



REPUBLIC OF KOSOVA
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora

As of October 20, 2023

PRELIMINARY REPORT

Initial Analysis of Serbia's Paramilitary Aggression on Kosova

Executive Summary

On September 24, 2023, Serbia committed an act of aggression against Kosova, carried out by a paramilitary group of more than 80 troops in Banjska/Banjskë, Republic of Kosova.

This preliminary report provides clear evidence of Serbia's support and coordination. Up to the highest levels of the Serbian state, they are involved in this and other destabilizing acts. Serbia supported, facilitated, and directed this terrorist attack.

A trove of documents and a huge cache of military-grade weaponry, seized and examined by Kosova law enforcement, are proving beyond a reasonable doubt that this attack was set up to instigate a wider violent coup against the Republic of Kosova and thus serve as a pretext for a military intervention by the Serbian Army, which has been on high alert and amassed near the Kosova border for a long time. Only after public warnings from the United States on September 30, 2023, did the Serbian president, A. Vučić, order a partial withdrawal but kept the state of high alert for the troops and had the Minister of Defense of Serbia publicly announce that the army would invade Kosova if the president of Serbia gave the order. Thus, the threat of an invasion by Serbia remains imminent even after international outrage over the attack on September 24.

The EU-labeled terrorist attack has been successfully repelled by Kosova Police on September 24, after hours of exchange of gunfire between the paramilitary criminals and Kosova Police, that acted with great restraint to avoid risking the lives of pilgrims and monks in the nearby Banjska/Banjskë Orthodox Monastery.

In order to provoke and start widening clashes in the north of Kosova, the Serbia-backed paramilitary group had initiated the operation by setting up a roadblock. Upon the arrival of regular Kosova Police who came to investigate the incident, they immediately opened fire on the police

officers from their hidden positions. They murdered Police Sgt. Afrim Bunjaku and wounded other police officers.

In the ensuing police operation against the terrorists, three paramilitaries were killed, and several others were wounded. Among those killed was a former personal bodyguard of a close political ally of Serbian President Vučić, namely the former Minister of Defense and current head of the Serbian intelligence agency BIA, A. Vulin. Only recently, Vulin had been placed under sanctions by the United States.

Kosova police forces exercised necessary restraint during the exchange of fire to avoid risking the lives of innocent civilians.

As a result of the police actions, finally, six perpetrators were arrested, and tons of military equipment were seized. According to available data, more than 80 attackers withdrew and escaped to Serbia.

A wide array of military weaponry seized, alongside documentation of their origin, undoubtedly originates from the Serbian army's cache and is not even available on the black market (see information below). This is additional proof that this attack was not limited in scope to a single place but executed with the goal of widening clashes, killings, and instigating a military conflict.

Tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition for machine guns, anti-tank missiles, uniforms, and weaponry for as many as 400 military troops, along with many other sophisticated weapons, clearly demonstrate that the attack on September 24 was seen as only the starting point of something much bigger.

In combination with the massive troop movements in the wake of the attack by Serbia and the current state of high alert for the Serbian Army, it is the most probable scenario that this attack was to be followed by more and would prepare the pretext for Vučić to invade the territory of Kosova with the ultimate goal of a Donbas scenario, namely the annexation of at least the north of Kosova.

Initially rejected as flat-out wrong by the Belgrade regime and the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Serbia, I. Dačić personally, who is the first official coordinator of all Serbian intelligence agencies and a known close ally of Russian President Putin, when published by the government of Kosova, a later public confession following a published drone video showing him in action, M. Radoičić, a close ally of Serbian President Vučić for years, has been identified as the leader of the paramilitary group in the terrorist attack.

Radoičić, a U.S.-sanctioned shadow ruler of politics and organized crime in the north of Kosova, has been the political, business, and criminal power broker installed by A. Vučić as the deputy chair of the Vučić-founded and guided ultranationalist party Srpska Lista in Kosova. Despite several attempts by Vučić over the years to diffuse the close connection, there is plenty of evidence, including TV footage showing the two ultranationalists sitting next to each other at a press conference, that they are close allies.

Radoičić is being portrayed in several reports over the years as a violent force, controlling Srpska Lista as well as threatening fellow Serbs in the north of Kosova. He is seen as the key player in a widespread network of rule by a combination of multimillion organized crime business and ultranationalist political activities that secure hundreds of millions of profits per year derived from drug and arms trafficking and other crimes overseen by Radoičić and other leading figures of Srpska Lista, mostly in coordination with political and criminal partners in Belgrade.

To the detriment of ordinary Serbian citizens, who have not been properly protected from these violent and criminal structures close to Vučić until the new Kosova government implemented the rule of law against the rule of crime in the north of Kosova, Radoičić and his people pressured citizens even in political processes.

As far back as 2018, Radoičić was already identified as "Vučić's man" in Kosova by many observers and Serb politicians in Kosova as the real power broker in the northern municipalities of Kosova. His indictment in the context of the murder of a Serb political competitor, Oliver Ivanovic, has been unsurprisingly skipped by Serbian authorities. This most prominent case has never been thoroughly investigated by the Serbian state, contrary to all the dramatic announcements made by Radoičić's ally Vučić after Ivanović was gunned down in front of his office in Mitrovica.

Radoičić's well-known, public and private, political and business connection to the President of Serbia is a smoking gun in this act of aggression that was repelled by Kosova on September 24, 2023.

It is beyond any doubt that such a prominent figure with significant political and business influence, and such intense contacts with Vučić and his associates, wouldn't undertake such an attack without the knowledge and consent of the Serbian President, who created the ultranationalist political party in Kosova and installed Radoičić as his "Prigozhin" in Kosova.

The choice of violent gangs, hooligans, and criminal actors to carry out his orders is a key characteristic of Vučić's modus operandi. International media outlets, from The New York Times to the German magazine DER SPIEGEL, as well as specialized publications like Balkan Insight, have extensively reported on indicative elements of the close connection between Vučić and organized crime in Serbia and Kosova.

As demonstrated in this report, Radoičić is deeply embedded in the security structure of the state of Serbia, ranging from the police to the army and intelligence services at various levels of the chain of

command. This is not possible without the knowledge, consent, and protection of the highest levels of the Serbian state.

The evidence in this case has been thoroughly investigated and evaluated. This report does not share every detail, but it does reveal some of the facts that can be made public without endangering ongoing criminal investigations.

Based on the gathered evidence, the following key elements can be revealed at this stage:

1. The Banjska Attack on September 24, 2023, was carried out by a paramilitary group that had been recruited, trained, and specifically designated for this purpose, equipped with heavy arms provided by the state of Serbia. The paramilitary group operated under the operational command of Serbian government structures, namely the Serbian army and intelligence agencies.
2. The goal of the attack was to instigate a wider conflict and escalation by inflicting significant damage on state structures of the Republic of Kosova, including the loss of lives. This involved challenging, threatening, and potentially killing members of the international peacekeeping force KFOR, as well as members of the Kosova Police. The deliberate killing of Kosova Police officer Mr. Afrim Bunjaku, and the attempt to kill other police officers, exemplifies the ruthless brutality with which the strategy was carried out. It is obvious that in case the plans to widen the conflict were realized, KFOR and other international security personnel would have been involved.
3. The location of the Monastery and the way the operation was planned and executed leaves no doubt that calculating fatalities in the course of a police operation against the terrorists at a monastery of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosova, were meant to contribute to the pretext for a military intervention to allegedly save endangered Serbian citizens of Kosova and pilgrims from Serbia.
4. The evidence proves that the chain of command for this operation originates in Serbia's state structures, making this attack an act of aggression against the territorial integrity of a neighboring country.

Any potential involvement by the state of Russia through its intelligence officers and other state actors within Serbia and the Serbian security structure is still subject to further investigation.

The use of force by Serbia against Kosova, the incursion into its territory, and the killing of members of security personnel with plans to expand the area of operation, along with involving international peacekeepers in potential clashes with military equipment, constitute a crime under public international law. Responsibility for this crime lies with the President of Serbia and his security structures involved.

5. The temporary impossibility to prosecute the paramilitary members of the terrorist group as a consequence of Serbia's rejection to extradite them promotes impunity for crimes and

constitutes a violation of international criminal law, which might serve as a leeway for undertaking new attempts of paramilitary terrorist attacks, even in the near future.

6. Besides providing operational and organizational support, Serbia's leadership continues to incite conflict in Kosova, up to the point of an armed revolt.

This aggression, through propaganda and coercion of the population in the northern part of Kosova, was only wound down after the failed operation. President Vučić addressed Serb citizens of Kosova, suggesting that the time would come for them to leave Kosova "on tractors." These warnings are absolutely fabricated and aimed at further escalating the situation to the point of an armed rebellion against the democratic institutions of Kosova.

In order to keep open the opportunity for a military invasion of Kosova at any time, Serbia is maintaining as many as 48 "forward operating" bases of its army near the border of Kosova. To bolster the preparations for war, Vučić is organizing huge murals and graffiti across Serbia, promoting the slogan "When our army returns to Kosova."

The overall propaganda in Serbia for an upcoming war has reached unprecedented levels, even compared to the constant hate speech promoted by the aggressive, nationalist Serbian leadership through its media.

Introduction

On September 24, 2023, a paramilitary group from Serbia invaded and attacked the Kosova Police near the Banjska Monastery. Kosova Police Sergeant Afrim Bunjaku was killed, and another police officer was wounded. The clergy in the Banjska Monastery and 49 pilgrims from Novi Sad (Serbia) were caught in the attack when the paramilitaries entered the premises of the Monastery while retreating after killing police officer Bunjaku.

After the initial exchange of fire with regular police, Kosova Special Police Units arrived on-site. The police operation lasted for several hours, during which the involved state institutions practiced close coordination with KFOR and EULEX. Finally, the situation was brought under control without any civilian casualties, as the clergy of the Monastery and the visiting pilgrims were successfully protected from harm.

The operation presented a clear case of aggression against the Republic of Kosova, carried out by a paramilitary group financed and supported by Serbia, as proven by evidence found on the site after the operation.

The operation was led by Milan Radoičić, who was the vice president of the Srpska Lista political party, founded by Serbia's President Vučić as his political arm in Kosova politics. Vučić had his close ally Radoičić installed as vice president of the party, who was widely considered the de facto leader of the party. For many years, Radoičić has been widely considered to be "Vučić's man" in Kosova. As far back as 2018, with the murder of a prominent Serb leader in opposition to Vučić and Radoičić, Oliver Ivanovic, the grip on power in politics, business, and organized crime by Radoičić was widely acknowledged. Another Kosovar Serb political figure and former minister in Serbia, Rada Trajković, publicly stated in the wake of the murder of Ivanovic that Radoičić "completely controls life in the north of Kosova, deciding on good and bad."

While Vučić denied any involvement of Serbia in the attack, evidence gathered before, during, and after the attack proves the opposite. The involvement of Serbia in all phases of this operation, including operational, logistical, financial, and finally, political support and legitimacy, can and will be proved in court.

Kosova continues to call for consequences for Serbia's involvement in this atrocious crime. From planning and training the terrorist paramilitaries before the attack to declaring the EU-labeled "terrorist attack" an "act of patriotism" and declaring the three killed terrorists national heroes, and announcing a statewide day of mourning in Serbia, is deeply appalling. It provides further proof of how deeply Serbia is involved in this attack, as well as in a series of other clandestine operations against a sovereign and peaceful neighboring country.

The Vučić-aligned group was supplied with heavy weapons manufactured in Serbia, which are only available to military structures and not even accessible on the black market.

Kosova law enforcement conducted the operations to protect civilians and defend the territorial integrity of Kosova in a highly professional manner. This demonstrated the readiness and capability of Kosova Special Police to mitigate threats posed by heavily armed groups, in close coordination with KFOR and EULEX.

This report presents evidence gathered and evaluated by Kosova's law enforcement institutions regarding the September 24 attack from Serbia against Kosova.

Sections 1 to 6 provide factual evidence across the entire timeframe, from the initial planning to the actual execution of the operation. The weapons and other equipment used by the paramilitary terrorists are listed, and their purposes are specified.

Section 1 describes the preparatory phase of the attack, including evidence of the training of the Serbia-paramilitary group in official military bases in Serbia.

Section 2 provides information on the planning, including predetermined goals of the operation, which were foiled by the successful intervention of Kosova Special Police.

Section 3 provides detailed descriptions of how the terrorist attack was executed operationally, including information on the misuse of KFOR insignia and the rationale behind the decision to stage the initial attack near the Banjska Monastery.

Section 4 provides evidence on the weapons, ammunition, and explosives confiscated.

Section 5 provides information on the tactical and logistical support of the group by Serbia.

Section 6 provides information on the connections and involvement of members of the terrorist group in past incidents.

Section 7 provides analysis and conclusions on the direct involvement of the state of Serbia in the paramilitary operation.

The relevant institutions of the Republic of Kosova are available for cooperation and sharing of information with our partners under the premise of an ongoing investigation. Upon request and depending on the degree of mutual cooperation, Kosova is ready to share further evidence and scrutinize evidence in greater detail. Kosova law enforcement institutions remain ready to cooperate with EUROPOL for further investigation.

We invite our partners and allies to pressure the political leadership of Serbia to no longer deny its involvement, to hand over the more than 80 terrorists and criminals involved, and to cooperate fully with international partners and with Kosova law enforcement in order to shed more light on the logistics, planning, and goals of the attack on September 24.


I. THE PREPARATORY PHASE OF THE TERRORIST ATTACK

Training in Serbia's military bases

Over a period of two years, in dozens of different training sessions, the members of the Serbian paramilitary group, including members of the terrorist-labelled groups "Civil Protection (Civilna Zaštita)" and "North Brigade (Severna Brigada)," carried out military training in order to prepare for attacking Kosova.

Various tactical and doctrinal trainings has been held with higher intensity in recent weeks, especially after most of the paramilitaries from Kosova had to leave the country following their involvement and subsequent prosecution by law enforcement after the brutal attack on KFOR, Kosova Police, journalists, and various citizens in Zvečan/Zveçan on May 29, 2023.

A large part of them, totaling more than 150 members, were selected for intensive military training by military instructors from the Serbian Armed Forces, including the Gendarmerie and the special military police unit 'Cobra,' which is directly subordinated to the Chief of General Staff of the Serbian Army Forces (SAF).



"Pasulianske livade" military base in Serbia where the paramilitaries trained on military equipment, including HUMVEE military vehicles. (Picture taken from drone seized from terrorists)

Trainings were also held at SAF training ground in Peshter, near Tutin, Serbia. Additionally, trainings were carried out at the military barracks in Raška, Serbia. There, the paramilitary group was instructed in theoretical lectures about surveillance and defense.

Exercises were also conducted at the Training Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "Mitrovo Polje" of Serbia in Vrnjačka Banja and Kopaonik in the mountains near Kosova.


From then until at least a few days before the September 24 attack, most of the terrorists were re-organized into a group, receiving intensive training from military instructors and others. The group began to intensify their preparation for a military-grade attack against Kosova. The Serbian Armed Forces' Raška barracks served as a location for continuous training of members of this illegal formation before and especially throughout the year before the September 24 attack.

After the attack, Kosova Police seized drones/unmanned aerial vehicles that contain video recordings of the training/simulation of the very attack, which was held at the training ground of the military complex "Pasuljanske Livade" in Serbia. The recorded simulation dates from September 20, 2023, just four days before the Banjska attack. The training was organized during the night and is believed to be the final ground preparation for the planned attack.

Misuse of U.S. donated Humvee military vehicles

In the seized video recording, U.S. HUMVEE military vehicles are seen being misused as part of the training/simulation of the attack. As recently as in July 2023 only, some 66 HUMVEE vehicles were delivered to Serbia by the United States.

In the wake of the September 24 attack, the U.S. State Department stated it requested a full investigation since the U.S. takes very seriously any claim of involvement of US-supplied equipment in such terrorist activities.




*These two pictures show the military training by the paramilitaries on 20 September 2023 at 05:16 a.m. at the **military base "Pasuljanske Livade" in Serbia**. The coordinates for the photo on the left are 44.002110 N, 21.615930 E and on the right 44.002080 N, 21.617230*

II. PLANNING PHASE OF THE PARAMILITARY OPERATION

Goal of the operation

Satellite maps, topographical maps and sketches were also found at the scene. This evidence proves that the paramilitaries were trained in military tactics for the operation that targeted all strategic points in the two highways Mitrovica-Jarinje/Jarinjë and Mitrovica-Brnjak/Bërnjak, with the clearly stated goal to occupy and control an entire territory of municipalities in the north of the country.



Some of the topographical maps of Serbia Armed Forces (SAF) used by the paramilitaries

According to the evidence, the operation was planned to be carried out in three phases, with a total of 43 points located at crossroads, strategic high places (hills), and bridges.

First, an attack on the checkpoint of the Kosova Police at the crossroads of Bistrica was planned to take control over Leposavić/Leposaviç.

In the second phase, the goal was to control the two roads leading to Jarinje/Jarinjë and to the village of Zerovnica.

The third phase allegedly foresaw the deployment of the paramilitaries in the vicinity of the Banjska Monastery and control of the road from the 'Izvor' crossing into the village of Banjska.

All these steps should ensure the opening of a free corridor for continuous weapon and other supplies from Serbia.



Picture of combat/strategies and an actual military-style operation in December 2022 in Leshak/Leposavić. The military maps used were produced by the Military Geography Institute of Serbia. Some of the maps indicate plans for digging military-style trenches. In the vicinity of some of the points marked on the map, military trenches were also planned, similar to those barricades erected by Vučić's and Radoičić's allies in December 2022.

Preceding Activities of the Serbian Army (SAF) In Support of the Attack

The Serbian state supported the military attack fully, including sending special forces to illegally enter into the Republic of Kosova

UAV reconnaissance flights by SAF

Dozens of unmanned aerial vehicle/drone flights over the northern part of Kosova have been reported recently, presumably by Serbia.

Specialized units of the Serbian Armed Forces (SAF) for airspace control, among them units in Raška have been reinforced recently with specialized surveillance teams from Niš and Kraljevo and are observing the terrain of the northern part of Kosova, providing images of the static and mobile checkpoints of Kosova Police.

SAF Special Unit “Cobra” entering into Kosova

Intrusion of about 60 members of the military police unit for special purposes 'Cobra' of SAF special units into the territory of Kosova was registered on September 05, 2023, at the northern border of Kosova.

This military police unit is subordinated directly to the Chief of the General Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces (SAF), with whom terrorist leader Radoičić is in close coordination.

The “Cobra” unit stayed in the location “Vranovicko Brdo” in the border area to Kosova. It is suspected that 10 Cobra troops consciously and illegally entered dozens of meters into the territory of Republic of Kosova. The entry was recorded in the settlement Klečkë in the municipality of Zubin Potok near to the Bërnjak/Zubin Potok border point.

These Cobra members in black uniforms, among them some masked, were armed with long guns.

Misuse of Ambulances for Weapon Transport into Kosova

Most concerning is that it has been confirmed that even medical ambulances have been misused to illegally transport weaponry from Serbia into Kosova. Also, one member of the paramilitaries, I. Milenkovic, who was killed in the fight with Kosova Police on September 24, 2023, was an ambulance driver from Leposaviq and at the same time a former member of the 125th Motorized Brigade of the Serbian Army - Prishtina Corps.

III. THE EXECUTION OF THE ATTACK

The paramilitaries left Novi Pazar, Serbia, in the afternoon of September 23, documented with photos (taken at 16:39) found on the phone of one of the organizers/leaders of this paramilitary group.

In the early hours of September 24, 2023, the group entered Kosova using the illegal road near the border crossing called 'Izvor,' the shortest road connecting Novi Pazar in Serbia and the village of Banjska in the municipality of Zvečan.

Based on the statement of one of the arrested individuals, their journey was made in groups and in an organized manner. Three to four vehicles continued towards the village of Banjska/Zvečan. The distance from the border to Banjska Monastery is about 14 km. The operation was led by Milan Radoičić.



Photo taken on September 23, 2023 at 16:39 (From right: Vladimir Radivojević and Ugljesa Jaredić)

KFOR insignia used by the Serbia-paramilitary paramilitaries.

To enter Kosova from Serbia, the paramilitary group also used camouflaged vehicles that had been prepared to look like vehicles of the NATO-led protection force KFOR, by using stickers with the inscription 'KFOR' and falsified license plates similar to those used by KFOR. Milan Radoičić's car was wrapped with military-colored 'wrapping foil.' In the trunk of the car, a KFOR logo was found, as well as insignia for diplomatic cars 'CD'.



Comparison of seized vehicle with "KFOR" number plates (top) with original vehicles in use by Latvian KFOR (below).

Why Banjska – Militarily Strategic, Politically Sensitive

The choice of the village of Banjska as starting point of a wider military action was made due to its strategic location since it offers fast access to the envisaged territory with Leposavic with Zvecan and North Mitrovica as well as access to Serbia through secondary roads.

This area is currently under the influence of the illegal and criminal structures that Serbia has invested in, sponsored, and continues to control through Serbia-appointed personnel and financial resources. The obvious religious significance of the Banjska Orthodox Monastery, along with an obvious calculation on civilian casualties, should have served as a perfect camouflage to portray falsely regular law enforcement actions by Kosova Police into an attack against the Serbian Orthodox Church, exactly at a time when pilgrims from Serbia and North Macedonia were residing in and around the Monastery.

The Actual Operation

The first group of paramilitaries is reported to have initially settled in the guesthouse of the Banjska Monastery (L-shaped building, see picture), and the others were scattered in the fields around the monastery. Two other support groups have been stationed on two hills in the village of Banjska.

On September 24, 2023, in the early hours of the morning, the Serbian paramilitaries led by M. Radoičić blocked the bridge at the entrance to the village of Banjska with two trucks, so that access to this location by road became impossible.



On Sep 24, 2023, after 6 a.m., masked and armed individuals were inside the Banjska Monastery, with a TAM 110 T armored vehicle outside the Monastery.

After receiving the information, at around 03:10, two units of Kosova Police went to the scene. Upon reaching the location, they were attacked by the paramilitaries who were located near the barricades, where Sergeant Afrim Bunjaku was killed, and one police officer was injured. Based on the observation of the scene, it can be determined that the paramilitaries were well prepared and were positioned near the trucks at the barricade, where an explosive device was placed (an anti-personnel mine of MRUD type), which was activated via remote control (battery), which was found at the scene.

The first footage from the thermal drone proves the presence of the paramilitaries in and around the Banjska Monastery. Around 06:00, it was reported that the Kosova Police were being attacked from the direction of the Monastery with a large-caliber machine gun.

From the footage provided by the drone, after 06:00, masked, uniformed (olive green) and armed individuals were observed inside the Banjska Monastery, while an armored vehicle of the type TAM 110 T (Serbian production) and a large number of SUVs were observed outside the Monastery.



1: Guesthouse, where the first paramilitary group initially settled.

2: Drone footage from the same location, with Vučić ally Milan Radoičić.

3, 4: Footage from a thermal drone; a number of paramilitaries can be detected in the two marked areas.



1: Roadblock set up on the bridge with trucks; paramilitary hiding with a "Zolja" grenade launcher. 2 and 3: Vehicles of the attacked Kosova Police teams.

Radoičić's Close Links with Serbian Army and Serbia's Police

Serbia granted Radoičić unhindered movements in Serbia, secured by high-level protection. Radoičić's interactions with Serbian Army Forces (SAF) even intensified after President Vučić installed his successor as the head of the SNS party, M. Vučević, as the new Minister of Defense in October 2022.

The connection between them is mainly facilitated by Radoičić's partner in organized crime, Z. Veselinović, a long-time supporter of Vučević in Novi Sad local politics.

Moreover, Radoičić entertains close relations with the Chief of Staff of the Serbian Army, M. Mojsilović, who is of Kosova origin. Among others, Serbian Special military units like the 'Cobra' units operate under the direct command of the SAF Chief of Staff.

Radoičić is also deeply embedded in the structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia and subsequently protected by Serbian police. Serbian Police in the areas of Raška, Novi Pazar, and other areas near Kosova received clear orders regarding the 'people of Radoičić,' that in the case any vehicle of theirs might be stopped for any irregularity, they are to be released immediately, and no documents are to be required. Radoičić had even recently appointed many of his trusted people to leadership positions there.

Radoičić is also in close connection with the director of one of the main directorates of Serbia's intelligence service BIA, Bojan Dimić.

IV. WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES CONFISCATED

Vehicles and a vast arsenal of heavy weapons, firearms, explosives, ammunition, and numerous military equipment were seized by Kosova Police after the paramilitary attack on September 24, 2023.

The items included rocket launchers, heavy armored vehicles, SUVs, ATV 4x4, explosives, drones, automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars, smartphones, ID cards, radios, and over 100 military uniforms, as well as Serbian Kalashnikov variants Zastava M70 (with milled receiver), M70A B2, and Zastava M70 B1 assault rifles, along with Zastava M92 carbines, all of them manufactured in Serbia.

The paramilitaries were equipped with short and long-range military weapons, explosive devices, anti-tank weapons, and other equipment described in detail below.

The use of extensive logistics with the support of Serbian state entities is corroborated by a case dating from June 23, 2023. On that day, a car of state-owned Serbian Railways with a huge arsenal of weapons was stationed near the municipality of Zvečan, in direct connection with Serbian state authorities supporting an illegal militant formation that operated in the north of Kosova.

Also, in a Kosova Police raid action on September 5, 2023, dozens of such weapons were seized in an object belonging to a member of this paramilitary formation.

The logistical capacities of this formation were financed and provided by Serbia and its structures, which mainly enter Kosova through illegal routes in the north of the country.

The weapons seized at the Banjska attack scene are military-grade weapons, most of which are manufactured in Serbia, including newly produced weapons, such as:

- M75 hand grenades, mainly of Serbian production in 2021
- Hand rocket launchers (Zolja), of Serbian production in 2021
- 30mm shells (nitroglycerin), of Serbian production in 2022

The table below lists a selection of the equipment seized by Kosova law enforcement, with EULEX and KFOR present on the site:

Name		Country of origin	Description	Pieces
	TAM 110 T7	Serbia	TAM modified armored truck	2
	ATV	Russia	ATV STELS GUEPARD Trophy Pro Eps	4
		/	Various SUVs	29
Vehicles				



Rifles

Serbia

Various Serbia-designed AK-47's (M70). Produced in Serbia's state-owned "Zastava" factory. Use: infantry; shooting range 410 meters.

66 pieces,
364 maga-
zines



Silencer

Serbia

Suppressor (silencer) for AK-47

18



Ammunition

Serbia

Ammunition, different calibers (5.56mm; 7.62mm; 12.7mm; 9mm, etc.)

Over 80,000
pieces



Rifle grenade

Serbia

Anti-personnel rifle grenade

51



Zastava M84

Serbia

General-purpose machine gun manufactured by Zastava Arms, Serbia

9



Zastava M76

Serbia

Sniper Zastava M76: semi-automatic weapon for long distance. Produced in Serbia's state owned "Zastava" factory. Shooting range 800 meters.

6



Sniper rifle

Serbia

Zastava M12 "Black Spear"

2



Pistols

//

Pistols

6 pieces,
3 silencers



M80 Zolja

Serbia

Anti-tank rocket launcher, single-use guided antitank system; manufactured in the state owned "Sloboda" factory in Serbia. Use: against armored vehicles and fortifications. The projectile can penetrate steel up to 30 cm; effective distance up to 250 meters.

41



M93

Serbia

Automatic grenade launcher Zastava M93 BGA 33mm – automatic weapon, caliber 30mm, produced in Serbia by state owned “Zastava” factory; Use: against lightly armored vehicles; effective range of 1700 meters.

2 pieces,
5 magazines



30mm for Serbia
M93

30 mm High-Explosive Fragmentation

330

Mortar shells, 82 mm and 62 mm, are standard shells from the countries of origin, former socialist countries.

They are not used by NATO member countries. Mortars are considered artillery weapons and are used for long-distance shooting, typically within the range of 5-8 km.



M57
60mm
mortar

Serbia

Mortar produced by Serbian company PPT Namenska, still in stock of SAF

1



60mm
mortar
shell

Serbia

This shell is launched by the M57 mortar

199



M69
82mm
mortar

Serbia

M69 mortar/82mm; designed by Military Technical Institute, Serbia.

3



82mm
mortar
shell

Serbia

This shell is launched by the M69 mortar

77



MRUD

Ex-Yugoslavia/
Serbia

Anti-personnel mines; used against infantry, designed to kill and injure; usual actuation by electric detonator; can also be set up for tripwire actuation.

9



TMA mine 4 Serbia

Anti-tank mine

8



M52

Serbia

Hand grenade

44



M72

Serbia

Hand grenade

78



PEP-500 explosive

Serbia

Plastic pentrite explosive PEP-500. Military explosive; used to destroy bridges and infrastructure, also used to make explosive devices for killing of people and destruction of armored vehicles

16 pcs;
8 kg



Dynamite

Serbia

Dynamite explosive

143 pcs;
24 kg



TNT explosive

//

TNT explosive

198 pcs;
23.7 kg



Drone

//

DJI Drones

3



Radios

//

Motorola; Hytera; Baogeng (mobile and static radios)

34

Many of the seized weapons cannot be sold by producers without permit of the Serbian state and are not to be found in the black market.



Some of the equipment and vehicles seized during and after the operation

Additional Evidence by Public Reporting

An investigation conducted by the internationally renowned Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), Serbia's outlet, published on October 9, 2023, reveals that the ammunition used by the members of the group during the clashes in Banjska was produced in the Belom factory in Serbia in 2022. The mortar mines, as well as the anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades, were manufactured in other state-owned factories in 2018 and 2021 in Kragujevac. The automatic grenade launcher M93 was repaired at the Technical facility in Čačak. The form 59056 in the package indicates that the weapons come from the facility in Čačak, and the factory number 201 matches the marking on the grenade launcher M93. The packaging bears the signatures of three

individuals (which are clear and legible) alongside the stamp of the Military Technical Overhaul Institute from Čačak. Serbia does not have any excess of M93 launchers and is not on the list of countries that export them.



Bullets seized on site have been produced in Serbia in 2020

The mines with the symbols RZK 1801 R indicate that they passed through the production line of the technical factory in Kragujevac (RZK) in 2018. The Cyrillic alphabet on the markings suggests that they were manufactured for the Serbian Army. This eliminates the possibility that they were sold to private contractors for export purposes.



M-80 grenade launchers, in original packaging from factory

The other model M-80 grenade launchers with symbols RZK 2101, 11R indicate that they were manufactured in Kragujevac in 2021. Such models are rarely found on the black market due to strict controls, as evidenced by the original factory packaging in which they were seized.

Military experts in Serbia have stated that these weapons could have made their way into the north of Kosova through three potential avenues:

- theft from a Serbian depot (although no such incident has been reported);
- sale to private traders who may have subsequently sold them to Radoičić (a possibility given that Serbia sells significant quantities of weapons to other destinations through proxies), or
- direct transfer by the state itself.

Both directly and indirectly, military analysts in Serbia argue that it is inconceivable that any groups could have acquired such heavy weapons without the involvement or cooperation of the leadership of the Serbian state. Serbia maintains strict control over its exports, making it highly improbable for private companies, which require end-user certificates, to resell parts to paramilitary groups involved in the attack on Kosova.

The seized mines, which were produced in 1984, are a cause for particular concern, especially since Serbia still possesses a significant number of these mines in its stockpile. These weapons are even prohibited under the Ottawa Convention. The police officer, Afrim Bunjaku, was killed by internationally banned weapons from Serbia. He succumbed to injuries inflicted by such a mine that was remotely activated.

Similar mines have been confiscated from other criminal gangs in Serbia, which are evidently closely linked to the leadership of Serbia, as well as to criminals and paramilitaries like Radoičić. These criminal gangs and their semi-military activities clearly receive support and protection from the state of Serbia.

V. SUPPORT OF THE PARAMILITARIES BY THE SERBIAN STATE

Tactical and logistical support

The weapons used by the paramilitary troops undeniably demonstrate that the attack on September 24, 2023, could not have occurred without guidance and support from the state of Serbia.


On April 22, 2023, the Serbian Armed Forces (SAF) conducted a demonstration of their capabilities, codenamed "Granite 2023," at the SAF air base in Batajnica, Serbia.

Official representatives of Vučić's SNS founded and directed the "Serbian List" party in Kosova, which included the paramilitary leader, criminal and self-confessed terrorist Radoičić (see encircled in red).


On that occasion, the extremists and proxies of the Belgrade regime published threats through aggressive messaging, stating, "...our Army is today equipped with the most modern weapons, combat and defense vehicles, to the pride of all the Serbs, especially our people from Kosovo and Metohija.



Based on the evidence, a direct link between the state of Serbia and the attack can be established on several accounts. Matches of seized documents with weapons from the Serbian military prove the direct link to the state of Serbia.




A signed military document with the initials of the state of Serbia (SRB) on the packaging of the MRUD device/mine. As well, other such items were found at the scene, including the mine activation wire (30 meters).



MRUD anti-personnel mine from the Serbian Armed Forces (SAF), marked with initials SRB, indicating the owner, the state of Serbia.

The inscription on the arm emblem of the military uniform of a Serbian soldier, found as evidence by the Kosova Police after the attack on September 24, 2023.



1: Emblem with the inscription "Za Slobodu i Čast Otadžbine" (For Freedom and Honor of the Fatherland) on the arm of a Serbian soldier.

2: The same emblem was found in the seized equipment of the paramilitaries on September 24, 2023.

Logos of the International Police Association (IPA) Serbia Section were found in confiscated cars.



Weapons in military boxes administered by the Serbian Armed Forces (SAF).



Enforcing, Encouraging and Legitimizing violence by Serbia's Leader

Serbia's President Vučić clearly and publicly declared the paramilitaries of the September 24 attack as heroes and declared a statewide day of mourning for the paramilitaries who lost their lives in the attack. At the same time, he denied his publicly proven ties with Radoičić and the deep involvement of the Serbian state in the attack on Kosova. He portrayed the terrorist attack as initiated by people from within the four municipalities in the north of Kosova and suggested that there are people in uniform who are "accepted as heroes," a clear reference to the paramilitaries who had returned from Banjska to Serbia.

In Vučić-controlled media outlets and 'Telegram' channels (Russian-Serbian), there was an increased degree of propaganda inciting violence and attempting to shift the blame onto the victims. The false narrative of "Albanian paramilitaries attacking Serbs" was promoted, and a call for "resistance" against Kosova Police was made, with slogans like "There is no Surrender." These messages were spread by high-ranking political figures in Serbia.

Aggressive graffiti with open threats of invasion in Kosova has appeared across Serbia with slogans like "When the army returns to Kosova," insinuating violent revenge and persecution. This rhetoric is reminiscent of Serbia's brutal aggression against Kosova in 1998/99, which led to an international NATO intervention to stop Serbian army and paramilitary violence. Prominent figures from that era, including war criminal president Milošević's former speaker I. Dačić and close ally A. Vulin, hold high offices in Serbia today.

While this slogan first appeared in several locations in Belgrade at the end of July 2023, it has since spread and was displayed on a banner in a stadium in Belgrade by hooligans of the football club Crvena Zvezda, which is closely linked to the powerful intelligence agency BIA and seen as a source of violence.

The "Delije" hooligans of "Crvena Zvezda" were sent to Kosova from Serbia by Vučić's BIA and played a significant role in the violent attacks against KFOR in Zvečan on May 29, 2023. They exhibited unexpected and massive brutality with the clear aim of inflicting severe injuries on NATO soldiers, even risking fatalities.

The hooligan group was also prominently present on October 1, 2023, during the funeral of one of the paramilitaries killed in the attack, and they escorted the event with fireworks. Within the same hooligan structure and the "Delije" fan group, the Serbian intelligence service BIA has a significant influence, which is most openly demonstrated by the leadership position of the director of the first Directorate of BIA in the "fan" club.

Simultaneously, there is a growing display of open military threats against Kosova by Serbia in various cities. This represents a significant escalation in the aggressive war rhetoric of the ultranationalist Serbian leadership, reminiscent of the war-mongering propaganda campaigns of Milošević and his former propaganda minister, Vučić.

Inside Kosova, the same slogan appeared in four municipalities in the north of the country in August and September 2023. The last of the four graffiti displays occurred just two days before the terrorist attack in Banjska.

In Serbia, near the Kosova-Serbia border, Serbian Armed Forces (SAF) and other security structures are being kept on high alert, with a potential state of combat readiness, even though it may not be formally announced. This heightened alertness is ostensibly to remain prepared for potential military intervention within the territory of Kosova.

The pretext for such preparations is consistently propagated in media controlled by Serbia's leader, Aleksandar Vučić, and by Vučić himself. The aim appears to be to create artificial tensions and incidents that could lead to "unmanaged" security issues, which might not be adequately handled by Kosova Police, KFOR, or EULEX. This would then allegedly necessitate an urgent military intervention by Serbia.

In preparation for such a scenario, Vučić frequently employs hate speech campaigns and vilifies the situation of Serb citizens in Kosova. He has used derogatory terms to describe political figures in Kosova, including Prime Minister Albin Kurti, and allowed his media outlets to use slurs targeting the Albanian ethnicity. This consistent and aggressive hate speech has gone largely unaddressed by Western politicians, despite the dangerous pretext it creates for a potential conflict.

The lack of Western readiness to closely observe and to call out former propaganda minister turned president Vučić's systematic derailment of Western values and replacement by Russia's political and societal system has not only fostered a loyal Putin ally as an EU and West courted Trojan horse. Much more importantly, and dangerously, Western weakness towards Serbia's staggering aggressiveness and racist Serb supremacy ideology as laid down in official doctrines like the "Serbian World," a mere copy of the "Russian World" of Putin. Both imperial claims aspire to nothing less than full control over the neighboring countries with minorities of their ethnicity. Not only Kosova, but also Bosnia Herzegovina and Montenegro are evident targets of such "Greater Serbia" aspirations that are far from dead under the leadership gang of former Milosević aides who managed to survive and widely deceive a Western audience in politics, diplomacy, and, to a lesser extent, media that had been deceived by their master, Milosević, up to a point when Serbia believed it could go to war again.

Based on statements of Serbian civil society NGOs like the Helsinki Committee, Vučić has managed to manipulate and brutalize wider parts of the Serbian population internally. Combined with an escalation in Serbia, internally and externally, with Serbia as a pro-Russia and anti-Western country. While a majority of Serbian citizens oppose Serbia's membership in the EU (compared to more than 90% in favor in Kosova), Russia's war criminal president Putin is by far the most popular figure among Serbians, as of 2023, even after the brutal invasion of Ukraine.

In combination with hate speech campaigns against both the West, the EU, and the most pro-Western constituent in the Balkans, Vučić is paving the way in preparing military incursions and even invasion into neighboring countries, also trying to organize secessionist steps by local ultranationalist representatives in Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro, and in creating the pretext of a second conflict and war in Europe.

Dozens of Russian personnel inside the government of Serbia, from the Defense Ministry to the intelligence agencies, a staggering increase from just about 10 common military exercises per year at the beginning of which is ruled to now 100, a consistent bellicose rhetoric and visits of serving troops on the Kosova border by the Russian ambassador are more than writings on the wall that Russia is ready to wage war in the Balkans if needed and considered useful from the Moscow perspective.

Widely unnoticed in the West among media and politics is the fact that the not-so-popular Vučić and his criminal allies like Radoičić and others are trying to maintain tight control over resisting ordinary Serb citizens regularly by using threats, and in some cases, even burning their cars and, in some cases, even their houses.

Vučić and his cronies focus their interest primarily on escalation in the north of Kosova, where Serb citizens of Kosova are in the majority and therefore have even more privileges to self-govern according to their preferences, while the other Serb-majority municipalities are left behind.

The real reason for this focus on the northern part is not politics but raw business. Vučić has vested business, criminal, and raw material interests, ranging from maintaining control over profits from a multi-million drug and trafficking organized crime infrastructure. Drug laboratories are being dismantled piece by piece by Kosova law enforcement under the resolute anti-corruption and rule of law policy of the Kosova government.

In response to this widespread crackdown on organized crime, including on close allies of Vučić, including but not limited to Radoičić and a series of other extremist nationalist and criminal elements involved in organized crime, Vučić resorted to a coordinated campaign aimed at misleading ill-informed international observers into believing that the Kosova Police units involved in this government strategy against mafia-style control of the northern (and other) parts of Kosova would represent a "threat" to the Serb citizens. Contrary to the fears of many ordinary Serb citizens who are themselves afraid of these violent criminal gangs, Vučić and his government-controlled media even tried to portray that Serb citizens would be facing a "humanitarian disaster," also being exposed to "terror," and even subjected to "pogroms."

Among some Western observers, that manipulation strategy was successful. Just weeks before the deadly aggression of September 24, a Western official posted a video showing herself asking Special Police officers in front of her own camera, "What the hell brought you here? This is just a peaceful neighborhood."

If one wanted to know, and if one were not turning a blind eye to reality, one could and would have known about the significant struggle of organized crime and military circles in Serbia to resist the increasingly strong rule of law against crime in the north and throughout Kosova. This is a hallmark of the new democratic, rule of law-focused, pro-Western government. Some may not have known, but others chose not to know, thereby aiding extremists in depicting the situation through Putin-like manipulation of real events.

All this rhetoric is evidently derived from a playbook that Putin had employed against Ukraine to justify his later military intervention and annexation of the Donbass and Donetsk regions, not to mention Crimea and the major invasion that started in 2022. It is of no surprise to well-informed observers that Vučić, as the closest ally of Putin in Europe alongside Belarus President Lukashenko, is following that strategy.

In addition to the state of military readiness, namely the direct threat of a military aggression against the Republic of Kosova, the mobilization of the Serbian military is also intended to embolden Serbian paramilitary and terrorist groups operating covertly inside Kosova.

VI. INVOLVEMENT OF PARAMILITARY TROOPS IN PAST EVENTS

Weaponry and Operations

Members of the paramilitaries who carried out the September 24 attack had also organized and participated in the attack against KFOR on May 29 in Zvečan.


At the same time, some of the confiscated weapons linked to the September 24 group are similar to those used or found in previous cases as well.

Model M75 hand grenades were also used or found in the following cases:

- December 6, 2022: Attack on the MEC (Municipal Election Commission) offices in North Mitrovica
- May 29, 2023: Attack on KFOR in Zvečan
- June 23, 2023: Weapons seized in a vehicle in Zvečan
- September 5, 2023: Weapons seized in a house in Zvečan

The photo shows that the M75 hand grenade found on May 29, 2023, in the attack on KFOR members is of a similar model to the hand grenades found in the 'Audi' vehicle on June 23, 2023.

Photos of the Serbian-made M75 grenades seized from the paramilitaries are similar to the grenades used in the attack on the Municipal Election Commission (MEC) offices in northern Mitrovica and the attack on KFOR members. Weapons seized from a vehicle in Zvečan and those seized in the house of a member of the terror organization labeled "Civil Protection (Civilna Zaštita)" in Zvečan are also similar.



1: December 6, 2022: Attack on the offices of the MEC.

2: June 23, 2023: Weapons seized from a vehicle.

3: June 23, 2023: Weapons seized in the house of a member of "Civil Protection (Civilna Zaštita)."

4: May 29, 2023: Same type of grenade used in the attack on KFOR.


5: September 24, 2023: Hand grenades seized from the paramilitaries.

In addition to automatic weapons of Serbian production, grenade launchers were also seized at the scene. The use of the same grenade launcher for automatic rifles, of Serbian production, was also seized at another location in Zvečan on June 23, 2023.



1. Automatic rifle launcher/grenade launcher, seized from terrorist group, September 24, 2023.
 2. Two launchers were found in obe vehicle in Zvecan, 23 June, 2023.

Members of the paramilitaries who carried out the terrorist attack on September 24 were also equipped with tools for opening trenches, military trenches, and firing positions, similar to the ones used for barricades in December 2022.



1: Trenches and firing positions near the barricades, December 2022.
 2: Captured tools of the paramilitaries for opening military trenches, September 24, 2023.

When extremist groups, including part of the paramilitaries involved in the Sep 24 attack, erected their roadblocks in December 2022—falsely described as a "protest" by ordinary citizens—most of the trucks used for blocking were not just placed there as trucks but were **rigged with "TNT" TM 100 explosives** (see photo 2). These explosives were deliberately used in order to hinder KFOR and Kosova law enforcement from moving the trucks off the roads without the potential for casualties in human lives.

The same type and model of explosives of Serbian production were seized on September 24, 2023, from the paramilitaries.

On September 5, 2023, that type of explosives was seized in the house of a member of the terrorist group labeled "Civil Protection (Civilna Zaštita)" in Zvečan/Zvečan.



1) Dynamite/explosives in the possession of the paramilitaries on September 24, 2023.

2) Dynamite/explosives placed on trucks that were barricaded in December 2022.

3) Dynamite/explosives found in the house of a member of the "Civil Protection (Civilna Zaštita)" in Zvečan.

In the barricades of July 2022, masked and armed individuals had appeared near the trucks that blocked the road. The same event also occurred on September 24, 2023, when individuals from the vicinity of the trucks that had blocked the road attacked the Kosova Police patrol.



1) Gunman at the barricades of July 2022.

2) Armed and masked individuals during the terrorist attack on September 24, 2023.

Identified members of the paramilitary group

A large number of militants who were attacking KFOR in May 2023, engaging in clearly organized brutal violence, under the guise of "protests" against KFOR troops in Zvečan, were later identified as leaders of the organization labeled as terrorists, "Civil Protection (Civilna Zaštita)."

One of the leaders, M. Milenkovic, has been arrested for his participation in the organized attacks against KFOR troops and is awaiting trial.

Most of the identified members of the terrorist organization "Civil Protection (Civilna Zaštita)" who participated in this brutal violence against KFOR escaped to Serbia.

A. Vučić, the president of the EU candidate country Serbia, is not only refusing to extradite these terrorists and bring to justice those who planned, attacked, and severely wounded KFOR troops, pushing the boundaries of Serbia's relationship with the West and escalating the situation further. Vučić is even providing shelter for these individuals.

And he continues to escalate the situation further – as our government warned, after the planned attacks on KFOR went unpunished for Vučić. Instead, the EU is sanctioning its strongest ally in the region.

Encouraged by the weak Western response to the escalation by Serbia, particularly against KFOR, Vučić is now using these terrorists for an open aggression against Kosova. At least some of those

who attacked KFOR were members of the more than 80-troop strong paramilitary group trained and equipped by Serbia.

Documents and equipment of terrorists involved in the Serbia-led attack on KFOR in May 2023 were seized at the site of the Serbia-led attack on Kosova on September 24.



1) S. Jovanovic pictured in May 2023 during the attacks against KFOR troops alongside M. Milenkovic.


2) ID card of Jovanovic found at the scene of the September 24 attack.



1) Member of the terrorist organization "Civil Protection (Civilna Zaštita)," Milorad Jevtic "Micko," during violent protests against KFOR troops in Zvečan.

"North Brigade (Severna Brigada)"

Since August 2022, members of the "Civil Protection (Civilna Zaštita)" terrorist organization had started calling themselves the "North Brigade (Severna Brigada)," and they began covering the cities of northern Kosovo with graffiti bearing this name. Emblems of the "North Brigade (Severna Brigada)" were seized from a car in Zvečan on June 23, 2023. Milun Milenkovic "Lune" declared himself as the "deputy commander of the North Brigade (Severna Brigada)." The latter is the founder of the kick-boxing club "Kosovska Mitrovica," and many members of this kick-boxing club are also members of the terrorist organization "North Brigade (Severna Brigada)." Some boxing shorts with inscriptions/logos of this kick-boxing club were seized among the numerous equipment of the paramilitaries in Banjska on September 24, 2023.



The "North Brigade (Severna Brigada)"

- 1) "North Brigade (Severna Brigada)" graffiti appeared on August 18, 2022.
- 2) "North Brigade (Severna Brigada)" emblems were found during the confiscation of weapons in Zvečan on June 23, 2023.
- 3) One of the leaders of this organization, Milun Milenkovic "Lune," was arrested on June 13, 2023.
- 4) Logo of the kick-boxing club "Kosovska Mitrovica," owned by Milun Milenkovic "Lune."
- 5) Boxing shorts with the logo of the kick-boxing club "Kosovska Mitrovica" were confiscated among the items on September 24, 2023.

Graffiti “When the army returns to Kosova”

Graffiti with the message "When the army returns to Kosova" appeared at the end of July in several locations in Belgrade. A banner with the same message was also displayed by fans of the Crvena Zvezda football club in Belgrade during a friendly match. The same graffiti appeared in the four municipalities of northern Kosova from August to September 2023. The last two graffiti with this inscription appeared on September 11, 2023, and September 22, 2023, two days before the terrorist attack on the Kosova Police in the village Banjska. Emblems with such inscriptions were also found at the scene after the terrorist attack on September 24, 2023.



1: Graffiti “When the army returns to Kosova”, appeared in the municipalities of north of Kosova two days before the attack.

2: Emblem with the inscription “When the army returns to Kosova” was found at the scene on 24 September 2023.

Contracts with illegal structures in northern part of Kosova supported and financed by Serbia

The members of the terrorist organizations "Civil Protection (Civilna Zaštita)" and "North Brigade (Severna Brigada)," during their activities, had signed contracts with illegal structures in the north of Kosova, which were supported and financed by Serbia. An example of these contracts for two members who participated in the terrorist attack on September 24, 2023, can be found below.

“KOPAONIK 2022”

A year ago, in September 2022 (the same month as the terrorist attack in September 2023), members of the 72nd Special Operations Brigade participated in the field exercise named "KOPAONIK 2022," during which Milan Radoičić and all other members of terrorist formations were stationed. For the purposes of this exercise, the map of "Novi Pazar" was used, and the primary objective of this exercise was to gather information about international troops in Kosova and certain locations within Kosova.

The similarities between this exercise and what happened on September 24, 2023, are staggering.





Figure 28: Kopaonik 2022


Kopaonik is the location where the members of the terrorist formation were stationed, as well as M. Radoičić.

The similarities are as follows:

1. The month of the exercise "September 2022" is the same as the month of the execution of the terrorist operation "September 2023."
2. The maps used during the exercise are roughly the same as those used by the paramilitaries.

РЕПУБЛИКА СРБИЈА-АП КиМ ОПШТИНА ЛЕПОСАВИЋ ОПШТИНСКА УПРАВА БРОЈ:112-1/121 ДАТА: 27. 12. 2022. године ЛЕПОСАВИЋ На основу члана 199. Закона о раду ("Сл. гласник РС " број: 34/2005, 61/2005, 54/2009, 32/2013, 74/2014, 13/2017 УС, 113/2017 и 95/2018 ау.тум.) Сагласности Привременог органа општине Лепосавић број 112-584 од 26. 12. 2022. године, закључује се: УГОВОР О ДЕЛУ Дана 27. 12. 2022. године у Лепосавићу, између: 1. - Општинске управе општине Лепосавић, улица Војске Југославије бр. 33 коју заступа Начелник општинске управе Радмила Вуковић (у даљем тексту: Наручилац посла), с једне стране и 2.- Баловић Ђорђа из Кутља, нема улице бб, општина Лепосавић са ЈМБГ / 0203990924799, лична карта број 010342022 издаја од ПУ за Косовску Митровицу (у даљем тексту: Извршилац посла), статус: незапослено лице с друге стране. Члан 1. Извршилац посла се обавезује да за наручилаца посла обавља послове чишћења улица, паркова и приобаља реке Ибар. А у циљу стварања уређеније, здравље и еколошки чистије животне средине за грађана општине Лепосавић. Члан 2. Извршилац посла се обавезује да послове наведене у члану 1. овог уговора обавља у периоду од 01. 01. 2023. године до 31. 03. 2023. године у пословним просторима и ван пословних просторија Наручиоца посла у оквиру утврђеног распореда радног времена. Члан 3. Наручилац посла се обавезује да извршиоцу посла, на име месечне накнаде за извршене послове исплати накнаду у износу од 40.000, 00 динара (четрдесет хиљада динара).	Члан 4. За време обављања посла из члана 1. овог уговора извршилац посла има право на пензијско и инвалидско осигурање, здравствено осигурање, у складу са Законом о раду. Члан 5. Уколико Извршилац посла некавалитетно обавља уговорене послове, не поступа по наредбама Наручиоца посла, крши радну дисциплину и уколико престане потреба за њим Наручилац посла може отказати уговор и пре истека уговореног рока из члана 2. овог уговора. Члан 6. Експертне спорове по овом уговору, уговорне стране решаваће споразумно, а спорове које не реше споразумно решаваће надлежни суд. Члан 7. Овај уговор сачињен је у четири истоветна примерка од којих по два примерка задржава свака уговорна страна. ИЗВРШИЛАЦ ПОСЛА,  НАРУЧИЛАЦ ПОСЛА, 
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Contract of D. BALOVIC, a radical extremist from the municipality of Leposavić/Leposavić. He took part in the military attack and is reported to be injured and is recovering in Serbia.

РЕПУБЛИКА СРБИЈА-АП КиМ ОПШТИНА ЛЕПОСАВИЋ ОПШТИНСКА УПРАВА БРОЈ:112-1/127 ДАТА: 27. 12. 2022. године ЛЕПОСАВИЋ На основу члана 199. Закона о раду ("Сл. гласник РС " број: 34/2005, 61/2005, 54/2009, 32/2013, 74/2014, 13/2017 УС, 113/2017 и 95/2018 ау.тум.) Сагласности Привременог органа општине Лепосавић број 112-584 од 26. 12. 2022. године, закључује се: УГОВОР О ДЕЛУ Дана 27. 12. 2022. године у Лепосавићу, између: 1. - Општинске управе општине Лепосавић, улица Војске Југославије бр. 33 коју заступа Начелник општинске управе Радмила Вуковић (у даљем тексту: Наручилац посла), с једне стране и 2.- Танасковић Александра из Врачева, Нема улице бб, општина Лепосавић са ЈМБГ / 200795924953, лична карта број 004914433 издаја од ПУ за Косовску Митровицу (у даљем тексту: Извршилац посла), статус: незапослено лице с друге стране. Члан 1. Извршилац посла се обавезује да за наручилаца посла обавља послове чишћења улица, паркова и приобаља реке Ибар. А у циљу стварања уређеније, здравље и еколошки чистије животне средине за грађана општине Лепосавић. Члан 2. Извршилац посла се обавезује да послове наведене у члану 1. овог уговора обавља у периоду од 01. 01. 2023. године до 31. 03. 2023. године у пословним просторима и ван пословних просторија Наручиоца посла у оквиру утврђеног распореда радног времена. Члан 3. Наручилац посла се обавезује да извршиоцу посла, на име месечне накнаде за извршене послове исплати накнаду у износу од 40.000, 00 динара (четрдесет хиљада динара).	Члан 4. За време обављања посла из члана 1. овог уговора извршилац посла има право на пензијско и инвалидско осигурање, здравствено осигурање, у складу са Законом о раду. Члан 5. Уколико Извршилац посла некавалитетно обавља уговорене послове, не поступа по наредбама Наручиоца посла, крши радну дисциплину и уколико престане потреба за њим Наручилац посла може отказати уговор и пре истека уговореног рока из члана 2. овог уговора. Члан 6. Експертне спорове по овом уговору, уговорне стране решаваће споразумно, а спорове које не реше споразумно решаваће надлежни суд. Члан 7. Овај уговор сачињен је у четири истоветна примерка од којих по два примерка задржава свака уговорна страна. ИЗВРШИЛАЦ ПОСЛА,  НАРУЧИЛАЦ ПОСЛА, 
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Contract of A. TANASKOVIC. He took part in the military attack and has been reported to be injured and recovering in a hospital in Novi Pazar, Serbia.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Serbia, most likely with knowledge and guidance from its president, A. Vučić, has employed various means to establish and instruct a paramilitary group under the leadership of M. Radoičić and Serbian illegal structures to mobilize against KFOR and Kosova in the north of Kosova. Over many months, they supported the escalation by mobilizing Serbia's Armed Forces and deploying troops and warplanes at the Kosova border.

After the next level of escalation in May 2023, when a direct attack, planned and guided by Serbia, was carried out by violent perpetrators sent in from Serbia alongside extremists from Kosova to directly attack KFOR troops, and it was met with no strong response by KFOR, the EU, or the United States, Vučić made the decision to escalate further against Kosova.

In obvious coordination and with not yet fully identified support from Russia, he instructed relevant individuals within the intelligence and security structures of the Serbian state to plan, prepare, train, and equip a Serb paramilitary group to engage in open conflict with Kosova.

A full protection of Kosova and its borders by KFOR was no longer considered credible in the assessment of Serbia's leaders, and by extension, Russia's leaders. This was due to the fact that the reactions to earlier escalatory steps, including political and quasi-military attacks on the West and Kosova, went unpunished.

At the same time, Serbia's formal alignment with the war crimes-accused Russian leader Putin has been further deepened by Serbia's Vučić. The current Serbian president has a long history of cooperation with war criminals, ranging from serving as a propaganda minister for former Serbian president Milosević to secretary-general of the Radical Party of convicted war criminal V. Seselj, who is considered to be Vučić's most influential mentor and is being protected by Vučić. Seselj was not extradited to the UN tribunal despite official requests. Vučić's allies include Foreign Minister Dačić, who was a former right-hand man of "The Butcher of the Balkans," Milosević, and Serbian Intelligence Chief and Putin proxy A. Vulin, who was a former aide to Milosević and his wife, who herself was a leftist party leader during the Milosević era.

In a pattern similar to the reaction of the West to the former Serbian strongman Milosević, the then close observer and minister Vučić is evidently calculating a similar weakness in Western reaction to ongoing preparations against a neighboring country.

As a result, a Russia-backed and possibly planned escalation by Serbia in the Balkans is actively unfolding, not only against Kosova but also in other countries that are subjected to being a testing ground for Western resolve in a geopolitical challenge by Putin in a region within the geographical scope of NATO and the EU.

Moscow is undoubtedly deeply involved in Serbia's planning and guidance of the escalation, with Vučić, Vulin, Dačić, and others engaging in intense discussions and collusion with Moscow. This is evidenced by visits of Vulin to Moscow, Dačić and his predecessor Selakovic meeting the Russian counterpart Lavrov, and statements from Putin's spokesperson Peskov. Lavrov and Russian embassies around the world have been voicing their support for Serbia's escalation regularly, and their support has intensified since Serbia began its open aggression against KFOR troops in May 2023.

Belgrade and Moscow are still calculating that the West won't have a response to a limited conflict, and they were preparing the September 24th attack as the beginning of a limited military campaign

that should ultimately lead to the annexation of the northern part of Kosova, following a playbook similar to the one used in Donbas.

From the perspective of Belgrade and Moscow, given the reluctance of the EU and the U.S. to openly call out and confront Vučić's aggressive moves, and in some cases even appeasing him after his escalation, it still appears feasible and worth the risk to continue pursuing their goals.

The many warnings of the government of Kosova to partners and allies have been turned down as political maneuvers, and the risk was totally ignored and still is by some in the West. When after Vučić's open attack on KFOR, the Kosova government warned of coming conflict and people being killed, they were not listened to, and sanctions were not imposed by the EU for this reason.

The lack of Western readiness to acknowledge and firmly address the Russia-Serbia axis of aggression continues to encourage both, and thus contributes to increasing the danger of war in the Balkans. It seems to be a pattern the West and the region are reliving time and again, as it was the case in 1991, 1992, and 1998/99 with the last Yugoslav wars. In all cases, it started with Serbia instigating a wider conflict and war by first operating paramilitary groups it then officially denied having any connection with. The war crime tribunal after the Milošević wars, of which the current Serbian leadership was an active and integral part, and they never conceded any wrongdoing ever since, proved in detail the preparation and perpetration of war and war crimes.

The paramilitaries that conducted the September 24th operation operated freely and absolutely unhindered in Serbia, including in the border zone to Kosova. They were not only tolerated but actively supported, and they enjoyed privileged treatment by the Serbian state from the leader to vast chunks of its security structures.

The leader of the paramilitary operation, M. Radoičić, did not only lead the attack. For many years now, he has served Serbia's leader Vučić's personal interests and orders, not only in leading organized crime in the north of Kosova, but also as a force of intimidation of ordinary Serb citizens of Kosova, forcing them to either lay low or face severe harm. This harm includes threats, beatings, extortion, blackmail, burning of cars, and even houses.

Rigging democratic procedures and elections, erecting roadblocks, and using propaganda in a Putin-style manner are duties of Vučić's proxies in the region for which they earn dozens of millions of Euros in shadowy contracts with the Serbian state, often financed by EU and Western taxpayers. Corruption and crime are the key signatures of the Vučić regime, not only in Serbia but still in those areas of Kosova where the rule of law is not yet fully implemented.

Tolerating this area of no rule except violence by organized crime and its political arm has emboldened Belgrade and Moscow to step by step increase distortion and aggression, finally believing that a weak West would not find the courage to stand up to a limited conflict in the Balkans.

It was the Special Kosova Police that filled the dangerous void left by Western forces and diplomats who were appeasing Vučić, which only encouraged him and Moscow to draw wrong conclusions and risk a war. It was dangerously close to such a war when the Kosova Police repelled more than 90 paramilitary troops who were trained, equipped, and guided by Serbia.

These paramilitaries may attempt to come back if the West continues to turn a blind eye to the increasing risk of war that Putin is using as a strategy to divert Western resources needed in Ukraine and elsewhere by luring the Balkans into conflict.

Sending clear warnings, backed up by military and law enforcement might, is crucial to deter Serbia from making another, better-planned attempt to rewrite the pages of history, as Vučić and Putin have repeatedly stated as their ultimate goal for the Balkans.

In addition to nationalistic revanchism, there is a significant profit motive behind securing a paradise for organized crime in the northern part of Kosova. Serbia's nationalist elite is closely intertwined with its business elite, much like in Russia and some other places. They make enormous profits through state capture, exploiting the state and its citizens through corruption and extortion, often amounting to hundreds of millions of euros.

The northern part of Kosova has also provided a fertile ground for drug laboratories, which generate hundreds of millions in profits from drugs sold in Western Europe. Unfortunately, some elements within the EU have been more focused on appeasing Belgrade than on protecting Europe's young people from drugs and preventing their countries from being further infiltrated by international organized crime. Heroin, cocaine, and manufactured drugs have been key components of a system that talks about protecting minorities but often prioritizes the protection of their illicit business model.

Radoičić has been acting under the directives of the Serbian leadership, utilizing its security and defense structures, and being deeply involved in Serbia's corrupt business dealings. His activities have allegedly included kidnapping, murder, drug trafficking, and more. Srpska Lista is often seen as more than just a regular political party; it is considered by some as a front and cover-up for organized crime and nationalist violence. Efforts to engage with Kosova's Serbian citizens, particularly those in the north, should involve reaching out to their real representatives who are committed to peace and stability, rather than discouraging them by engaging with representatives associated with corruption and criminal activities. Dialogue with all segments of society is essential for fostering understanding and cooperation in Kosova.

Radoičić and the Serbia-trained paramilitary group appear to have aimed to conquer and control the northern part of Kosova with the ultimate goal of either annexing it or bringing it under Serbian control. This would involve a series of violent conflicts, effectively cutting out parts of a neighboring country, which is a grave violation of international law and principles of territorial integrity. Such actions are deeply concerning and a threat to regional stability and peace.

The EU is still feeding the beast by not holding Vučić accountable for a series of violations of his obligations under the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and the candidate status, and how openly he is swindling on the EU, ordering his media machine to demonize the EU and the U.S. over many years now. It is not accidentally happening that the ambassador of the United States in Serbia is receiving death threats even. The opening of Pandora's Box by letting Belgrade and Moscow pursue their path of even military escalation in Southeast Europe, against NATO and the EU, needs to be reversed before it will be too late.

After the failure of their attack on September 24, most of the paramilitaries escaped back to Serbia. When wounded and other terrorists fled the scene to Serbia, Serbian Armed Forces waited for them at the border to transport them to secure places.

Serbia's president, Vučić, is not only treating the terrorists as heroes, but he is also providing them with any help, including institutional protection. Institutional protection ensures that no information about the whereabouts of as many as 90 invaders is leaked to the public. At the same time, Vučić is rejecting the justified requests from Kosova and international partners of Serbia to fully cooperate with the investigations of the attack. Instead, he is implying his many times successful strategy of

making outrageous lies and allegations to distract the West from pressuring Serbia to fulfill its obligations. This time, Vučić claimed that not the attacked, but the attackers would be the victims, even going so far as to allege "assassination" of terrorists by the defending Kosova police, who suffered the loss of a brave police officer killed by a grenade weapon banned by international treaties.

CHRONOLOGY OF PREPARATIONS

The operational and strategic aims of the paramilitaries are fully in line with the goals to regain control over "Serbian land" in the Balkans which are openly expressed by Vučić and Serbia's leadership. Previous actions and logistics, along with an aggressive media and other public campaign, should prepare public opinion for an alleged necessity to intervene in what would have become a staged armed uprising in neighboring Kosova that would require sending the Serbian Armed Forces in for the sake of saving Serbs under threat for their lives.

The strategic preparation of setting the stage for military intervention started long before the actual September 24 attack in a series of escalations sold to an ill-informed Western audience as a 'local protest'.

Already suspected of illegal activity, M. Radoičić publicly appeared in Leposaviq/Leposavic on July 5, 2022, and in a video recording, he tried to challenge the institutions of the Republic of Kosova, stating that he's 'already back in Kosovo'.

On July 7, 2022, numerous graffiti messages were found on the main streets of North Mitrovica, echoing Radoičić's video content. These messages included the Serbian nationalist claim 'NEMA PREDAJE'/'No surrender'.

Intensified attempts to mobilize especially young people into illegal structures have been directly financed by Serbia, with the financing of the terrorist-labeled 'Civil Protection (Civilna Zaštita)' being conducted with the aim of providing cover for their activities.

Individuals recruited and paid by Serbia were given tasks such as monitoring the activities of Kosova institutions in municipalities in the north and other parts inhabited by Serb citizens of Kosova, but also monitoring KFOR movements and pursuing other goals described as threatening the security and lives of Serb citizens of Kosova.

These members of the terrorist group received their salaries through the illegal regular salary system of Serbia in Kosova, which Serbia had agreed to dissolve in an EU-brokered agreement more than 10 years ago. Instead of meeting its obligations, Serbia, under Vučić, vastly increased those illegal structures in a neighboring country.

The financing by the Serbian state is documented through hundreds of contracts (of which, as an example, two copies are included in this document). The two beneficiaries mentioned in the contracts are believed to be participants in the paramilitary attack on September 24.

For over a year, Serbia's leader Vučić and his underlings and media have consistently and falsely, debunked by OSCE reports and other observers, distorted the reality of Serb citizens of Kosova by claiming it as dire. Vučić even talked about unfolding 'ethnic cleansing' and regularly threatened to use the Army to intervene should the situation for Serb citizens become unbearable. Nothing could be farther from the truth, as international reports show, and as Vučić clearly knows. Vučić's claim

was not about the situation of Serb citizens. It was the constant drumbeat for a coming war, as we now know and as the Kosova government had warned its international partners for a long time.

In light of the weak response and indulgence by Western officials, Vučić, Radoičić, and others decided to escalate further.

Aggressive actions, including the participation of terrorist elements from Serbia, have been carried out by illegal Serbian structures in Kosova, especially in the north. These actions have included murders, barricades, attacks on Kosova Police, KFOR, EULEX, journalists, and political opponents of the 'Serbian List.' Citizens have also been intimidated and arrested under the claim that they had cooperated with the legal institutions of the Republic of Kosova. The means of intimidation by the 'Serbian rule' even included the burning of vehicles belonging to Serb citizens of Kosova who did not comply with the terror imposed by Radoičić's associates.

In April 2023, in the next step of escalation to prepare the preconditions for military intervention by Serbia, Vučić referred to northern Kosova as 'occupied,' pretending to have the right to use force.

In May 2023, a coordinated and brutal attack, for the first time directly targeting KFOR, resulted in the severe injury of 90 KFOR soldiers. This attack served as a final test of the West's resolve. It was a general rehearsal, and the West's reaction, which was not to punish the attackers in Serbia but the attacked in Kosova, gave Belgrade the green light to proceed with a military action that a whole military unit of 150 troops had been training for extensively.

In June 2023, Serbia sent Special Unit troops into Kosova to abduct the 3 Kosova Police officers. The reaction of the West again was not to name the incursion into Serbia and the forceful abduction for what it was. The continued appeasement of Vučić only signaled to Belgrade and Moscow that the plans for military action could be put in motion. It was the perfect parallel to Ukraine; the West did not want to be forced to take a resolute stand.

Accompanying the drumbeats of war, highly symbolic graffiti with the threat "When the Serbian Army returns to Kosova" began to appear on walls across Serbia and in the north of Kosova in an evidently organized manner. These deliberate writings on many walls could not have occurred without the support of Serbia's leadership. In fact, Vučić defended this aggressive slogan and falsely claimed that the threat would be in line with UN Resolution 1244. In a politically extreme move, he even requested permission for the Serbian Army to enter Kosova, ostensibly to protect against a falsely alleged threat to Serb citizens of Kosova by the multicultural government of Kosova, which comprises Albanians, Serbs, Bosniaks and others. This government operates under one of the most modern and minority-protecting constitutions in Europe.

The sequence of escalations and preparations clearly indicates that the paramilitary attack was strategically and meticulously planned by Serbia's leader, most likely in close coordination with its military ally, Russia. Russian personnel are deeply embedded within the Serbian state security structure and are actively involved in the inner workings of Serbian planning and decision-making.

The challenge in the Balkans appears to be driven by aspirations of Serb supremacy and the desire of both Russia and Serbia to exert influence over what they perceive as "Serbian land" not only in Serbia but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosova, and potentially parts of Croatia and Montenegro. This complex geopolitical situation involves issues related to national identity, historical disputes, and regional power dynamics, making it a significant challenge for the stability and security of the region.

If the West continues to allow Vučić to escalate and does not take unmistakably clear steps to deter both Vučić and Putin from further escalating, the Balkans could once again descend into war. This

time, with Putin at the helm of Russia, a brutal war criminal who is ready to shed the blood of hundreds of thousands of innocent people for his political goals. The sooner the West starts sending unambiguous signals discouraging escalation by Serbia and Russia, the higher the chances are that another war can be avoided.

HOW AND WHY SERBIA IS BEHIND THE ATTACK

Resemblance with the 1990s Milošević playbook

The resemblance of the tactics to those employed in the 1990s in Serbia's wars against Croatia and Bosnia is striking. It began with kidnaping of police officers and clandestine paramilitary provocations aimed at sparking a wider confrontation, already planned by Serbia's leadership. The September 24th group was cautiously composed, including Kosova Serbs, in order to present the assault as a 'homegrown' explosion of anger from allegedly suppressed people. The official outcry and the fueling of anger by Serbia's leaders, along with the glorification of terrorists as 'national heroes,' are poised to create an atmosphere of revenge that is likely to lead to renewed terrorist attacks and even prepare the ground for at least a limited war against a democratic and peaceful neighboring country—much like what happened with Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and finally Kosova in the 1990s.

Serbia is safe on the border with Kosova

In Vučić's Serbia virtually nothing happens without top-down approval. The border with Kosova is secure beyond any doubt. Serbia has a reasonably good system of tracking weapons in place and can quickly identify any missing quantities from its storage depots.

Scale of the operation requires expertise and massive support

US ambassador to Kosova, Jeffrey M. Hovenier, analyzed that the attack was 'coordinated and sophisticated... The quantity of weapons suggests this was serious, with a plan to destabilize security in the region.' White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby also stated that the attack 'was not a random one and that the amount and types of arms that were found represent a threat not only to Kosova personnel but international personnel, including NATO troops.'

Trained in Serbia's military bases

The paramilitary troops have been trained in Serbia's military bases. Serbia's Minister of Defense and the Commander of Serbian Armed Forces admitted that they routinely train Kosova Serb citizens. Serbia's military chief claimed that what happened on private property would not be his business, a clear violation of Serbia's legislation that military training must not take place on private property.

KFOR insignia and Humvee vehicles

Confiscated KFOR insignia and other evidence show that a larger operation disguised as KFOR was planned. The use of Humvees by Serbia to train the attackers demonstrates the extent to which Serbia and Vučić consider the West to be weak; they would not have done it if they were afraid of a strong Western reaction.

Key political role and visible link with Vučić

The paramilitary commander, M. Radoičić, is closely linked with Vučić. Vučić made him a political leader as deputy chair of Srpska Lista, the political party with official Belgrade support. Radoičić sat next to Vučić in all important meetings with Kosova Serb citizens, including in Serbia's Security Council. While Vučić denies having Radoičić as a friend, he admits he was a close collaborator. As a leading figure with visible friendship with Serbia's President, he admitted his central role in the action which resulted in deaths. Radoičić's involvement proves support by Belgrade.

Violent group attacking KFOR in May was sent in from Serbia

The group attacking KFOR on 29 May is closely linked to football fans who are also close to President Vučić, who was a part of that violent scene for many years.

Vučić's son Danilo has a close relationship with the attackers. Danilo Vučić was in the car with one of the terrorists on four out of the five occasions when he came to Kosova. It is widely known that Vučić sends his son to be present at various occasions, such as the recent illegal celebration of Republika Srpska Day in February 2023 in Bosnia. The Vučić associate was one of the brutal attackers who assaulted KFOR.

Serb analysts argue that Radoičić is under the protection of the Serbian state in a manner similar to the main suspect Jovanjica (who is openly shielded by the government). Radoičić has been involved in various criminal cases, including the attack against the opposition politician Borislav Stefanovic.

Legitimizing 'forced uprising'

While Vučić nominally denounced the murder of the police officer, the overall narrative promoted by him and his media machine glorifies the deadly attacks as part of an imagined uprising. Vučić even defends the use of explosives as a legitimate tool to "defend against Kurti's terror."

Radoičić's key role in the operation

Only after Kosova presented drone footage proving Radoičić's involvement, he publicly admitted his role in the operation. But later, in front of the prosecutor, he denied the crimes he was charged with, but he openly admitted his wish to encourage Kosova Serbs for an armed uprising.

Paramilitaries belonged to two terrorist organizations

While Vučić maintains that they would have trained as individuals, evidence shows that most of the attackers belong to the terrorist organizations “Severna Brigada” (North Brigade) and “Civilna Zaštita (Civil Protection).

Vučić refuses involvement, claiming that it would go against his interests

After the attack was repelled, Vučić argued that the attack was not in his interest, so Serbia could not possibly be involved in it. It's a typical strategy of denial. Only the failure did not suit Vučić. But the operation was planned for success, not for failure, including military intervention.

Vučić's display of detailed understanding

Vučić displays detailed knowledge and a consistent reinterpretation of the attack. For example, Vučić went into details to argue that Kosova's police officer was not killed by a hand grenade but by an explosive that was tied between two trucks. The Serbian narrative justified the handling of explosives as legitimate self-defense.

Military build-up of Serbia's Army at the border with Kosova

After the failed operation, in a continuation of intimidation, Serbia amassed a massive presence of troops and weapons, which Vučić called "so sophisticated that even the West was scared of." This was the fourth increase of troops and mobilization at the border in recent times, clearly displaying its intent to project power and intimidate Kosova.

Charade court case in Serbia

Serbia raised a criminal case against Radoičić for minor parts of the crime, in a fashion that most Belgrade commentators argue resembles similar hiding of perpetrators close to the regime (similar to the Jovanjica case). He was arrested but released within less than 24 hours. Allegations by Serbia's Prosecutor accusing the group of obtaining weapons in Bosnia & Herzegovina were quickly dismissed by Bosnian authorities.

Political coordination between Serbia's judiciary and the government.

The preparation with propaganda is meticulously planned. For example, M. Durić told Newsweek: 'We have been warning for years, though, that the human rights situation in Kosova is unbearable,' Durić said, 'and that sooner or later someone will—out of pure frustration and desperation—take matters into their own hands, simply to ensure their basic safety and survival and the security of their homes and families.'

Weapons entered Kosova recently from the north

The way that Serbia's Prosecutor has compiled the accusations, it is clear that the weapons used in Banjska have entered Kosova's north recently.