Tag: Turkey
Anatomy of a possible “safe zone”
In late July, it was announced that the US would be allowed to use Incirlik airbase in Turkey to conduct airstrikes against ISIS. This move came immediately after ISIS claimed responsibility for a bombing in Suruç, Turkey that killed 33 people. It has been widely reported that the US/Turkey deal also included a provision for some sort of safe zone, or ISIS-free, zone along the Turkish-Syrian border.
US officials have denied that this zone would be a true safe zone or no-fly zone, but rather that the US and Turkey would collaborate to clear a zone from ISIS control and look to man it with moderate opposition fighters. According to Foreign Policy, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has said that the zone will not be an official no-fly zone but will have US air support. President Erdoğan has stated that the zone could allow for 1.8 million Syrian refugees to be repatriated.
News sources are generally in agreement that the zone would extend west along the Syrian border from Jarablus on the Euphrates. Some reports state that the zone will extend as far as Marea, while others state that it will extend as far as A’zaz. The depth of the zone is less certain, but reports indicate that it will be 40-50 km deep. Assuming a depth of approximately 45 km, the zone would look like this if it extends to Marea:
Here is a larger zone extending to A’zaz:
- The red line is the Turkey-Syrian border and the yellow line is the possible extent of the zone, if it goes to A’azaz.
The larger population centers, as well some towns and villages where fighting has recently taken place, are marked with pins. Those marked in black are under ISIS control and those in green are under rebel control. Zahraa, in red, is a Twelver Shiite, regime-controlled city, and Aleppo, in white, is under mixed rebel and regime control. It is worth noting that the eastern portion of the zone is sparsely populated, but Manbij and Al-Bab are larger cities, with populations of ~100,000 and approximately ~60,000, respectively. The Western part of the zone is more heavily cultivated and densely populated; whether the zone would contain the sizeable towns of A’zaz (population ~30,000) and Tel Rifat (population ~20,000) is an important question.
Below is a map of areas of control created by Dutch student Thomas van Linge and updated on August 18. I have overlayed a portion of the map onto a Google Earth view of the zone:
If the zone extends to Marea it will encompass almost entirely ISIS-held territory (shown in gray). Marea itself is under ISIS siege and is controlled by a mix of the FSA, the Islamic Front and Jaysh Al-Mujahideen. A’zaz is controlled by a mix of the FSA and the Islamic Front and Tel Rifat is controlled by a mix of the FSA, Jaysh Al-Mujahideen, the Islamic Front, Faylaq Al-Sham (also known as the Sham Legion–a group of moderate Islamists who have had ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, but are trying to distance themselves from it).
Andrea Taylor and Abigail Kukura have suggested that a coalition of rebels known as the Levant Front (or Jabhat al-Shamiyya) could be at least partially relied upon as a ground force to protect the zone. The Levant Front is an alliance between the Islamic Front (which includes Ahrar Al-Sham), Jaysh Al-Mujahideen, and three other Islamist rebel groups. Ahrar Al-Sham is a hardline Islamist group, that supports the creation of a Sunni Islamic theocracy in Syria. It coordinates tactically with the Nusra Front, but also works with more moderate and secular rebel groups. Ambassador Robert Ford and Ali El Yassir have argued that the US should open a dialogue with Ahrar Al Sham, because it is one of the most powerful rebel groups. Given the composition of rebel groups in the western portion of the zone, the US will be forced to cooperate with Ahrar Al Sham, at least indirectly through Turkey.
The zone has been the scene of significant fighting in the past few weeks. In the following maps, I have once again used Thomas van Linge’s map of areas of control, and marked the sites of recent clashes with red flames. I excluded clashes in Aleppo proper. I obtained information about these clashes primarily from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
There are four primary hotspots:
- The area along the front lines between ISIS and the rebels, especially around Marea.
- A cluster of villages and a gas factory near the Turkish border on the front lines between ISIS and the rebels.
- Areas on the far edge of the zone where clashes have occurred between rebels and regime positions in the Twelver Shiite cities of Zahraa and Nubl.
- Clashes between the regime and the rebels in the northern outskirts of Aleppo.
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Tehran calling
Unlike many colleagues around Washington, I have decided to talk with and answer questions from Iranian media willing to publish them. I think it important for Americans to try to be understood in Iran. Certainly Tehran is making big efforts to be understood in the US. While I find some of what the Iranian media broadcast objectionable and even odious, most of the questions they ask me are straight up, like these from Hamid Bayati, published this morning in the Tehran Times:
Q: As you know Iran and Russia begin new initiative to bring peace to Syria, so how do you evaluate these efforts?
A: There really is nothing to evaluate yet. The Iranian four-point proposal, which has been public for some time, requires a good deal more detail before it can be evaluated. The key question is how the transition will be handled. No political solution will work that keeps Bashar al Assad in power, because the Syrian opposition will continue fighting.
Q: Some experts believe that after nuclear deal reach between Iran and world powers, Western countries especially the US begin to cooperate with Iran in regional issues such as Syria, and a new era begins in Middle East. Do you agree with this view?
A: Not really, even if I would like to see it happen. Iran with the nuclear agreement will have substantial resources. The question is how it will use those resources. Hardliners in Tehran will presumably argue for more support to Iran’s allies in the region: Bashar al Assad and Hizbollah, Iraqi Shia militias, Houthi forces in Yemen and Hamas. The US and Europe will not welcome moves of that sort. There will be enormous pressure on the US administration to push back, especially against Hizbollah.
Q: Turkey launches airstrikes against ISIL and PKK positions in Syria and Iraq, are these acts helpful to peace process in Middle East or not?
A: The Americans think more Turkish help against ISIL is vital. The US and Turkey have different opinions about the Kurds in Syria, though at this point PKK attacks inside Turkey are making that irrelevant.
Q: How do you evaluate the US-led Coalition against ISIS after one year of its creation? Does this Coalition reach its goals?
A: The Coalition has not reached its goals, but it has blocked ISIS advances and has rolled them back in some areas (Tikrit, Kobane, Tal Abayd). Without a better formula for who will govern in ISIL-controlled territory, I don’t see how the Coalition can “win.”
Q: As you know US congress is reviewing the Iran nuclear deal and it is possible US lawmakers will kill this deal. If this event happen what will we have after that?
A: It is possible but not likely that US lawmakers would kill the deal, but in order to do so they would need a 2/3 majority in both houses of Congress. That will be difficult to get. If they do kill the deal, Iran and the P4+1 will have some important decisions to make. Do they abandon the deal completely, or do they implement it without the US? If the deal is abandoned, what will Iran do?
Q: In an interview aired Sunday on CNN’s “Fareed Zakaria GPS,” Obama said the United States’ role in global politics could be affected by the deal, how do you explain this sentence?
A: Defeat of the deal would separate the US from its allies and undermine confidence in American leadership in many countries. It would be like the Senate’s rejection of the League of Nations almost 100 years ago, a move that isolated and weakened the US.
Q: If US congress kills the deal, is it possible United States and EU continue a different strategy toward Iran? I mean is it possible they have different relations with Iran and EU that don’t follow US policy?
A: It is possible, though the US might try to apply “secondary” sanctions by barring European companies from doing business with the US if they do business with Iran. That would create big problems with America’s closest allies.
Q: It seems European countries have been more eager than US to revive their relations with Iran, how do you explain this view?
A: Europe needs Iranian oil and gas much more than the US does. Our companies are far less interested in doing business with Iran than some European countries. Geography is destiny I’m afraid.
As I failed to respond adequately to his question about the PKK, Hamid sent more, which were not published with the rest of the interview:
A: What do you think about Turkey military attacks on PKK positions? Some experts said these attacks are because the AK party lost in elections. Some experts said Turkey attacks the PKK because Turks don’t want Kurds to be strong, what do you think about it?
Q: The PKK made the mistake of ending the ceasefire with the Turkish government, which reacted forcefully. Some think this was the result of a split among the Kurds between those who did well in recent elections and the military component, which feared irrelevance.
It might have been better for the Turks to escalate more slowly; some think Erdogan may be seeking to regain some of the popular support he has lost recently by vigorously responding to every Kurdish provocation. But the PKK is a terrorist organization that attacks the Turkish state and can’t expect safe haven in Iraq or Syria. Iranian support for the PKK is a big concern for Turkey.
The complication of course is that the most effective Syrian fighters against ISIL include Kurds affiliated with the PKK. The Americans prioritize the fight against ISIL, which is an international threat. The Turks prioritize the fight against the PKK, which is a domestic threat. Iran does likewise when it faces a domestic threat of the PKK variety. The US and Turkey will work out their differences in dealing with the Kurds. I’m less sure that Iran and the US, or Iran and Turkey, will do likewise, though it would be desirable.
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The Iran deal’s regional impact
On Monday, an all-MEI panel discussed After the Iran Deal: Regional Repercussions and Dynamics. Panelists included Robert S. Ford, senior fellow and former US Ambassador to Syria, Thomas W. Lippman, scholar, Gönül Tol, director of the Center for Turkish Studies, and Alex Vatanka, senior fellow. Paul Salem, vice president for policy and research moderated.
Vatanka stated that reformists, moderates, the Iranian public and most of the Iranian media are in favor of the deal. Some hardliners criticize the deal, but they’ve opened a previously taboo debate about the pros and cons of Iran’s nuclear program.
Khamenei has been vague, but this shouldn’t be taken as opposition; Khamenei rarely unequivocally supports anything. Those close to Khamenei are defending the deal. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hasn’t come out against it but they and their subsidiaries worry that the deal will hurt them financially. Rouhani needs to reassure them that they won’t lose out as foreign firms enter the market.
The Rouhani Administration is a Western-educated team with cohesive thinking on the country’s direction. Like China, they may try to open up economically and deal with political reform later. Zarif believes that Western companies must invest in Iran to render the deal more stable. Khamenei appears to accept economic reform but has made the resistance economy part of his legacy. It is unclear what he wants from the deal. Is he looking to prevent the possibility of war, eliminate sanctions, or make new friends? If many reformists lose their seats in the next Majlis elections, it means that Khamenei is unwilling to let a reform agenda go farther. If the Majlis accepts the deal and Congress rejects it, Iran can portray themselves as the good guys.
There are contradictions regarding Iran’s regional relations. The deputy foreign minister recently stated that Iran wanted to talk with the Saudis about Yemen and Bahrain, but then an ayatollah at a Friday sermon put Saudi Arabia, Israel and ISIS in the same category. If the reformists reconcile too much with the Saudis, the hardliners will brand them as pro-Saudi agents.
Lippman said that despite US declarations of an unshakeable commitment to the Gulf, Gulf Arabs were publicly skeptical until recently. Now the GCC countries publicly (if not privately) believe the US commitment. Beginning at Camp David, they decided that the Iran deal was done and that they weren’t going to do “a full Bibi.” They will work with the US and each other to confront regional problems.
The Saudis won’t race to a bomb; they care about self-preservation, which includes full integration into the world economy. The Saudis can’t afford to become nuclear outlaws.
Tol stated that understanding Turkish fear of the Kurds is key to grasping Turkish politics. It also plays a role in Turkey’s stance vis-a-vis Iran. Turkey shares the West’s objectives regarding Iran’s nuclear program but has promoted engagement rather than isolation, voting against UN sanctions in 2010. Iran is a large market for Turkish goods and the two countries have close energy ties. However, Turkey worries that a nuclear Iran could change the regional balance of power. All political parties in Turkey welcomed the deal and the sanctions relief.
Turkey has three main concerns about Iran:
- Iran is a destabilizing force in Iraq and opposes Turkey in Syria.
- Closer ties between Washington and Tehran could come at Turkey’s expense, focusing too much attention on the fight against ISIS and undermining Turkey’s anti-Assad efforts;
- Iran’s support for the PKK and PYD.
Ford asserted that the problems in Iraq and Syria don’t revolve around the US and Iran but around local grievances. The pressures against the Iraqi state are increasing. Low oil prices are contributing to the Kurdish drive for independence. Progress on Sunni-Shia reconciliation is lacking. Iran is partially responsible because of its ties to militias that are considered terrorist organizations by the US. Iran is unlikely to give up these allies, whose political leaders are ruthless and capable. It is unclear if the US and Iran can work together in Iraq. ISIS can recruit as long as the conflict between the Sunnis and the militias continues. If Iran cedes control of the militias to President Abadi, that could help.
Assad is losing and the opposition is advancing on the Alawite homeland. There are diplomatic visits between Syria, Russia, and Iran; Syria’s foreign minister recently visited Tehran and likely
also Oman, which serves as an intermediary with the Saudis. There are also reports that Iran is about to put forward a peace plan with a unity government, constitutional amendments to protect minorities, and future internationally supervised elections. Ford thinks this won’t succeed because the Turks haven’t signed on and their closeness with the armed opposition gives them a veto.
The Russians and Iranians are urging the US to stop pushing against Assad and start working with him, but Assad is about to lose his supply lines. There were recent anti-Assad protests in Alawite-majority Latakia province. Assad doesn’t have the capacity to take on ISIS if it can’t hold the Damascus suburbs. The Iranians have to recognize that Assad is losing but they will almost certainly use at least a small portion of the money from sanctions relief to shore-up Hezbollah and Assad. This will cause a short-term increase in violence.
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Peace picks August 10-14
1. After the Iran Deal: Regional Repercussions and Dynamics | Monday, August 10th | 12:00 – 1:30 | MEI | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a discussion of expectations across the region following Iran’s agreement with the P5+1 on its nuclear program. The historic deal may end Iran’s status as a pariah state, particularly in capitals outside the region. How have leaders in Tehran indicated they may proceed? How do the Arab states and Turkey view the implications of an Iran empowered by sanctions relief and diplomatic normalization? How might regional states react if Iran steps up its interventions in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere? And what actions are America’s allies in the region likely to want of the United States in managing Iran? Discussing these and other questions will be MEI senior fellow Robert S. Ford, MEI scholar Thomas W. Lippman, director of the Center for Turkish Studies Gönül Tol, and senior fellow Alex Vatanka. MEI’s vice president for policy & research Paul Salem will moderate the conversation.
2. Naval Aviation | Wednesday, August 12th | 9:00-10:00 | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join CSIS and the U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) for a discussion with Lieutenant General Jon Davis, Deputy Commandant for Aviation and Vice Admiral Mike Shoemaker, Commander, Naval Air Forces moderated by Admiral Joseph Pureher, USN, Ret. Vice Admiral Peter H. Daly, USN, Ret., CEO, USNI will provide an introduction. The Maritime Security Dialogue brings together CSIS and USNI, two of the nation’s most respected non-partisan institutions. The series is intended to highlight the particular challenges facing the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, from national level maritime policy to naval concept development and program design. Given budgetary challenges, technological opportunities, and ongoing strategic adjustments, the nature and employment of U.S. maritime forces are likely to undergo significant change over the next ten to fifteen years. The Maritime Security Dialogue provides an unmatched forum for discussion of these issues with the nation’s maritime leaders.
3. Thailand and the Changing Geopolitical Dynamics of Southeast Asia | Wednesday, August 12th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In the Asia-Pacific, economic development and interconnectivity is growing alongside increasing tensions between neighbor states. This is no clearer than in the fight for building Thailand’s infrastructure. Nobuhiro Aizawa will discuss how Thailand’s 2014 coup and competing infrastructure bids are altering the geopolitics and international relations of Southeast Asia. Abigail Friedman will offer comment, and Carnegie’s James L. Schoff will moderate. Speakers include: Nobuhiro Aizawa, associate professor, Kyushu University, Abigail Friedman, founder and CEO, The Wisteria Group. Moderator: James L. Schoff, senior associate, Asia Program,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
4. The Threat from Within: Israel’s Extremist Dilemma | Wednesday, August 12th | 11:30 | FPRI (n.b. this event is in Philadephia but FPRI posts video and/or audio of its events) | REGISTER TO ATTEND | “We have been lax in tackling Jewish terrorism,” said Israeli President Reuven Rivlin this week in response to the attacks at the gay pride parade and then the firebombing of a home in the West Bank, resulting in the burning to death of an 18-month-old child. These are not isolated incidents, however, and pose a threat to the Israeli government’s authority, Israeli democracy, and add yet another impediment to peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. We have asked Barak Mendelsohn to explore the rise of Jewish extremism in Israel, the dilemmas it poses for Israel, and what might be done to alleviate it. Barak Mendelsohn is a senior fellow at FPRI and associate professor of political science at Haverford College. This past academic year, he served as a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Security at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He has already written extensively on the Messianic movement inside Israel, in addition to his work on radical Islam and jihadism. He served in the IDF for 5 years and received his Ph.D. in government from Cornell University. His books include Combating Jihadism (University of Chicago Press, 2009) and The Al Qaeda Franchise (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015).
5. From Coalition to Conservative Majority: What’s Next for UK Foreign Policy? |Wednesday, August 12th | 6:30 | British Embassy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | This past May, the United Kingdom took to the voting booths and surprised many pollsters by handing a slim majority to Prime Minister David Cameron’s Conservative Party, thereby electing the UK’s first Conservative majority government in over a decade. Meanwhile, former Tory coalition partners the Liberal Democrats, led by outgoing Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, managed to hold only about 15% of their previous seats, the Labour Party lost seats and the Scottish National Party became the third largest party in the Commons. Since the election, the UK has continued to play a major role in the international foreign policy scene, from announcing its commitment to maintaining NATO’s defense spending target of 2% of GDP to playing a leading role in negotiations on the Iran Nuclear Deal. Young Professionals in Foreign Policy and the British Embassy invite you to join us for a post-election discussion moderated by Deputy Head of Mission to the United States, Patrick Davies. Mr. Davies, joined by a panel of experts from the Embassy, will discuss the new UK government, as the UK and its allies grapple with foreign policy issues such as combating ISIL, nuclear negotiations with Iran and EU reform.
6. Assessing the Iran Nuclear Agreement: Placing Sanctions in Context | Thursday, August 13th | 10:00-11:00 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Sanctions are what convinced Iran to begin negotiations with the United States. However, the mechanics behind lifting sanctions and the differences among international, U.S. and European Union sanctions are complicated. All beg the question of how effective the Iran deal really is. This program will explore the role of sanctions in the Iran Deal. Our panelists will examine the structure of the sanctions regime, debate its various implications, and explore what we can do about it. Among the questions to be addressed are: What sanctions are currently in place on Iran? What is the difference between multi-lateral oil sanctions and unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran? Is it really possible for the sanctions to be “snapped back” if Iran violates the agreement? Would the sanctions regime really disband if there was no agreement? Join us as our panel discusses Iran’s new sanctions regime and what it means for the future. Panelists include: Ilan Berman, Vice President, American Foreign Policy Council, Emanuele Ottolenghi, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation. Hosted by: James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and the E. W. Richardson Fellow, Heritage Foundation.
7. The Iran Deal: Key Issues and Controversies | Thursday, August 13th | 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join us for a discussion with Dr. Colin Kahl and other members of the administration on key elements of the Iran nuclear deal and its specific implications for the international community. Speakers include: Dr. Colin Kahl,
Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Adviser to the Vice President, Jon Wolfsthal, Senior Director for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, National Security Council, Chris Backemeyer, Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy, U.S. Department of State. Moderator: Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS.
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Limits of US-Turkey cooperation in Syria
On Thursday, the SETA Foundation hosted a talk entitled The U.S.-Turkey “Safe Zone” Agreement: What does it mean?. Panelists included: Sabiha Senyucel, research director of the Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), Mark Perry, independent author, Melissa Dalton, fellow and chief of staff at the CSIS International Security Program, and Kadir Ustun, Executive Director of the SETA Foundation. Kilic B. Kanat, research director of the SETA Foundation, moderated. The panelists believe that the recent US-Turkey cooperation in Syria will remain limited because Turkey and the US continue to have divergent interests.
Senyucel said that the recent bombing in Southeast Turkey pushed Turkey to take a more active role in the anti-ISIS coalition. Now the coalition can use İncirlik for bombings. The Kurdish issue is no longer just a domestic Turkish issue. The Turkey-PKK peace process is finished for now, but Senyucel hopes it can restart soon. The roles of the PKK, the PYD and the Syrian Kurdish entity are all linked. YPG fighters fought ISIS in Kobane, giving the Kurds international legitimacy. This changed the Kurds’ thinking about what they could achieve regionally.
After Kobane, the YPG and PKK demonstrated that they could fight ISIS on the ground and US airstrikes helped them take Tel Abyad. This concerned Turkey, which has good reason to distrust the PYD because of its links to the PKK. After the Gezi Park protests, the PKK stopped honoring its commitments and asserted de facto control over some parts of Eastern Turkey. There may have been mistakes from the Turkish side, but the Turkish government also displayed restraint. The PKK’s mid-July announcement that they were returning to arms was unjustified. Turkey is now reminding the PKK that they won’t achieve their ambitions. The US has agreed to support Turkey in this, but Senyucel isn’t sure how long this will last.
Kadir asserted that the US and Turkey can’t agree on the big picture in Syria. Obama believes the US only has limited interests; he isn’t trying to fix Syria. The PYD is a local actor that can contribute to the US’s non-strategy strategy. Turkey has tried to protect its border, host refugees, prevent the spillover of the conflict and resolve the Kurdish question. Necessity has limited Turkish actions. Turkey can’t ally with the PKK-linked PYD; the PKK has asserted de facto control over some towns in eastern Turkey and hasn’t fully committed to withdrawing guerrillas.
Turkey will allow the US to use İncirlik and will work to create a safe zone in Syria for the moderate opposition. Ankara wants a broader strategy from the US, but the US is uninterested. Will planes taking off from İncirlik help the PYD? The PYD has been reluctant to distance itself from the PKK and stop expelling Arabs from its territory. The PYD also allows Assad’s air force to overfly the territories it controls. If these things continue, the US and Turkey won’t come to a real agreement, but both sides need a broader strategy to make lasting progress.
Dalton agreed that the US and Turkey have divergent objectives. The Turks have called the recent agreement a safe zone, but the US has avoided this term. The agreement will involve enhanced border cooperation. The length of this cooperation area will be ~65 miles, but other elements are unknown:
- How deep into Syria will it go?
- Will Assad’s air force be excluded?
- Will there be cover for civilians in nearby cities outside the zone?
Broader US-Turkey cooperation will be needed for a long-term solution, but the anti-ISIS fight and border cooperation are likely to be the focus for now.
Perry highlighted the fact that there is unlikely to be any well-articulated US strategy from this administration, but there are three observable US policy principles:
- We maintain relations with allied regional states despite difficulties.
- Our enemy is Islamic extremism.
- There is no appetite for strong anti-Assad action.
We want Assad to lose, but don’t want his opponents to win. This is a tough line to walk with Turkey. The use of İncirlik will allow the US to gather better drone intelligence. Assad is unlikely to launch air operations in the area of the proposed safe zone because Assad doesn’t want to tangle with the US Air Force. The Obama administration’s vagueness may not be bad. The US has made many foreign policy mistakes; doing nothing is a viable option since Syria is so complex. We can protect our friends, maintain our strength, assist the victims, and remain friendly with Erdogan, without further intervention.
Barbara Slavin, nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council South Asia Center, asked about the US train and equip program. Many of the 54 rebels that we have trained have reportedly been captured by Jabhat Al-Nusra. Slavin asked whether the possible safe zone could be an injection point for these rebels. Dalton stated that it could be used for this purpose, because there is currently no other logical injection point. However, questions about how and at what cost the US and Turkey plan to protect such a zone remain. Kadir took a similar position, noting the slowness of the program. Perry discounted the program entirely, noting that the last successful US train and equip program was in the Philippines in 1899. The US is keeping the fiction of train and equip so that we can keep our hand in the game in Syria.
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A nervous region wary of the nuclear deal
On Wednesday, the Conflict Management Program at SAIS and MEI hosted a talk entitled After the Deal: A Veteran Journalist’s View from Tehran. Speakers included Roy Gutman, McClatchy Middle East bureau chief, and Joyce Karam, Washington bureau chief for Al-Hayat. Daniel Serwer of both SAIS and MEI moderated. Both speakers emphasized the dynamics that caused regional players to be wary of Iran.
Early last Spring, Gutman traveled to Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey.
In Israel, he observed that the major national security concern wasn’t the Iranian nuclear program, but rather Iran’s conventional threat through the buildup of Hezbollah forces. Israelis were disappointed that the US was leaving a security vacuum in Syria for Iran to fill. The Israeli position on the Iran deal is difficult to understand; Israeli politicians oppose it, but Israel’s foreign policy elite considers Iranian conventional forces a larger threat.
Jordanian officials also worried about regional chaos and Iranian influence. They were baffled by the half-hearted US response to Assad, as well as its airstrike-only response to ISIS.
Egypt is preoccupied by terrorism and the upheaval in Libya, but Egyptian officials are also concerned about Iran’s growing influence and US inaction.
Officials in every government (aside from Turkey’s) spoke of collusion between Turkey and extremists. The Turks think the Iranians know that the US is not a determined counterpart. They believe the US is appeasing Iran.
Gutman then traveled to Tehran to gauge the mood there. Iran has come in from the cold after 36 years, but Tehran resents the last 36 years of US policy. Change in Iran won’t happen fast. Khamenei has said that Iran’s policy towards the “arrogant” US government won’t change and that Iran will keep supporting its regional allies.
Israel views Hezbollah’s buildup as a direct threat, but Iranian officials told Gutman that the Tehran holds the trigger on Hezbollah’s weapons and won’t pull it unless Israel threatens Lebanon or Iran. However, a former Iranian diplomat admitted that Iran has no vital interest in Lebanon or the Palestinians. Iran also appears to have no vital interest in Yemen, but likes seeing Saudi Arabia embroiled in an unwinnable war. Iran is unalterably opposed to the breakup of Iraq into three states.
Iranian officials don’t think the deal is perfect, but still see it as a win-win for both sides. They view themselves as MENA’s most powerful and stable state. They are glad that US has accepted them as a regional player and negotiating partner.
After the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, Iran filled the vacuum. The Iraqi Army collapsed on Iran’s watch. Iran does not acknowledge its responsibility for this and ascribes the rise of ISIS to others. They also believe that foreign forces fought in Deraa and refused to acknowledge Assad’s role in fomenting terrorism by releasing terrorists from prison. Iranian officials also stated that all sectors of Lebanese society back Hezbollah’s deployment in Syria. Iran needs a reality check.
Iran opposes the creation of a safe zone/no-fly zone in Iraq and has threatened to send basijis into Syria if this happens. Iranians don’t understand the scope of Syria’s humanitarian catastrophe or Iran’s role in it. There are too many disagreements between the US and Iran to form a regional security agreement now. The US needs a policy for Syria; if we don’t have a policy, others will fill the vacuum. The US also needs an official version of what happened in Syria to counter the Iranian invented view of history.
Karam noted that the Arab response to the deal is less monolithic than Israel’s, but the GCC and Israel view Iran’s regional behavior similarly. The UAE, Oman, and Turkey quickly welcomed the deal because they have good trade relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar were more cautious. The Saudis don’t view the deal as US abandonment, but they fear increased Iranian regional meddling. Arab public opinion has shifted drastically since 2008, when 80% of Arabs viewed Iran positively. Now only 12% do. The Arab street is suspicious of the deal. The US explained the deal to Arab governments, but not to their people. The Arab street wonders whether the money Iran will gain from sanctions relief will go to funding Iranian students, or to Qassem Suleimani and more chlorine gas, barrel bombs, and Hezbollah fighters for Assad. Assad is a costly budget item for Iran. When will Iran realize that Assad can’t win? Nevertheless, Hezbollah keeps getting more involved in Syria.
Karam stated that the Gulf countries obtain commitments from the US at talks like Camp David, but then nothing gets done. The US is four years behind on Syria and needs an official policy.
Serwer noted in conclusion that the regional issues would be far worse if Iran had, or were about to get, nuclear weapons.
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