Month: March 2012
Bosnia’s fate
Milan Marinkovic writes from Nis:
What is to be done about Bosnia? The divided country seems unlikely to survive without life support from the international community.
The half of Bosnia’s territory called Republika Srpska (RS) is dominated by ethnic Serbs. An overwhelming majority of them do not regard Bosnia as their homeland; rather, they are dreaming of secession. The number of non-Serbs in RS is too small to affect this prevailing political trend.
The other half, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), is shared between Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and Croats. A still undetermined percentage of the latter are hoping for the creation of their own separate entity along the lines of Republika Srpska.
Bosniaks are the only among Bosnia’s so-called “constituent peoples” who are united in thinking of Bosnia as their beloved country. Unlike Serbs and Croats, Bosniaks do not have a reserve motherland. But given that Bosniaks are thought to account for less than a half of the overall population, they constitute only a relative, not the absolute majority.
Another reason why Bosniaks appear unlikely to decide the future of Bosnia on their own is that they are deeply divided among themselves on how the country’s political system should be organized. Although Bosnian Muslims are traditionally considered moderate and secular, the war and its consequences have radicalized some of them.
Bosniak nationalist political parties are increasingly flirting with Islamic clericalism, much to the liking of Bosnia’s Islamic community. Its leader, Reis Effendi Mustafa Cerić, recently gave an interview to the Radio Free Europe complaining that Bosniaks are the only people in the region who do not have their exclusive nation-state.
That’s obviously true, but there is no feasible way to make Bosnia the nation-state of Bosniaks except by allowing Republika Srpska to secede. Even if Bosniak political and religious leaders might accept secession of RS, most ordinary Bosniaks relentlessly oppose any possibilty of changing Bosnia’s existing national border.
Major EU powers also would not like to see Bosnia divided into two independent states. The secession of Republika Srpska would make an already problematic Serbia all the more difficult to manage, while at the same time increasing the likelihood that the rest of Bosnia turns into an Islamic state.
The fates of Bosnia and Serbia are in many ways interconnected. Albeit rhetorically aggressive, President of RS Milorad Dodik is wise enough not to make any hasty move that could undermine his position. Dodik will therefore refrain from either declaring or holding a referendum on independence until he receives a green light from Belgrade.
While the potential unification with RS would undoubtedly help Serbia materialize an old dream of growing into the dominant power in the region, Belgrade is aware that it cannot afford to be deprived of continual financial support from the EU without which its economy would become virtually unsustainable. Serbia is looking to use both RS and (northern) Kosovo as trump cards to get as many concessions from Brussels as possible on the path toward EU membership. So long as the West can keep Serbia part of the European integration process, the threat of secession by RS is going to remain just a threat.
Saving Bosnia from dissolution is the easier part of the job. Helping the country overcome its internal malaise is a much tougher challenge. While the EU may be able to maintain the current status quo in Bosnia for some time, the Europeans do not seem capable of improving the situation. A more serious engagement on the part of Washington would be more than welcome, but is unlikely to take place in the foreseeable future, due to priorities elsewhere.
Turkey could play a significant role in Bosnia. As a rising economic power seeking to expand its influence in the Balkans through strategic investment and close cooperation with local governments, Turkey has an interest in contributing to stabilization of the region. Turkey especially wants to see progress in Bosnia, with which it has strong historical, cultural and religious ties.
A problem for Ankara is that many South Slavs – particularly those of Christian denominations – are suspicious of Turkey’s action in the Balkans because of its imperial Ottoman past. The Turks need to convince Christian Slavs that their intentions today are different. If they succeed, it would not immediately solve the Bosnian puzzle, but would probably move it closer to a solution.
The worst thing to happen is that Serbia at some point reverts to retrograde nationalism and decides to ultimately withdraw from all European projects. Then it would be just a matter of time before Dodik – or whoever is in charge of RS at the time – is given the green light to declare independence.
The question remains whether Sandjak, a Bosniak/Muslim-dominated sub-region in southwestern Serbia, constitutes a trump card that could be used to counter a potential attempt by Banja Luka and Belgrade to divide Bosnia. The answer is: not likely.
Sandjak is incomparable to Republika Srpska for a variety of reasons. RS occupies a far larger territory than Sandjak – both in terms of total size and relative to Bosnia’s and Serbia’s respective areas. Serbs account for almost ninety percent of Republika Srpska’s population and about one-third of Bosnia’s; Bosniaks, though the majority ethnic group in Sandjak, make up only between two and three percent of Serbia’s overall population.
Unlike a great majority of the Serbs in RS, most Bosniaks from Sandjak are loyal citizens of their country – Serbia. Bosniaks and Serbs in Sandjak in most cases have good and mutual relations, completely different from those between Bosniaks and Serbs in Bosnia – and especially different from those between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.
Some of the Bosniaks from Sandjak feel dissatisfied due to Belgrade’s institutional discrimination against them, but their displeasure is directed at Serbian authorities rather than their Serb neighbors. Even among the young, who are more prone to extreme ideologies and behaviors, interethnic incidents are minor and infrequent.
While some political tensions do exist in Sandjak, they are low intensity and not ethnically motivated. Serbian intelligence services and security forces maintain a relatively strong presence, primarily because of Sandjak’s geographic location and terrain, which have made the area a traditional smuggling route. Another reason for the increased security measures is that the Wahhabist movement has its local cell in Sandjak.
But most importantly, unlike Republika Srpska, which shares by far the longest section of its eastern border with Serbia, Sandjak is not contiguous with Bosnia’s Muslim-dominated entity, from which it is separated, ironically, by Republika Srpska.
The bottom line: Sandjak could at best serve to put additional pressure on Serbia if everything else proved ineffective, but probably nothing more than that. That is the trouble with frozen conflicts such as the one in Bosnia. When you leave them in limbo for too long, new carrots and sticks are less and less likely to work.
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E pluribus Syria?
Eric Shu, Brown graduate and jack of all trades for peacefare.net, contributes this first writeup of a Washington event that occurred March 9 at the United States Institute of Peace. May there be many more.
As the violence in Syria continues to intensify, tensions regarding the role of minorities in both the current conflict and post-Assad regime are rising. The discussion at USIP featured minority expatriates from the Christian, Alawite, Kurdish, and Druze communities as well as a professor (and member of the Syrian opposition abroad) who provided a Sunni perspective.
The generally optimistic discussion was filled with anecdotes of collaboration among the different communities, in sharp contrast to many reports from Syria. Three threads permeated through the panel’s conversation: identity, the historical diversity of Syria, and the divisions created by the Assad regime as a strategy for control.
Dima Moussa reflected on her identity as a Christian Syrian, emphasizing that it was not until she immigrated to the United States that she felt the need to add the “Christian” prefix. Prior to moving to the United States, she resided in a diverse neighborhood with minorities living together. Mr. Oubab Khalil, the panelist representing the Alawite community, spoke of creating a pluralistic and secular community. Khalil, like Moussa, stressed that Alawites were also Syrians and that not all of them were supporters of the regime. “Alawites are not born criminals,” he emphatically pointed out. All panelists agreed that the Assad regime is playing up the sectarian divide in order to divide and weaken the opposition.
Historically, Syria has been a region of many minorities who have co-existed. The Christian presence predates Islam in the area, though Christians make up only 10% of the population today. But what is the potential for this cosmopolitan community in today’s Syria?
Oudei Abouassaf, representing the Druze minority, pointed out the gap between younger supporters who were driving the movement and those who had experienced oppression in the past. For individuals from the older generation, fear has become the norm. To alleviate this fear of speaking out, Abouassaf recommended that the Syrian National Council (SNC) focus on more public outreach that utilizes a positive message inviting support for the opposition.
Abed Alo spoke on the behalf of the Syrian Kurdish community, explaining that the oppression of the Kurds had been two-fold: first for living under an oppressive Syrian regime and second for being Kurdish. The memories of oppression, which kept the Druze minority from speaking out, also constrained the willingness of the Kurdish community to openly support the opposition.
When asked whether the Sunni community held the same views as he did regarding the potential for cooperation, Najib Ghadbian, signatory to the Damascus Declaration and professor at the University of Arkansas, responded that these views were “widely represented.” At the conclusion of the event, each panelist was invited to share his or her thoughts on what they felt the majority would need to do to best include the minority communities into this transition. The panelists agreed with the points that Dr. Ghadbian, referencing the SNC’s plan, had previously laid out:
- Increase outreach/publicity
- Include minorities in outreach activities
- Work to provide a comprehensive vision that will provide equal citizenship and protection of civil liberties as well as celebrate unique identities
- Creating safe zones for defectors
Despite these mechanisms for inclusion, the reality on the ground is only getting more dismal. Assad’s rejection of Annan’s call for ceasefire and political dialogue and continued killing of dissidents will make it more difficult to unite communities and encourage defections. The Alawite dominated military will need to be assured of safety so that defections can happen.
The tipping point for defections has not yet been reached and there is no certainty whether it will happen. Members of the Syrian opposition abroad, downplay the divisions. The on-the-ground reality, as seen from various reports, differs. However hard the panelists (all expatriates) wish for a cohesive community, there is no denying that the potential for an explosion of sectarian violence looms.
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Shut out
Max Boot in the Washington Post today makes the case for U.S.-led military intervention in Syria. Zack Beauchamp at foreignpolicy.com makes the case for relying on diplomatic, political and economic tools. Zack wins. The score isn’t even close.
Boot
Boot dismisses most of the downsides of military intervention without serious discussion. He cites Syria’s lack of air defense effectiveness against Israel in 1982 (sic) and in 2007, when the Israelis achieved strategic and tactical surprise in a one-time raid on a single target. The inapplicability of these instances to a major, fully anticipated air campaign against multiple targets in urban areas in 2012 should be obvious. An American-led air war in Syria is going to be difficult and kill a lot of civilians.
Likewise, Boot writes off the large Syrian army as mostly conscripts and unmotivated. But it has also proven cohesive during a year of attacking Syrian cities. There have been few defections compared, for example, to Libya. The notion that only Alawites will fight for Bashar al Assad, as Boot implies, is just wrong.
Boot also writes off the argument that we don’t want to get into a proxy war with Iran, claiming that the Iranians are already fighting a war with the U.S., or with Russia, saying Moscow won’t fight for Bashar. But he doesn’t even consider the political and military risks to our ability to attack Iran, if that proves necessary to prevent it from building nuclear weapons, arising from a prior attack on Syria. The Obama Administration is not making a mistake to keep its powder dry if it wants to maintain a serious military threat against Tehran’s nuclear program.
Claiming that we have not even provided communications capabilities to the Syrian opposition, which is surely untrue, Boot says Syria is already in a civil war and doesn’t bother considering whether foreign military intervention could make things worse rather than better. After all, our other Middle Eastern military adventures have gone swimmingly over the past 10 years, without any blowback that undermines U.S. national security?
Our military intervention will also somehow prevent Syrian chemical weapons from falling into the wrong hands. The evidence on this question in Libya is still not in, but I’ll bet we haven’t prevented it entirely there, where our assets were much stronger than what they are likely to be in Syria.
Beauchamp
Zack doubts that airstrikes can have the desired impact in urban areas. He also notes the strength of the Syrian army (relative to the Libyan one) and the divisions in the opposition (also relative to the Libyan one). “Safe zones” would be target-rich environments for the Syrian army and difficult to defend for those intervening. Ground troops would be required. As for chemical weapons, Bashar might well use them in the event of an international military intervention, making things much more deadly than they would otherwise have been.
Beauchamp also considers the negative implications of a U.S.-led military intervention without Security Council approval. It would, he says, stiffen Indian, Brazilian and other resistance to “responsibility to protect,” undermining its usefulness in the future. Certainly there is ample reason to believe this.
Instead, he suggests we rely on diplomatic, political and economic pressure: referral of Bashar al Assad to the International Criminal Court (ICC), assurances to the Russians that their interests will be served in a post-Assad Syria, and consideration of renunciation of any debt Bashar incurs now as “odious,” i.e. not to be repaid. These are, admittedly, not strong options: the Security Council referral to the ICC is unlikely, assurances already offered have not yet moved the Russians, and anyone who still thinks Bashar’s debts are going to be repaid in full if the opposition wins is smoking something.
Shut out. These are, nevertheless, the right approaches to a problem for whose solution there are no good options. A U.S.-led military intervention without a UN Security Council resolution or even an Arab League request is a non-starter. I’d call this one four or five to zero for Beauchamp. And he didn’t even know what game he was playing: his piece is mostly about R2P and how it is properly applied to Syria. He’s right on that too.
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By any other name, still Macedonia
Zara Bozinovska of the Skopje daily Dnevnik asked some questions. I replied. I’ve touched up the questions a little, just to make them a bit more accessible to English-speaking readers.
Q: Some time ago you stated that Chicago summit is an opportunity to correct the injustice that is done to Macedonia in Bucharest [at the 2008 NATO Summit, when Greece blocked Macedonian membership]. Two months before the NATO gathering, do you think there is a chance to change anything in terms of Macedonia’s membership?
A: It isn’t looking good. Greece, preoccupied with its financial problems, has remained indifferent to the International Court of Justice decision. The Americans, while supportive of Macedonia, have not to my knowledge done anything substantial to change the situation. I may still hope for a solution, but I am not seeing one emerging.
Q: What can be changed and how injustice could be corrected if [the] NATO Secretary General, as well as senior U.S. officials repeat that there is no NATO membership until the name is resolved, calling [for] consensus in decision making?
A: Obviously one possibility is to solve the name issue. The parameters by now are well known. But I haven’t seen any flexibility either in Athens or Skopje. The other possibility is to convince Athens to allow NATO membership as The FYROM, as required by the interim accord and the ICJ decision.
Q: Do you think that consensus is stronger than injustice?
A: Consensus is the NATO rule. Yes, I suppose it appears stronger than injustice at this particular moment.
Q: What should Macedonia do in [the] next two months, given that on its side [Macedonia] has the judgment of the Hague Tribunal. How we can use that judgment?
A: My view is that the NATO issue should be solved under the interim accord, in accordance with the ICJ decision, not in the UN talks on the name, which may go on forever. But neither Washington nor NATO seems to agree with me. If I am correct, the right address for Skopje is Athens, not New York.
Q: What do you think, why Greece keeps the Hague judgment on low level?
A: Because they lost.Q:
Q: You said that Skopje should stop knocking on the door of ambassador Nimetz and to address directly Athens to convince the [its] authorities to allow admission to NATO under reference FYROM. How can we convince them for an issue that cannot be resolved 20 years, especially when both sides accuse each other constantly?
A: Maybe it would be best to stop accusing and start negotiating. That starts with this question: what does Greece need that Macedonia can provide?
Q: What is the impact of the current situation and the crisis in Greece? Does Greece just use the crisis as an excuse for failure to solve the issue or it really cannot think of the name issue?
A: The financial crisis does make it difficult for Greek politicians to think about the name issue. It also gives them a good excuse for not doing so. Not to mention upcoming elections.
Q: Why do you think that the Macedonian-Greek name dispute is one of the most uninteresting problems stemming from the breakup of former Yugoslavia? Uninteresting and long last[ing], as you said…
A: Uninteresting because I think Macedonians have a right to call themselves whatever they want. If Skopje and Athens reached an agreement tomorrow to call you Martians, would anyone pay any attention to it? Would the language you speak suddenly become “Martian”? Long-lasting because it involves identity issues on both sides. And we know how difficult identity issues are, especially in the Balkans.
Q: Recently we witnessed several interethnic incidents in Macedonia, but also in the neighborhood. In Kosovo, the Macedonian flag was burned, and the same happened in Albania. Is there a danger of a new crisis in the region?
A: There is growing pan-Albanian sentiment in the Balkans, due to Serbia’s unrelenting opposition to Kosovo’s independence and continued control of north Kosovo, Kosovo’s difficulty moving forward on its path to the EU, as well as the difficulties Macedonia is facing getting into NATO and proceeding with its EU candidacy. It would be far better to solve these problems than to allow the current situation to fester.
Q: Who is behind these incidents, do you think that they may be organized by one center?
A: I really don’t know.
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In case you missed it
Here is the audio of Melissa Block’s NPR piece on Syria from All Things Considered Yesterday. It features Anne-Marie Slaughter, Paul Wolfowitz and me:
If you prefer the transcript, find it here. I won’t comment (I confess I find it difficult to listen or watch myself on broadcast media and haven’t done so yet), but I’ll be glad if you do.
PS: And if you haven’t seen the trove of Assad emails The Guardian is summarizing, you should. This could do a lot more to undermine his authority and legitimacy than the Free Syria Army.
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Seconda casa
I rarely write about Italy, where I spent 10 years (during three tours) at the U.S. embassy. We left via Pinciana 21, the deputy chief of mission’s residence, almost 20 years ago, while I was Charge’ d’affaires ad interim, which gets loosely translated on resume’s as “acting ambassador.” I moved first to Villa Taverna, the ambassador’s residence, with then 11-year-old Adam, because they wanted to renovate the DCM’s apartment, across from the Villa Borghese. I learned quickly why American ambassadors in Rome decide to work in the afternoons at home. “The residence” is Capri in Rome.
I’m tempted to write today because we are leaving for Rome tomorrow for a 10-day vacation. Have no fear: I’ll continue to post from there. I’ll give one talk–at the International Affairs Institute on the American approach to Iran’s nuclear program–but I’ll be seeing lots of people and no doubt talking about today’s other big problems: the euro, Syria, North Africa will I imagine be among them.
The Italians have to take North Africa more seriously than we do. They get a lot of gas from Algeria and Libya, where they have giant investments. I’ll be interested to learn how they view the ongoing transition in Libya, a country they know particularly well as a former colonial possession. Ditto for Algeria, where modest reforms and upcoming elections raise the question of whether what is now Africa’s biggest country (now that Sudan has split) can avoid a popular revolution and find a soft landing. Syria will seem less important to most of my friends, though some will realize both how dangerous the current situation is and how beneficial the fall of the Assad regime could potentially be.
On the home front, Italy is recovering, at least for now. Interest rates on government debt are far below their peaks now, the banks haven’t suffered too much, the budget has been at least temporarily straightened out, and the country has a prime minister, Mario Monti, who is more than welcome in Brussels and the White House. I think they disinfected after Silvio Berlusconi’s visits. Monti, whom I knew as a professor when I was economic minster of the embassy in the late 1980s, is the model of decorum and integrity, almost an anti-Berlusconi.
But none of that makes ordinary Italians feel better off. Unemployment and underemployment is high, taxes are up, and growth is worse than anemic. Monti is a kind of bankruptcy trustee–he was put in to prevent the worst and will be allowed to stay until things really start looking up. Then the politicians will engineer his fall and take back the helm, as they did after the previous trusteeships of Bank of Italy Governors Ciampi and Dini. Giorgio Napolitano, the president who is credited with putting Monti in place, has limited powers under normal circumstances, and his term ends in 2013, when he will turn 88. The European Union Germans are right to try to put in place a permanent restraint on deficit spending. Otherwise, it’ll be back.
The question for Italy is whether it can live within those restraints. My guess is it can if it wants to–the Italians are amazingly ingenious entrepreneurs. I remember once visiting a textile manufacturer–his company made Blumarine, which was then all the rage, and I gather may still be–who explained to me the incredible network of small contractors who enabled him to stay competitive in a world that was already being inundated with cheap clothing from Asia. I had arrived at his office from a visit to the Ferrari factory, where I saw a lot of numerically controlled machine tools manufacturing the world’s supposedly “hand-made” car (the boss explained that only the upholstery was handmade, as there were real quality advantages to robots in making the rest). My Blumarine friend said he had a Ferrari in the garage. Where did he drive it I asked? “Drive it?” he replied. No, no, no, he said. It is a great investment just sitting there. You wouldn’t want to run up the mileage or take any risks.”
Clever they may be, but recent events have demonstrated some serious flaws in the Italian character. The Costa Concordia off Tuscany and the Costa Allegra off the Seychelles are emblematic. The first shipwrecked apparently because the captain was showing off the ship to his friends on shore. The second suffered a crippling fire. Berlusconi’s long tenure as prime minister was just as devastating to the ship of state.
Much of recent Italian history betrays neither good judgment nor good luck. Italy needs both to stay afloat these days. But Rome wasn’t built in a day, and it won’t collapse before we walk its vicolo del divino amore again. May it ever be thus.
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