Tag: Yemen
Washington’s fault
Even for someone who served abroad as an American diplomat, the Egyptian penchant for conspiracy theories about Washington’s supposed role is astonishing. So too is the crudeness of Egyptian anti-Americanism. While I was treated to a good deal of poor taste and baseless speculation about American machinations while serving as an American diplomat in Italy and Brazil, the admixture of hope for good relations with the United States was significantly greater there. Egyptians seem genuinely to dislike the US and attribute many of their ills to it.
It is difficult to understand how people as clever as the Egyptians have failed to break the code of American behavior: Washington understands that it has relatively little influence over what happens in Egypt and is prepared to accept whoever comes to power with a modicum of legitimacy and promises to steer the country towards something like a democratic outcome with as little violence as possible. That’s what happened when Mubarak fell, it is what happened when Morsi took over, and it is what happened when the demonstrations and General Sissi pushed him out.
Washington is following the Egyptian lead. If American behavior seems erratic and incomprehensible to Egyptians, that is largely because the revolutionary course the Egyptians have chosen is so unpredictable. The result is that all sides in Egypt are convinced the Americans are arrayed against them. Neither secularists nor Islamists in Egypt seem inclined to look in the mirror to see the origins of what ails their country. Both prefer to blame it all on Washington, which has been less than adroit in countering the vituperation.
This is not to say there is no basis whatsoever in the conspiracy theories. Ambassador Patterson likely did try to get General Sissi to negotiate some sort of deal with the Muslim Brotherhood. Deputy Secretary of State Burns did not spend several days in Cairo recently lounging around the embassy–he surely pushed for Sissi to clarify the future roadmap for preparing a constitution and holding new elections. The Americans will be concerned to see things in Egypt move towards relatively democratic stability, with the state’s monopoly on the legitimate means of violence restored (especially in Sinai). They may make mistakes of judgment about how that would best be accomplished, but to imagine that they want Morsi back in power, or Sissi to continue in power without elections, is just plain wrong.
I don’t begrudge Egypt its enthusiasm for its latest military rock star. General Sissi has clearly tapped some deep vein of political gold in the Egyptian body politic. But we should all recognize this cult of personality for what it is: a budding autocrat whose similarity to Gamal Abdel Nasser should raise eyebrows not only in Washington. My dean Vali Nasr predicts that the Americans will soon be back to a policy of supporting Middle Eastern autocrats against more and less radical Islamists.
I hope not. The Arab uprisings are a tremendous opportunity to encourage greater freedom in a part of the world that has seen little of it. Things are now going sour in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt, not to mention poor Syria. Each circumstance is distinct, but in all of them the genie will be difficult to put back in the bottle. What is needed from the United States is consistent backing for democratic processes, which require relatively stable and orderly environments. The only thing we should want to be blamed for is support to those who seek human dignity and open societies.
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The Al Qaeda conference call
This morning’s report of an intercepted conference call with participation of up to 20 Al Qaeda bosses and operatives goes some way to explaining the nonsensically broad travel warning and embassy closings of recent days. The odd configuration of closings apparently was derived from the conference call. This suggests what anyone who knows the American bureaucracy will have already guessed: we don’t pay anyone to be careless, so the system is exceedingly risk averse (without however necessarily decreasing the risk).
Also of interest is this: Washington responded to the intercept in part with drone strikes in Yemen. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula escalated the threat, causing the evacuation of Embassy Sanaa and disruption of American aid programs in a country desperately in need of them. Now both Al Qaeda and its opponents seem to be massing in Sanaa for a showdown. A movie script along these lines would hardly be credible.
Evacuation of civilian Americans from Yemen has serious implications. It is hard to picture how the flow of personnel from the Yemeni hinterland into Al Qaeda can be stemmed without solving some of Yemen’s problems with water, poverty and governance. There is every reason to believe that the drone war increases Al Qaeda recruitment, however vital it may appear to the joint chiefs in the short term.
This is a frustrating situation: a terrorist network conference call stymies the world’s last remaining super power. Ayman al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s chief executive, has to be reasonably pleased with the effect he is having at so far minimal cost (those few “militants” killed by drones in Yemen). It might even be that the conference call was a setup, conducted entirely for the benefit of the National Security Agency’s Arabic speakers. The subsequent leaks will have indicated to Al Qaeda a good deal about American intercept capabilities, though they likely already knew most of that.
President Obama was right to underline last night on Jay Leno that Americans are far more likely to be killed in automobile accidents than in terrorist attacks. That was true even in 2001, when Al Qaeda killed close to 3000 Americans. The numbers in most years are well under 30, few of them in the United States and not all by Islamic extremists.
But that won’t satisfy the Administration’s critics, who will emphasize that the conference call suggests Al Qaeda central has been reconstituted and is directing its franchisees once again. Al Qaeda is certainly showing itself a resilient and resourceful opponent, one that manages to tie up gigantic American resources with minimum effort.
What should we be doing in this situation? Protecting our people is certainly priority one. But making sure they can conduct their diplomatic, consular, economic assistance, and other functions is also vital. I know no one who thought we were doing enough on the civilian side in Yemen before the recent threat emerged. Just restoring our people to their original effort will not be sufficient.
We need a much beefed up civilian effort in Yemen. That isn’t going to happen so long as the terrorist threat is out there. The terrorists know it. They also know they don’t actually have to carry out an attack to block governance and development efforts. They need only get us to evacuate our civilians. Yemeni employees will carry on, at great risk, but they will not be fully effective beyond the humanitarian realm without Americans or third country nationals.
A terrorist attack now might underline the point and prevent us from returning them any time soon, but the threat has already had a serious impact.
PS: On the ingredients of what is needed, see for example Daniel Green’s piece.
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Peace picks July 29 – August 2
1. Squaring the circle: General Raymond T. Odierno on American military strategy in a time of declining resources, American Enterprise Institute, Monday, July 29, 2013 / 10:30 AM – 11:30 AM
Venue: American Enterprise Institute
1150 17th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Mackenzie Eaglen, General Raymond T. Odierno
With sequestration a reality and little hope for a bargain on the horizon, the US military is facing a steeper-than-planned defense drawdown that few wanted but fewer still seem to be willing or able to stop. What are the implications for the men and women of the US Army if the sequester stays on the books for the foreseeable future?
AEI’s Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies will host General Raymond Odierno, Chief of Staff of the US Army, for the second installment of a series of four events with each member of the Joint Chiefs.
Register for the event here:
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Yemenis in DC
I spent a couple of hours with visiting Yemenis earlier this week, focused on the current national dialogue. This was not a cross-section of Yemeni society. These were well-educated, mostly mid- to upper-level bureaucrats who certainly know what people in Washington want to hear.
The vision they projected is not reconstruction but rather building a New Yemen: a single (but not overly centralized) civil state, stronger provincial and local self-governance, stronger protection of individual rights. Three hurdles seemed foremost on the Yemenis’ minds:
- fuller integration of the south;
- security for the population;
- international community engagement. Read more
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“Il potere logora chi non ce l’ha”
As I am about to risk denunciation for drawing unreasonable parallels, let me state up front that Turkey is not Egypt, Egypt is not Libya, Libya is not Tunisia, Tunisia is not Syria, Syria is not Yemen, Yemen is not Morocco or Kuwait. If there is one thing we’ve learned from the Arab awakenings, it is that each finds its own course within a particular historical and cultural tradition. Distinct political, economic, social and religious conditions are like the soil and rocks through which a river finds its way to the sea. It is difficult to predict the water’s course as gravity pulls it in the inevitable direction.
That said, it seems to me we are seeing in the Middle East a common factor, perhaps a bit like the granite that forces water to find another difficult-to-predict direction. That common factor is the difficulty all of the “democratically elected” leaders are having in adjusting to politics with an opposition. Tunisia is struggling with a Salafist opposition that is stronger than many expected. Islamist militias in Libya have forced its parliament into a harder line on purging Qaddafi-era officials than its leadership found comfortable. Egypt is facing a summer of discontent as President Morsi runs into criticism and street demonstrations by his erstwhile non-Islamist allies.
Now it is Turkey’s turn, where protest against destruction of a park in Taksim square has turned into a much broader challenge because of overreaction from the security forces and Prime Minister Erdogan’s arrogant response. Now the theme is “everywhere is Taksim, resistance is everywhere.” I hardly need mention that in Syria Asad and his security forces managed by overreaction to turn a few teenage graffiti artists into a civil war.
Despite the differences in context, there is a common theme here: the inability of rulers, even democratically elected ones, to govern in an inclusive way that provides opposition with a legitimate role. The flip side of the coin is the inability of opposition forces to figure out how to influence those who govern them without resorting to violence, disruption and rebellion. There is an exception to the rule, but a limited one. Yemen, of all places, is proceeding with a national dialogue that appears for the moment serious, though it has failed to include the southern secessionists and may eventually fail on that score.
Widening our aperture a bit, I would submit that we are seeing something similar in Iraq, where Prime Minister Maliki has managed to keep a few Sunni elites in the tent but seems to have driven large numbers in Anbar and Ninewa into an increasingly disruptive opposition that extremists are exploiting to challenge the security forces and may lead to further division of the state. In Bahrain, the monarchy and its opposition have driven each other into mutual polarization. Only in Morocco, where the king has tried to get ahead of the reform curve, and in Kuwait, where parliament plays a modestly more serious role than in most other Arab monarchies, have we seen the opposition developing as a possible alternative governing elite: loyal but with its own program and leadership cadres.
So the common problem I see is the failure to develop in many places an opposition that is serious about presenting a governing alternative. In dictatorships of course the regimes don’t want such a thing to happen and do everything they can to prevent it. But even in newish democracies that instinct remains. And opposition behavior all too often confirms that there is no viable alternative, or that there are many, no one of which has enough political omph to merit gaining power in a relatively free and fair election. Knowing this, fragmented oppositions do little to gain credibility as governing forces but focus instead on gaining adherents and influence through street demonstrations.
It will take time to get past this stage of things. Maybe a decade. It is not easy to turn a street movement, even a successful one, into a political force with real governing potential. In Giulio Andreotti’s immortal words, “il potere logora chi non ce l’ha.” Power wears out those who haven’t got it.
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Game of Drones
The debate over the use of drones falls into three paradigms: legal, practical and moral. The panel hosted on Wednesday by the Bi-Partisan Policy Center (BPC) followed this pattern.
John Bellinger, a lawyer and former adviser to the Department of State, said legally, it is permissible to use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to kill leaders who plot against the United States. Under international law, use of force is permissible under an imminent threat or during ongoing hostilities.
Hina Shamsi of the ACLU replied that the United States does not conduct drone strikes under those guidelines. No evidence is required that a plot is taking place. During wartime, Thomas Kean, the co-chair of the BPC’s Homeland Security Project, we may suspend civil rights and take otherwise illegal actions, but the US drone program is going beyond that and conducting actions illegal even in wartime.
A crucial problem is lack of transparency. The Obama administration needs to prove that what they are doing is lawful. So far they have not succeeded. Who is making the decisions? What are the legal standards? Who are the targets and why? Restricted access to White House legal memos on the drone program inhibits Congress from constructing an adequate legal framework and from conducting oversight. Bellinger posed the question, once meant to be a controversial joke, now an impending reality: “Will drones be Obama’s Guantanamo [controversial legacy]?” Shamsi warned that transparency is necessary for a healthy democracy. The drone program threatens our democracy’s health.
Philip Zelikow, former counselor at the Department of State under George W. Bush, presented a defense and explanation of how the administration approaches the use of UAVs. The argument centers on how to conduct warfare with a group like Al Qaeda, a non-state actor, spread out over multiple nations. First, he explained, you need to define a doorway that once entered allows you to kill people. Having passed through the doorway, you ask ‘which people can I kill?’ You have to set standards. Zelikow advocated a: “rule of law” approach. The doorway should be public, debated and discussed, to ensure a healthy democracy. Who you can kill should be defined carefully as someone who directly participates in hostilities.
Bellinger pointed out that the rest of the world operates within a human rights paradigm. The drone issue heavily affects international response and regional blowback. No other nation has publicly agreed with our drone program. To others, the US appears indifferent to civilian casualties. The perception of America as ruthless undermines our legitimacy as a world power. Shamsi added that America needs to be concerned about the precedent it sets for the rest of the world. Sooner or later, other countries and non-state actors will get drone technology. “We need to consider,” she added, “if we want to live in the world that we are currently defining.”
Mark Mazzetti of the New York Times posed the question of how and why drones are used in countries where American is not at war. Is the bar different for targeted killings in Yemen or Pakistan? What does this new style of war mean for regional repercussions and blowback? Drone strikes gone awry, in these areas especially, generate fear and hatred. They also lead to increased radicalization and motivate extremism.
The time has come for a renewed debate on the use of military force, including drones. The enemies are not conventional ones. We need public discussion on what is permissible, legally, practically and morally.
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