Time to withdraw US bases in the Gulf
The US bases in the Middle East are a key issue in the present confrontation with Iran. Here they are:
The knee jerk reaction is to say they have to stay. But it is time to reconsider. Donald Trump has already lost this war. We need to consider our options for making sure we don’t lose the next one.
Too close
The Iran war has demonstrated that many US bases are too close to Iran for comfort. The Iranian coast lies less than 150 miles from Bahrain, where the US Fifth fleet headquarters. The bases in Kuwait are even closer, as are those in the UAE. Iran has many missiles that can fly that far and much farther:
It also has lots of drones that can reach well beyond the Gulf:
American defenses against these weapons are good, but not perfect or unlimited. They are also expensive and take a long time to manufacture. It is time to put more distance between US bases and Iran.
What to move
The bases inside the Gulf have proven less than useful in the current war. They are especially vulnerable. Iran has managed to destroy important assets like their vital radar installations. The naval assets that enforce the blockade and have proven important in the current war are those in the Arabian Sea, outside the strait of Hormuz:
They can control shipping in and out of both the strait and the Bab al Mandeb (the strait between Yemen and Djibouti and Eritrea). That’s why the British and American base at Diego Garcia is so important. US bases in Turkey and Europe also provide places from which the US can project air power.
Pulling back is not pulling out
Any US pullback from the Middle East risks leaving the perception of a vacuum. It could encourage Gulf states to reconsider their de facto alliances with the US and hedge by accommodating Iranian interests. That is already happening and isn’t entirely avoidable.
But it could get worse. The US would need therefore to discuss planning for a pullback with the Gulf states and reach an understanding with them on burden sharing. US commitment to their defense would need to be spelled out more clearly than previously.
The US could require in return Gulf commitments to their own defense as well as to pipelines for oil and gas exports that circumvent both the strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandeb. The Gulf Cooperation Council, in which all six Arab states of the Gulf are represented, should be encouraged to coordinate its members’ oil and gas export infrastructure as well as their defense plans.
The flies in the ointment
The reasons the Gulf countries have not built oil and pipelines that circumvent the two choke points are important. The UAE has coastline outside the strait of Hormuz and is doubling its pipeline to Fujairah on that coast. But Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait do not have that option. They have not wanted to trust Yemen, which has been embroiled in a civil war for 10 years, or Oman to let their products cross their territory unmolested. Yemen is dicey. But there should be a price that would ensure Omani cooperation.
Another possibility is a pipeline through Iraq and Syria to the Mediterranean. But Iraq and Syria are already rebuilding an old pipeline to carry Iraq’s oil to Europe. The Gulf monarchies’ main customers are increasingly in East Asia. So export from the Arabian Sea coastline of Oman is a better bet.
Offshore balancing
Advocates of “offshore balancing” have long advocated that the US take that approach in the Middle East. Opponents fear that would enable Iran to dominate the region. But Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan are already signaling with their newly concluded Mecca Joint Defense Agreement resistance to both Iranian and Israeli dominance in the region. Allowing the powers that be in the region to reach their own equilibrium, with US backing for its friends in the background, is worth a try.
Provided, however, that it does not lead to a nuclear arms race in the region. That could be catastrophic.
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Trump is up the Gulf without a paddle
Another week of President Trump’s predicting the re-opening of the strait of Hormuz has passed. The result so far is a statement from the Iranian National Security Council Secretary re-iterating the usual list Tehran demands (translation courtesy of Google):
- Never threaten Iran with any language or insult the sanctities of this nation.
- End the war and aggression against Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and Iraq forever.
- Lift the naval blockade and withdraw its military forces (naval and air) from around Iran.
- Pay the damages of the two wars of aggression and imposition on Iran without any reduction.
- Lift the cruel and illegal sanctions against the Iranian nation.
- Unconditionally release the frozen and stolen assets of the Iranian people.
Let’s examine the merits of these demands one by one. Remember though: I am not a lawyer.
Never threaten
This is rich, coming from a government that encourages its citizens to chant “Death to America.” The Supreme Leader (Ali Khamenei) explained the target was the US government, not the American people. But that of course is what Trump says about his threats. So no comfort there.
Mutual insults are a long tradition in US/Iranian relations. I doubt they are going to disappear anytime soon. But both countries would do well to reduce the volume and frequency. It satisfies domestic constituencies, but it isn’t going to bring an end to the war.
End the aggression
Here I agree with labeling the war as aggression. The UNGA definition is “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State.” The Americans might claim they did it in preventive self-defense, but it is hard to see how that would convince a reasonable third party. The UN Charter does not allow pre-emption.
As for Iran’s allies in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and Iraq, none of them are internationally recognized states. They are all para-statal forces, so I think they are not entitled to the same protection from aggression that states have.
Lift the blockade and remove forces
Blockade is an act of war. This war is a war of aggression. So I think the Iranians are well within their rights to ask the US to lift the naval blockade.
The Iranians can ask whatever they want of the US forces near Iran, but there they are not on firm ground. The US can station forces wherever a host country invites them as well as sail and fly in international waters and airspace.
Pay for the damages of war
Again: the Iranians can ask, but they no doubt know that any American leader who agreed would not last long. American taxpayers have already paid for the military force that caused the damage. They won’t pay a second time.
I expect however that the Iranians will get fees for services rendered from ships passing through the strait of Hormuz. They will be content with that.
Lift the sanctions
Alleviating sanctions is certainly possible in a deal. That was part of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The lifting then did not work well from the Iranian point of view. I expect them to insist on better this time around.
Sanctions however have perverse effects. It is entirely possible that lifting them will undermine the Islamic Republic and its citizens’ loyalty to it.
Unfreeze Iranian assets
The is also true of Iran’s frozen assets. Once they start flowing back to Tehran, Iranians are going to want to see the benefits. If instead the powers that be use the money for weapons, the nuclear program, and feathering their own nests, ordinary Iranians will begin to demand their share.
Bottom line
I suppose these demands may be prelude to an agreement, but it doesn’t sound like it. US acceptance of anything like them would spell ignominious defeat. I’m not against that, as the war was a stupid act of aggression. Trump has promised an agreement with Iran that can’t be reached while Iran and Oman are negotiating an agreement that can be reached on tolls in the strait of Hormuz..
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Ending two wars as best we can
Both Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Ukrainian President Zelensky are in the US, nominally for Senator Lindsey Graham’s funeral. At the same time, their wars with Iran and Russia respectively are beginning to intersect. Ukraine has attacked an Iranian ship allegedly carrying munitions to Russia across the Caspian Sea. Russia is at the same time providing Iran with intelligence, including targeting for US bases in the Middle East.
The question is: how should the US respond to this growing symbiosis between Iran and Russia?
Ukraine first
I think Evelyn Farkas had it right on NPR this morning (the relevant remarks are at the end):
Washington should prioritize helping Ukraine achieve something like victory. That would weaken Russia for sure, as she suggests. But I’m not sure is correct that it would weaken Iran much. Moscow could continue to provide it with targeting data. It is not clear whether Tehran is getting anything else that it really needs from Russia.
The reason for prioritizing Ukraine is different. It is a winnable war. Ukraine is already well on the way. It has chased the Russians from the Black and Azov Seas, partially isolated Crimea and put it under siege, and battered Russian energy and commercial infrastructure. President Putin is cracking down on domestic dissent, considering a personnel mobilization that he has spent years trying to avoid, and importing more North Korean troops to fight in Ukraine.
Iran
The Iran war is not winnable. Tehran has demonstrated that it can block traffic through the strait of Hormuz despite air attacks from Israel and the US. A ground invasion would be foolhardy and counterproductive, driving up oil prices. Iranian threats, backed up occasionally by a drone or two, suffice to prevent many ships from even trying to pass the strait.
The sooner the US can get a ceasefire implemented with Iran, the better. The world economy has held up well so far, but oil stocks are bottoming out. The current pause in fighting is providing some relief to around $80 per barrel, but renewed strikes (or a ground invasion) will quickly force oil prices over $100 per barrel. That in turn will push gasoline prices toward or above $5 per gallon. The mid-term election is less than 100 days away.
The impacts of tolling
A serious ceasefire will require at least tacit US agreement to Iranian tolling of ships passing the strait. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention permits charging for services rendered like security and navigation. The US has not signed but says it abides by that treaty’s provisions on international straits. It permits “transit passage” (on, over, and under the sea) even in wartime. So getting Iran, which has objected to transit passage, to use the 1982 Convention would be a small win, even if the tolling is a big loss.
US consumers will not pay the tolls. Oil is traded at world market prices, with adjustments for quality and transport costs. So it will be Gulf producers who pay price hike caused by the tolls. They won’t like it, but it will encourage them to do what they should already have done: build greater pipeline capacity to export oil without going through the strait of Hormuz or the Bab al Mandeb.
End the wars
These two wars have seriously damaged US standing. They have demonstrated that
- American military capacity is less impressive than its reputation.
- US support for friends and allies is shaky.
- American diplomacy is weak.
Rebuilding the US military and diplomacy will take time and money. The sooner it starts, the better.
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Where we are at with Iran
With more pain and little gain in the Iran war, the question is what course of action the US should take. The options are few. The stakes are great. Let’s have a look:
Option 1: double down
President Trump is doubling down on the air attacks. The US is nightly raiding Iranian military and dual use facilities. CENTCOM claims to have hit Iran’s military operation centers, naval capabilities, aircraft hangars, drone storage facilities, and military logistics infrastructure in an effort to further weaken Iran’s ability to threaten commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
The results have not been great. Traffic through the Strait is still down sharply:
Most of what gets through does so with the Iran’s permission. In addition, Iran’s Yemeni allies, the Houthis, have declared an embargo of Saudi-connected traffic in the Red Sea. They haven’t enforced it yet, but if they do it will cut off several more million barrels per day of supply to world markets. Oil stocks are already at record low levels. Prices are approaching $100 per barrel.
Iran and its allies are attacking Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan was well as Israel and US forces throughout the Middle East. Damage to US military sites is significant. Many are too close to Iran for comfort:
The US is already moving some assets further away. That will further strain the pilots and equipment conducting the air attacks. Some US munitions stocks are dipping to levels that raise questions about whether the US would be able to meet a new contingency somewhere else in the world. The idiot MAGAtes now call the Secretary of War says the war has cost $37 billion. That will no doubt prove a dramatic understatement. Others are calculating $132 billion.
This may be a forever war, but this phase will have to end sooner or later.
Option 2: Invade
There is no option to invade all of Iran. It is 2.4 times the size of Texas with a population of 88 million, almost three times that of Texas. An invasion like that of Iraq in 2003 would require well over half a million troops.
The US could presumably seize control of the coast along the Strait, but that alone is at least 100 miles long. And the Iranians have the drones and missiles required to launch from further inland. The American troops on the coast would be sitting ducks.
Seizure of Kharg Island, where Iran loads most of its oil, would be challenging as well, but it would add nothing to the goal of opening the Strait. The US Navy in the Arabian Sea is already preventing the export of Iranian oil.
The US so far has suffered minimal casualties (less than two dozen killed and fewer than 500 injured). Those numbers would be multiplied by orders of magnitude in an invasion.
Option 3: Backoff
When you are in a hole, stop digging. The US could announce success and end its air attacks. The Iranians would then be free to extract tolls. Traffic through the Strait would recover to something like its pre-war levels.
Since oil is traded at world market prices (with variations for quality), the Iranian tolls would have to be paid by suppliers. But there are limits to what the Tehran can charge. If they charge too much, suppliers will build more pipelines that circumvent the Strait.
Even charges of 1 or 2% will bring significant resources to Iranian coffers, amounting to more or less Tehran’s oil revenue. The US is fond of saying tolls are not permitted. But in fact charges for “services rendered” are permitted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Turkey collects them for passage of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. In the straits of Malacca, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore manage a voluntary funding system called the Aids to Navigation Fund.
The major downside of this option is the precedent it sets for other international straits, especially the Bab al-Mandeb:
Option 4: Negotiate the backoff
While Iran has indicated it has no trust in President Trump, the US could try to see what it could get for an offer to backoff.
This would arguably be better than doing it unilaterally. Washington might get Iran to agree to charge only for “services rendered.” It would also be useful to get Iran to agree to apply the 1982 Convention, which establishes a right to “transit passage” even in wartime. Tehran so far has agreed only to the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention, which does not allow charges but does allow interference with shipping during wartime.
This option would, like Option 3, open Pandora’s Box to charges for passage through other international straits. But that is arguably inevitable. Fortunately, most are at least partly under the control of countries that would likely prefer the current system, without tolls. The Gibraltar, Dover, Danish, and Bering straits fall more or less in this category.
The Bab al-Mandeb is the main sticking point. Providing the Houthis with a steady income would not be wise.
Bottom line
There are no really good options. Trump has driven the US into a dead end. But Option 4 beats the others, if only because a return to negotiation will save a lot of lives and money. But it will have to be a negotiation over the terms of tolling. That is a big loss for the US, but it’s where we are at.
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More pain and little gain
Donald Trump’s 14-point plan for ending the war he and Israel launched against Iran lasted less than a month.
That is not unusual for a ceasefire. The US has spent the last ten nights bashing Iran, including dual-use infrastructure. Iran has returned fire, not only against US forces but also against its allies in the region, especially Jordan and Kuwait. Tehran has also hit ships to prevent them from using the Omani side of the strait of Hormuz.
The US has re-imposed its embargo on ships using Iranian ports. But Iran during the ceasefire exported something like 80 million barrels of oil and imported a lot of the supplies it needed. It no longer has the empty ships it can load to be ready for another ceasefire. Brett Erikson thinks this means they won’t agree to one.
Upping the ante
Instead, the Iranians are upping the ante. Their Houthi allies in Yemen have declared a naval blockade, closing the Bab al Mandeb to Saudi shipping. The Saudis had been exportiIg about 5 million barrels per day of crude through that route, as well as some oil products.
Whether the Houthis will enforce this blockade effectively is not yet clear. But it could have a dramatic effect on world oil prices. Stocks are near an all-time low. Chinese conservation measures, which so far have helped moderate oil prices, are near their limit.
What the belligerents want
The main Iranian objective is continued control of the strait of Hormuz. It wants to charge tolls there, a move that is legal under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention for “services rendered.” Iran will claim it provides security and navigation services. The legal situation on tolls is confused, not least because President Trump has more than once threatened that the US would take charge of the strait and charge tolls.
Leaving aside Trump’s dumb remarks, the US wants to return to the pre-war regime. Then all ships transited the strait without paying tolls and without the risk of attack. That would unquestionably be nice, but the odds are low. Iran only needs to threaten an attack to raise insurance rates. An occasional volley, even one that doesn’t hit a ship, will be enough to dramatically slow traffic.
Israel, which conned Trump into this war, still wants regime change. It will do all it can to convince Trump to continue maximum military and financial pressure on Iran.
Why the uncertainty
This can’t go on forever.
The Islamic Republic regards this war as existential. Iranian capacity for sacrifice is enormous, not least because repression insulates the regime from popular pressure. But it is not infinite. The damage to Iranian infrastructure is starting to hurt.
America is not really suffering, yet. But it will soon. Oil prices are above $80 per barrel and moving towards $100, again. Price at the pump averages $4 per gallon, with prospects for $5. The US Congressional election is less than four months off. America needs to worry about the availability of munitions for any future contingency.
At some point, both the Iranians and the Americans will want to pause the war again.
There is no predicting when that will happen. It depends on decisions by individuals, above all Donald Trump and Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. For now, they seem content to batter each other. Only more pain and little gain will convince them otherwise.
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On the agenda and off for US-Serbia
The US government is proceeding with its “strategic dialogue” with Serbia tomorrow. This is in the runup to a Serbian presidential and parliamentary election, which President Vucic has said will occur in the next three or four months. He himself intends to resign before the election. He is term-limited and cannot run again but is widely expected to support a candidate who will invite him to form a government as prime minister. This is the gimmick Vladimir Putin used to stay in power in 2008-12. The Americans are giving Vucic and his gimmick a boost.
The agenda
The agenda for the strategic dialogue supposedly includes:
- Energy and infrastructure
- Artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced computing
- Defense cooperation and investment
- Liquefied natural gas (LNG) and data center projects
The Americans will be looking for transactions that can tie Serbia more closely to the US. This is a carbon copy of the Biden Administration efforts, which focused on lithium deposits. The most important item will likely be an effort to get Serbia to import American liquified natural gas (LNG). That would help loosen Serbian dependence on Russian gas. No doubt the Americans will also be looking for Serbia to buy more defense materiel from the US as well as use US artificial intelligence tools.
Serbia is expert at offering the Americans half a loaf. Vucic has already made a quick trip to Kyiv for a photo op with Ukrainian President Zelensky, in connection with a Southeast Europe/Ukraine meeting. He refused however to sign on to the statement from that meeting, as it called for tightened sanctions.
The photoop may still give Serbia a boost with some in Washington. Even the White House seems keen on Zelensky these days, as the Ukrainians appear to be winning.
What is not on the agenda
As is often the case with diplomatic events, the real significance of this meeting is what is not on the agenda. Vucic’s turn towards autocracy is nowhere to be seen. The Americans won’t complain about Serbia’s declining rankings on governance and rule of law. Nor will they complain about corruption. If they do, the Serbian delegation will just stare back. Or maybe even hint that an American administration that is attacking democracy and committing blatant corruption at home should forget it elsewhere.
Kosovo isn’t on the agenda either. The Americans might I suppose complain about a Serbian minister’s public statement that she would have ethnic cleansed Albanians from Kosovo in 1998. Certainly past American administrations–Republican and Democratic–would have expected her to be fired before the Serbian delegation arrived in Washington. But they are unlikely to demand that Vucic’s friend and advisor who has admitted to organizing a terrorist attack in northern Kosovo be turned over to the judiciary Serbia once recognized as legitimate for trial.
Nor is Europe on the agenda. In the past, the Americans have always supported EU membership for all the Balkan countries. No more. This Administration regards the EU–the US’s largest trading partner in goods and services combined–as an adversary, not a collaborator.
Implications
It is hard to miss the implications. The US is no longer a reliable promoter of democracy and rule of law. It is prepared to trade that for LNG sales. If someone at the White House or State Department disagrees, they can prove me wrong: issue a clear statement taking Belgrade to task for its declining commitments to democracy, rule of law, peace with Kosovo, and meeting the qualifications for EU membership.
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