Dialogue should not be about the Association
Antigonë Isufi of KALLXO.com asked questions. I replied:
- Do you expect renewed momentum in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue following the formation of Kosovo’s new institutions? What factors will determine whether the process can move forward?
A: The negotiating strategy of the EU will be important. If Brussels continues to prioritize the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, without any quid pro quo for Kosovo, the Dialogue will continue to go nowhere. My view is that the ASM can only be acceptable to Kosovo once all threats to its sovereignty and territorial integrity are removed, preferably by Serbian diplomatic recognition.
If the Serb municipalities, who already cooperate, want to institutionalize their cooperation, they can do that without any obstacle as a non-government organization, or better within the framework of the existing Kosovo Association of Municipalities.
- Do you expect high-level meetings between Kosovo and Serbia to take place in the coming weeks or months? What conditions would need to be met for such meetings to be convened, and how likely are they to produce concrete results?
A: I suppose the EU will insist on meetings, but if they persist in asking nothing of Serbia and everything from Kosovo they won’t go anywhere. Of course it depends a bit on who will be prime minister of Serbia. If it is Vucic, he has made it clear he will do nothing that advances recognition of Kosovo as sovereign and independent. That means the ASM has to be de-prioritized. If it is someone else, we’ll have to wait and see.
- What should be the immediate priorities of the dialogue? Should the focus remain on implementing the 2023 Agreement on the Path to Normalisation and its Implementation Annex, or are new political commitments needed to move the process forward?
A: I think the initial focus should be on implementation of existing agreements, including the older technical ones as well as normalization and its implementation annex. I haven’t heard of any new magic formulas.
And for those who say the normalization agreement is modeled on the one the two Germanies found useful, I would remind them that the two Germanies agreement allowed both to join the United Nations. If that were to happen for Kosovo, I’d have to rethink. But I won’t, because the Russians have their own reasons for stopping Kosovo UN membership.
- How significant is the role of the European Union and its special representative in facilitating the next phase of the dialogue? Do you believe the EU should adopt a different approach to overcome the current obstacles and encourage both parties to fulfil their commitments?
A: Yes, I believe the EU should not insist on the ASM but work on other matters until Serbia is ready to recognize Kosovo. Getting a Serbian signature on the normalization agreement might be the right place to start.
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Two awful messes make an awful world
President Trump persists in making things worse. The awful wars in Ukraine and Iran are prime examples.
Ukraine
Ukrainian President Zelensky has repeatedly expressed his interest in a negotiated end to the Ukraine war. Russian President Putin has not. He wants to slog on until all of Donetsk province is in Russian hands. At the current pace, that could take decades.
President Trump has nevertheless decided to bring heavy pressure to bear on Ukraine, not on Russia. He has cut off early warnings of Russian missile launches. He has also slowed Starshield (the military version of Elon Musk’s Starlink) connections for Ukraine, hindering navigation of its air defense missiles and drones. That contributes directly to deaths, injuries, and destruction in Ukraine.
Trump appears to be negotiating an oil and gas deal with Moscow that would benefit his associates, and likely also himself. Trump lifted sanctions on exports of Russian diesel, apparently in a futile effort to bring down global prices before the US election. That failed, but the move is putting a lot of cash in Putin’s pockets. Trump has not stopped Russia from helping Iran to target US and allied assets in the Middle East.
Trump has also made a fool of himself by announcing an “energy” truce between Moscow and Kyiv that neither warring party knew about. Russia violated it right away. Ukraine followed.
Ukraine’s air defense was already in trouble before these Trump stupidities. Lack of Patriot and other missiles allows the many more Russian drones and missiles launched this year to reach their targets. Ukraine is still hitting a lot of Russian oil and cyber facilities. A cold winter looms in both countries.
The Middle East
Things are little better in the Middle East, especially when it comes to issues of most direct interest to the US.
American escorting of ships through the strait of Hormuz worked for a while. But Iran has stepped up its game and is hitting many more. The process is a complicated and difficult one. Smaller ships belonging to the oil producers carry the oil through the strait and then offload it outside the strait to much larger crude carriers belonging to the consumers. Presumably the extra costs involved are born by the producers, who however are also benefiting from increased world prices for whatever they can sell.
Iran is starting to restore some nuclear sites. While it is presumably far from being able to reconstitute its nuclear program, this is likely an early sign that it is intent on doing so.
Israel and Iran appear to have restored deterrence for now. They are not hitting each other directly. But Israel continues to hit what it says are Hamas and Hezbollah targets in Gaza and Lebanon.
The Yemeni Houthis and Saudi Arabia are attacking each others’ airports. The Houthis are also encircling Taiz, but they have lost direct control over the Bab al Mandeb. President Trump has refused to support the Saudis militarily but the US is providing intelligence.
Elsewhere in the Middle East, things are static and sometimes improving, if modestly. Syria and Türkiye are reintegrating their Kurdish rebels, though the economic situation in Syria remains dire. The Arab kingdoms and the Egyptian dictatorship are holding, despite the damage Iran has caused. Iraq, heavily dependent on oil exports and revenue, is getting some out overland through Syria.
What next?
The big question is whether the US and Israel will go back to war with Iran before or after the US election November 3. Trump has said he won’t until after, but he is a liar. No one should believe anything he says without verification. He appears out of ideas, if he ever had any. War isn’t an idea, its a resort of the desperate. He appears desperate.
More war in the Middle East will be awful for Ukraine, as it will continue to exhaust US munitions. Nor will it be good for America, as the oil and gas price increases will likely tip the economy into stagflation.
In Ukraine, Trump has made it clear he is determined to see Russia win, despite the preferences of the Congress and the American people. That makes an awful world, as it splits the NATO alliance and ends America’s already fading role as leader of the democratic world.
Putin has good reason to be happy with his “nelegal” agent in the White House.
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Albanian anti-government protests: student revolt and political crisis
This morning I received this excellent report from Albert Rakipi of the Albanian Institute for International Studies. I am posting it here with his permission:
Anti-Government Protests in Albania: The Student Revolt and the Escalation of the Political Crisis
Tirana, October 14, 2026
Introduction: From More Than 100 Days of Protests to an Escalating Political Crisis
Albania is facing a serious escalation of political and social tensions. The student protests of October 13 and 14, 2026, accompanied by violent clashes, damage and attacks on state institutions, have opened a new phase in an anti-government movement that has continued for more than four months. Over the two days, central Tirana was marked by barricades, fires, tear gas, interventions by special police units and attacks on public buildings, at times taking on the appearance of a violent confrontation zone.
The immediate context of this crisis is the “Flamingo Revolution,” which began on May 31, 2026, in opposition to a tourism project in the protected area of Zvërnec. Over the following 130-plus days, the largely peaceful demonstrations expanded their agenda from environmental protection and objections to the approval process for strategic investments to corruption, political accountability, the model of governance and demands for the resignation of Prime Minister Edi Rama. The involvement of students in mid-October has changed the movement’s social weight, pace and profile.
The student protests began with concerns about higher education and young people’s prospects, but have now acquired an explicit political objective: the departure of the prime minister and his government. This distinguishes the current movement from conventional protests over university fees and study conditions. The situation must be understood simultaneously as a crisis of public order, political representation and public trust in institutions.
The Dynamics of the October 13–14 Protests
On October 13, students gathered outside the Ministry of Education in Tirana. The demonstration escalated after stones and other hard objects were thrown at the building and clashes erupted with police. Demonstrators spread to Skanderbeg Square, Durrës Street, Kavaja Street and other areas, where barricades were erected, rubbish bins were set on fire, and public and private property was damaged, including City Hall. Despite police interventions, groups of protesters repeatedly regrouped, and clashes continued into the evening.
A particularly troubling aspect was the manner of police intervention. Footage showing protesters beaten with batons, dragged along the ground and subjected to rough treatment during detention, including in circumstances where some individuals posed no immediate threat, revealed unacceptable conduct and raised serious questions about proportionality and professionalism. The case of a 19-year-old with a broken leg who was handled carelessly by officers heightened concern. Repeated use of tear gas also affected people who were not involved in the clashes. These incidents cannot be justified by violence committed by other individuals at the protest.
The initial toll included more than 50 people taken into police custody and 27 who received medical treatment, among them students, police officers, journalists, passersby and a foreign diplomat who sustained a head injury. Seven people were still receiving treatment at the Trauma Hospital on the morning of October 14, none in life-threatening condition. These figures reflect the initial phase and do not constitute a final count of incidents across the two days.
On October 14, the confrontation escalated markedly. After demonstrations resumed near the Ministry of Education, where the entrance, security cameras and parts of the building were damaged and fires were started, groups of protesters moved toward central state institutions. The Prime Minister’s Office was attacked, and objects and trees within its perimeter caught fire. At the offices of the Presidency of Parliament, protesters forced open the main entrance and some entered the building; a fire was also started near the entrance. Attacks and attempted arson also targeted the Ministry of Justice. Commercial premises were damaged, and further flashpoints emerged across central Tirana.
The attacks on the Prime Minister’s Office, parliamentary offices and ministries marked a qualitative escalation: the targets were no longer merely police barriers but the buildings and symbols of state power. Nevertheless, responsibility for arson and damage must be attributed to those who committed the acts, not to all students or citizens who took part in the protests. Distinguishing peaceful protest from violent conduct is essential to a fair assessment of the events.
Student Demands and the Political Character of the Movement
Initially, students raised issues concerning university fees and conditions, education funding, the quality of studies and employment prospects. The demand now dominating the protests, however, is not a package of educational reforms. Organizers have stated that they are not seeking sector-specific negotiations with the Ministry of Education but the resignation of Prime Minister Edi Rama and the departure of the government.
This demand coincides with the main objective of the movement that began on May 31. The “Flamingo Revolution” has also called for a transitional technocratic government, free and fair elections, the cancellation of the contested Zvërnec project and changes to the legal framework governing protected areas and strategic investments. These are elements of the broader civic platform and should not automatically be presented as demands unanimously endorsed by all students.
The involvement of the parliamentary opposition increases the political significance of the protests but also raises the question of how far the organizers will maintain their independence from political parties. The combination of demands for political change with the mobilization of a younger generation makes the protests potentially more consequential than a dispute over education.
Response of the Government and State Institutions
The government’s response has focused on condemning violent acts, protecting institutions and prosecuting those responsible. At the time this report was prepared, no direct public response by Prime Minister Rama to the central demand for his resignation had been identified. Deputy Prime Minister Albana Koçiu condemned vandalism and urged students to distance themselves from violence. In a statement on October 14, Interior Minister Ervin Demo accused the country’s longstanding political opposition of exploiting student grievances to foment destruction and unrest. He also alleged involvement by “malicious foreign hands,” which, he said, had operated through social media since June, but offered no specific public evidence in the statement to substantiate this claim. Demo characterized the violence as part of an organized scenario, warned those responsible for arson and destruction that they would face individual criminal accountability, and praised the professionalism of the police. At the same time, he urged students to choose dialogue with the government, referring to the Pact for the University. This interpretation of events contrasts with concerns over excessive force by police officers; both the allegation of foreign interference and responsibility for violence require independent verification.
Police announced the suspension of four officers and the head of public order at Tirana Police Station No. 1 in connection with incidents involving the use of force. The Albanian Helsinki Committee called for independent investigations, transparency concerning detainees and compliance with the principles of necessity and proportionality. Investigating attacks on institutions and investigating possible police abuses are simultaneous obligations, not mutually exclusive alternatives.
In his October 14 response, President Bajram Begaj called for restraint and respect for the right to peaceful assembly, emphasizing that neither violence by protesters nor unlawful use of police force can be justified. He expressed his readiness for dialogue. The Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs also condemned an incident at the Apostolic Nunciature in which the premises and symbols of the diplomatic mission were affected.
Beyond the public-order response, the government faces a political challenge: demands for its departure cannot be treated simply as a disciplinary matter or a disagreement over university policy. A credible institutional response requires both accountability for violence and attention to the grievances that have fueled the protests.
International Reactions and the European Dimension
The European Union responded on October 14 through its Delegation in Albania, expressing concern over the violent escalation and reiterating that freedom of assembly and expression are fundamental rights. The Delegation called for these rights to be exercised peacefully, for proportionate police action and for priority investigations into allegations of excessive force against protesters and journalists. It urged de-escalation and constructive dialogue.
The German Embassy supported the EU position, while the British Embassy stressed that violence cannot be legitimized as a means of protest and that respect for the law and democratic freedoms is essential. These reactions do not amount to endorsement of demands for the government’s resignation; they focus on standards of conduct for institutions and protesters.
For Albania, which seeks to advance its EU accession negotiations, the crisis carries particular significance. European integration is not only a matter of aligning legislation: it requires the practical protection of fundamental freedoms, respect for the rule of law and accountable institutions. At the same time, safeguarding peaceful protest does not relieve the state of its duty to ensure the safety of institutions and citizens.
Factors Driving the Expansion of the Anti-Government Movement
The expansion of the protests cannot be explained solely by the October incidents or dissatisfaction with higher education. It reflects the accumulation of political, institutional, economic and social factors that have created a perception that the government is failing to respond to the concerns of a significant segment of the public.
The most important political factor is the crisis of state integrity and public trust. A number of ministers, former ministers and senior officials have been convicted, are on trial or remain under investigation; their legal statuses differ, and criminal responsibility is individual. Particularly significant is the case of former Deputy Prime Minister Belinda Balluku, who remains a member of parliament while facing allegations concerning public procurement procedures, which she denies. In March 2026, the parliamentary majority rejected a request by the Special Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Prosecution Office (SPAK) to authorize her arrest. The decision drew criticism that political protection could obstruct accountability, while the majority argued that the request did not meet the criteria of necessity. The European Union’s IPARD II program also exposed serious institutional weaknesses: an investigation by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) identified irregularities and suspected fraud in the administration of agricultural funds, undermining confidence in the management of European assistance.
Even more troubling is the lack of a clear boundary between organized politics, oligarchic interests and organized crime. Independent Albanian and international experts have long warned of the risk that criminal networks could influence public decision-making, procurement and strategic sectors of the economy. The case of former State Intelligence Service director Vlora Hyseni is particularly serious given the nature of an institution with central national-security responsibilities. The investigation into alleged disclosure of classified information and her communications with businessman Ergys Agasi have raised serious questions about information security and institutional integrity. Agasi is at the center of investigations into relationships among business interests, officials and public procedures; suspicions that he may have acted as an intermediary between government representatives and networks pursuing illicit interests require judicial clarification. These developments are alarming indicators of the risk of state capture, but they do not constitute conclusive proof that all alleged criminal links have been established.
The construction industry and real estate market make this problem particularly visible. Luxury towers and complexes continue to rise in Tirana while many dwellings remain unoccupied, and prices in segments of the market approach those in European capitals, beyond the financial reach of most young people. Money-laundering risk assessments identify construction as a high-risk sector for bringing proceeds from international drug trafficking, corruption and other criminal activities into the legitimate economy. The contrast between the construction boom, the stock of unoccupied housing and purchasing power raises serious questions about the origins of capital, ownership transparency and financial oversight. The 2023 census identified approximately 356,000 unoccupied dwellings nationwide, but this figure does not refer solely to luxury apartments and does not, in itself, prove money laundering. Nevertheless, the scale and character of urban development heighten concern about the potential influence of criminal capital and concentrated interests over the city’s development policies.
Beyond these problems, living costs, insecure employment, unequal opportunities, emigration and the lack of prospects for young people have widened discontent. Violent and, in some visible instances, disproportionate police interventions have deepened the sense of distance between citizens and institutions. In this context, students are no longer simply demanding better university conditions but the resignation of the prime minister and the government in response to a perceived crisis in the model of governance.
Conclusions and Outlook
The events of October 13–14 mark a turning point in the dynamics of protest in Albania. A civic movement that began on May 31 as an environmental protest and gradually broadened into an anti-government movement has been strengthened by the participation of students and accompanied by a new level of confrontation with the state. Attacks on the Prime Minister’s Office, parliamentary offices and other institutions, together with footage of unacceptable police use of force, demonstrate the danger of an escalating cycle of violence.
The movement’s future will depend on sustained mobilization, the ability of organizers to distance themselves from violence, their relationship with the opposition and the possibility of protests spreading beyond Tirana. For the state, decisive factors will include transparency in investigations, accountability for possible abuses, respect for peaceful protest and the capacity to provide a political response to the demands raised.
The central issue is not simply the restoration of calm to the streets of the capital. It is whether Albanian institutions can rebuild public trust and address the causes that have brought protests with different origins together around a demand for a change in government. For a country seeking European Union membership, this is an important test of democratic resilience and the functioning of the rule of law.
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It’s not just the verdict that is unjust
The Kosovo Specialist Chambers’ has convicted former President Hashim Thaci and three other Kosovo Liberation Army leaders of war crimes but acquitted them of crimes against humanity. The sentence for Thaci is 25 years.
This is happening while Aleksandar Vucic is resigning from the Serbian presidency to outmaneuver protests and avoid a term limit. He has called an election he will ensure his party will win, making him prime minister instead. Vucic was Information Minister to Slobodan Milosevic’s government during the time in which the court says Thaci committed his crimes. Vucic’s Serbia last week buried Ratko Mladic, convicted of genocide at the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), with high honors.
The contrast is hard to miss. A Kosovo president who had tried to defend fellow citizens from Serbian oppression is in prison. Serbia is empowering a politician who served the government that attacked civilians in Kosovo and honoring the perpetrator of even worse crimes in Bosnia.
How did this happen?
This happened because Kosovo, and Thaci in particular, gave in to strong American and European pressure to create the court by constitutional amendment. It is a Kosovo court in law, but not in substance. Its staff is international. Created to focus on organ trafficking allegations in a Council of Europe report, it found no evidence to support them. So it turned its attention instead to Serbian intelligence allegations.
Some of the allegations against KLA fighters are no doubt true. But I do not believe that Thaci had command authority over the forces that committed the crimes. I know this not only because Americans in a position to know testified to it at his trial. But also because in conversation with him after the war, in front of a KLA fighter, he told me that his role was limited to political spokesman of the KLA. He was not a fighter or a commander.
Acquittals were never in the cards however. The Europeans spent 200 million euros on the Specialist Chambers. Serbia had pressured the Americans and Europeans, claiming it was unfair that ICTY had convicted mostly Serbs for crimes in Bosnia and Kosovo (where they had indeed committed most of the crimes).
The Americans might once upon a time have tried to save the KLA leaders from injustice, or at least prevented the burial of Mladic with honors. But now they have forgotten human rights. They focus entirely on their own, narrow interests. Ironically, Thaci, as prime minister and president, was far more friendly to those than the current prime minister.
What happens now?
Thaci and the other KLA leaders will appeal. That will take years, during which the court will keep them incarcerated, as it did in the five years before the verdict. With some luck, the sentences may eventually be reduced. But no country in the future will make the mistake of creating an international court of this sort without retaining the ability to abolish it. That isn’t possible for Kosovo because constitutional amendment would require Serb cooperation, which won’t be forthcoming.
The more immediate question is what happens in Kosovo. Many Albanians there will find the outcome unjust. They will protest angrily, but I hope peacefully. Violence will gain nothing. The verdicts will please, but not satisfy, many Serbs. Some may celebrate. There too violence will gain nothing.
The Americans and Europeans should be chagrined. They have criminalized a liberation movement that they supported and reduced international justice to political revenge. But they have moved on and won’t pay much heed. This is one more lesson in why you shouldn’t be too friendly to Washington and Brussels.
It’s not just the verdict that is unjust. It’s the court.
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Kosovo should get on with governing
Naile Ejupi asked me questions yesterday. Bota Sot published today. Here is the original English:
Q: Kosovo now has a new government led by Albin Kurti. How do you assess the political situation following the formation of the Kurti 4 government, and what should be its main priority in order to ensure political and institutional stability?
A: I wouldn’t want to comment on domestic priorities, but in foreign policy I think the main near-term priority is getting Kosovo, its defense ministry, and its army ready for NATO membership in 2028. Beyond that, Pristina should be preparing assiduously for EU membership. Never mind that neither is likely to happen right away. It is the preparations that are important right now.
Q: The agreement between LVV and LDK to support Bekim Sejdiu for president has been opposed by six LDK lawmakers. Do you believe this internal division could jeopardize the agreement, and how serious could the consequences be for Kosovo’s institutional stability?
A: I assume it does jeopardize the agreement. I don’t think there is a question of institutional instability, but I also don’t think a new election is a good idea.
Q: Should LDK leader Lumir Abdixhiku view the opposition of the six lawmakers as an internal party matter, or could their position have broader consequences for the functioning of Kosovo’s institutions?
A: Clearly there are broader implications. I hope the votes can somehow be found to make Sejdiu president, not because of who he is but because it is high time to get back to the serious business of governing.
Q: Richard Grenell has publicly expressed support for the six LDK lawmakers opposing the agreement. How significant is this intervention, and could it be interpreted as a political message to Kosovo’s current leadership?
A: So far as I am aware, Richard Grenell is no one in the US administration. His history suggests anything he says is not to Kosovo’s advantage.
Q: If the LVV-LDK agreement on the presidency fails because it cannot secure enough votes, how realistic is the possibility of Kosovo heading toward another election, and what would another electoral cycle mean for the country?
A: If the agreement fails and isn’t somehow replaced with a different proposition, I suppose a new election would be inevitable. But the citizenry is clearly tired of going to the polls and wants to see the government governing.
Q: Do you think the current confrontation between LVV, LDK and the opposition is shifting Kosovo’s political focus away from strategic issues such as relations with the United States and the European Union, as well as the dialogue with Serbia?
A: Yes, I think it is doing precisely that. I’m not so worried about the dialogue with Serbia, which I doubt will go anywhere with Aleksandar Vucic. But relations with the US and EU need repair and tending.
Q: The verdict in the trial of Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi and Jakup Krasniqi at the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague is expected soon. How significant could this verdict be for Kosovo’s political landscape and society?
A: Of course the verdicts will be significant for many in Kosovo. I expect some people to be pleased, others upset. The important thing is that all reactions should be moderate and non-violent. Kosovo has no choice but to accept the verdicts. It should do so showing off its most civilized behavior, whether in protest or in celebration. That is true for both Albanians and Serbs.
Q: If the former KLA leaders are acquitted, could this have a direct impact on Kosovo’s political balance, particularly on the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the opposition?
A: Difficult to say. I have no idea what the KLA leaders will do if acquitted. They might just retire, or return to politics. That is their choice. When I met with Hashim Thaci in prison last fall, we did not discuss that issue.
Q: And what could be the political consequences if the verdict is a conviction?
A: Conviction and further imprisonment would in my opinion be unjust, and it will be an enormous disappointment to many Albanians. But as I said, there is no choice but to accept, criticize if you like, and protest, peacefully.
Q: Could the verdict in The Hague have an impact on Kosovo’s relations with the United States and its European partners, given the political importance this case has assumed in Kosovo?
A: I don’t think it is the verdict that will have an impact, but how it is received in Kosovo.
Q: Overall, do you see Kosovo entering a new political phase with the formation of the Kurti 4 government, or could the unresolved presidential issue, divisions within LDK, and the Hague verdict lead to an even more unstable political period?
A: Sure, there could be instability, but the constitution provides for an election as the way out. It would not be the best solution in my view, but the constitution is the constitution.
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