C+ is not a good grade

President Vucic, like Putin, tells you what you need to know. It really is not veiled.

C+ is what I would give as a grade for implementation of the year-old “Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia.” Koha asked for an interview on this subject but then did not call at the appointed time. So I wrote this piece instead. It’s a B or B+ for Pristina and a C for Belgrade.

Let’s break it down article by article:

Good neighborly relations:

Certainly not in general, but there has been some limited progress on mutual recognition of their respective documents and national symbols, including passports, diplomas, license plates, and customs stamps. Pristina was never the problem. Belgrade has moved on this. B or B+ I guess.

Respect for the UN Charter:

Serbia fails (that’s an F) miserably on respect for “the sovereign equality of all States, respect for their independence, autonomy and territorial integrity.” Kosovo gets a B+, marked down due to continued shortcomings in protection of human rights and non-discrimination. Things are improving in those departments, but problems remain.

Peaceful settlement of disputes:

Serbia fails (F) on settlement of disputes exclusively by peaceful means and refraining from the threat or use of force. Belgrade sponsored the September 24 attempted uprising intended to create a pretext for the use of force, which it threatened by mobilizing its forces on Kosovo’s borders. Belgrade had also already kidnapped two Kosovo police from Kosovo territory and organized a mob that attacked NATO-led peacekeepers. Kosovo has no real option for use of force, but nevertheless gets an A for the police handling of the September 24 incident.

International representation:

Serbia (D) continues to oppose Kosovo’s membership in international organizations. Kosovo (A) has not to my knowledge objected to Serbia’s membership in them.

EU path:

Serbia (D) is no longer in transition to democracy and does not align with EU foreign policy, especially but not only on Ukraine and Russia. Kosovo (B+) is moving in the right direction on democracy and does respect EU foreign policy.

Dialogue process:

Neither Belgrade nor Pristina is much engaged, the former because it objects to the basic premises and the latter because it has gotten little benefit. C+ for both.

Treatment of the Serbian community in Kosovo:

Kosovo has conceded little on “self-management” but is resolving one important issue concerning Serbian Orthodox Church property at Decan/i. Pristina has muddied the waters on financial support from Belgrade by insisting on use of the euro but there is really no bar to direct communication for the Serbian community with the Kosovo government. B for Pristina, but no better than a C+ for Belgrade, which insists on violating Kosovo law in transferring finances opaquely and in dinars.

EU and others’ support package:

I really don’t know. Has it been created? Is anything happening on this front?

Joint Committee on implementation:

Is this just the Dialogue writ small, or has such a thing been created?

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A new book is a joy. Hackers are not.

The new book is entitled Strengthening International Regimes: the Case of Radiation Protection. I submitted the manuscript December 31. Palgrave MacMillan will publish it in April. That is very fast for an academic book. I am grateful to everyone involved: the German owner Springer, the British imprint, the New York-based editor, and the copy editing and production crew, which I think works in India. Globalization is not defunct yet.

I regret the $120 price. I don’t expect you to buy it. But please do ask your local or university library to get it.

It took a lifetime

The book is the product of most of my lifetime. I initially wrote about the history of radiation protection for my Princeton doctoral dissertation with Tom Kuhn. That was in the 1970s, but my dissertation only got to 1934. The international regime that protects all of us from ionizing radiation was then still a pre-teen.

I’ve now completed the history more or less to the present, in good time for the 100th anniversary of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) in 2028. What was once an exercise in history of science is now also an exercise in the creation and dissemination of normative regimes. I am fortunate that my own career followed the same trajectory. It gave me tools with which to trace a fascinating history across two disciplines. That is a rare treat.

The crux of the matter

The keystone of the regime for radiation protection is an epistemic community of global experts. They used specialized knowledge to protect both the enterprises using radiation as well as human health and the environment. They have been remarkably successful. The entire world respects the norms they set, even though they lack legal authority. That lack of legal authority has made the norms more resilient, not less.

Their success can teach us something about what makes a regime strong. I argue in the book that the lessons learned may be applicable to other technologies and knowledge-rich subjects that entail both risks and benefits. Balancing them cooperatively rather than in an adversarial process has distinct advantages. The lessons learned may have applications to less knowledge-rich enterprises as well. I explore the possibilities beyond ionizing radiation in the final chapter.

More anon

I’ll have more to say about the book in coming months and will hope to meet some of you in public discussions of mine and related work. If you have suggestions of institutions that might be interested in hosting a discussion, please let me know. I am already trying to arrange something at SAIS and some of the other international affairs institutions with which I am affiliated.

In the meanwhile, I will welcome thoughts on how to liberate my Gmail from the block Google has imposed on it. You can reach me, until the hackers get to it, at dserwer1@jh.edu My Googlevoice number 202 681 7021 is also blocked. Those of you who have it should please use my other number.

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When Jews and Arabs agree and disagree

The horrors of the October 7 attack and the Gaza war are all too present. But it is notable that at least some Arabs and Jews are reacting in similar, if not identical ways. At least I find that true in the US and hope it is true more widely.

Atrocity is atrocity

Most of the Jews and Arabs I come into contact with find both the Hamas attack and the Israeli reaction atrocious. Both are prepared to acknowledge the context for the Hamas attack. It came in the midst of escalating Jewish settler violence against Palestinians on the West Bank and East Jerusalem as well as right-wing Jewish challenges to the status quo on the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount. But that in no way justified an indiscriminate attack on civilians inside Israel.

The same is true in the other direction. Most Arabs and Jews understand Israel had to respond. Nor do they think it wrong to seek justice for the Hamas perpetrators and release of the hostages taken to Gaza. But the indiscriminate and disproportionate assault on the civilian population there is still entirely unjustified and counterproductive. States today have obligations when they undertake military action that should not be ignored. Yes, it is true that the United States and its allies during World War II conducted indiscriminate and disproportionate bombing of Germany and Japan, including use of the atomic bomb. But international norms have changed. Even then, protection of civilians was required, not optional. Today it is de rigueur. Atrocity is atrocity.

What could Hamas and Israel have done?

Both Hamas and Israel should have focused their targeting on military targets. That would have meant for Hamas only attacking military bases, not the nearby music festival or kibbutzim, many of which are in fact sympathetic with the Palestinian desire for a state. For Israel it would have meant targeting individuals and groups clearly associated with Hamas and other armed factions in Gaza. That would have precluded the razing of more than 50% of the buildings in the Gaza Strip.

That both warring parties violated the rules of war will have long-term consequences. Israelis will have a lot harder time putting the October 7 attack behind them. Many are seeking revenge, not justice. Some Palestinians will likewise seek revenge. Gaza will be far more difficult to rebuild. Both will be rallying to the more extreme factions of their respective politics, making agreement harder than it might otherwise have been. If you kill people indiscriminately because of their identity, you can expect that identity to strengthen, not weaken.

What is to be done now?

The Americans and others have made no secret of their intensifying effort to reach agreement on a multi-week pause in the fighting to allow exchange of prisoners/hostages. That would certainly be a good thing. But if the exchange is less than complete, the fighting is likely to restart if the same people remain in power.

Prime Minister Netanyahu is determined to continue the war for as long as possible. He knows that a prolonged pause will open the possibility his government will fall and a less radical one take its place. Hamas may likewise fear a prolonged pause will bring its status into question as well. There have already been demonstrations in Gaza against Hamas. A pause will make the consequences of what it brought on starker.

It would make a big difference if Jews and Arabs inside Israel could get together to dump Netanyahu as well as Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas. He is almost as unpopular as Netanyahu. That would open the door to an Israeli government committed to getting the hostages released, Gaza rebuilt, and a common destiny mapped. It would also enable a reformed and more capable PA.

It is clear enough that neither Jews nor Arabs are going to leave Palestine/Israel to the others. The Jews complain when Palestinians talk about “from the river to the sea.” But Palestinians are correct to perceive that the settlers are trying to do it, not just talk about it. Neither will succeed in its maximal ambitions. They are going to have to share the land. There is no reason they can’t do that. It will require wisdom, not slogans.

Why won’t Biden change American policy?

Where Arabs and Jews in America disagree is on US policy. Arabs are sorely disappointed in the President Biden’s unconditional support for Israel and say they won’t vote for him again. Jews like me point out that he has shifted towards support for a fighting pause, exchange of hostages/prisoners, and support for a two-state solution, even though he hasn’t diminished his support for Israel’s right to defend itself or conditioned aid on Israeli behavior.

Much of the Administration and many Jews seem ready to go further, including Tony Blinken. The Secretary of State has said that the Jewish settlements on the West Bank are not consistent with international law. That is a big step in American politics, though the Administration has done nothing to reinforce the statement with actions.

Arab Americans are saying they won’t vote for Biden again. A significant number indicated their displeasure yesterday in the Michigan democratic primary by voting “uncommitted.” That was a smart move. It demonstrated political weight.

But it would be foolish for Arabs and Muslims in Michigan and elsewhere to carry through on the threat and not vote for Biden in November. His likely challenger, Donald Trump, would be far less likely to speak up for Palestinian rights than Biden is. Trump has always wanted increased Jewish support but never got it. Christian evangelicals, however, are vital to the Republican base today. Most of them don’t want to hear anything about the Palestinians. Trump has said little or nothing about Gaza so far. But when he does, Palestinians won’t want to hear it. Voting for Biden may be distasteful to Arab and Muslim Americans, but staying home or voting for Trump should be unthinkable.

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Gaza questions are easier than answers

No one wishing Israel well should want Netanyahu to remain prime minister.

The New York Times has already described how Netanyahu’s plan for postwar Gaza clashes with everyone else’s thinking. Netanyahu wants a full-fledged re-occupation of Gaza, complete with puppet Palestinian government there. He is already clearing a buffer zone inside the Gaza fence and wants to control the Egyptian/Gaza border as well. He imagines that UNRWA can be abolished. Israeli-selected local officials would manage an Israeli-imposed deradicalization process.

What is this really all about?

This is nothing but a formula to continue the Gaza conflict indefinitely. Netanyahu figures that as long as the war lasts he can delay his political downfall. So he is defying President Biden’s pitch for Palestinian Authority revitalization and takeover of Gaza, which would also be a difficult maneuver. Netanyahu has also repeatedly and forcefully ruled out a Palestinian state, which the US supports in principle. Israel and the US are not aligned, diplomats would say, except on Israel’s right of self-defense.

Inside Israel, Netanyahu’s policies are finding a good deal of support, even if he is still wildly unpopular. A lot of right-wing Israelis appear to be looking for revenge, not peace. While Gazans are suffering the horrors of indiscriminate and grossly disproportional attacks, Israel’s soldiers are celebrating the destruction of homes and mosques. Things will only get worse if the Israelis send ground forces into Rafah, where much of the Gaza population has taken refuge from attacks further north.

What is the alternative?

The diplomatic world is struggling to produce an alternative. That would apparently entail a longish pause in most of the fighting to permit a series of hostage exchanges. It is not a bad idea, but there are obvious limits. Hamas will not surrender all of the hostages, because once it does it fears Israel will restart the full-scaled assault on its cadres. But Israel won’t want to surrender all of its prisoners either, so perhaps there is a middle ground with some common interest. Hamas will be finding some of the hostages burdensome and Netanyahu is under political pressure to get some back.

If a pause and additional prisoner exchange does prove feasible, the Americans, Qataris, and Egyptians will want to use the occasion to try for a negotiated end to the war. That too is not a bad idea, but it is hard to see how they could get Netanyahu or Hamas to agree to it. It would either entail Israeli acceptance of a continued presence of Hamas in Gaza or Hamas agreeing to surrender. The former isn’t going to happen with Netanyahu and his rightwing allies in power. The latter isn’t going to happen without a more thorough military defeat than Hamas has suffered so far.

What if Netanyahu were no longer in power?

If Netanyahu and his coalition were to fall from power, other alternatives might emerge. A new Israeli government less committed to Jewish supremacy might conclude that the Netanyahu plan for postwar Gaza is nonsense. It might better understand that the war is creating chaotic conditions in Gaza that will be difficult to manage, never mind repair. Ever more radical groups could emerge and take over from Hamas. Or localized gangs and protection rackets could exploit the situation to establish drug and other smuggling operations.

Israel’s minimal goal in this war should include being at least as secure as it was before October 7. That will require local and international security forces, competent Palestinian governance, international humanitarian relief, Gulf economic assistance, and other inputs to stability that are already difficult to imagine. Continuing the war at this point is predictably counterproductive because it will make them more difficult, not easier.

But ending the war will require the Israelis to summon the political will and courage to get rid of Netanyahu sooner rather than later. That should now be President Biden’s top priority. Getting rid of the prime obstacle to peace is not optional. Continuing to cater to Netanyahu will only bring more grief to Israelis, Palestinians, and ultimately Biden himself.

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Stevenson’s army, February 18

– WaPo book review tells how anti-tax movement captured GOP

– WaPo columnist sees value in Washington books

– CRS has new background paper on the budget process

– Brookings has a debate about Ukraine policy

– I like DARPA and wish DOD would do more OTA. Here’s background on the approach.

– Pakistani official admits election rigging

– Fred Kaplan skewers Tucker Carlson

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Stevenson’s army, February 17

– NYT says Israel was behind attacks on Iranian pipelines

– WaPo says Russia has been running disinformation campaign against  Zelensky

– Politico says UAE limits US attacks in region

– Ukraine withdraws from Avdiivka

– Brookings tracks Ukraine data

– Oscar-winning Navalny documentary is available on HBO MAX

Survey shows Republican parents are raising Democratic daughters.

More on Gen Z views

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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