Month: March 2011
Revolutions require follow through
Michelle Kelemen had a good piece on NPR this morning focused in part on what shifts in U.S. assistance are required as autocrats fall in the Middle East.
This is a subject close to my heart, as I watched in Serbia when we abandoned Serbian civil society organizations as soon as Milosevic fell. Even worse, we cut off Otpor, the student movement that sparked the popular protests, because it put up billboards saying “we are watching you.” This ambiguous phrase, accompanied by a picture of a bulldozer, was meant to convey that the protesters would continue to monitor the new authorities, as well as the remnants of the old regime, to make sure that the transition was completed. The right thing to do, but too much for U.S. Embassy Belgrade.
Net result: reform in the Serbian security services never was completed. Serbia is still struggling with the consequences, which include a political spectrum unable to escape the unfortunate dictates of the ethnic nationalism that kept Milosevic in power.
I fear something like this may also happen in the Middle East, where the Obama Administration is already ambivalent about how much change it really wants. The remaining autocrats are no doubt pressing for less rather than more, and some think their influence is behind the President’s hesitation to take more decisive action in Libya. Would anyone watching recent events in Egypt be surprised if the security services managed to come out of this without thorough vetting and reform?
To Hillary Clinton’s great credit, she is quoted in the NPR piece as saying,
When I spoke with the Egyptian officials just over the last couple of weeks they kept mentioning central and eastern Europe. They kept saying that’s how we want to turn out. We don’t want to get this derailed. We want to make this work. So we want to help them make it work.
In Central and Eastern Europe there was a strong magnetic pole in Brussels that ensured the new governments would point in the right direction. That is not the case in the Middle East, where the Saudi and Jordanian monarchies as well as the Syrian and Yemeni secular autocrats (not to mention the Iranian theocrats) will weigh in heavily against fully democratic revolutions. Indigenous democrats are going to have to keep the needle pointed in the right direction.
The Secretary of State and her Egyptian interlocutors have the right approach, one that will require continuing support not only to the new post-autocratic governments but also to the civil society organizations, including some of the Islamic ones, that mobilized and steered the protests. I would shift substantial resources to them–and to support for the upcoming referenda and elections–quickly and decisively. Revolutions require follow through.
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No fly may fly
The Arab League today asked the UN Security Council for a no-fly zone over Libya, while rejecting foreign intervention (presumably on the ground?). Wes Clark said no to the no-fly zone, for fear of heading down the slippery slope without adequate justification for military action.
I guess the question I would be asking the Arabs is whether they are prepared to contribute to the effort. Arranging that might be technically difficult, but a positive answer would certainly help to calm American nerves, which seem less than steady.
The Americans, if they want to do no-fly, still face opposition inside NATO, especially from Turkey. Not to mention the Security Council, where China and Russia may not be thrilled with the idea.
Even if Arab participation is not possible, the Arab League call is an important diplomatic step, especially coupled with its decision to open a dialogue with the Interim National Transitional Council and in effect recognize it as the legitimate government of Libya. Gaddafi may not be listening, but people around him are no doubt wondering how long he can hold up against peers who want him out. His cronies will want to act before he absconds.
Of course none of the diplomatic dance, important as it is, will make much difference if Gaddafi’s forces continue to gain ground. Nothing succeeds like success. That goes for the Interim National Transitional Council as well of course. I certainly wish them, and the long-suffering Libyans of Tripoli, the best.
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Time to make history
President Obama yesterday declared Gaddafi to be “on the wrong side of history.” By this he presumably means that in the long-term Gaddafi is finished. The trouble is it does not look as if the Colonel is finished anytime soon. History can be a long time in the future.
Things are moving, slowly. The Arab League is meeting today to discuss a no-fly zone over Libya. The head of the Libyan Interim National Transitional Council, who now has the honor of a substantial price on his head offered by Gaddafi, has called for a sea blockade as well. The Americans, belatedly in my view, have announced that they will establish liaison with the Council. The president of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, made a strong statement calling for Gaddafi to step down but did not call explicitly for a no-fly zone and in fact offered no indication of concrete steps the EU is taking to force Gaddafi out. NATO is reportedly studying military options. But the African Union has issued a fence-sitting declaration that excludes military intervention.
Gaddafi has said he will turn Libya into another Vietnam. In a perverse sense, he has already done that, with his forces playing the unfortunate role of the Americans in Vietnam. But the Americans held on for a long time in Vietnam, and Gaddafi may do likewise in Libya. He knows, as does Washington, that no one is even thinking about putting American boots on the ground. The Iraq/Afghanistan Syndrome is much in evidence, with Defense Secretary Gates making it clear he does not want to take military action against Gaddafi.
The issue now is how to keep the rebellion alive while we all deliberate. Humanitarian assistance to the rebel-held areas is becoming urgent, as supplies there are dwindling. A shift in the military balance is also important. Gaddafi’s forces have taken Zawiya in the west and likely also Ras Lanuf towards the east. Superior fire power and organization are giving Tripoli important advantages. We can all hope that the Libyans will handle this situation on their own, or that the Arab League or EU will rescue the rebellion.
But in our heart of hearts, we know that international leadership lies with the Americans. When did Europe or the Arab League ever take decisive action? Everyone is waiting for President Obama to make history in the present, without waiting for it to happen in the future. He has a lot of options. The time has come to choose the ones he wants to pursue.
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This is interesting
Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Bozidar Djelic is cited today as saying that Serbia has to find a solution for Kosovo before it can enter the EU, which might happen by 2015. This is not new, nor is it as promising as it sounds at first reading, because he adds:
Such compromise would guarantee economic and political autonomy of Kosovo, without jeopardizing Serbia’s territorial integrity….We cannot have a long-term peace if we support one nationalism against the other. It’s good to support the European kind of compromise which is not satisfactory but it is functional.
It is also said that he cited two precedents: Hong Kong and the two Germanies. Both of these are cases in which reintegration into a single sovereign state was the eventual result.
Anyone who follows Kosovo knows that autonomy within the context of even nominal Serbian sovereignty is no longer possible, if it ever was. Nor will reintegration happen, except in the context of EU membership for both Belgrade and Pristina. Belgrade cannot hope to govern Kosovo the way China today governs Hong Kong or Berlin governs East Germany. That’s a pipedream.
Djelic’s statements are nevertheless interesting, as they suggest that Belgrade is beginning to think seriously about what it has to do about Kosovo in order to get into the EU. This should be the vital question for Belgrade. It is also urgent, since the EU is unlikely to move quickly on an application for membership from a state that cannot define its own borders.
It should also be the vital question for Brussels, which so far has not spoken unequivocally about the need to resolve the Kosovo issue before Serbia can enter the EU. It is of course hard for Brussels to speak with one voice on this subject, as 22 of its member states have recognized Kosovo and 5 have not. Some of those 22 are sure to block Serbian membership so long as the Kosovo issue remains unresolved and have said as much publicly and privately. Getting an unequivocal statement out of the 27 would go a long way to clarifying the situation. You don’t need to have recognized Kosovo to know that EU membership for Serbia is impossible without resolving the Kosovo issue.
Washington will also have to be clear with Belgrade about the need to resolve Kosovo before Serbia can enter NATO. This is less urgent, as Serbia understandably shows few signs of really wanting NATO membership. But no one should be encouraging Belgrade to think that anything less than a full resolution of the Kosovo issue is vital to Serbia’s long-term relationship with the United States.
Pristina should take notice too. It would be perilous for Kosovo if Serbia were to enter the EU first, even if it has accepted Kosovo as a sovereign state. Belgrade would then have a veto on Pristina’s EU membership. The only reasonable solution to this problem is for Pristina to accelerate its own efforts at preparing for EU membership. It has done well to meet the EU technical requirements for the Schengen visa waiver, and I hope the EU will come to its senses and allow that to go forward. But there are many other areas in which Pristina is lagging. It needs to get its own house in order. Governing well is the best revenge.
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That was easy!
EU mediator Robert Cooper opened talks between Pristina and Belgrade Tuesday in Brussels, marking the launch of a dialogue process called for by the UN General Assembly last fall and likely to last many months if not years. Chief negotiators Borko Stefanovic and Edita Tahiri are eminently capable and qualified exponents of their respective sides and will be expected to try to keep the talks going despite shaky political situations in both capitals.
I’ve now heard several different versions of the agenda, with Stefanovic saying the first item was land registers, diplomatic sources saying it was supposed to be customs (an obviously sensitive issue for the Serbian side) and the Americans originally interested in establishing the authority of the Kosovo courts in northern Kosovo.
I’m not sure it matters much. Whatever works is okay for me. But I do think it will be difficult to keep the focus on practical issues without wandering off into status questions. If you don’t think land registers can be linked to status issues, guess again. Serbian government and Church land claims in Kosovo are extensive. The link of status to customs and courts is too obvious to mention.
This is one of those diplomatic dances that drives outsiders nuts. All the diplomats agree the talks are about practical issues, not status, but it is also perfectly clear that the eventual goal is to get to a situation in which Serbia can accept Kosovo as a sovereign state, one way or another. Membership in the UN might be sufficient, if formal diplomatic recognition proves too difficult.
Nothing less than that will get Serbia into the EU, and nothing less than that will satisfy Pristina and Washington either. We just don’t say it in polite company, because it will make life harder for those Belgrade who want to prioritize Serbia’s EU membership. But that symmetrical table, with the Pristina delegation on one side and the Belgrade delegation on the other, already presages the eventual outcome.
That is not to say there isn’t a lot of work to be done on practical issues, or that it won’t be useful to start with them. The potential agenda is long: land registers, customs, authority of the Pristina institutions in northern Kosovo, mutual recogntion of documents, return of artefacts, state property, citizenship, pensions, salary arrears, transportation and telecommunication links, police and border patrol cooperation…. Resolving at least some of these issues will improve relations between Pristina and Belgrade–which have been virtually non-existent since the 1999 NATO/Yugoslavia war.
I trained both Serbian foreign service officers and Kosovan officials for these talks years ago. I’m delighted to see that they are happening, and I wish both sides well in pursuing their legitimate interests. Success in these talks will help a good deal to move the Balkans closer to the EU. Failure is not an option. Best wishes to Edita and Borko!
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Libya policy options
With kind permission of theatlantic.com, here is my piece they published this morning:
16 Ways the U.S. Can Help in Libya
Mar 10 2011, 7:00 AM ET By Daniel Serwer
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Thursday, March 10, 2011
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From multilateral sanctions to unilateral covert action, here are the options Obama faces
The weekend has come and gone without a decisive outcome in Libya. The see-saw conflict continues, with Qaddafi’s tanks barging into Zawiya in the west but losing Ras Lanouf to the rebels in the east. A few people managed to demonstrate in Tripoli Friday, but sprays of automatic weapons fire dispersed them quickly. This is hardly a fair fight. Qaddafi enjoys significant geographic, military, and strategic advantages, which he is exploiting more with every passing day. A lengthy and bloody stalemate remains a distinct possibility.
The Obama administration is weighing its options. We run the risk of remembering this week’s events the way some of us remember the shelling of Dubrovnik twenty years ago: a moment when the U.S. and Europe shipped humanitarian relief supplies but their magnificent military instrument, NATO, stood by, watching relatively weak military forces wreck death and destruction on defenseless civilians. President Obama has already said, “What I want to make sure of is that the U.S. has full capacity to act rapidly if the situation deteriorates in such a way that you had a humanitarian crisis on our hands, or a situation in which defenseless civilians were finding themselves trapped and in great danger.”
Humanitarian concerns are not the only ones in Libya. Every day the war there continues drains many millions of dollars from the U.S. economy in the form of high oil prices, slowing the recovery. There is no guarantee oil prices won’t rise significantly higher, especially if demonstrations continue on the Arabian peninsula and possibly break out in Saudi Arabia. Time is not on our side.
The only objective for which the U.S. will likely consider taking serious risks is the removal of Qaddafi’s regime and, hopefully, its replacement with a constitutional, representative government that maintains the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
As Obama meets with his advisers to consider what the U.S. can and cannot do, here are the options he is likely to consider. He will weigh the risks of involvement against the dangers of non-involvement, the efficacy of intervention against the likelihood of backlash, unilateralism against multilateralism, the needs of Libyans against the needs of the U.S. It is a daunting list with many trade-offs and no clear best choice.
Action Under United Nations Authority
(1) More strictly enforce the financial sanctions already in place. Italy — and likely other states with close financial ties to Libya — is not yet enforcing the UN-approved financial sanctions on Libya’s sovereign wealth funds. Libyan individuals and front companies who escaped the initial asset freeze could also be targeted. The U.S. could lead a concerted effort to determine where Qaddafi is still getting money from and stop the flow. But this would require convincing states that do not already enforce the sanctions to begin doing so, which may be against their financial self-interest.
(2) More strictly enforce the arms embargo. .Libya has imported its arms mainly from Russia, Czech Republic, Serbia, and more recently Italy. It is not clear that these and other countries have withdrawn all technicians and stopped all shipments, in particular of spare parts.
(3) Draw global attention to the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation. The ICC prosecutor did well last week to give a press conference outlining his efforts. He could be encouraged to deploy investigators at least to Benghazi if not closer to Tripoli. The ICC could also set up a website on which Libyans could document abuses. There is a great deal of information coming out via Twitter and other social networks that could be collected more systematically so that it can be properly investigated once on-the-ground access is possible. As the investigation moves forward, it will appear more threatening to Qaddafi, and could act as more of a deterrent.
(4) Enforce land, sea, and air blockades around Libya. These would enforce the arms and travel bans, in addition to helping to detain individuals being investigated by the ICC. The blockades would also position U.S. and allied forces offshore for further military action, if ever needed.
(5) Jamming and broadcasting. Jamming Libyan military communications would be consistent with the spirit of the existing UN Security Council resolution and could have a substantial effect on Qaddafi’s ability to wage war against the rebels along Libya’s long Mediterranean coast. We could also begin broadcasting international media outlets into Libya to help spread information and galvanize opposition, as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya did in Egypt.
(6) Discourage companies from doing business with Libya. They could be made to understand that anything they ship to Qaddafi and his minions now, or any new deals they make, could cause them commercial losses when the regime falls. It is particularly important to talk to the Italian oil and gas company ENI, which is heavily dependent on Libyan supplies and is partly Libyan owned.
(7) Expand humanitarian assistance and evacuation capacity. The buildup of displaced people and refugees, many of them non-Libyan, on the borders with Tunisia and Egypt is a burden that we can help relieve by expanding shipment of humanitarian assistance and repatriating people more quickly.
Action Under New United Nations Authority
(8) Many Libyan financial assets in the U.S. have been frozen by sanctions. We could channel those assets to the Transitional Council, the political body that rebels have established as the temporary leadership in the liberated east. Helping to fund the Council could enable it to buy the military equipment it badly needs. However, this would set an unusual precedent — frozen assets are typically held with the expectation that the original owner could one day reclaim them, rather than simply given away — that could deter future foreign investment.
(9) Establish an account to control the money importers pay for Libyan oil and gas revenue. We could ask the UN to create a single account, like the 1995 “oil for food” program that controlled how Iraqi oil revenues could be spent. Libyan oil revenue could also be channeled to the Transitional Council, so long as it stays united and can legitimately claim to represent the Libyan people.
(10) Allow arms shipments directly to the Transitional Council. UN Security Council resolution 1970, passed only days ago, bans all arms shipments to Libya. Opening a breach in the arms embargo will be difficult, as many Security Council members will not want to set a precedent of allowing arms shipments to a rebellion. But it’s worth recalling the Bosnian war, when we turned a blind eye to Iran’s clandestine arms shipments to Muslim fighters. There’s no telling who could arm the Libyan rebels, but if anyone is going to do it, it might as well be us.
Direct Military Action
(11) No fly zone (NFZ). This has been extensively debated in the media as well as in Congress. But all sides seem to agree on this: better to do it with approval from the UN Security Council, both because we could use the help and to brand it as a global — rather than an American — mission. But this approval could be very tough to get unless circumstances deteriorate dramatically. While an NFZ would unquestionably help the rebellion and hurt Qaddafi, it would also require attacking Libyan air defenses. Keeping the patrols aloft would be an expensive burden, especially if it drags on for weeks or months. This could be especially unappealing to state that wouldn’t want to be seen as supporting a U.S. military effort against a Muslim country. Remember how few countries lined up to join us for invading Iraq? Any U.S. military action risks plunging us into war in Libya and and shifting the narrative away from popular uprising to a Western war against the Arab world or against Islam.
(12) No fly forever. In this less discussed variant on a no fly zone, we could take out the entire Libyan air force, fixed wing and rotary, with carefully targeted air strikes. This would require an initial attack on Libya’s air defenses, like the NFZ, but it wouldn’t require the same continuing, open-ended commitment. It would probably have to be done unilaterally, however, since discussion in the Security Council would alert Qaddafi’s military to the incoming attack and make it harder to find and destroy their aircraft.
(13) U.S. air support for rebel ground forces. This is the approach we took in both Kosovo and Afghanistan, where indigenous military forces pursued the ground war with U.S. air support. This would involve us deeply in the conflict in Libya and arguably make us morally responsible for the behavior of the Transitional Council ground forces, which may well exact ferocious revenge on Qaddafi’s loyalists. It would also require close coordination with an irregular Libyan force that appears loosely organized.
Covert Measures
(14) Establish a direct channel to Qaddafi and encourage him to leave Libya. While those who want to see Qaddafi held accountable would object, we could open a back door by which he could leave Libya. Zimbabwe and Venezuela are thought to be ready to receive him. The ICC could get him later, as it did with former Liberian President Charles Taylor. But finding him a new (if temporary) home might make Qaddafi more willing to leave. A number of states — perhaps Chad or Turkey, for example — may be able to establish intermediaries to help negotiate Qaddafi’s flight.
(15) Provide intelligence to the rebels. Battlefield intelligence could help the rebellion in meeting the challenges posed by Gaddafi’s superior firepower and reach. This could include early warning of air and ground strikes.
(16) Put U.S. special forces into Libya, ready to move against Qaddafi if an opportunity presents itself. This is fraught with risk. The troops could be found out and used to embarrass the U.S. or the rebels. They could be killed or, worse, captured. The Dutch have already been caught with marines in Libya on a mission to evacuate Dutch citizens. But it would enable us to move quickly and decisively to take out Qaddafi if we find a good opportunity or, in extreme cases, if the risks of allowing him to remain simply become too dire.
There is of course a possibility that anything we do will poison the ongoing revolutions in Libya or even throughout the Arab world. Doing nothing is also option. But, with hundreds dying, thousands fleeing, and no peaceful end in sight, nothing may be the riskiest option of all.
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