Presidential duplicity in video and living color
I’m glad some Kosovo Albanians still speak Serbian. See below:
Demush Shasha commented on Twitter:
Yesterday was a great day to get insight to Vucic duplicity. He gave back-to-back interviews to
@amanpour on CNN and “Ćirilica,” pro-Russian Happy TV. It was an illustration of what Amanpour called “You say one thing internally and another thing to (international) interlocutors”.
With Amanpour he spoke about importance of peace and distanced himself from army built-up by underlining how those are independent army decisions that have nothing to do with him. He tried to portray himself as peace loving man who refused to sign “high military readiness” order.
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It’s not only about Kosovo
Serbia’s effort to destabilize Kosovo so that it can claim control of its Serb-majority north should today be apparent to all. The license plate brouhaha of last year, the boycott of municipal elections in the spring, the subsequent rioting against the elected non-Serb mayors, the attack on NATO peacekeepers in May, the kidnapping of Kosovo police–these were all prelude to the foiled insurrection last weekend.
Hear and see no evil
But the US and EU have so far failed to draw the necessary conclusions. They continue to call for dialogue without any consequences levied against Belgrade. The American Ambassador in Belgrade has even seen fit to suggest Serbia should join NATO. The overwhelming majority of Serbs reject that prospect. Their government’s recent behavior makes it not just illogical but nonsensical.
Within the EU, holding Serbia accountable is difficult because it requires unanimity. Viktor Orban’s pro-Russian Hungary is the usual spoiler. The outcome of yesterday’s election in Slovakia will make Bratislava Moscow’s next best friend.
In the US, it is the Biden Administration’s dogged and fruitless offer of goodies to turn Serbia towards the West that blocks any serious reevaluation of Balkans policy. The officials concerned simply do not want to accept failure. They continue to pursue appeasement, blind to Belgrade’s malfeasance.
It’s not only Kosovo
This blindness will have consequences. Serbia, like Russia, sees the West as divided and weak. Belgrade may back off temporarily in Kosovo in order not to provoke a serious reaction. But Serbia will continue to pursue irredentist aims in Montenegro and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In Montenegro, government formation is blocked. The new president there wants pro-Russian parties in the coalition. The prime minister-designate is resisting, under pressure from Washington and Brussels. But he also rejects cooperation with the Western-oriented former ruling party. The country is in a dangerous limbo. Belgrade, working with the Serbian Orthodox Church, could well create chaos there, as it has repeatedly in recent years.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community High Representative has taken a series of unwise decisions that have damaged his own standing. He can no longer freely enter the 49% of the country’s territory known as Republika Srpska (RS). Its leader has taken the entity to within a few short steps of secession. He awaits only Moscow and Belgrade approval to declare de jure independence. He has already separated the RS from the country’s judicial and executive authority.
What’s next?
The Ukraine war will be an important factor in what happens next in the Balkans. The omens are not favorable in any of the possible scenarios.
If Russia were to lose in Ukraine, Moscow might well try to get compensation in the Balkans. The method would be destabilization, not naked aggression. Serbia could be given the green light and covert assistance to create chaos in northern Kosovo, force installation of a pro-Russian government in NATO member Montenegro, and allow RS to declare full autonomy if not independence.
If Russia wins in Ukraine by holding on to Crimea and at least part of Donbas, the precedent will reinforce Serbia’s push for at least de facto if not de jure control of Serb populations in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro.
If the war in Ukraine continues for another year, Moscow could decide to refocus on the Balkans and set a precedent there for what it wants in Ukraine.
All these scenarios would entail major losses for the the US and EU. They can be prevented. But only if current policies are reevaluated now and a much tougher approach taken to counter Serbian irredentism.
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Stevenson’s army, September 30
Extra! By 335-91, the House passed a relatively “clean” Continuing Resolution to continue government funding for 45 days. The Senate seems likely to approve in a vote Saturday evening. Even that “clean CR” is 71 pages long.
I failed to post this edition yesterday:
It’s New Year’s Eve FY2024 and a lapse in appropriations is likely. Vox has a good list of the contending factions. Politico notes the additional FAA problem.
– Sarah Binder explains how the motion to vacate [fire the Speaker] could play out.
– My friend Derek Chollet faced a tough nomination hearing.
– Reuters reports on possible US-Saudi-Israeli deal.
-NYT says UAE has been intervening in Sudan.
– Joe Cirincione disputes smear of Americans involved in Iran negotiations
– New Yorker examines the fall of Nagorno-Karabakh
– Law prof analyzes new DOD Law of War manual
– Economist reminds us of the value of hand-writing
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, September 29
– The Senate went back to its old dress code. Good.
– House used its Holman rule to try to cut SecDef Austin’s pay to $1. Bad.
– DOD lists defense spending by state. It matters to Members.
– The Hill notes end of the trade consensus.
– Just Security has much harsher view of Menendez actions helping Egypt.
– WSJ says India’s spy agency does covert ops abroad.
– Former Marine doesn’t like GOP ideas about attacking Mexico.
– RAND scholar wants to avoid long Ukraine war.
– Steve Walt examines ethical issues in Ukraine war.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stiffening the approach to Serbia
Kosovo police and NATO forces in the Serb-majority north of the country over the weekend foiled an armed uprising. One Kosovo policeman and three terrorists were killed and others arrested. But most seem to have escaped. Serbia and its Srpska Lista political proxies in Kosovo have declared a day of mourning. That confirms their support for the insurrection. The little green men appear to have found safe haven inside Serbia.
Serbian President Vucic met subsequently with the Russian Ambassador. Vucic complained about “brutal ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo, for which there is no evidence. We have no confirmation that Vucic ordered the armed uprising. But one of his mainstays in northern Kosovo was involved. Such things don’t happen without Belgrade’s knowledge. Vucic could have stopped it in advance or denounced it after the fact. He did not do either.
What this incident tells us
This incident is confirmation that Vucic does not intend to normalize relations with Kosovo. The Belgrade/Pristina dialogue with that objective is a cover for his real goal. He wants separation of the four northern Serb-majority municipalities. He would prefer de jure partition and hopes that Russian success in annexing parts of Ukraine will validate that objective. But he would settle, for now, for de facto separate governance, in the form of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities.
Pristina has demonstrated that its police can handle, with NATO backing, a heavily armed group of several dozen determined militants. But it is just as clear that Serbian armor could move into Kosovo with ease. It is less than 25 miles, maybe an hour’s tank drive, from the nearest Serbian border crossing to north Mitrovica. NATO has recently beefed up its forces in Kosovo. But it is not clear whether they are equipped or trained for anti-armor warfare.
American and European diplomats think Serbia will not attempt such a move because of the political consequences. But Vucic knows better. He is trying to convince the world that Serbs are being ethnically cleansed from Kosovo. That could validate a claim his tanks protect civilians. That is why he repeatedly claims, without evidence, that such ethnic cleansing is ongoing, as he did yesterday in a meeting with the Russian Ambassador.
The American and European response
The Western response has been weak so far. Brussels and Washington have appealed to “both sides” to prevent further violence and escalation. This implicitly equates the sterling performance of the Kosovo police with an illegal armed uprising that could have caused instability throughout the Balkans. Those responsible for Balkans policy in both capitals are unwilling to admit failure of their efforts to lure Serbia westward. Instead, they are urging a quick return to “the dialogue.”
An alternative approach would denounce Belgrade’s support for the armed uprising, labeling it a terrorist act and levying sanctions against Vucic and his defense and national security officials. NATO would prepare its forces in northern Kosovo for defense against an armored invasion. The West would praise the Kosovo police and urge a fair and speedy trial for the perpetrators in Kosovo courts. Ambassadors to Belgrade would be withdrawn for consultations.
A new policy is needed
They could be sent back quickly with a single message: the era of appeasement is over. If Belgrade wants EU membership, Serbia needs to quickly:
- arrest and turn over the terrorists to the Kosovo authorities.
- drop its insistence on separate governance of Serbs in Kosovo.
- align with Ukraine sanctions on Russia.
- support Kosovo membership in international organizations, including the United Nations.
If Belgrade refuses, the EU should announce it is freezing accession talks. The US should suspend military cooperation with Serbia, including cooperation with the Ohio National Guard.
Washington and Brussels should also prepare to spur Pristina to reach out to northern Serbs to find alternatives to Srpska Lista. In addition, Pristina should seek to ensure that there are no anti-Serb incidents throughout Kosovo, in order to invalidate Vucic’s claims of ethnic cleansing. Pristina should promptly investigate any incidents that do occur. The courts should promptly try perpetrators.
It is time to reconfigure Western policy on Serbia and Kosovo. Renewal of the current approach will bring new failures. A firmer approach with Belgrade is the necessary first step.
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Cold comfort is better than none at all
“Above all,” he says (at 18:49), “Iran must face a credible nuclear threat.” This is Prime Minister Netanyahu implicitly acknowledging, whether intentionally or not, Israel’s own nuclear weapons and stating against whom they are targeted. At the same time, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is making it clear that he intends to match Iran’s nuclear capabilities:
Turkish President Erdogan has made a similar pledge.
This raises the disturbing question: are we at the brink of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East? I had a look at this question last spring with two Middle East Institute interns. Our conclusion then was that the situation needs monitoring. I can say a bit more now.
Can a Saudi nuclear capability be blocked?
While it is rarely mentioned in public, an amped-up Saudi non-proliferation commitment is likely a key part of the Biden Administration’s current negotiations with Riyadh for a bilateral security agreement. That wouldn’t be a popular proposition on its own in the U.S. Congress. But if it comes with a Saudi commitment not to develop sensitive nuclear technology (especially enrichment, reprocessing, and weaponization), it might be more attractive on both sides of the aisle. American security relations with both Japan and South Korea, on which the press reports the Administration is modeling a possible agreement with the Kingdom, include de facto commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. West Germany’s entry into NATO included such a commitment as well.
But the US/Saudi negotiations aim primarily at formal normalization of Saudi relations with Israel, for which in exchange the Saudis want concessions to the Palestinians. The Crown Prince is sounding soft on that score. He wants improvement in the life of the Palestinians. Netanyahu is not going to find it easy to get his ultra-nationalist coalition partners to offer even that. Nor is it clear he wants to. A substantial non-proliferation commitment from Saudi Arabia could however sweeten the deal from Netanyahu’s perspective. He won’t want some future, less friendly, Crown Prince to wield nukes.
The Saudis have indicated they intend to upgrade their non-proliferation safeguards agreement with the IAEA. That is a good step in the right direction, but it falls short of the strictest arrangement known as an Additional Protocol. That is where the U.S. should want the Kingdom to arrive.
What about Turkey?
Erdogan already has American nuclear weapons in Turkey. Were he to push for Turkey’s own nukes, those might be withdrawn, as they really don’t serve much military purpose. But Ankara is taking risks these days in many directions, exercising its right to a far more independent foreign policy than in the past:
- Participation with Iran and Russia in managing the conflict in Syria.
- Purchase of Russian air defenses, even if now mothballed due to the American reaction.
- Mediation of the grain deal between Russia and Ukraine.
- Opposition to Finland’s and (still) to Sweden’s membership in NATO.
- Support for Azerbaijan’s military operation to take back Nagorno-Karabakh.
It would not be surprising if Erdogan concluded that nuclear weapons would be an appropriate bulwark for this more independent course.
Could Egypt be far behind?
Likely yes, as things stand today. President Sisi has stated that he wants Egypt to be like Germany: a great power without nuclear weapons. Neither Egypt’s economy nor its army are currently in a position to resist American and Israeli pressure against Egypt acquiring nuclear weapons. But if Riyadh and Ankara were to get them, Cairo would want to follow suit. When would then be the question.
Iran sets the pace, but might stop short
Israel’s nuclear weapons, which have existed for more than 50 years, did not ignite an arms race. Iran’s nuclear capabilities, which have been advancing rapidly, could well do so. Israel kept its nuclear program behind a (sometimes thin) veil of secrecy. Iran is unable to hide its progress, as even hindered IAEA inspections provide a good deal of transparency. If Tehran decides to build a nuclear weapons, the world is going to know it, sooner rather than later. Ignoring that development would be difficult for both Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In the Middle East, Iran is the nuclear pace setter.
But Tehran might stop short of full weaponization. Its own national security is the reason. If Iran gets nuclear weapons, the slightest doubt in Israel about whether a missile is being prepared for launch with a nuclear warhead could lead to Armageddon. It would be far wiser for Tehran to make it clear that it has stopped short of weaponization. Being a few weeks from becoming a nuclear power would give Iran most of the benefits of becoming one without all of the risks.
That is cold comfort. But cold comfort is better than none at all.
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