Tag: Balkans
Good news, finally, but unlikely to last
Bits of good news all around. The US House of Representatives, after months of allowing a small number of dissenting Republicans to block vital expanded aid to Ukraine (as well as infusions for Israel and Taiwan), has now approved it. Israel has retaliated against Iran for last weekend’s massive barrage of missiles and drones. It managed to do so without provoking any further escalation. And on a much lesser scale of geopolitics, the Council of Europe appears to be readying itself to admit Kosovo as a member.
Better late than never
All of this is good news, even if much delayed.
The Congress should never have allowed its Russophile right-wingers to put Ukraine’s existence at risk. It is appalling that someone could become Speaker who required months of cajoling to recognize the importance of getting more assistance to Kyiv. Last year’s Russian dominance in the war of attrition has done real damage, not only to Ukrainian morale.
We can hope that the US will now send Ukraine everything it needs. The aim should be not only to resist Russian advances but also to roll back Moscow’s recent gains and the threat they now poses to Kharkiv. Ukrainian F-16s should arrive this summer. A big Ukrainian push with the right weapons could force Russian retreats in Donbas, the south, and even Crimea.
Israel needs to do more
Israel has been rampaging in Gaza as if it had nothing to fear. The Iranian attack, though a failure, is hopefully a reminder to Jerusalem that self-restraint and diplomacy can be virtues, not weaknesses. The Israelis need now to resuscitate the talks with Hamas and reach an agreement, however unsatisfactory, for the release of at least the civilian hostages.
They also need to get rid of Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has repeatedly endangered Israeli security. His encouragement of US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, his financial and political support for Hamas, his opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state, and the deplorable intelligence and military failures of October 7 qualify him as the worst Israeli prime minister, not just the longest-serving.
Serbia’s spite is shameful
The Council of Europe has dawdled far too long in approving Kosovo for membership. It is far more qualified than its principal opponent, Serbia. And allowing Kosovo in will give Serbs who live there a new and potentially fruitful avenue to pursue complaints, through the European Court of Human Rights.
The spitefulness of Belgrade’s opposition, which directly contradicts an agreement the European Union claims Serbia adhered to in February, may be expected, but it is still deplorable. Kosovo is demonstrably better qualified for CoE membership than Serbia.
Can we hope for more?
Good news is particularly welcome when it is a harbinger of more. Some may hope that the voting in Congress augurs a less polarized political atmosphere in which moderate Democrats and Republicans can cooperate to neutralize the nutty MAGAites. But I see little hope of that. Speaker Johnson will now face an effort to remove him. If he wins, the MAGAites will be embittered and he will be more cautious in the future. If he loses, we could face a truly dire situation, as then he would have to be replaced with an even more convinced MAGAite.
In the Middle East, Netanyahu still seems firmly in power. Though his margin in the Knesset is narrow, his allies stand no chance of remaining in power if he falls. He himself could end up in prison on corruption charges. Netanyahu is not going to be easy to displace. Let’s hope the civilians in Rafah won’t pay the price of keeping him in the prime ministry.
In the Balkans, Belgrade may lose the battle to keep Pristina out of the Council of Europe. But that is a minor skirmish in Kosovo’s effort to gain full international recognition. There is no sign of progress on UN membership. EU membership is far off. NATO will have to be the next major battle. Fortunately that excludes Serbia from having a veto or even a vote. But Hungary and now Slovakia will more than likely be prepared to do Belgrade’s dirty work.
A long road ahead
Those of us looking for a Ukrainian military victory, a Palestinian state that will live in peace with Israel, and UN membership for Kosovo still have a long wait ahead. But every step in the right direction today is one that doesn’t have to be taken tomorrow.
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Kosovo is more qualified than Serbia
Serbia is currently engaged in a ferocious campaign to block Kosovo membership in the Council of Europe (CoE). This is despite an explicit commitment in the February agreement the Americans and Europeans claim is legally binding not to do that for any international organizations:
Serbia will not object to Kosovo’s membership in any international organisation.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en
The merits of the case
I don’t know if the CoE will admit Kosovo later this spring. It certainly should. The main CoE qualification is rule of law:
Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
https://rm.coe.int/1680306052#:~:text=Every%20member%20of%20the%20Council,as%20specified%20in%20Chapter%20I.
Kosovo has been steadily improving and ranks above the median regional average on eight dimensions of rule of law. It is third in the region, slightly behind Montenegro and more behind Georgia, but well ahead of Serbia’s declining scores. Pristina recently resolved a major complaint. It recognized the Decan/i monastery’s property rights, an issue outstanding for more than 20 years. Corruption, regulatory enforcement, and criminal justice are its weakest dimensions. All of these are symptoms of a new and relatively weak state.
Benefits for Serbs
The main purpose of the CoE is
To promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law across Europe and beyond
In principle, you would think that people who really are discriminated against would welcome their country’s membership in such an organization. Instead, Belgrade is dead set against it.
The issue is not only one of ideals. There are practical consequences of CoE membership. It opens to citizens access to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). That is a serious privilege. If a national justice system fails in the eyes of a citizen of a member state of the CoE, that citizen can appeal to the ECHR, which has a strong tradition of ruling in favor of equality and non-discrimination, including the Balkans. That doesn’t mean its decisions are always implemented, as Bosnians will be anxious to tell you, but it does strengthen those who suffer discrimination. Member states can also file complaints against other member states, another privilege that Belgrade should welcome.
Why not?
Belgrade opposes Kosovo CoE membership for several reasons. First, Belgrade doesn’t want to acknowledge that Kosovo is a state. Second, it fears that Kosovo will file complaints against Serbia. There is ample reason for such complaints stemming from discrimination and other human rights violations against the Albanian majority inside Serbia, the treatment of Kosovo citizens in Serbia, and the failure of Serbia to account properly for its wartime malfeasance in Kosovo.
Third, Belgrade is also trying to pressure Kosovo into creating an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, which it sees as important to formalizing its relationship with the Serb population inside Kosovo. The CoE Parliamentary Assembly regards this as an issue Kosovo should resolve after membership. Such minority associations are common among CoE member states and Kosovo has promised to create one. But it quite reasonably doesn’t want to do so until Serbia acknowledges its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Bottom line
The sad fact is that non-member Kosovo today is more qualified for CoE membership than current member Serbia. It is high time to fix that.
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C+ is not a good grade
C+ is what I would give as a grade for implementation of the year-old “Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia.” Koha asked for an interview on this subject but then did not call at the appointed time. So I wrote this piece instead. It’s a B or B+ for Pristina and a C for Belgrade.
Let’s break it down article by article:
Good neighborly relations:
Certainly not in general, but there has been some limited progress on mutual recognition of their respective documents and national symbols, including passports, diplomas, license plates, and customs stamps. Pristina was never the problem. Belgrade has moved on this. B or B+ I guess.
Respect for the UN Charter:
Serbia fails (that’s an F) miserably on respect for “the sovereign equality of all States, respect for their independence, autonomy and territorial integrity.” Kosovo gets a B+, marked down due to continued shortcomings in protection of human rights and non-discrimination. Things are improving in those departments, but problems remain.
Peaceful settlement of disputes:
Serbia fails (F) on settlement of disputes exclusively by peaceful means and refraining from the threat or use of force. Belgrade sponsored the September 24 attempted uprising intended to create a pretext for the use of force, which it threatened by mobilizing its forces on Kosovo’s borders. Belgrade had also already kidnapped two Kosovo police from Kosovo territory and organized a mob that attacked NATO-led peacekeepers. Kosovo has no real option for use of force, but nevertheless gets an A for the police handling of the September 24 incident.
International representation:
Serbia (D) continues to oppose Kosovo’s membership in international organizations. Kosovo (A) has not to my knowledge objected to Serbia’s membership in them.
EU path:
Serbia (D) is no longer in transition to democracy and does not align with EU foreign policy, especially but not only on Ukraine and Russia. Kosovo (B+) is moving in the right direction on democracy and does respect EU foreign policy.
Dialogue process:
Neither Belgrade nor Pristina is much engaged, the former because it objects to the basic premises and the latter because it has gotten little benefit. C+ for both.
Treatment of the Serbian community in Kosovo:
Kosovo has conceded little on “self-management” but is resolving one important issue concerning Serbian Orthodox Church property at Decan/i. Pristina has muddied the waters on financial support from Belgrade by insisting on use of the euro but there is really no bar to direct communication for the Serbian community with the Kosovo government. B for Pristina, but no better than a C+ for Belgrade, which insists on violating Kosovo law in transferring finances opaquely and in dinars.
EU and others’ support package:
I really don’t know. Has it been created? Is anything happening on this front?
Joint Committee on implementation:
Is this just the Dialogue writ small, or has such a thing been created?
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Serbia is the problem, Serbs the solution
Where did they get this nice photo in my living room?
I did this interview for Arlinda Rrmoku of Pristina outlet Sinjali yesterday:
Dialogue
1. What progress has been made towards the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia in recent years?
A: Very little. Acceptance of documents and license plates. Payment of electricity bills. Good things that should have happened long ago.
2. What are the main obstacles hindering the normalization process between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: The main obstacle is Serbia’s resistance. But Kosovo has also failed to do all it could to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb citizens, which is a vital part of normalization.
3. How do you assess the role of the European Union in facilitating dialogue and reconciliation between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: The EU has failed to use its leverage with Serbia. It has used leverage with Kosovo, but inappropriately and without results.
Politics are an obstacle
4. What impact could the recent political changes in Kosovo and Serbia have on the normalization process?
A: Not much. In Serbia, Vucic remains very much in charge. In Kosovo Kurti and Osmani remain in charge.
Washington has been too
5. How do you see the role of the United States in promoting stability and peace in the Western Balkans, particularly regarding Kosovo-Serbia relations?
A: Washington has done poorly in recent years. It was a serious mistake to prioritize the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, which in my view can only come with recognition.
6. What steps should be taken to address the remaining issues in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, such as the status of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo?
A: Pristina should be taking unilateral action to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb citizens, as indicated above. This will require much greater effort to meet their needs, allow Serbia’s legitimate subsidies to flow, and protect their property, in particular at the monastery in Decan/Decani.
As is Russia
7. How do you view the involvement of other regional actors, such as Russia and Turkey, in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process?
A: They don’t really play directly, but Russia is supporting Vucic’s illiberalism at home and irredentism with his neighbors. Turkey I see as a relatively minor player, though it occasionally will weigh in.
8. What are the potential implications of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue on the broader stability of the Western Balkans?
Security is at risk
A: The dialogue as conducted in recent years has not been a factor for stability. Its difficulties have echoed in the region.
9. How can economic cooperation and integration initiatives contribute to the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: I believe it can: having populations and companies that prosper could lessen hostilities and open new possibilities. But Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo makes this difficult.
10. How do you assess the security situation in the Western Balkans, particularly in light of recent developments?
A: It’s shaky, due mainly to Serbian malfeasance.
11. What are the main security challenges facing the region and how can they be addressed?
A: Serbia and Russia are the main security challenges in the region.
12. How do you see the role of NATO and other international organizations in ensuring security and stability in the Western Balkans?
A: NATO is the guarantor in Kosovo, Croatia, Montenegro, and Macedonia as well as the backup guarantor to the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That makes it pretty important to the region. The EU has the primary role in Bosnia.
13. What impact could unresolved disputes and ethnic tensions have on the security situation in the region?
A: I don’t worry about a big war or a long one, but localized instability and ethnic cleansing is a serious threat in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro.
Borders need improvement
14. How do you assess the effectiveness of border management and security cooperation among Western Balkan countries?
A: More would be better. Trade delays at the borders are too long, migration and trafficking too easy, and the border between Serbia and Kosovo too porous.
15. What role can the European Union play in promoting security sector reform and institution-building in the Western Balkans?
A: You’ll have to ask the EU, but my understanding is that the EU does a great deal on border management.
16. How do you see the potential for increased cooperation between Western Balkan countries and neighboring EU member states in addressing common security challenges?
A: I’d like to see more, especially between Croatia and Bosnia as well as Bulgaria and Macedonia, but political issues make that sometimes problematic.
Reciprocal reassurance is key
17. What are your recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders to promote peace, stability, and reconciliation in the Western Balkans, particularly between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: Kosovo needs to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb population, Serbia needs to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Albanian population, and the two countries need to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. When they do those things, peace, stability and reconciliation will be far easier than today.
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Time to turn the policy around
There is no exaggeration in what Albin is saying. President Vucic financed, supported, and orchestrated the terrorist attack of September 24. The Kosovo police the EU wanted (and continues to want) withdrawn from northern Kosovo responded professionally, killed three of the perpetrators, and prevented worse from happening. Washington and Brussels know this but won’t say it. They prefer to allow Vucic to get off scot-free.
They are likewise allowing him to avoid responsibility for the unfair national and fraudulent Belgrade elections of December 27. The European Parliament has called for a commission to investigate. But so far the European Commission, the Council, and most of the Member States are keeping their mouths shut about an election that wouldn’t pass muster in any EU country. It didn’t come close to the relatively free and fair elections in recent years in Kosovo, including two that installed Kurti in office.
See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil
Why this “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” approach to someone who is taking an EU candidate country into ever closer alignment with Russia and China? Many tell me the ammunition Serbia supplies to Ukraine is a factor. But Belgrade surely ships as much ordnance or other military supplies to Moscow as it does to Kyiv. It is unlikely Vucic would cut off Kyiv out of spite for Western criticism. Inat only goes so far when it is a question of profits for your arms manufacturer friends.
Support for “stability” is another possible explanation. But Vucic has no viable opposition, either on the liberal democratic side of Serbian politics or the ethnic nationalist side. Serbia’s problem is a lack of political competition, not an excess of it. He is the destabilizing force both in his country’s politics and in its relations with its neighbors.
The internationals are part of the problem
Lack of international political horsepower is another explanation. EU negotiator Miroslav Lajcak is exhausted and at the end of his rope. The dialogue he has led for more than three and a half years has played out. Belgrade has repeatedly and loudly renounced supposed “legally binding” agreements reached there. Yesterday he refused to sign them at the Security Council. Without real progress on de facto if not de jure recognition, Pristina refuses to create the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities that Lajcak and American negotiator Gabe Escobar unwisely made their top priority.
Many hope things will improve with Assistant Secretary of State O’Brien in charge. He has been appropriately blunt with the Bosnians. But it is not clear whether he is prepared to dial up the heat on Vucic about the Serbian elections, the dialogue with Pristina, Belgrade’s September 24 terrorist attack, or the kidnapping of three policemen on Kosovo territory. Jim recognizes the difficulty of any political settlement and tries to steer his efforts in the economic direction, hoping to flank the recognition issue.
So who cares?
None of this is a big problem, at least as seen from Washington or Brussels. But it isn’t a big problem until it is. Vucic is increasingly serious in his efforts to destabilize the neighboring countries with irredentist and self-victimizing claims on behalf of their Serb populations. The Russians will be pushing him in that direction, to echo and amplify their own claims in Ukraine. The atmosphere in Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo is increasingly tense. It would not take much effort to provoke instability even in all three, then justify the movement of Serbian tanks to protect the local Serb population from false rumors of ethnic cleansing and genocide.
Even without revanchist moves into his neighbors, Vucic can exploit the Serbian domestic scene to promote violence. His security forces have been arresting and beating dissenters who dare to apologize for Serb atrocities in the 1990s. They have even lain flowers on the grave of a young girl killed by Serb security forces in Kosovo. The repression intimidates the Serbian opposition and ensures it will not retreat from hard-line Serbian nationalism on Kosovo. It is admittedly inclined not to do so anyway, but Vucic wants to make sure no one gets any fancy ideas about acknowledging the malfeasance of the Milosevic era. As Information Minister then, he was a mainstay of that regime.
What is to be done?
The right approach to this situation is to recognize failure and turn the policy around. I thought when he first came to power Vucic might be the guy to take Serbia in a democratic direction. He has chosen not to be. He instead decided not to befriend the West but rather to ally with the East. He dishes out just enough goodies to Washington and Brussels to keep them from calling his bluff. It doesn’t take much.
It is time to call him out, loudly and clearly. The US should insist on the transfer of the September 24 perpetrators to Kosovo for trial. As the European Parliament has proposed, the EU should stop its ample financing of Serbian efforts to prepare for accession until new elections are held, at least in Belgrade. The dialogue should be refocused on the economic issues O’Brien prefers. The EU and US should call out high-level corruption in Belgrade. The EU should lift the “consequences” it levied on Kosovo and acknowledge Pristina’s anti-corruption efforts. That would be a Balkans policy worthy of President Biden’s claims to supporting democracy.
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How to counter the Serbian world
Last week I said Europe will not be whole and free anytime soon. Serbia has chosen to be on the eastern side of a line that will be drawn through the Balkans. The question then is how keep the other Balkan countries on the western side of the line.
This is in part a question of what they should do about the ethnic Serb populations within their borders. Serbia is pursuing a “Serbian world” strategy intended to gain as much leverage on the neighbors as possible. Belgrade is also positioning itself so that it could demand secession of neighboring Serbs if geopolitical conditions in the region and the rest of the world would permit it.
Bosnia on the spot
This puts Bosnia and Herzegovina in a difficult spot. Forty-nine per cent of its territory constitutes “Republika Sprska” (RS). Serbs make up perhaps 37% of Bosnia’s population, most of them in the RS. Many of their political leaders since the 1992-5 war have promised to separate, either de facto or de jure, from the other 51% of the territory. Milorad Dodik, who currently holds the presidency of the RS, has dominated the entity’s politics for more than 15 years. He has salami-sliced RS to within a centimeter of independence. He has also stolen a lot of its revenue and sought to cooperate with Belgrade in making the “Serbian world” a reality.
Dodik also cooperates with ethnic nationalist Bosnian Croats, in particular Dragan Covic, in his anti-constitutional political, and corrupt economic, enterprises. The Bosnian Croat political leadership seeks to echo the RS. It wants a “Third Entity” that would provide to Croats whatever de facto or de jure separation the RS achieves. This would split the Bosniak-Croat “Federation,” which occupies 51% of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory. It would also leave a rump Muslim entity that would create serious problems for its neighbors, Europe, and the US.
The risk is clear: if either Dodik or Covic secedes, the Bosnian state would be fragmented in three. Instabiliity and likely war would decide the lines between them. The State Department’s Assistant Secretary for Europe, Jim O’Brien, has made it crystal clear that the US opposes these secession ambitions. He hopes the latest European Union cash will prevent it and promote meaningly reform. But there is a long history of ethnic nationalists in the Balkans pocketing the money and doing the opposite of what the EU would like. We’ll have to wait and see whether future implementation can match O’Brien’s clarity and forcefulness on the main issue. Bosnia must remain a single, multiethnic, democratic state.
Montenegro is already in Serbia’s maw
Close to 30% of Montenegro’s population regards itself as Serb. Belgrade has successfully parlayed recent elections there into formation of pro-Serbia national governments. This has happened despite the country’s entry into NATO in 2017. The trick was to use avowedly pro-EU politicians against a dominant political party and politician, former President Djukanovic, who had governed for too many decades, with support from ethnic minority allies. The Serbian Orthodox Church and Russia’s security agencies pitched in to help. They have reaped handsome rewards, the former church property and the latter influence.
Though much-criticized for supposed corruption, President Djukanovic presided with dignity over the alternation in power. His successors have not proven their corruption accusations against him. It remains to be seen whether the more liberal democratic coalition that he formed can revive and regain power. Its pro-EU credentials were stronger than those who are now participating in a coalition that includes explicitly pro-Serbian and pro-Russian politicians, who improbably claim also to be pro-EU. Their failure to deliver what Jim O’Brien terms “benefits to citizens” could lead to another alternation in power.
Kosovo needs its Serbs
In Kosovo, the Serb population is the largest minority, but only constitutes at most 6% of the population. The Kosovo constitution provides the Serb minority with extensive protection and powersharing arrangements. But most Kosovo Serbs remain separate from the majority Albanians. Their languages (unlike the dominant languages in Bosnia and Montenegro) are incompatible. The Serbs south of the Ibar River live mostly in Serb-majority enclaves. But they appear to have made their peace, at least for now, with the Albanian-dominated institutions in Pristina. Like Albanian-majority municipalities, Serb-majority ones have extensive powers over local governance.
The northern four Serb-majority municipalites contiguous with Serbia are far less integrated than those south of the Ibar. Using its military, economic, and political leverage, including intimidation by its secret services and their organized crime partners, Belgrade has successfully ensured that they refuse to accept Pristina’s authority. The northern Serbs have boycotted municipal elections and withdrawn from Kosovo institutions.
Serbia wants the Serb-majority municipalities to form an Association. That would enable them to govern jointly and separately from Pristina, as in the RS. In the right geopolitical environment, the Association might also act as a vehicle for the four northern municipalities to secede from a state Belgrade still does not recognize. It was a similar association of provincial authorities that led to the formation of the RS before its attempted secession in 1992 from Bosnia.
What to do about Kosovo
Countering this requires a difficult maneuver from Pristina. It needs to convince the northern Serbs that they will be better off as Kosovo citizens (even if they retain their Serbian citizenship as well). Some are moving in that direction, as suggested by their increased willingness to get Kosovo license plates, identity papers, and passports. But many of the Serbs in the north have been among the most belligerent, and sometimes violent, opponents of Pristina. Belgrade has succeeded in making outreach to the northern Serbs far harder than outreach to Serbs in the municipalities not contiguous with Serbia.
Prime Minister Kurti is making a point of speaking more in his fluent Serbian. All Pristina authorities should be more careful than they have been in the past to display the country’s ethnically neutral flag, rather than the ethnic Albanian flag (also the flag of Albania) many of them prefer. Implementing the many power-sharing arrangements in the constitution is not easy, but still necessary. So too is financial support for the Serb communities and implementation of the Constitutional Court decision on the Decan/i monastery, which Pristina has refused so far.
While I don’t know the merits of the specific issues cited here, it certainly sounds like the police action described is counterproductive:
What to do in Montenegro
In Montenegro, only the constitutional political process can decide whether to allow Serbia to continue to dominate political outcomes. But NATO will need to protect itself if Russian penetration of Podgorica’s security establishment continues. With war still raging in Ukraine, the US and EU need to be far more attentive than in the past to Moscow’s use of Montenegro to compromise NATO security. The West should redouble support to truly independent civil society in Montenegro, ensuring that it exercises the same vigilance over the current government that it did over the previous one.
What to do in Bosnia in Herzegovina
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is no substitute for ridding the political leadership of those who oppose the country’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The EU and US have waited too long for the Bosnians to do it on their own. They need help. No more international funding should go the RS while Dodik is in charge. The High Represenatative should be ready to remove him from office if he continues illegal RS moves. Brussels and Washington should be pressuring Zagreb to facilitate bringing Dragan Covic to justice for corruption. Strengthening EUFOR’s troop presence in the northeastern town of Brcko is also vital. No Serb secession can occur without Brcko.
Bolder and better are the right directions for the international judges in Bosnia and the High Representative. While maintaining the Dayton peace settlement is vital, it will not suffice for EU accession. A recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights is where Bosnia should aim to go: towards a civic state rather than ethnonationalist powersharing. Moving it in that direction should be the EU and US objective.
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