Hold the line
Sonja Biserko, the courageous chair of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Belgrade, announces The End of the Kosovo Myth in a paper written for the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society project “Communicating with Europe”:
In order to secure a candidate status (provided it is genuinely interested in it), the Serbian Government will have to make efforts to repair the damage caused by the imprudent radicalization of the situation in northern Kosovo and to show readiness for a constructive continuation of dialogue with Pristina. It will have to do this by December, before the EU member countries vote on the Commission’s proposal for Serbia’s candidacy.
The Serbian Government and President have yet to dissociate themselves from the ‘log revolutionaries’. A firm position of the Government to this effect would help ease tensions and calm passions among Serbia’s citizens, who have long realized that Kosovo cannot be returned within Serbia’s borders. Serbs in Kosovo, including those living in the north, have no confidence in Belgrade’s policy and are much more realistic about the situation. As it turns out, ordinary people both in Kosovo and in Serbia have proved far more realistic and rational than government itself.
I hope she is correct in believing that the day is near when Belgrade will align itself with the more realistic expectations of ordinary people. In the meanwhile, it is important for Washington and Brussels to hold the line, insisting on a resolution of the northern border/boundary issues before candidacy and looking forward to resolution of all other Kosovo issues before Serbia achieves EU membership.
More on this Saturday, when I put up a piece I’ve done for Serbian Pravda on the Kosovo situation and Serbia’s EU candidacy.
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9 thoughts on “Hold the line”
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Over the past few months, Mr. Tadic and his regime have been trying to take the pulse of the populace vis-a-vis the issues of Kosovo and EU candidacy respectively. What they’ve found out is this: a) most people do not believe anymore that Serbia could regain sovereignty over its former southern province, but they nevertheless do believe that Belgrade might somehow extract a division of Kosovo so that four Serb-dominated municipalities in the north would be annexed back to Serbia (a recent upsurge in vice-premier Ivica Dacic’s popularity hence comes as no surprise, I guess); b) people are increasingly disappointed at the EU, partly in relation to how its leading member states have been dealing with the Kosovo issue itself, partly because they feel the EU is “unjust” because it requires Serbia to fulfill “too many conditions”, and partly because the EU is facing its biggest crisis ever – one that is even threatening its very existence – and is therefore far less attractive today than it was before.
The regime in Belgrade has thus drawn two major conclusions: a) the abandonment of the EU integration process is by no means going to help us regain Kosovo – i.e., whether Serbia continues toward the membership or not, Kosovo remains de facto independent (something that wise people have already been repeating for years now); b) accordingly, our short-term goal is to earn candidate status by showing a more constructive attitude until the decision is eventually brought in December, but our long-term goal remains the ethnic-based division of Kosovo as long as there is at least a theoretical chance for that to happen.
The usual suspects – Jovanovic and Draskovic – are already calling for a recognition of reality, but they head small parties, and Draskovic is already reporting a renewal of the death threats. On the other hand, the results of the census are beginning to come out, and these may make a difference in public opinion. For years the vital statistics office has been reporting a negative growth rate, but even so the new figures, the aggregated results of the past ten years, are shocking – an overall loss of well over 350,000 people in a country of about 7 million. The rate of decline can only pick up in the future, since the largest cohorts are just now entering what are supposed to be their golden years and death rates can be expected to climb.
Ordinary people (i.e., people who post comments at the newspapers’ online sites) are beginning to make the connection between the “saving Kosovo” and losing Serbia, and in a country where politicians are elected, this may be more important than statements by those currently in power.
Entire villages are disappearing all over Serbia, and the government is preoccupied with expanding its territory? It would make more sense to beg the log-sitters to come home to Serbia to help stave off the end.
Kosovo North today is being held hostage by the Serb government. They are encouraging Serbs to gather there, engage in criminal activities, expel KosovoAlbanians from their homes, provoke the ones that are still remaining there, and not participate in democratic Kosovo institutions. Just as the infamous Milosevic rose up to power through nurturing public ethnic hatred (back in 1987 his speech in FusheKosove on the Battle of Kosovo) and psychologically mobilizing civil KosovoSerbs to maintain and deepen their hate towards Kosovo Albanians.
Serbian govt is showing no progress, and I am sure that they do NOT represent the views of those decent Serbian people (like Sonja Biserko and others).
It is certain that the region is dependent on a truly democratic Serbia, which (unfortunately) remains only in our dreams. Kosovo, even though it has been the first and the last victim in former Yugoslava of this kind of illicit behavior, has already overcome the war consequences, we are very much looking forward to the future. A democratic Serbia, would officially apologize for the war crimes, and serve as a good example of a friendly neighbor, with whom it shares the goal of EU integration.
However, having heard Catherine Ashton’s last insight that enlargement policy for the remaIning SEE countries will not change until 2013, it has remained nothing but to turn to ourselves and agree on a potential peace treaty. That is the only way forward.
Dear Meliza,
It would be great if the northern Kosovo Serbs were under control of Serbian government as you believe to be the case. Because if so, Belgrade could simply order them to quit their preposterous log revolution and instead begin to behave rationally. I fear, however, that the situation is rather opposite; namely, that Serbia – not only the government but most of us citizens – is a hostage to the interests of certain politico-criminal elements from Kosovo’s north Serb-dominated municipalities.
Of course, Serbian political leadership bears a great deal of responsibility for that, since it has been funding their parallel local institutions all the time, which has made them feel too much confidence in their ability to influence political decision-making in Belgrade. Thus, for example, there have been a few strong disagreements of late between Serb political representatives from the north on one side, and some government figures in Belgrade, such as President Tadic or chief Serbian negotiator, Mr. Borislav Stefanovic, on the other, whereat the former are apparently trying to blackmail the latter.
Now, I am wondering what would happen if Belgrade at some point decided to deprive those in the northern Kosovo of entire financial support. Would it eventually bring them to senses or would they still persist with their obstinacy? The latter outcome would imply that they have alternative sources of funding – presumably through smuggling and other illegal activities – which are sufficient to allow them to act independently from Belgrade. Not only could that encourage KFOR and Kosovo authorities to take a more assertive action against criminal structures in the north, but Serbia’s position at the international scene would become far more comfortable, as well. On the other hand, however, President Tadic and his government would certainly risk being condemned by a considerable portion of the electorate at a time that the voting draws near. Let’s hope they are brave enough to take the risk for the sake of the future of all of us in both countries who want to live normal lives in a stable and peaceful environment.
There is actually little evidence that Belgrade is holding north Kosovo “hostage” and ample that Tadic has little control there. The northern Kosovo Serbs are on the barricades because they want to be, because they see moves by Kosovo authorities, KFOR and EULEX since July as efforts to destroy their communities and sever their ties to Serbia. Tadic probably just wants the problem to go away but he cannot order people to abandon self-defense. They would not listen anyway. And EU threats to withhold EU membership from Serbia unless it behaves will lead to nothing positive as well.
Of course, the Kosovo Albanians know their rhetoric about the “criminal” north resistance to rule of law is gross exaggeration. But they hope thereby to stir their internationals on to further efforts to subdue the north for them. But there really is no solution to the north through use of force.
At some point, compromise?
One of the papers reported yesterday that neither Bogdanovic nor Konuzin is denying that the number of requests for Russian citizenship has reached 50,000. That would just about solve the problem. The Communists (in Moscow) say they’d welcome the Serbs and Rogozin is saying it would help with Russia’s depopulation problem – there’s plenty of room east of the Urals. (More sensible people are being much more reserved on the matter, of course.) The log-istas don’t want to be part of Kosovo, they don’t want to listen to their own government in Belgrade – maybe they should after all be encouraged to start packing for somewhere where they’d feel safe? This is being suggested by Serbs from the rest of the country who seem to be getting fed up with the concentration of interest on a small minority of Serbs at the expense of everybody else. They’re not even defending the medieval churches and monasteries, up there in northern Kosovo.
The decision of the ICJ might not have been decisive enough for some, but numerous countries argued that a people have a right to self-determination only when their human rights and ethnic rights are being seriously infringed. (The others who weighed in seem to say there was simply no justification under any circumstances for unilateral border changes.) The human rights issue was the basis for arguing that Kosovo had a right to independence, although it didn’t persuade enough of the judges to give Kosovo an outright win. Just what would be the basis for allowing the northern Serbs to rejoin Serbia? The first ruling on the matter, by the League of Nations court, was that the people of a region do not have the right to transfer (or transfer back, after a border change) to a different country simply because they want to. The internationals keep saying that under Ahtissari, the Serbs in Kosovo have more minority rights than any other community in Europe – if the northern Serbs win their struggle to reunite with Serbia on the basis of their treatment in Kosovo, how many other groups would consider they had even better reasons to demand at least a reconsideration of their position? The Hungarians in Vojvodina (or Slovakia), maybe? the Muslims of Sandzhak? The Basques?
“numerous countries argued that a people have a right to self-determination only when their human rights and ethnic rights are being seriously infringed.”
I have always found that a rather nonsensical position. Nearly every government initially reacts to guerrilla attacks with human rights violations. This position would be just an encouragement for guerrilla’s to randomly kill government officials.
number of requests for Russian citizenship has reached 50,000
Obviously these people think of the Ossetians who have adopted Russian citizenship in order to be better protected against aggressive actions of the government under which they live. It does not necessarily mean that they want to emigrate. It is unfortunate to see how quick this is picked up by Albanians who see a new excuse to drive the Serbs out.
My reaction to some point that were highlighted in the Biserko report:
To begin with, these autonomies are not a result of agreement but the outcome of conflict and represent part of the war booty.
Kosovo’s independence is the product of war. Not the demands of the northern Serbs. So what is the point?
irrespective of all the regional initiatives made, Belgrade still commands a great influence on neighbouring countries, i.e. their internal stability, by using the local Serbs.
So the fact that Serbia worries about the fate of the Serb minorities outside its border is used as an excuse to give them less rights. It is a logic that I don’t understand.
There is an impression that a territorial autonomy would satisfy the Serbs’ aspirations only for a short time.
Autonomy is always a compromise and there will always be people who want more. This hasn’t stopped countries elsewhere in the world from granting minorities autonomy. However, Biserko seems to have some strange image of Serbs as a special type of bad people who cannot recognize the benefits of “good enough” and always want more.
Secondly, irrespective of all the regional initiatives made, Belgrade still commands a great influence on neighbouring countries, i.e. their internal stability, by using the local Serbs
If you are incapable of seeing Serbs outside Serbia as having their own ideas and you see every of their acts as a machination by Belgrade you are bound to come to this conclusion.
Thirdly, Serbia refuses to grant territorial autonomy to minority communities in its own territory. For instance, no Serbian government has granted the Vojvodina Hungarians’ demand for territorial autonomy since it was made 15 years ago.
The autonomy for the Vojvodina was meant to serve this purpose already in Tito’s time.
As it turns out, ordinary people both in Kosovo and in Serbia have proved far more realistic and rational than government itself.
If Biserko means that they support her vision I don’t see it at the elections.
“Kosovo’s independence is the product of war. Not the demands of the northern Serbs. So what is the point?”
War is a traditional way of determining boundaries. (Mladic said borders are bloody and marked by graves, when the Serbs were winning.) You could ask the Hungarians about this, or the Germans (who lost Konigsberg, capital of Prussia since the Middle Ages) and Japanese (the Kuril Islands) to Russia in WWII. And how were the present peaceful borders of Europe established? Serbia was either not strong enough or interested enough to fight for Kosovo, and so lost it. War is a practical way of determining who is capable of taking and holding territory. Referenda aren’t. A friend says “Wars don’t determine who’s right, just who’s left.” Which in the real world is what counts, right?
“So the fact that Serbia worries about the fate of the Serb minorities outside its border is used as an excuse to give them less rights. It is a logic that I don’t understand.”
They either do more or hope to do more than simply worry about Serbian minority rights. Under the recent law on the diaspora, Serbs living abroad are to be used to further Serbia’s national interests. [Within the host country’s laws, of course.] Marking out your countrymen as a potential fifth column in their current countries of residence does not seem like a good-neighborly gesture.
“However, Biserko seems to have some strange image of Serbs as a special type of bad people who cannot recognize the benefits of “good enough” and always want more.”
Maybe she reads the newspapers and sees this argument repeatedly brought up, often in terms of “we out-waited the Turks, we can out-wait the Albanians.” This is why Serbia is so resolutely refusing any formal recognition of Kosovo’s independence – as long as they haven’t recognized it, there’s always the chance they’ll get it back someday, goes the argument. (Every piece of news about problems in America is seen as a Sign that the world order is changing and the new big powers will favor Serbia, and before long, and Kosovo and Metohija will once again be made a Serbian province.) As far as being “a special type” of people, that’s how Serbs view themselves – they once had a (briefish) empire in the area, they sacrificed themselves to protect Europe (by being under the Turks for 500 years) – they’re entitled.
“The autonomy for the Vojvodina was meant to serve this purpose already in Tito’s time. ”
I don’t understand your response, but the government in Belgrade has certainly been dragging their feet on the issue. What successive governments in Belgrade have achieved is to increase the proportion of Serbs in the area and break up compact Hungarian populations by moving in Serbs from other areas [as they also did in Kosovo]. The Chinese are doing the same thing in Tibet, as a way of pacifying it. When the proportion of Serbs in Kosovo started falling in the 70s and 80s due to out-migration, it was picturesquely referred to as “genocide.”
” ‘As it turns out, ordinary people both in Kosovo and in Serbia have proved far more realistic and rational than government itself.’
If Biserko means that they support her vision I don’t see it at the elections.”
I don’t know how realistic an impression it’s possible to obtain from reading the responses to articles in the online newspapers, but the proportion of letters deriding the position of the KSerbs in the north and calling for an end to this preoccupation with the Kosovo problem is showing what looks like a significant increase. It may not even matter whether the moderators having been receiving such comments for years and didn’t start printing them until recently, or whether there’s been a real change in public attitudes, since what is printed is governed by law. An official reinterpretation of what’s in the national interest or tending to foment ethnic discord would be even more interesting. Elections have given people a chance to make symbolic gestures, an easy way to “defend Kosovo” – especially when it was being claimed that it wouldn’t cost them membership in the EU. I make no predictions about the upcoming elections, especially with the current EU problems. Milosevic felt he couldn’t end the war until the people started demanding it, and he could interpret it as a “win” because no Nato troops would be stationed in Serbia itself. The politicians need some cover, but with nobody dying in airstrikes, they’re apt to have a harder time finding it.