Stevenson’s army, November 11

– NYT has interactive graphic on the Gaza tunnels.

– WOTR writer revisits his article on Israel’s urban warfare

– Prof Hal Brands analyzes Chinese strategies for Taiwan

Politico discusses the Trump plan for Gaza:

LET IT BURN: Trump has a plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: just let it burn.

“You have a war that’s going on and you’re probably going to have to let this play out … because a lot of people are dying,” he also told Univision reporter ENRIQUE ACEVEDO last night. “There is no hatred like the Palestinian hatred of Israel and Jewish people. And probably the other way around also, I don’t know. You know, it’s not as obvious, but probably that’s it too. So sometimes you have to let things play out and you have to see where it ends.”

“Eventually there’s peace, because you’re going to have a winner and a loser,” Trump continued.

It’s as pure a distillation of EDWARD LUTTWAK’s “let it burn” theory as there exists. In his seminal 1999 Foreign Affairs article “Give War a Chance,” Luttwak wrote “an unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace … fighting must continue until a resolution is reached.”

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Stevenson’s army, Novemberr 10

– FT says Israel got warnings about Hamas.

– WaPo says Congress isn’t getting review of Israel aid

– US raises concerns about West Bank settlers

– House GOP still confused

War Powers law has had good effect [a view I share]

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Stevenson’s army, November 9

Hamas leaders –in Doha — tell NYT their plans for the war.

– SecState Blinken explains US requirements for a peace. See also WSJ. And NYT critique.

– DOD explains US military role.  [Note: still no US AUMF for Israel]

– Politico reports on State dissent memo on Israel.

– Andrew Exum has lessons from Lebanon.

– Dan Drezner questions Israel’s ability to restore deterrence.

– Don’t forget: there’s also a tragic war in Sudan.

– Notice: there’s nothing on the plans to fund the government after Nov 17 because too many people have too many plans

-House GOP sets 2024 calendar. Printout here.

– Intelligence analyst argues Putin decided on war before US Afghan debacle

– Politico has good backgrounder on next week’s APEC summit

– NYT magazine answers: What does Space Force do?

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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The day after should not be Iran’s

While Americans have opined, Israel has so far said little about the “day after” in Gaza. This interview with retired Israeli Brigadier General Amir Avivi provides a hint of at least some of the thinking near the Israeli government. He says essentially that Israeli security the day after will require two things: closing off Gaza from arms supplies shipped through Egypt and allowing Israel to raid as it wants inside Gaza.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has also suggested that Israel will need to provide security for a long time to come, which would mean in essence reoccupation of Gaza (or some portion of it). The Americans are opposing that.

The open air prison

The Israeli proposition amounts to a heightened version of the outdoor prison approach that failed on October 7 to protect Israeli security. It is not clear whether the Israelis are thinking the Egyptians will agree to tighten security at Gaza’s southern border or if they have something else in mind. Nor is it clear why the Israelis think their raiding would be any more effective after the war than it was before October 7. Israeli ground incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank have not been successful in curbing militancy there.

There are other problems with this option. Reconstruction in Gaza will require tens of billions of dollars. Why would any Gulf country ante up if Israel is reserving to itself the privilege of destroying whatever is rebuilt? If the rebuilding doesn’t occur, Gaza’s inhabitants will be living in even greater misery than before the war. Why would that not lead to more resentment and extremism rather than less?

An international intervention

Another option would be an international intervention. This could be like the ones executed with a measure of success (at least in re-establishing security) in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Gaza, with a population of about 2 million, is small enough to be comparable, even if the conflict there is far more intense.

Using RAND’s data for “heavy peace enforcement,” a similar operation in Gaza would require about 23,000 international troops and 3000 international police. This would be on top of 6000 local troops and 4500 local police. Annual costs would run over $6 billion. You can quarrel with these numbers. But given the dire situation in Gaza they are more likely too low than too high.

Troops and police will not be readily available

The Gulfies could ante up the money, but the troops and police are a serious problem for them. Peacekeeping troops might be available from the more usual UN suspects, but it would be the biggest UN peacekeeping operation in the world today. Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Rwanda, and Pakistan are now the main UN troop contributing countries. India, now more than ever allied with Israel, might be a problem for the Gazans, but the others are possible.

The international police however would have to be Arab speakers. Which Arab countries have thousands of excess police they would be willing to contribute? Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and Syria can be counted out due to their own civil wars. Egypt will resist, as it has spent decades trying to avoid responsibility for Gaza or Gazans. Jordan will likewise hesitate. The King has his hands full at home. The Gulf countries may be willing to foot the bill, but they won’t provide the personnel.

Even the local troops and police are an issue. All the readily available Gazans will have served in the Hamas brigades and police. Israel won’t want them re-empowered. The Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank has only 10,000 police of its own. Neither Israel nor the PA will want half of them transferred to Gaza. The Gazans might not welcome them given the long contention between the PA and Hamas.

The local option

This forces us to consider the local option. Perhaps we can do without troops on the assumption that the Israelis won’t allow re-armament, even of people not previously affiliated with Hamas. UNRWA, the PLO, and nongovernmental organizations they cooperate with in Gaza should have a pretty good idea of who is who and what they are capable of. At least in the immediate aftermath of a ceasefire, they could provide relief and begin the process of rebuilding education and health care. They could also start to reconstitute a Gazan police force.

The Israelis will be suspicious of UNRWA, the PLO, and their colllaborators. This issue might be alleviated if a good deal of the humanitarian supplies were provided by Israeli nongovernmental organizations committed to coexistence and ready to collaborate with legitimate, non-Hamas, Gazan counterparts. That would complement the usual flow of humaniarian goods from Egypt through the Rafah crossing. Gazans would understandably be hesitant at first about humanitarian supplies from Israel. But the idea would be to flood the zone with clean water (much of Gaza’s water already comes from Israel), food, medical and sanitary supplies, temporary shelters and other vital commodities. That would be hard to resist.

None of this can happen, until…

None of this will happen soon. The war is still raging. There is no sign of the mutually hurting stalemate or the mutually enticing way out that are the classic conflict management conditions for a successful negotiation, starting presumably with a ceasefire.

Israeli goals are clear: to obliterate Hamas’ capacity to attack Israel and compel Hamas to give up the more than 200 hostages it still holds. Some Israeli officials cite even broader objectives: to destroy Hamas’ governing capacity and to eliminate its ideology. But I doubt Israel is willing to lose its own citizens in pursuit of those broader objecdtives.

Hamas’ objectives are less clear. Some of its leaders are telling the New York Times that it wants to create a permanent state of war with Israel. If that is true, we won’t have to worry about the day after for a long time. Others believe the near-term objective is release of all Palestinians in prison in Israel. A hostage/prisoner exchange is certainly within the realm of possibility within months, if not weeks.

Consider the alternative

None of this is edifying. But consider the alternative. If the war ends with no clear plan for reconstruction, the Iranians and Russians will be glad to pitch in. Their resources are limited. But Iran will be glad to let loose the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to help resuscitate something much like Hamas, Hizbollah, or the Houthis. The Wagner remnants would be glad to help arm and train them.

Far better than that would be a Gaza that could join the West Bank in negotiating statehood with Israel. Reconstruction should proceed with that goal in mind. Netanyahu aimed to split the Palestinans between the West Bank and Gaza. That strategy to postpone the Palestinian state is at the end of its useful life. It is time for those who support the Jewish state to welcome Palestinian aspirations for one of their own.

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Serbia should defeat Vucic, not Kosovo

He all but calls terrorists freedom fighters. Hamas should be pleased.

Jakub is correct. American acceptance without substantial protest of the terrorist act attempted on September 24 in northern Kosovo is incompatible with any serious shift in US policy in the Balkans. Appeasement knows few limits. The Belgrade-sponored and -trained insurrectionists were not freedom fighters. They were proxies doing the Serbian state’s will against the Kosovo state, which the US recognizes and supposedly prizes as a partner.

This is nuts

Six weeks have passed without any apparent US or EU reaction, beyond mild scolding. In the meanwhile Serbian President Vucic has snubbed the EU in favor of attending a Beijing-hosted Belt and Road Summit.

Not surprisingly, the latest EU-sponsored meeting between Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti failed to make progress. The EU and US want Kurti to institute an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASMM) without any serious quid pro quo from Vucic. He is unwilling even to see Kosovo join the UN despite a supposedly “legally binding” February agreement not to block it from international organizations. I quote from Article 4: “Serbia will not object to Kosovo’s membership in any international organisation.” Bilateral recognition, Vucic persistently says, is out of the question.

The fault lies mainly in Belgrade

Serbia is mainly at fault for the present stalemate. It has refused to abide by agreements the EU and US claim are legally binding. The backstory includes Belgrade urging Serbs not to use Kosovo license plates, to boycott Kosovo elections, and to attack Kosovo police and international peacekeepers. Belgrade does not abide even by the 2013 agreement that launched the idea of the ASMM, which provides for the Kosovo constitution to be applied in the north, with ample provisions for Serb participation.

Nevertheless the EU is sustaining its “consequences” on Kosovo. They were levied to get duly-elected but non-Serb mayors from using their offices in northern Kosovo municipal buildings and to force Kosovo to reduce its police presence there. Only one of the four mayors I am told is going to his municipal building. The Kosovo police presence has been reduced due to improved security conditions. But there is no sign of easing on the EU’s part.

The Association

The nub of the issue is the Association. The EU gave Vucic and Kurti drafts of its statutes at their last meeting. I hoped it would have leaked by now, but apparently it hasn’t. The key question is whether the proposal guarantees that the Association will operate in accordance with the Kosovo constitution and not constitute a new layer of governance like Republika Srpska in Bosnia. That has rendered Bosnia dysfunctional. Republika Srpska originated in six Serb Autonomous Regions, which united to form the larger entity. That is a precedent the US and EU should not allow.

I’ve seen no guarantee they won’t. The Americans have published an op/ed that says it won’t happen. But they aren’t willing to sign on the dotted line to prevent it. Nor are the Europeans prepared to commit. Without such a guarantee, an elaborate proposal like the one from the European Institute of Peace and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung runs the risk of laying the groundwork for partition of Kosovo and secession.

The right way forward

The Americans succeeded last week in forcing the resignation of Serbian Security Information Agency chief Aleksandar Vulin. He is a diehard advocate of the “Serbian world,” which is code for Greater Serbia and entails Kosovo partition. It would be hard to doubt that he backed the September 24 plot, providing material as well as political support. But his resignation is no substitute for a major shift in Belgrade policy, which can only come from from the mouth of President Vucic. He needs to acknowledge responsibility for the September 24 plot, apologize, and pledge nothing like it will happen again.

The odds of that are nil to zero. Vucic has called parliamentary and local elections for December 17, hoping they will shore up his flaging support. Or at least give him a renewed mandate. He won’t be apologizing to Kosovo for anything in the middle of an election campaign. Nor thereafter.

The best that can happen now is defeat of the present governing coalition. The opposition claims it has united as “Serbia Against Violence.” That is good news. Now they need to focus on getting their often young, left/liberal, environmentalist, and anti-violence voters to the polls. Serbia should defeat Vucic. Not Kosovo.

Stevenson’s army, November 6

Blinken and CIA Director Burns are in the Middle East.

– WSJ notes threats to US forces in the region

– NYT says State concerned assault rifles may be given to Israeli settlers

– New IC budget numbers declassified. ODNI table

Will US need a draft? [This issue will come up in mock conference exercise]

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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