Tag: Kurds
The ISIS war and Iraq’s politics
The Turkish Anadolou news agency asked me some questions about the war against the Islamic State in Iraq. Then the International Business Times asked questions about the political situation in Iraq. I answered:
Anadolou agency on the war against ISIS
Q: The Pentagon has recently announced that it has built up a fire base where American Special Operation Forces operates artillery against Daesh and a few weeks later the Department said that it may establish more fire bases ahead of Mosul offensive and just yesterday we heard that the Pentagon is also authorizing deployment of 200 additional troops alongside combat helicopters to the help the operation.
First of all what does this tell us about Obama administration’s policy in Iraq?
A: Obama wants to do what he can to destroy the Islamic State before leaving office. Recent progress in getting ISIS to give up territory is making the Americans want to accelerate the process. They are prepared to take some additional risk in order to do so.
That said, I think one of the important decisions recently has been increased funding for the Kurdish peshmerga, who have proven among the most effective troops fighting IS.
Q: Is the US involving more and more in the swamp in Iraq?
A: Yes, though I’m not sure it is really a swamp. IS lacks the popular support that made Vietnam a quagmire.
Q: Do you think that Obama’s no boots on ground policy is over?
A: It is clearly over. The American troops on the ground will certainly be defending themselves as the need arises.
Q: Without the US isn’t it possible for Iraqi forces to retake Mosul?
A: I don’t know that it is possible with the US. Mosul will be a big and difficult operation. I imagine the Americans and Iraqis are hoping that it will fall without a major battle.
Q: Why does the administration feel compelled to involve itself in the Mosul operation in a combat role?
A: The Americans want to accelerate the process and have important means–like the Apaches–that the Iraqis lack.
Q: How is this troop build-up in Iraq tied into the election process? And what does it tell us about post-election term or next president?
A: I doubt it is tied to the election process itself, because ISIS has really not been a big issue, yet. But it is certainly tied to the approaching end of the Administration.
The next president will be under the same pressures Obama is. Cruz, Trump, Kasich or Clinton might be inclined to respond by doing more. There is lots of pressure from the American public to finish with the Islamic State as soon as possible and to get American troops out of harm’s way. Sanders would want to do less.
International Business Times on the political situation in Iraq
Q: Abadi said his goal is to fill his cabinet with technocrats. What does that mean in reality and why have so many people refused their appointments?
A: What it should mean is the appointment of people based more on their technical competence than on party or sectarian affiliation. You have to ask the people who refused appointments why they did so, but clearly any new minister would like to be sure that he or she will have the kind of political support required to get the job done. That will be especially true for more “technical” types, who can’t by definition assume political support.
Q: Who pressured Abadi into reshuffling his cabinet? Shiite clerics or the US? How much do you think the Americans were involved in this decision?
A: I think the Americans are supportive of Abadi in general and his decision to reshuffle the cabinet with more competent people in particular. You’ll have to ask the Shiite clerics about their views, though one of them–Muqtada al Sadr–clearly played a key role in the demand for a “technical” government. It seems to me Shiites in Iraq in general are demanding more competent and accountable governance. That is not a bad thing.
Q: How does what is happening now in Baghdad compare to what happened under Maliki? Seems like the US keeps repeating its mistakes when it comes to advising Baghdad.
A: Maliki became increasingly autocratic and sectarian. Quite the opposite is true of Abadi: it seems to me he is trying hard to move in a less sectarian and less autocratic direction. It isn’t easy.
Q: Parliament has always been dysfunctional. What makes this current political crisis different?
A: Different from what? In parliamentary systems, getting approval for a ministerial reshuffle when the governing party does not have a clear majority is often difficult. Iraq is not a consolidated democracy like the UK or Germany. Baghdad is also under enormous pressure from the war against IS, the fall in oil prices, Kurdistan’s growing appetite for independence and Sunni discontent.
Certainly the Americans would be happy to see a new government in place focusing its attention on defeating IS and governing effectively on the territory regained from it.
Q: What is at stake here? Are we seeing this trickle down to the local population? Have any affects on the economy?
The Iraqi economy is already on the ropes due to low oil prices. I don’t think the political situation comes near to that as a depressing influence.
A: How much of what is happening in Baghdad is a result of U.S. policy failures?
Q: I see it more as a result of US success in installing a parliamentary semi-democracy in Iraq. I don’t really regret the fall of Saddam Hussein, even if some Iraqis and Americans do. But not everything in Iraq is a consequence of what the US does. There is an Iraqi political dynamic over which Washington has little real influence.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Tin cupping
A friend dropped this piece in my in box:
Iraqi Kurdistan is in trouble. Last week its Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani visited Washington, along with a Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) delegation of officials, including Interior Minister Kareem Sinjari and head of foreign relations Falah Mustafa Bakir, to convince the US Administration to release more funds. The delegation pitched a stark message to policy makers: Kurdistan is the most effective force fighting ISIS, but it faces a greater existential threat–the economy. That economy has come unstuck as oil and gas prices have tanked, and the Iraqi government has refused to release Kurdistan’s share of the federal budget.
Meanwhile Kurdistan’s peshmerga fighters have been spearheading the war on ISIS, even as the Iraqi-Kurdistan region plays host to 1.8 million refugees. The KRG cannot keep up with these pressures.
But the KRG’s woes are, at least in part, of its own making. The budgetary dispute with Baghdad came after repeated failures to uphold the KRG’s side of an oil production agreement. In a provocative move, the KRG signed an oil supply deal with Turkey in an attempt to further bypass Iraq, and at the end of 2015 seized deposits at two branches of the Iraqi central bank. The money went mainly to pay a vast public sector. Once Baghdad pulled the plug, the KRG was forced to make up the deficit by selling off oil. When the price of oil dropped the government fell four months in arrears for civil service salaries and three months in arrears for peshmerga soldiers. Salaries have been cut to enable payments.
Now Qubad says the KRG is running a $100 million deficit per month, down from a high of $400 million thanks to pay cuts and austerity measures. Even so, Kurdish officials know this is a huge hole to plug. The recent delegation ominously warned policy makers that if the KRG continues at this rate it will fall behind on payments again, including to its peshmerga fighting ISIS.
This is why the Kurdish delegation was in Washington. It needs money, badly. The public sector employs over 1-in-5 in Kurdistan, so the failure to pay salaries is felt broadly. The KRG has justified pay cuts to its employees as a necessary measure to allow those reduced salaries to be paid on time. If the government falls behind again, workers may reach new levels of unrest.
Given the problems the region is beset with, one might expect the KRG to shelve its long-held ambitions for independence. The US is unlikely to support an independence bid at this time: US policy has long supported a united Iraq, and that position is unlikely to change while the Kurdish economy remains a mess and ISIS remains at large.
It is surprising then, that last month President Barzani reaffirmed his support for an independence referendum, setting the timeline for “before October.” Officials and experts have suggested that Barzani is creating a distraction, trying to draw attention away from his refusal to stand down after his term expired last year. But Qubad appeared to support President Barzani when speaking at the Wilson Center in DC last Thursday. While stopping short of naming a date, he unequivocally denied that the referendum issue was a distraction.
Talabani is a member of the opposition Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Former Kurdish officials and those who know him describe him as pragmatic on the independence issue. He understands that Kurdistan cannot expect to transition to independence while all of its prospective neighbors remain skeptical, if not outright hostile to the prospect of a Kurdish nation. It certainly cannot expect a smooth transition while its economy is already on its knees, and it is fighting a war with a frontline less than 50 miles from its capital at Erbil. His decision not to play down independence suggests Kurds may be hoping to use it as threat, if attempts to secure aid are met with uncertainty, if not outright rejection.
US aid, if it comes, will almost certainly require the KRG to drop its independence bid for now. If Kurdish officials are digging in on the issue, it bodes ill for the prospects of a swift resolution. It is possible Talabani’s decision to talk up the issue is evidence of failed negotiations with the administration and with Congress. That means there may be worse to come for Kurdistan, and US-Kurdish relations.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Dire
Iraq’s Kurdistan Region is making noises about conducting a referendum soon to decide its political future. A drafting committee is working on the wording of the proposition. President Barzani and his PDK are committed to conducting the referendum this year.
Whatever the wording, Kurdistan’s largely young Kurdish population will understand it to be about independence. Ditto the large Kurdish diaspora, which referendum advocates want to enfranchise. Most of Kurdistan’s now substantial Arab population of people displaced by war will not be able to vote.
The outcome is predictable: 90% and likely more will vote yes, whatever the precise wording.
The case for Kurdistan’s independence is on the face of it compelling. Saddam Hussein’s regime mistreated its population, chasing Kurds from their homes and even out of the country. Kurds were even gassed during the 1988 Anfal campaign. Kurdistan won a large measure of autonomy in the 2005 Iraqi constitution, but the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil has been at best rocky since then. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not received all the oil revenue it is entitled to, it has had to defend its own territory from the Islamic State without help from Baghdad and it faces demands from its population, most of whom no longer speak Arabic, for complete independence. The KRG claims to be a democracy and to treat minorities well.
So why shouldn’t it happen?
The geopolitical circumstances are not favorable. While Kurdistan has vastly improved its relations with Ankara, large parts of eastern Turkey were slated at the end of World War I to become part of a Kurdish state. Turkey will not want to see independence for its southern neighbor while it represses a violent Kurdish rebellion on its own territory, for fear of the irredentist consequences. Iranians feel even more strongly on this issue: what the Kurds call “eastern Kurdistan” is inside the Islamic Republic. Iran’s population is not much more than 50% Persian. Tehran will fear the Kurds won’t be the only ones looking to get out. The Baloch have been rebelling since 2004.
Iraqi Kurds naturally look to the Americans for support. Washington was vital to their survival in the 90s, when it protected them with a no-fly zone in northern Iraq. The Kurds supported the 2003 American invasion of Iraq and happily hosted American forces. The KRG has welcomed Iraqi Christians displaced by ISIS and maintains friendly relations with the US, even welcoming American investment and admitting Americans without the visas the Baghdad government requires. My Kurdish friends ask plaintively: don’t the Americans want a new friendly ally in the Middle East? One with at least a nominal commitment to multiethnic democracy?
Washington might, but it has global concerns, which include maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, where Moscow is supporting breakaway territories in each of those countries. Independence for Kurdistan would open the proverbial Pandora’s box, strengthening Russian arguments and undermining the international consensus that has formed against independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the annexation of Crimea and the rebellion in Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as the aspirations of Transnistria. China will be no less opposed to Kurdistan’s independence than the Americans, for fear of the implications for Tibet.
Even inside Iraq, there are issues. The boundaries of Iraqi Kurdistan are not agreed. While the KRG seized the so-called “disputed territories” during its offensive against the Islamic State in 2014, Baghdad has not agreed that they belong within Kurdistan. The KRG is offering to conduct referenda in these territories on whether they want to join with Kurdistan, fulfilling a provision of the Iraqi constitution. But doing that while the KRG is in control is unlikely to convince Baghdad that a free choice is being made.
At current oil prices around $30/barrel, the KRG is nowhere near having the financial resources to be independent. Baghdad isn’t providing the funding it should, but independence would leave Kurdistan even worse off. It is still an oil rentier state, despite its hopes for a more diversified economy. My guess is that oil prices in the future will have a hard time going over $70-80/barrel, because above that level massive quantities of unconventionally produced oil and gas (as well as other alternatives) will come on line. The KRG needs closer to $100/barrel to meet its financial requirements with oil production even well above current levels.
Advocates of an independence referendum are claiming that it would be prelude to a re-negotiation of the relationship with Baghdad, not necessarily a one-way street to independence. Anyone who knows young Kurds will doubt that after voting for what they think of as independence they will accept some sort of confederal arrangement to stay nominally inside Iraq. An independence referendum is far more likely to be prelude to still another war, in which Arabs (both Sunni and Shia) fight Kurds to determine the borders they have failed to agree on for more than a decade.
The implications of a referendum without prior agreement, both on the legitimacy of the process and on Kurdistan’s borders, are dire.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Kurdistan keeps reinventing itself
On Wednesday, SAIS hosted an event entitled “Kurdistan: Re-Inventing Itself, Yet Again.” Sasha Toperich, Senior Fellow and Director, Mediterranean Basin Initiative, Center for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS made opening remarks. Hemin Hawrami, Director, Foreign Relations Office, Kurdistan Democratic Party gave a keynote address, which was followed by a panel discussion. Rebeen Pasha, WYLN Senior Fellow, Mediterranean Basin Initiative, introduced and moderated the panel. Panelists included Hawrami and Salam Mohammad Islam, Chief Executive Director, Rwanga Foundation.
Toperich explained that Iraqi Kurdistan has a 600 mile front with ISIS and 1.8 million refugees/IDPs. Baghdad has not provided the KRG with the funding it promised. Iraqi Kurdistan is a flag without a country and a safe harbor for minorities affected by ISIS atrocities. The different groups in Iraq should be able to chart their own destinies while being reconciled with each other. If Iraq must remain united, the Kurds must be able to take out their own loans and revive their economy. He strongly supports the KRG’s independence referendum.
Hawrami stated that Iraqi Kurdistan is an important actor in a chaotic Middle East. Many of Iraqi Kurdistan’s challenges are external. ISIS is a symptom of sectarianism in Iraq and developments in Syria. A military response to ISIS is a short-term solution. ISIS was a terrorist organization but became a terrorist state when it captured Mosul. The KRG warned Baghdad about ISIS, but Maliki didn’t listen. When ISIS attacked the KRG, they aimed to:
- Gain control of disputed areas claimed by the KRG.
- Stop the independence referendum.
ISIS is a combination of Takfirism and Ba’athism. The KRG has a three-phase counter-ISIS strategy:
- Stopping ISIS.
- Rolling back ISIS.
- Defeating ISIS.
Over 1,600 Peshmerga sacrificed their lives to accomplish the first two goals. The KRG remains threatened; there are still daily skirmishes. But defeating ISIS requires liberating Mosul; the Iraqi government isn’t yet finished with Ramadi. Liberating Mosul requires boots on the ground (Sunnis and Peshmerga). But they will need more equipment. The Peshmerga have been unpaid for four months but are still fighting.
Iraqi Kurdistan has experienced three shocks since 2014:
- Maliki cut the budget for the KRG in February 2014.
- The influx of 1.8 million refugees and IDPs.
- Low oil prices.
Until 2013, Iraqi Kurdistan was the only region in the Middle East and North Africa with double-digit economic growth. Had it been independent, its rank in the areas of openness and governance would have been comparable with Malaysia and Indonesia. Unemployment was at 6% but is now ~25%. The poverty rate has jumped from 3% to 13%. The KRG is still learning how to govern; more still needs to be done. Kurdistan wants dialogue with Baghdad (not military conflict) but doesn’t want to be part of another decade of sectarianism and bad governance. Dialogue with Baghdad has improved; they now have a joint committee with Baghdad that meets monthly.
That is why they are holding the referendum (hopefully this year), which is not for immediate independence but asks what people want for their future. It will be for all citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan, including those in the diaspora.
The Kurds have been victims since Sykes-Picot but the borders are now only on maps. The KRG hopes these borders can be redrawn through peaceful coexistence and wants to add to the number of functioning political entities in the region. The KRG has become a safe haven for Iraqi Christians, most of whom now live in Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan is a villa in the jungle that must be protected.
Pasha stated that he sees both challenges and opportunities for Iraqi Kurdistan. He grew up under Saddam and couldn’t imagine a future without Saddam. If we detach ourselves from the current situation, we can focus on Kurdistan’s future potential. Investing in young people is key for Iraqi Kurdistan’s future since 2/3 of the population is under 30.
Hawrami, in response to a question, said the Kurds believe the disputed territories are Kurdish and have waited ten years for censuses and referenda in these areas. Since the Iraqi Army’s retreat, the KRG has provided security but won’t impose a military status-quo. The KRG will hold special referenda in these areas for them to decide if they want to be part of Kurdistan. The KRG will also not accept interference by the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs). If these areas choose to join Iraqi Kurdistan, the KRG will provide them with special status based on power-sharing and equal opportunities.
Another audience member asked about KRG-Turkey relations. Hawrami explained that Turkey and the KRG have common interests; they have strong economic ties and the KRG supports the peace process in Turkey. Out of 3,300 foreign companies working in Iraqi Kurdistan, over 1,300 are Turkish. Turkey has not publicly rejected the independence referendum and recognizes that Iraqi Kurdistan adds to the stability of the region. Iraqi Kurdistan is not a threat to its neighbors.
A third audience member asked if it has become increasingly difficult for non-Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan. Hawrami responded that 1.4 million of the KRG’s IDPs are Arabs (Sunni and Shia) and the Kurds have provided them education. Their children are learning Kurdish. Thousands of Sunnis fled Ramadi during the military operation there and weren’t accepted in Baghdad because the PMUs feared they would change the demographics. They went to Kurdistan instead; the Kurds believe in freedom of religion. Islam has begun referring to citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan as Kurdistanis rather than Kurds, since 25% of the population is now non-Kurd.
Islam spoke about how effectiveness depends on efficiency. Since 1991, when Kurdistan achieved some self-governance, it has been at best effective but could have been more efficient and could have dealt with its challenges better. Instrospection is healthy for societies and Iraqi Kurdistan is still learning. In the early 1990s, CSOs in Iraqi Kurdistan were focused on humanitarian relief. They moved in the direction of democratization and development in the late 1990s, and especially post-2003.
The Rwanga Foundation’s vision is for education for all. They provide services, build capacity and design policies. They work on entrepreneurship and encourage youth to believe in themselves; youth are not only the leaders of tomorrow but also of today. Partnerships between CSOs, the government and the private sector will be important. Rwanga also provides humanitarian assistance in Sinjar. So far, Rwanga has completed 80 projects and has helped about 1 million people.
In the panel discussion, Pasha asked what is needed to rebuild liberated areas. Hawrami argued that ensuring security is paramount. The Peshmerga can do this, but more international assistance is needed for economic reconstruction. Islam noted that Sinjar needs more services for people to return.
Asked what Iraqi Kurdistan is doing to invest in good governance, Hawrami responded that the democratic process in Kurdistan began in 1992, but democracy also requires a culture of accountability and transparency. Iraqi Kurdistan was rural until the 1960s but the Ba’athists destroyed villages and moved people to urban camps. This transformed the people from producers to consumers. To increase productivity, the KRG has encouraged investment and boosted the private sector. The Kurds have institutions for accountability but democracy is an ongoing process. Many flaws remain. Fighting ISIS has made the Peshmerga stronger and the economic crisis will make the economy stronger because Kurdistan will enact reforms.
Hawrami noted that Iraqi Kurdistan looks to increase its trade relations with Iran, but won’t take sides in the regional sectarian conflict and won’t accept Iranian intervention in the disputed areas. Islam asserted that Kurdistan is on the right track, but there have been ups and downs. Developing the mentality of democracy takes a generation.
To conclude, Hawrami stated that the US must accept that the “one Iraq” policy is a failure and that Iraq is already divided. Washington must protect Kurdistan as a stable force in the region. Islam reiterated the importance of focusing on youth.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace picks February 1-5
- Fifteen Years of Fighting Terror: Lessons for the Candidates | Monday, February 1st | 1:00-2:30 | Open Society Foundations | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Despite a significant investment of personnel and money, current policies have mostly failed to stop violent extremism and instability from spreading across the Middle East and North Africa. Saferworld, a London-based NGO that works for peace in more than 20 countries, will release three reports analyzing lessons from 15 years of counterterror and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. The reports conclude that the U.S. approach to counterterrorism, stabilization, and state building has been counterproductive—and could be improved by focusing strategically on peace, relying less on the military, taking a tougher line on bad governance, and working more closely with civil society. An expert panel will discuss the policy and operational impacts of the recommendations derived from these case studies. The panel discussion will be followed by Q & A. Speakers include Larry Attree, Head of Policy for Saferworld, Sarah Chayes, Senior Associate for the Democracy and Rule of Law Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Richard Fontaine, President of the Center for New American Security. Scott Shane (moderator) is a national security reporter for the New York Times.
- Pin-Down Diplomacy: How Wrestling Promotes US-Iran Ties | Tuesday, February 2nd | 9:30-11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Much as “ping-pong diplomacy” helped break the ice between the United States and China in the 1970s, “pin-down diplomacy” between the wrestlers of the United States and Iran has been instrumental in changing perceptions about Iranian and American society, and building bridges between sports communities and ordinary citizens. The Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative invites you to a discussion about athletic exchanges between the United States and Iran and the role they have played and can continue to play in promoting better understanding between the peoples of these two long-time adversaries. Speakers include Greg Sullivan, Senior Adviser for Strategic Communications and Public Diplomacy in the State Department’s Office of Iranian Affairs. James Ravannack has been President of USA Wrestling, the national governing body of amateur wrestling in the United States, since August 2006. Christina ‘Kiki’ Kelley is Team Leader for the US Men’s Greco-Roman wrestling team for the Olympic cycle culminating in Rio 2016. Bahman Baktiari is Executive Director of the Salt Lake City-based International Foundation for Civil Society, an organization that explores fundamental social and political shifts underway throughout the Middle East and North Africa and focuses on bridging cultural gaps and fostering a discourse of understanding. Barbara Slavin, Acting Director of the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council will moderate.
- Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz on Iran’s Nuclear Agreement | Tuesday, February 2nd | 11:00-12:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The International Atomic Agency (IAEA) has certified that Iran has curbed its nuclear program by taking a number of steps including dismantling two-thirds of its installed centrifuge capacity, reducing its stockpile of enriched uranium and removing the core of its Arak heavy water reactor. As a result, the U.S. has lifted nuclear-related sanctions. Please join us for a discussion with Secretary Moniz on exactly what steps Iran has taken, how the United States can be confident that Iran’s breakout time to a nuclear weapon has been extended to at least one year, what lies ahead for the nuclear deal and what challenges remain.
- Implications of the Collapse of Oil Prices for the Middle East | Tuesday, February 2nd | 3:00-4:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The collapse of the oil prices has shocked both producers and consumers worldwide. As the most important producing region of the world, the Middle East has been particularly affected; state revenues are down, and cutthroat competition for market share and low global demand translates into greater challenges and uncertainty. The regional economic outlook is unclear, and questions remain about the potential long-term impact of sustained low oil prices. Three experts will analyze the geopolitical and financial aspects of the sharp decline in oil prices on both importing and exporting countries in the Middle East. Speakers include David Gordon, Senior Advisor at Eurasia Group, Aasim M. Husain, Deputy Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department at the International Monetary Fund, and Franziska Lieselotte Ohnsorge, Lead Economist at the World Bank. Henri J. Barkey, Director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center, will moderate the event.
- Iranian Public Opinion on Foreign Affairs on the Eve of Parliamentary Elections | Wednesday, February 3rd | 10:00-11:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Ebrahim Mohseni, Senior Analyst at the University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research will present findings from a new study of Iranian public opinion on the upcoming Iranian parliamentary elections, regional security issues, and expectations from the JCPOA. Three experts on Iran will comment on the survey results and discuss prospects for the February 26 elections, highlighting possible domestic, regional, and international implications. Panelists include William Miller, Senior Scholar at the Kennan Institute and the Wilson Center, Paul Pillar, Researcher of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, and Robin Wright, Wilson Center-USIP Distinguished Fellow. Henri J. Barkey, Director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center will moderate.
- Kurdistan: Re-Inventing Itself, Yet Again | Wednesday, February 3rd | 10:00-11:30 | Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | This year will be a difficult year for the people of Kurdistan. The crash in oil prices, the unrelenting war against ISIS, and the presence of 1.8 million Syrian refugees and displaced Iraqis have precipitated a dire financial crisis for the Kurdistan Regional Government. Join us for a discussion on how to move forward, both regionally and internationally, in light of these challenging times facing Kurdistan. Sasha Toperich, Senior Fellow and Director of the Mediterranean Basin Initiative CTR SAIS will make opening remarks. Hemin Hawrami, Head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party Foreign Relations Office, will offer the keynote address. Panelists include Salam Mohammad Islam, Chief Executive Director at the Rwanga Foundation, and Awat Mustafa, Senior Board Member and Head of Operations and Projects at the Barzani Charity Foundation. Rebeen Pasha, WYLN Senior Fellow at the Mediterranean Basin Initiative will moderate.
- North Korea’s fourth nuclear test: How will Pyongyang’s neighbors and the U.S. respond? | Wednesday, February 3rd | 10:00-11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | North Korea’s recent nuclear test and possible upcoming satellite launch underscore the increasing dangers posed by North Korea’s weapons development program and its implications for international security and the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. The United States and its partners in Northeast Asia must develop and execute a coordinated strategy to address these ever larger risks, but will differences among the relevant countries prevent realization of a shared strategy? What are the longer-term implications should North Korea sustain its weapons development? On February 3, the John L. Thornton China Center and the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings will host an event to assess the wider implications of North Korea’s recent nuclear test, weigh the possible responses by the Republic of Korea, Japan, and China, and then consider the impact on U.S. policy. The event will be moderated by Senior Fellow Richard Bush, and the panelists include Senior Fellows Katharine H.S. Moon, Jonathan Pollack, and Sheila Smith of the Council on Foreign Relations. After the discussion, the panelists will take audience questions.
- Turkey’s politics and foreign policy: Bridging the populism/realism gap | Thursday, February 4th | 3:30-5:00 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), populism has become a pervasive feature of the “new” Turkey. In the latest Turkey Project Policy Paper, Nora Fisher Onar of George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies explores the tension between populism and realism as a driver of uncertainty in Turkey’s domestic and foreign affairs. The paper examines the sources, evolution, and consequences of AKP populism since 2002, including the problematic disconnect between anti-Western domestic rhetoric and the recent need for pro-Western pragmatism as Turkey’s regional ambitions have been confronted by the disorder spilling across its borders. On February 4, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) will host a panel discussion to explore the tone and substance of Turkey’s politics and foreign policy as the country emerges from a polarizing electoral cycle. Fisher Onar will present the conclusions of her new paper, “The Populism/Realism Gap: Managing Uncertainty in Turkey’s Politics and Foreign Policy.” Following her remarks, Soner Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Alan Makovsky of the Center for American Progress, and Kadir Ustun of the SETA Foundation will offer their perspectives. The discussion will be moderated by Brookings TUSIAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirişci. After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
What to do about Syria?
On January 5, CFR hosted a panel discussion entitled “What to do About Syria” which also aired on HBO. The discussion was designed to resemble a National Security Council meeting. Panelists included Philip Gordon, Senior Fellow, CFR, Paul Pillar, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University, and Michael Doran, Senior Fellow, the Hudson Institute. Richard Haass, President, CFR, moderated the discussion.
Paul Pillar stated that none of the multiple sides in the Syrian conflict appears poised to win in the near future. The Russian military intervention that began in September has shored up the regime. The regime still controls roughly 1/4 of the country in a North-South strip. There are non-ISIS opposition areas, largely in the northwest but also near the Golan, as well as large areas of ISIS control in the east and Kurdish control in the north. There are hundreds of opposition groups and many coalitions. Over the past year, ISIS has had neither a net loss or a net gain of territory in Syria, but has lost territory on balance when Iraq is included.
Pillar explained that on the diplomatic front, the Vienna process led to the International Syria Support Group, whose members agree on the need for a ceasefire and political settlement. The Saudis held a meeting in Riyadh in December and agreed that Assad did not have to leave until after negotiations are held. The US adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which calls for a ceasefire. The recent suspension of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran shouldn’t have a huge impact beyond the enmity we already knew existed.
Philip Gordon described the current situation as a dynamic stalemate. The attrition of regime forces is unlikely to cause the regime’s collapse because of outside support from Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. The main battle in Syria doesn’t involve ISIS; it’s between the regime and the non-ISIS opposition. The Vienna Process is a positive step. However, the diplomatic gaps between the Saudis and the Iranians remain large.
Michael Doran believes that the US has essentially dropped its demand that Assad leave by pushing his departure so far into the future that it will not happen on Obama’s clock. This frees up the Obama administration to discuss deconfliction with Russia and Iran, a shift the Saudis dislike.
Gordon summarized US policy in Syria as such: since 2011, when Obama declared that Assad must go, US policy has been to strengthen the moderate opposition, in order to pressure the regime to negotiate. So far that hasn’t worked, but it remains US policy. Doran is right that the
definition of what a political transition would look like has evolved. As it became clearer that Russia and Iran would prop up Assad, diplomats examined other types of transitions that might be more feasible. There has been an effort to unify the opposition but it remains fragmented because our partners support different groups. We have tried to build the capacity of the opposition groups, but it has not been enough; they are fighting a professional military backed by Russia and Iran. The president has authorized force against ISIS, using the legal basis that ISIS threatens the Iraqi government; Obama lacks a legal basis to target the regime.
Doran spoke of the limits of our support for the non-ISIS opposition. Iran and Russia have backed the regime and there has not been comparable activity from our side. The train and equip program failed because we found few recruits willing to fight ISIS exclusively. We also work with the Kurds who are aligned with the PKK. We have alienated our Sunni allies. Our position on Assad is critical to mobilizing Sunni support against ISIS. The US would also need ground forces, perhaps in a 1:5 ratio with our allies.
Gordon clarified that the US does support the opposition militarily and politically. We just don’t provide specifics.
Pillar stated that even though the US is a superpower, it may not be able to satisfactorily solve Syria. It’s not in the US’s interest to take sides in the Sunni-Shia conflict. We should place more emphasis on the diplomatic track because tamping down the war is most important.
Gordon outlined two policy options going forward. First, the US could take out Assad militarily, but this could generate more refugees and cause a power vacuum. The better option is to prioritize a ceasefire to stop the war; this is more important than a political transition. Gordon clarified that he is not proposing an alliance with Russia and Iran, but ending the conflict roughly along the lines of the current reality on the ground. Local areas would gain autonomy, but this would stop short of a partition, so as not to set a precedent of carving out new states in the region.
Doran questioned Gordon’s attachment to the integrity of Syria, but largely agreed with his vision for an end state. However, he reiterated that such an arrangement wouldn’t be possible without ground forces. Haass proposed that the US think seriously about supporting an independent Kurdistan as part of a deal, since the Kurds are the most effective fighting force against ISIS.
Pillar highlighted potential positive effects of the Russian military intervention. Russia will draw the ire of radical Sunnis, and Russia will gain more leverage over Assad. Russia also has an interest in tamping down the conflict; it doesn’t want to prop up a beleaguered Assad forever.
An audience member asked how we might prevent revenge attacks once the conflict ends. Pillar pointed out that under Gordon’s autonomous regions proposal, groups would have a diminished ability on the ground to carry out revenge attacks. Haass contended that, contrary to Western notions of pluralism, a future map of Syria must reflect more homogeneity than heterogeneity.
Gordon addressed an audience question about why the US sees fighting ISIS as in its national interest versus fighting the regime. The US has identified ISIS as a threat because it kidnaps Americans and seeks to destabilize regional partners. We have identified discrete steps we can take to degrade and destroy ISIS. Taking out Assad would require an effort like the invasion of Iraq; we should not minimize the cost and consequences of such an effort. The notion that taking out Assad would yield a positive outcome requires a larger suspension of disbelief than the notion that the Iranians and Russians might agree to a ceasefire if the US drops its demand that they abandon Assad.
Another audience member asked whether we need the Saudis to agree that ISIS is a fundamental threat to their existence. Pillar contended that it would be ideal if the Saudis would follow their own interests more intelligently. In the past, the Saudis have faced the threat posed by Al Qaeda; persistent diplomacy and tough love talks will be required to get them to do the same with ISIS. Gordon noted that it is difficult to explain to countries what we think their interests should be. Saudi Arabia is more concerned about Iran than ISIS and Turkey is more concerned about the Kurds. Doran contended that the Saudis and the Turks have defined their interests correctly; we are wrong about what their interests are.
RSS - Posts
