Tag: United States

Iran’s generational divide


Broadcast live streaming video on Ustream

Yesterday’s talk at the Woodrown Wilson Center on Iranian domestic politics by Nicola Pedde, director of the Institute for Global Studies in Rome, provided much needed insight into the generational change  in Iranian politics and its implications for Iran’s relations with the West. The shift from a political class deriving from Iran’s theocratic apparatus to a younger generation of political figures emerging from the institutions of the revolutionary structures themselves is radically changing Iran’s engagement with the West, which is at the same time becoming more open and more confrontational. In light of these changes, Pedde argued that our perceptions of Iranian politics need to be heavily revised. Particularly, the idea of the Islamic Republic as a monolithic entity must be dispelled, and engagement must be sought with all elements of the regime – including those emerging forces that are more skeptical of Western intentions. Unless the West adapts to and engages with the new Iran, the future of any Western-Iranian agreement will be at risk.

A full event write-up can be found on the Woodrow Wilson Center’s webpage.

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Not in the cards

Yesterday I published a piece by Matthew Parrish suggesting that Iraqi Kurdistan (plus some of Syrian Kurdish territory) is headed towards independence. He imagines the path may be a relatively easy one, compared to the painful history Kurdistan has already endured.

I don’t agree.

My objections have nothing to do with the Kurdish case for independence. That is pretty good: they were promised it at the end of World War I, they have been mistreated both within Iraq and Syria for long periods, they were chased from their homes and out of Iraq, and they were gassed by the Baghdad government. This is a history comparable to Kosovo’s (though the Albanians were never gassed).

Unlike that former Serbian province, the Kurds do not have a UN Security Council resolution that promises them an eventual decision on their political status and the UN did not administer their territory for the better part of a decade. But they were protected by a UN-authorized no-fly zone that allowed them to develop substantial and relatively democratic governance. The distinction amounts to little net difference.

The case against Kurdistan’s independence is not based on Kurdistan’s merits but on geopolitical factors. Turkey, as Matthew suggests, has already accepted Iraqi Kurdistan’s de facto independence and deals with it pretty much as an independent state. It remains unclear what its reaction to de jure independence would be, but let’s assume it would accept (though recognition would only come if independent Kurdistan forswore any pretensions whatsoever to Turkish territory, as Matthew suggests).

That is the only good news. Matthew’s presumption that Iran would somehow come around is dubious. Tehran has made it absolutely clear that it fears the irredentist sentiment Kurdistan’s independence would unleash, endangering the peace and stability that has generally reigned in the Iranian province of eastern Kurdistan and uncorking other ethnic resentments throughout a country whose Persian population is likely no more than 60% of the total. Iran is not going to welcome an independent Kurdistan.

Just as important: Arab Iraqis would not accept an independent Kurdistan either. The presence of large oil reserves in territory that the Kurds now control, which Matthew cites as a plus for independence, is one reason. Another is Sunni fear of what would be a large Shia majority in an Iraq without Kurdistan. The Sunnis would be unlikely to secede from Iraq without Kirkuk and Baghdad, which they would fight for. Peaceful separation, like that of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, requires prior agreement on the lines of separation, which doesn’t exist today in Iraq and isn’t likely to exist in the future.

Nor would the international community welcome an independent Kurdistan. The Americans will oppose it because of the precedent it would set for the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. The Russians will oppose it because of the implications for its ethnically non-Russian republics. The Europeans will be worried about Catalonia. The Chinese about Tibet. Kosovo, which still is not a UN member, was an exception that proves the rule, not a new rule.

In any event, the Kurds aren’t likely to go for independence anytime soon. At current oil prices and production levels, Kurdistan is not financially viable. While Matthew may imagine peaceful coexistence with the Islamic State (yes, he does), few in Turkey or Kurdistan can. Ankara and Erbil as well as Baghdad all know that they need American, European and Gulf help to defeat the self-declared caliphate. Complicating matters by declaring independence will not improve the Kurds’ prospects for needed assistance.

Could things change? Of course. Certainly oil prices can go up, though likely not as high as they were, because anything above $80 per barrel will open the “tight” oil and gas spigot. Kurdistan will need something like that price (and 10 years or so of drilling) to be better off with 100% of their own oil revenue than 17% of Iraq’s. Kurdistan could come to terms with Baghdad on where to draw its border, which would remove one important casus belli. Turkey could settle its problems with its own Kurds and Syria could throw out the Islamic State. Iran could turn into a cream puff. But little of that is likely to happen in the foreseeable future.

Bottom line: Kurdistan is not headed towards independence anytime soon, despite the merits of its case.

 

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Towards Kurdistan independence

This piece comes to peacefare.net from Matthew Parish, identified in full at the end.

The Kurds are an atypical people. The geographical area they populate is essentially contiguous, but they have not enjoyed their own state in modern times. Since the early sixteenth century their territory and population has been divided between the Safavid (Persian) and Ottoman Empires. They stayed much that way until the Treaty of Sèvres, a European plan for dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire that anticipated a Kurdish nation amongst several new emergent states at the end of World War I. The existence of such a state was a corollary of Woodrow Wilson’s theme of self-determination for previously colonized peoples. Sèvres anticipated that a Kurdish state would emerge under joint Anglo-French suzerainty, but Ataturk buried the abortive treaty through success in the Turkish War of Independence.

The Kurds remained without autonomy, divided between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, for some decades afterwards. In the 1950s and 1960, the Kurds took advantage of the chaos surrounding Sunni minority rule in Iraq, and in particular the military coup of And al-Karim Qasim against the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 and his subsequent execution in a Ba’ath party coup in 1963. The First Iraqi-Kurdish war reached a conclusion after nine years in 1970, with establishment of a federal Kurdish entity within Iraqi borders.

The Kurds’ luck ran out with the seizure of absolute power in Iraq by Saddam Hussein in 1979.The humiliation of the Iraqi central authorities by the Kurds would not be forgotten during his totalitarian reign. De jure Kurdish autonomy would be progressively eroded until Iraqi Kurdistan fell entirely under the writ of Baghdad. This course culminated in the 1988-89 Al-Anfal military campaign to defeat the Kurdish Peshmerga (the region’s autonomous military), which involved the widespread massacre of civilians including use of poisonous gas attacks.

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No loophole

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, who has worked at Princeton since 2009, is the moderate voice of the Iranian regime, which lacks an ambassador (other than at the UN), in the United States. He said yesterday, in an interview with Die Welt (Moussavian provided the English translation):

R&D on nuclear weapons is not prohibited by NPT. NPT prohibits building, storage and the use of nuclear weapons. For many years Germany is doing R&D on nuclear weapons under IAEA’s supervision. Because Berlin wants to know the consequences of possible use of nuclear bomb against Germany by other nuclear powers. It is legitimate as long as the nuclear powers maintain thousands of nuclear weapon.

To me, this is one of the most interesting remarks in a lengthy presentation that helpfully and clearly outlines main parameters of a possible nuclear agreement with Iran:  limiting Iran’s enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to meeting its practical requirements (and thereby making the time it would take to achieve a nuclear weapons capability at least a year) in exchange for lifting of sanctions, starting with European oil and financial sanctions.

Whereas those parameters may be mostly agreed, as Moussavian suggests, the parties seem far apart on the question of nuclear weapons research and development, if Moussavian’s remarks represent accurately what people in Tehran are thinking.* Germany certainly does conduct research on the impact of ionizing radiation, a subject on which its scholars have been leaders since the discovery of X-rays in 1896 (I should know: I wrote my doctoral thesis at Princeton on the early history of protection against ionizing radiation). That is quite different from conducting research on how to initiate a nuclear detonation, which is what the Americans think Iran was up to at Parchin before 2003.

While a great deal more attention has been paid to the number of centrifuges and the quantity of enriched uranium Iran will retain under a possible nuclear agreement, the issue of clandestine nuclear weapons research is really far more important. I don’t know of a single case of nuclear proliferation due to materials and facilities monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Moussavian is correct in believing that an agreement that limits enrichment and reprocessing and enables the agency to keep tabs on all of Iran’s declared facilities should be adequate to provide at least a year of warning if there is any attempt at diverting material to a nuclear weapons program.

But that is not sufficient, especially if Iran is now claiming a right to conduct nuclear weapons research. I know of no such right in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nor to my knowledge has the IAEA ever agreed to monitor the nuclear (e.g. initiators) or non-nuclear (e.g. high explosive) research needed to develop nuclear weapons. Such research would be inconsistent with the purposes of the treaty. The IAEA’s interest in Parchin is not in order to monitor the activity but to understand Iran’s intentions. I won’t claim non-nuclear states have never done experiments of the sort Iran is accused of conducting at Parchin, but Iran is not just any non-nuclear state. It can expect no US relief from sanctions if it insists that conducting nuclear weapons research is legitimate. I doubt even the Europeans will fall for that one.

That comes from someone who would very much like to see an agreement within the parameters Moussavian suggests reached by the June deadline. But ending nuclear weapons research in Iran permanently and verifiably has to be part of the deal. Anything less leaves a giant loophole.

*PS:  on this point, Moussavian writes: “Iran neither had research on nuclear weapons nor has such agenda. As a scholar, I stated my personal interpretation from NPT which I believe it is correct. It has nothing to do with Iran’s position.”

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Hello Kurdistan!

I haven’t actually watched this video of a discussion last Friday with Namo Abulla of Kurdistan’s Al Rudaw and Tzvi Kahn of the Foreign Policy Initiative. I hope it isn’t too far off the mark. Stay tuned also for Stephen Mansfield, discussing his book, The Miracle of the Kurds:

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Scraping the bottom of the barrel

With the likes of Josh Landis predicting more of the same (fragmentation, radicalization, impoverishment, displacement) in Syria, it would be more daring than I am to predict improvement. But it is still interesting to ask what could possibly make a difference and turn things in a more positive direction?

There are two propositions on the table at the moment.

One is the UN-proposed “freeze” for Aleppo. This is intended to be more than a ceasefire. It would freeze the warring forces in place, thus preventing them from simply being redeployed to fight elsewhere, as well as initiate local governance on a cooperative basis between the opposition and the regime. Monitoring would initially have to be local, with international observers deployed in due course. In the absence of effective monitoring, the regime would be likely to use any such freeze to redeploy its forces (including intelligence cadres and paramilitaries) to the south, where the opposition is making headway. It is much harder for the opposition to follow suit, because its fighters generally focus on their home areas and its supply and logistical support is far less developed.

The second proposition is a Russian proposal for intra-Syrian dialogue. This will supposedly convene January 26-28 on the basis of the June 2012 Geneva communique, which calls for an interim governing body with full executive powers. Moscow, Tehran and the Syrian regime view this formula as allowing Bashar al Assad to remain in place and preside over a “national unity” government. The opposition and Washington say it means Bashar has to exit, or at least give up all executive power (which if implemented would mean that he would consequently exit sooner rather than later). There is no sign that this difference of interpretation has been bridged.

Separately, neither of these propositions seems likely to succeed. The Americans and Europeans are allowing both to move along, faute de mieux. The question is whether together they might be more likely to produce some sort of positive outcome.

I’m not seeing it yet. The missing ingredient is enforcement. Only if and when the international community gets together behind a UN Security Council resolution that makes it clear Bashar will suffer irreparable damage to his hold on power will he be willing to countenance a serious ceasefire in Aleppo that blocks him from redeploying his forces. This would require the Americans to be prepared to execute air strikes if there is a violation. As for creation of an interim governing body with full executive powers, enforcement would rely heavily on Russian willingness to cut Bashar’s military and financial supply lines if he transgresses. Putin has given no indication he is prepared to do that. Even if he were, Iranian support might keep Bashar afloat.

This brings us back to the inevitable:  there is no diplomatic solution in Syria in the current military situation unless Washington and Moscow come to terms and agree on one, including a mutual commitment to enforcement. They certainly have a common strategic interest in a negotiated settlement. Both capitals want the Islamic State and Jabhat Nusra, the main jihadi extremist organizations, defeated. They differ mainly on whether Bashar al Assad is a bulwark against the jihadis or an important cause of their presence.

Richard Gowan suggests there might be room for the US and Russia to reach a “dodgy”  grand bargain based on a trade-off between Ukraine and Syria: Moscow would temper its support for separatists in eastern Ukraine (and get some sanctions relief) in exchange for Washington backing off its demand for Bashar to step down. The trouble with this idea is that Washington has already backed off, because it gives priority to fighting the Islamic State. It might be more likely the other way around:  Moscow could back off support for Asad and temper support for separatism in Ukraine in return for Washington allowing some sanctions relief.

Like Russia, Iran props up Asad because it sees him as an ally against Sunni extremism, but Tehran has also needed Asad as a reliable link in the “resistance” chain that it has forged with Hizbollah and Hamas. There is no sign Iran is prepared to abandon Damascus. Even under sanctions and with lower oil prices, Tehran is providing ample men, weapons and financing. A nuclear deal this year would make that easier to sustain, as multilateral sanctions are at least partially lifted.

Freeze, intra-Syrian dialogue, grand bargain: we are scraping the bottom of the barrel. There may be something there that will work, but the odds are not good.

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