serbian negotiations with the EU but only insisting that Belgrade meet the standards the EU sets, just as Croatia had to do in becoming a member. She was also keen to point out that the problem of refugees entering the EU is not the main issue, but rather the conditions in the Middle East and North Africa that are generating the refugee flow. Europe has to do more about that, she suggested. All three presidents seemed keen on infrastructure connections (transport, telecommunications and energy) not only within the Balkans but also around the Black Sea and with eastern Europe, all the way to the Baltics.
The second session focused on the US election and likely shifts in foreign policy. The European panelists–Julian Lindley French and Stefano Stefanini–agreed that either candidate as president will want Europe to do more. Both also thought it should, but suggested that the benchmark should not necessarily be 2% of GNP spent on defense (the NATO goal) but rather a broader measure of national security expenditure that takes into account relevant civilian diplomatic, development and state-building efforts.
Former US Ambassador to Turkmenistan Laura Kennedy (retired) had the unenviable task of explaining America, in particular the candidate she does not favor, to the Balkan audience. Hillary Clinton, she said, would be well within the centrist, multilateralist tradition that Barack Obama also represents, even if she differs with him on Syria and other things. Donald Trump, however, would be a radical departure, one more friendly to Russia, far less concerned about human rights, doubtful of US alliances (including NATO), and much more unpredictable than Clinton.
The third session discussed the Islamic State (ISIL) challenge. There was much the usual discussion of radicalization and deradicalization, with some observers noting a sharp decline in the once high rate of Balkan Muslims leaving to fight in Syria and Iraq. This is apparently the result of a sharp crackdown in Kosovo and Bosnia. Reintegration of those returning to the Balkans and elsewhere is however still a big challenge, even if there has been no sign so far of violent extremist events in the Balkans attributable to returnees.
Much the most interesting moment was General (ret.) John Allen’s outline of the longer-term challenges that are likely to make the governance challenges we face in the Middle East (and elsewhere) harder: shifts of wealth to the east, growing inequality, urbanization, youth bulges and climate change are the factors I remember him mentioning. Terrorism, he suggested, is a symptom of much deeper problems that are not going to go away because ISIL is defeated militarily. We need to meet the governance challenges the longer-term factors pose if we want to live in peace.
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Fight and muddle
It took longer than anticipated, but it appears now that the cessation of hostilities in Syria is ending, mainly due to regime attacks on relatively moderate opposition forces in the center of the country. Fighting has also erupted in the far northeast, where Kurdish and regime forces had long divided the turf between them but are now going after each other.
The opposition’s High Negotiation Council has been leaving the UN-sponsored talks in Geneva, disappointed that in the minimal progress on humanitarian access and release of detainees, as well as the regime’s refusal to discuss political transition. I suspect they stayed long enough to avoid any American backlash, but we’ll have to wait and see. Technical level talks on some issues are said to be proceeding.
On the regime side, President Assad is feeling strong in the aftermath of Russia’s fall offensive, which succeeded in preventing the opposition from reaching the Alawite heartland it was aiming for. Both Moscow and Tehran have now doubled down on their support for Assad. No matter how often they deny being wedded to him, neither Russia nor Iran can hope for a successor regime even half as friendly to their interests as he has been. They know they are cooked in the long term if Syria becomes even remotely democratic, as the substantial Sunni majority will no doubt remember what they’ve done and seek eventually to exclude them from any substantial influence in the country.
What this amounts to for the US is a short term loss even if it can hope for a long term gain. The cessation of hostilities worked mainly by reducing Russian and regime attacks, which this fall were responsible for most of the violence, and freed the relatively moderate opposition to do what the Americans have long wanted them to do: attack the Islamic State (ISIS). They were somewhat successful, especially in northern Syria but also in the south. That was good news for Washington. So too were the demonstrations that broke out in some cities against Jabhat al Nusra, Syria’s Qaeda affiliate.
Now the big question is whether the Americans have done what is normally done during a cessation of hostilities: prepared its Syrian allies for the renewal of violence. If the relatively moderate opposition has been strengthened, it will be difficult for the regime to make further progress or even hold the territory the Russian offensive helped it to gain. Particularly important is whether the opposition has acquired antiaircraft weapons, which could tilt the military balance against the regime even if the still active Russians remain relatively unscathed. The regime uses vulnerable helicopters to drop so-called “barrel bombs,” which devastate civilian areas.
The situation in the region remains tense and confused. Turkey continues to be more concerned with countering the Syrian Kurds (as well as their own) than with fighting the Islamic State. Saudi Arabia still seems more focused on its support for what it considers the legitimate government in Yemen rather than support for the Syrian opposition or the fight against ISIS. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu took the opportunity of a cabinet meeting held on the Golan Heights to declare that they would never be returned to Syria, thus undermining the rapprochement between Israel and the Sunni Arab states even more than Israel’s growing cooperation with Russia.
President Obama remains determined to minimize American exposure in Syria and the Middle East generally, even as he beefs up aid and advising to both Baghdad’s security forces and the Kurdish peshmerga in Iraq, where the jabber about an impending assault on Mosul belies the shortcomings of the Iraqi army. If his meeting with Gulf states this week produced a new approach in Syria or Iraq, it has not yet become apparent. Washington seems resigned to muddling through until the January end of this administration, when more likely than not Hillary Clinton will begin to serve Obama’s third term. She will then have to decide whether to follow through on her pledges to take greater risks in Syria not only against ISIS but also against Assad by imposing a no-fly zone over part of the country.
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The ISIS war and Iraq’s politics
The Turkish Anadolou news agency asked me some questions about the war against the Islamic State in Iraq. Then the International Business Times asked questions about the political situation in Iraq. I answered:
Anadolou agency on the war against ISIS
Q: The Pentagon has recently announced that it has built up a fire base where American Special Operation Forces operates artillery against Daesh and a few weeks later the Department said that it may establish more fire bases ahead of Mosul offensive and just yesterday we heard that the Pentagon is also authorizing deployment of 200 additional troops alongside combat helicopters to the help the operation.
First of all what does this tell us about Obama administration’s policy in Iraq?
A: Obama wants to do what he can to destroy the Islamic State before leaving office. Recent progress in getting ISIS to give up territory is making the Americans want to accelerate the process. They are prepared to take some additional risk in order to do so.
That said, I think one of the important decisions recently has been increased funding for the Kurdish peshmerga, who have proven among the most effective troops fighting IS.
Q: Is the US involving more and more in the swamp in Iraq?
A: Yes, though I’m not sure it is really a swamp. IS lacks the popular support that made Vietnam a quagmire.
Q: Do you think that Obama’s no boots on ground policy is over?
A: It is clearly over. The American troops on the ground will certainly be defending themselves as the need arises.
Q: Without the US isn’t it possible for Iraqi forces to retake Mosul?
A: I don’t know that it is possible with the US. Mosul will be a big and difficult operation. I imagine the Americans and Iraqis are hoping that it will fall without a major battle.
Q: Why does the administration feel compelled to involve itself in the Mosul operation in a combat role?
A: The Americans want to accelerate the process and have important means–like the Apaches–that the Iraqis lack.
Q: How is this troop build-up in Iraq tied into the election process? And what does it tell us about post-election term or next president?
A: I doubt it is tied to the election process itself, because ISIS has really not been a big issue, yet. But it is certainly tied to the approaching end of the Administration.
The next president will be under the same pressures Obama is. Cruz, Trump, Kasich or Clinton might be inclined to respond by doing more. There is lots of pressure from the American public to finish with the Islamic State as soon as possible and to get American troops out of harm’s way. Sanders would want to do less.
International Business Times on the political situation in Iraq
Q: Abadi said his goal is to fill his cabinet with technocrats. What does that mean in reality and why have so many people refused their appointments?
A: What it should mean is the appointment of people based more on their technical competence than on party or sectarian affiliation. You have to ask the people who refused appointments why they did so, but clearly any new minister would like to be sure that he or she will have the kind of political support required to get the job done. That will be especially true for more “technical” types, who can’t by definition assume political support.
Q: Who pressured Abadi into reshuffling his cabinet? Shiite clerics or the US? How much do you think the Americans were involved in this decision?
A: I think the Americans are supportive of Abadi in general and his decision to reshuffle the cabinet with more competent people in particular. You’ll have to ask the Shiite clerics about their views, though one of them–Muqtada al Sadr–clearly played a key role in the demand for a “technical” government. It seems to me Shiites in Iraq in general are demanding more competent and accountable governance. That is not a bad thing.
Q: How does what is happening now in Baghdad compare to what happened under Maliki? Seems like the US keeps repeating its mistakes when it comes to advising Baghdad.
A: Maliki became increasingly autocratic and sectarian. Quite the opposite is true of Abadi: it seems to me he is trying hard to move in a less sectarian and less autocratic direction. It isn’t easy.
Q: Parliament has always been dysfunctional. What makes this current political crisis different?
A: Different from what? In parliamentary systems, getting approval for a ministerial reshuffle when the governing party does not have a clear majority is often difficult. Iraq is not a consolidated democracy like the UK or Germany. Baghdad is also under enormous pressure from the war against IS, the fall in oil prices, Kurdistan’s growing appetite for independence and Sunni discontent.
Certainly the Americans would be happy to see a new government in place focusing its attention on defeating IS and governing effectively on the territory regained from it.
Q: What is at stake here? Are we seeing this trickle down to the local population? Have any affects on the economy?
The Iraqi economy is already on the ropes due to low oil prices. I don’t think the political situation comes near to that as a depressing influence.
A: How much of what is happening in Baghdad is a result of U.S. policy failures?
Q: I see it more as a result of US success in installing a parliamentary semi-democracy in Iraq. I don’t really regret the fall of Saddam Hussein, even if some Iraqis and Americans do. But not everything in Iraq is a consequence of what the US does. There is an Iraqi political dynamic over which Washington has little real influence.
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