Month: March 2012
Negotiation time
With all the jabber the last few days about the use of force against both Syria and Iran, media attention is not focused on the prospects for negotiated settlements. But there are such prospects still, even if the odds are getting longer by the day.
Syria
International Crisis Group is out yesterday with a “now or never” manifesto rightly focused on prospects for UN/Arab League envoy Kofi Annan’s efforts:
Annan’s best hope lies in enlisting international and notably Russian support for a plan that:
Arming the Syrian opposition, which is happening already, is not likely to improve the prospects for a negotiated settlement along these lines. To the contrary, Western contemplation of safe areas and humanitarian corridors, loose Arab talk about armed the Syria Free Army, the occasional Al Qaeda suicide bombing and a Russian blank check for the regime to crack down are combining to plunge Syria into chaos. Someone may think that deprives Iran of an important ally, but it also spells lasting (as in decades-long) trouble in a part of the world where we can ill afford it.
The Americans have been mumbling about how arms will inevitably get to the Syrian opposition. This is true enough. But some visible support for Annan, and a behind the scenes diplomatic game with the Russians, would be more helpful to the cause of preventing Syria from becoming a chronic source of instability in Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Jordan.
Iran
Netanyahu came but this time did not conquer. He needed President Obama to be forthcoming on an eventual military action against Iran as much as Obama needed him to refrain from aligning with Republican critics. It fell to Senator Mitch McConnell to crystallize the emerging U.S. position: if Iran enriches uranium to bomb grade (at or above 90%) or shows signs of having decided to build a nuclear weapon (design and ignition work), then the U.S. would respond with overwhelming force. This is the proposed “red line.”
We should not be fooled by McConnell’s belligerent tone. Even assuming very strict verification procedures, the line he proposes is a relatively expansive one that leaves Iran with enrichment technology and peaceful uses of atomic energy, which is what the Islamic Republic claims is its red line.
While the press was focused on belligerent statements, the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China + Germany) have apparently responded to Iran’s offer of renewed negotiations. Iran has also told the International Atomic Energy Agency that it can visit a previously off-limits nuclear site believed to be engaged in weapons research, but procedures have not yet been worked out.
Bottom line
I wouldn’t get excited about the prospects for negotiated solutions in either Syria or Iran. But if ever there was a time to negotiate, this is it. By fall, both situations will likely be too far gone, with serious consequences for the United States, the Middle East and the rest of the world.
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Counter-revolution lives, but not forever
The past few days have seen ample signs that counter-revolution is alive and well:
- Syrian troops have retaken Baba Amr in Homs after weeks of shelling and the Free Syria Army’s tactical retreat.
- Vladimir Putin won his unfree and unfair election for President in Russia, routing the few candidates allowed to run.
- Iran’s President Ahmedinejad suffered losses to allies of Supreme Leader Khamenei in parliamentary elections that were no more free or fair than Russia’s.
The Syrians have fought their regime tooth and nail. The regime will exact terrifying revenge. The Russian protesters will demonstrate against Putin’s high-handedness. Bravo to Tony Picula, an election observer from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), who said:
There was no real competition, and abuse of government resources ensured that the ultimate winner of the election was never in doubt.
The Iranian protesters will roll over and play dead, exhausted by a regime that is constantly narrowing the space for political expression even as sanctions point it in the direction of an economic abyss. Facebook and Twitter are proving no match for determined autocrats willing to spill blood and fix elections.
That said, autocrats have their problems too. Bashar al Assad is broke and faces continuing high expenses as he tries to reduce Syria’s rebellious cities and neighborhoods one by one. Putin sits atop a system so corrupt and discredited that many are predicting his electoral victory will be Pyrrhic: the beginning of the end. Iran’s elites are at each other’s throats even as the President Obama assures Israel’s supporters that the United States will use military force if necessary to prevent Tehran from getting a nuclear weapon.
This last is the top priority for the United States. President Obama has clearly decided not to focus American military might againt Bashar al Assad but rather to husband resources for the main event, if it proves necessary: an attack on Iran’s nuclear installations that will have to encompass its air defenses and likely command and control systems as well. Hillary Clinton’s “reset” of relations with Russia is in trouble, but Russia is more an obstacle–something you trip over rather than something that really blocks the way–than a threat to American vital interests. Syria is a proxy war, one that is absorbing vast Iranian resources that Tehran can ill afford to divert from other priorities.
Sanctions and other diplomatic means do not produce results on a predictable timeline. Cuba has endured an American embargo for many decades. Military action has unpredictable consequences and does not always bring the intended results. Strategic patience is vital, but in short supply during an American electoral campaign. Counter-revolution lives, but it won’t last forever.
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Partial success or eventual failure?
Noah Pollak of the Emergency Committee for Israel tweeted today:
Obama policy = preventing Iran from getting nuke. Israel policy = preventing capability to build nuke. There’s the rub.
That is indeed the rub, but there is vast ambiguity hiding behind both equations. What does “getting” a nuke really mean? What does “preventing capability” really mean?
In short, building a nuclear weapons requires two of three things:
- Enrichment technology, or
- Plutonium production capability, and
- Specific design and ignition capabilities for nuclear weapons
Enrichment and plutonium production are “dual use,” that is they can be used for both peaceful and weapons purposes. Iran already has enrichment technology enabling it to enrich to 20%. That program is more advanced than its plutonium efforts. Moving beyond 20% enrichment is not a big technological step. What would it mean to take away this capability?
I suppose there is someone who thinks it means killing whichever Iranian nuclear scientists provide this capability. But realistically speaking that won’t be possible. The centrifuge enrichment technology that Iran has acquired is not a big mystery. There must be dozens if not hundreds of Iranians now capable of carrying the effort forward. To my knowledge, no state that has acquired enrichment technology has every surrendered it, though Libya may have come close. But Libya is not Iran, and what happened to Qaddafi would not encourage Supreme Leader Khamenei to go down the same road.
The only realistic approach to denying Iran nuclear weapons capability is to put its entire nuclear program under strict safeguards, with verifiable guarantees that it won’t enrich beyond current levels. Iran would also have to give up working on specific design and ignition capabilities. That is the direction President Obama is pointing when he says there is still a diplomatic solution.
The real question is whether Israel and its supporters in the United States could accept such a diplomatic solution as denying Iran nuclear capability. There was no sign of that at the AIPAC meeting today, where the President was applauded only when he talked about the military option and not when he mentioned diplomacy.
The problem with the military option is that it only delays and does not resolve. Iran would unquestionably redouble its efforts if its nuclear facilities are attacked. That is the correct lesson of the Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osiraq reactor in 1981, as Colin Kahl points out. Any attack would have to be repeated at shorter and shorter intervals, without any guarantee that they would prevent Iran from eventually getting nuclear weapons.
So which do you prefer? Diplomacy that leaves some capability in Iranian hands, and has to be constantly monitored to ensure compliance, or the military option, which is doomed to eventual failure in preventing Iran from “getting” nuclear weapons?
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This week’s “peace picks”
Frighteningly busy week in DC. Experts bloom even before the cherry blossoms:
1. Chinese Heir Apparent, Xi Jinping and U.S.-China Relations, SAIS, rm. 806 Rome, 12-2 pm March 5
Since 2009, the Islamist insurgency known as Boko Haram has escalated its attacks across Nigeria, targeting the country’s security forces, politicians and innocent civilians – Muslims and Christians alike. The Nigerian government, led by President Goodluck Jonathan has demonstrated itself ill-equipped and unprepared to manage such a crisis, juggle economic woes, compounded by the country’s fuel crisis and political unrest.
Last summer, General Carter Ham, Commander of U.S. Africa Command, confirmed Boko Haram’s links to al-Qaeda. Only after Boko Haram bombed the United Nation’s headquarters in Abuja did Washington take notice of this emerging threat to international security. Not only is Nigeria the largest African oil exporter to the U.S. but its peacekeeping contributions are the largest on the continent, as is its population. In November 2011, the Sub-committee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the House Homeland Security Committee, chaired by Rep. Patrick Meehan (R-PA), released a report on Boko Haram’s threat to the U.S. homeland.
Join us as we assess Boko Haram’s threat to Nigeria, the region, and the United States.
Keynote Remarks by
The Honorable Patrick Meehan (R-PA)
Member, United States House of Representatives
Followed by a Discussion with
J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.
Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, Atlantic Council
Ricardo René Larémont, Ph.D.
Professor of Political Science and Sociology, State University of New York at Binghamton
3. After Elections: Next Steps in Yemen’s Transition, IFES, 12-1:30 pm March 6
Where:
IFES
1850 K Street, NW, 5th Floor
Washington, DC 20006
Yemen’s February 21 presidential election resulted in the end of President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s 32-year rule. While some questioned the purpose of a one-candidate election, many others hailed it as a crucial first step in Yemen’s transitional process.
As the country moves forward, please join for a conversation on the next steps in Yemen’s political transition that will address issues including:
- What are the priority issues for the constitutional committee?
- What will be the role of civil society, youth protesters and opposition groups?
- What challenges exist for reconciliation with entities such as Al-Hirak and the Houthis?
Featured Speakers:
Elobaid Ahmed Elobaid, Head of the UN Human Rights Training and Documentation Centre for South West Asia and the Arab Region
Grant Kippen, Chief of Party in Yemen, IFES
Ibrahim Sharqieh, Deputy Director of the Brookings Doha Center (invited)
Moderated by Michael Svetlik, Vice President of Programs, IFES
Please RSVP by registering online
NOTE: Lunch will be served.
4. Arab Spring or Islamic Winter? SAIS, Rome Auditorium, 2-3:30 pm March 6
A politically incorrect debate among Arab, US and European observers a year after the Arab uprisings.
A question and answer period will follow.
Tuesday, March 6, 2012
Rome Building Auditorium
Moderator: Kurt Volker, Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Robbie Friedmann, Georgia State University
Karim Mezran, Johns Hopkins University
Daniele Moro, Visiting Scholar, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Pablo Pardo, Washington Correspondent, El Mundo
Daniel Robinson, Chief White House Correspondent, Voice of America
Samuel Tadros, Hudson Institute
5. Assessing the Implications of the Russian Presidential Election, Woodrow Wilson Center, 10-noon March 7i
Live Briefing from Moscow and DC
The Kennan Institute will sponsor a Moscow-Washington, DC seminar assessing the implications of the first round of the Russian presidential vote. U.S. commentators will be joined via video conference in Moscow with some of Russia’s leading political actors, including Alexei Navalny and Vladimir Ryzhkov.
Moderator: Blair Ruble, Director, Kennan Institute
Maria Gaidar, Founder, Democratic Alternatives (DA!), Russia
Ariel Cohen, Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, Heritage Foundation
Henry Hale, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University
Stanislav Belkovsky, Director, National Strategy Institute, Moscow
By Videoconference from Moscow:
Moderator: Olga Bychkova, Journalist, Ekho Moskvy
Alexei Navalny, Attorney, Moscow Bar Association
Vladimir Ryzhkov, Professor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, and Chairman, Republican Party of the Russian Federation
Please note that seating for this event is available on a first come, first served basis. RSVP is required to attend. Please call on the day of the event to confirm. Please bring an identification card with a photograph (e.g. driver’s license, work ID, or university ID) as part of the building’s security procedures.
The Kennan Institute speaker series is made possible through the generous support of the Title VIII Program of the U.S. Department of State.
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Henry Hale//Title VIII-Supported Research Scholar, Kennan InstituteAssistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Affairs, The George Washington University
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Ariel Cohen //Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, Heritage Foundation
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Director, National Strategy Institute, Moscow
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Maria Gaidar //Founder, Democratic Alternatives (DA!), Russia
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Journalist, Ekho Moskvy
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Attorney, Moscow Bar Association
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Professor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, and Chairman, Republican Party of the Russian Federation
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Blair A. Ruble//Director, Kennan Institute and Comparative Urban Studies Project
6. The Saffron Revolution: Prospects for Democracy in Burma, Center for National Policy, noon-1:15 March 7
Featuring:
Former Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security CouncilMarvin Ott
Former Deputy Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on IntelligenceJennifer Quigley
Advocacy Director, US Campaign for Burma
*A light lunch will be served*
Where
Center for National Policy
One Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Suite 333
Washington, DC 20001
202-682-1800
Map
Click here
7. Time to Attack Iran? U.S. Policy and Iran’s Nuclear Program, Carnegie Endowment, 7-8:30 pm March 7
6:00 – 7:00 PM
Networking Reception
7:00 – 8:30 PM
Debate
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Participants: Elbridge A. Colby, CNA
Participants: Jamie M. Fly, Foreign Policy Initiative
Participants: Dr. Matthew Kroenig, Georgetown University
Moderator: Eli Lake
Moderator: Newsweek and The Daily Beast
To RSVP, click here.
Despite diplomatic negotiations, international condemnation, and harsh economic sanctions, Iran continues to violate its international obligations by pursuing nuclear weapons capability. While some are still holding out hope for a negotiated solution, a different debate has emerged in the United States over whether it is now time for the use of military force to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions.
Join the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI) as it hosts a debate over the use of the military option against Iran’s nuclear program with Elbridge A. Colby (research analyst at CNA), Jamie M. Fly (FPI executive director), and Matthew Kroenig (assistant professor at Georgetown University) on March 7, 2012, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW). Eli Lake, senior national security correspondent for Newsweek and The Daily Beast, will moderate the discussion.
Background Reading
- Dr. Matthew Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2012.
- Elbridge A. Colby and Austin Long, “Why Not to Attack Iran,” The National Interest, January 11, 2012.
- Jamie M. Fly and Gary Schmitt, “The Case for Regime Change in Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January 17, 2012.
8. Who Owns the Syrian Revolution? The Roles and Challenges of Women and Minorities in the Syrian Uprising, USIP, 9:30-12:45 March 9
As the Syrian uprising enters its second year, uncertainty about the challenges confronting women and minorities looms especially large. Women have played a critical role throughout the uprising, with activists like Suhair al-Attasi, Razan Zaitouneh, and others emerging as leaders of protest and resistance to the Assad regime. Yet their contributions have often been overshadowed. Questions persist about whether women’s concerns and perspectives will be fully addressed, either in the current uprising or in a potential post-Assad Syria. How can Syrian women ensure that their voices are heard as the revolution unfolds and a new Syria takes shape?
Tensions around the future of minorities in Syria are also escalating. While the opposition includes Christians, Alawites, Kurds, Druze, and other minorities, the Syrian National Council (SNC), the most widely-recognized coalition of anti-regime forces, has struggled with the perception that it is not truly inclusive. It is often seen as heavily influenced by Islamists whose outlook toward minorities is viewed as uncertain, despite the SNC’s commitment to pluralism and tolerance. The Syrian regime, meanwhile, has characterized the opposition as a terrorist movement led by Sunni extremists. It has played, with some effect, on the fears of Syrian minorities about what their future might hold should the Asad regime be overthrown. As violence in Syria has escalated, moreover, sectarian tensions have become apparent. Can the uprising succeed without full support from Syria’s minorities? Will it be possible to prevent Syria from falling into sectarian conflict, and potentially a sectarian civil war?
To address these and other issues concerning the roles and challenges of women and minorities in Syria’s revolution, on March 9, from 9:30 am – 12: 45 pm, the U.S. Institute of Peace will hold two moderated discussion panels, co-sponsored with United for Free Syria and the Syrian Emergency Task Force.
9:30 am – 11:00am | Panel 1: Women and the Future of the Syrian Revolution
Speakers:
- Ms. Rajaa Altalli
Ms. Altalli is a Syrian political activist who serves as Director of International Relations for the organization Syrian Christians for Democracy.” She is a also co-founder of the Support Center for Syrian Minorities based in Washington, D.C. Ms. Altalli is a Ph.D. candidate in mathematics and geometric analysis at Northeastern University in Boston, and has taught mathematics at several universities in Syria.
- Ms. Farah Al Attasi
Ms. Al Attasi is a prominent author and commentator who appears frequently on Arab and American media to discuss Syrian affairs, as well as Middle Eastern issues and U.S. relations with Arab and Muslim worlds. She is currently Executive Director of the American Arab Communication & Translation Center (ACT), the founder and president of the Arab Information and Resource Center in Washington D.C., and owner of Zenobia Lounge, the first multicultural café and bookshop about the Arab and Muslim worlds. In addition, Ms. Al Atassi is the author of many publications in Arabic and English, including a collection of short stories titled “The Mask.”
- Marah Bukai
Ms. Bukai is a Syrian American author, academic researcher, and journalist who has dedicated her professional life to building bridges between the United States and the Arab and Muslim worlds through cultural dialogue. She has worked as senior media adviser at Vital Voices, a lecturer at the University of Maryland and Georgetown University, and is currently Public Diplomacy Program Specialist at FSI. Ms. Bukai is also the founder and chair of the Alwatref Institute for Humanitarian Studies, which aims to bridge the gap between East and West and increase the knowledge of the Middle East among American people. Bukai has five publications of poetry, including, most recently, a volume of poems titled “O,” that was published by Waref Publishing House in Washington, D.C.
- Rasha Alahdab, Esq.
Ms. Alahdab is a founding partner of Syrian Women for Syria, and a founding board member of Syrian Expatriates for Democracy. She is also a member of the Secretariat in the Syrian National Assembly and a member of the law office of the Syrian National Council, as well as a member of the law office of the National Change Current, a Syrian opposition organization.
- Ms. Rafif Jouejati
Ms. Jouejati is the CEO of a Virginia-based management consulting firm, and has been supporting the Syrian Revolution since March 2011. She currently serves as the English-language spokesperson for the Local Coordination Committees in Syria, the National Consensus Movement, and Activists for a Free Syria. She also supports the SNC’s Media Office by writing, translating, and editing press releases, statements, and other communiqués. Ms. Jouejati is also the Program Manager for the SNC-sponsored “A Thousand Years for Syria” initiative.
- Kathleen Kuehnast, Ph.D. (Moderator)
Director, Center of Innovation on Gender and Peacebuilding
U.S. Institute of Peace
11:00 am- 12:45 pm | Panel 2: The Roles and Challenges of Minorities in Syria’s Revolution
Speakers:
- Abed Alo, M.D.
Born in a Kurdish village north of Aleppo, Syria, Dr. Alo is a Surgeon and Fellow of The American College of Surgery. Dr. Alo has been active in the Syrian Kurdish Diaspora in the United States, and an active participant in and supporter of the Syrian pro-democracy movement since it’s inception. Dr. Alo will be speaking on behalf of the Syrian Kurdish community. Dr. Alo is also a member of United for Free Syria.
- Mr. Oudei Abouassaf
Born in Damascus, Syria, Mr. Abousassaf’s family is originally from the Druze-majority city of Sweida, in the south of the country. He is a member of the board of Syrian Expatriates in Support of the Syrian Revolution, Sweida. From 2009 – 2011 he held a position in the Department of Defense. Mr. Abouassaf was last in Syria in January 2011 and saw first-hand the situation on the ground in Syria. Mr. Abouassaf will speak on behalf of the Syrian Druze community.
- Mr. Oubab Khalil
Mr. Khalil, an Alawite, grew up in Lattakia province, Syria. He received a B.A. in law from Beirut Arab University in 2001, and he joined the Syrian Law Society Damascus Bar in 2003. Mr. Khalil immigrated to the United States in 2006, where he has been an outspoken critic of the Syrian government, and involved in promoting freedom and democracy in Syria; efforts to provide humanitarian aid to Syria; and raising awareness about the importance of establishing a secular and pluralistic state in Syria. Mr. Khalil is a member of the board of Syrian Expatriates Organization.
- Najib Ghadbian, Ph.D.
A Syrian academic and member of the Syrian National Council (SNC), Professor Ghadbian is associate professor of political science and middle east studies at the University of Arkansas. He is the author of several books and articles in English and Arabic. His Arabic book, “The Second Assad Regime: Bashar of Lost Opportunities,” was published in 2006. Dr. Ghadbian was a signatory to the Damascus Declaration and is currently active within the Syrian opposition abroad.
- Ms. Dima Moussa, Esq.
A Syrian-born attorney and member of the Syrian National Council (SNC), Ms. Mousa has been affiliated with the Human Rights Law Institute of DePaul University, focusing on Arab women’s rights. She has also volunteered with an organization that assisted Iraqi refugees in adjusting to life in the United States. In recent months, Ms. Moussa has been active in the Syrian-American community, serving as a media spokesperson for a key grassroots movements in Syria, in addition to independently working with activists inside and outside Syria. Ms. Moussa is fluent in Arabic and English, in addition to speaking Assyrian.
- Steven Heydemann, Ph.D. (Moderator )
Senior Adviser for Middle East Initiatives
U.S. Institute of Peace
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The choice is a deal or many attacks on Iran
Jeffrey Goldberg’s interview with President Obama has attracted lots of attention, mainly for his threat to use military force to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, about which the President said he is not bluffing. But what does it tell us about the prospects for a diplomatic solution to the impasse over Iran’s nuclear program? Not much, except for this key bit:
…the only way, historically, that a country has ultimately decided not to get nuclear weapons without constant military intervention has been when they themselves take [nuclear weapons] off the table. That’s what happened in Libya, that’s what happened in South Africa. And we think that, without in any way being under an illusion about Iranian intentions, without in any way being naive about the nature of that regime, they are self-interested. They recognize that they are in a bad, bad place right now. It is possible for them to make a strategic calculation that, at minimum, pushes much further to the right whatever potential breakout capacity they may have, and that may turn out to be the best decision for Israel’s security.
This is important because the President here is outlining the diplomatic solution he thinks possible, albeit in the vaguest terms.
What does he mean? Many countries have made the commitment that the President is referring to. They usually do it by signing and ratifying the Non-Proliferation Treaty (or in Latin America the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and agreeing to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. Brazil and Argentina made this commitment in the 1990s. So far as I am aware, no country has agreed to give up enrichment or reprocessing technology–it isn’t even clear what it would mean to do so, since the know-how resides in scientists’ brains and not in any given physical plant.
The trouble with Iran is that it has already signed and ratified the NPT, and apparently violated its commitments by undertaking uranium enrichment outside the inspection regime, according to the IAEA. So President Obama will be looking for additional commitments reflecting a genuine decision by Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, presumably based on the calculation that they would be better off without them.
How could that be? Acquisition of nuclear weapons creates several security dilemmas for Tehran: the United States will target Iran (we have foresworn first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, but not against nuclear weapons states), Israel will not only target Iran but also launch on warning, and other countries in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Egypt?) are likely to begin seriously to pursue nuclear weapons. Acquiring enrichment technology but giving up the nuclear option would provide Iran with a good deal of prestige without creating as many problems.
U.S. intelligence leaks this past week claim that Iran has not in fact made the decision to acquire nuclear weapons, thus leaving the door open to an agreement along the lines the President seems to be suggesting. Iran would have to agree to rigorous and comprehensive IAEA inspections as well as a limit on the degree of enrichment it would undertake well below weapons grade, which is 90 per cent and above.
The question is whether the internal politics of the three countries most directly involved (United States, Iran and Israel) will allow an agreement along these lines. As Martin Indyk points out, they are engaged in a vicious cycle game of chicken: Israel threatens military action, the U.S. ratchets up sanctions to forestall it, Iran doubles down on the nuclear program, causing the Israelis to threaten even more….
If war is to be avoided, someone has to break this cycle, putting a deal on the table. Daniel Levy suggests that Netanyahu is not really committed to Israeli military action but is trying to stiffen Obama’s spine. Obama is constrained because of the American elections from appearing soft on Iran. He has to appear ready and willing to use military force, especially when he appears before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) tomorrow and then meets with Netanyahu Monday.
This leaves a possible initiative to Tehran, which is free to move now that the parliamentary elections have been held. They are likely to mark a defeat for President Ahmedinejad, who has appeared to be the Iranian official most willing to deal on the nuclear program in recent months. Supreme Leader Khamenei is more committed to the game of chicken. He may even think nuclear weapons are necessary to his regime’s survival, a conclusion Indyk thinks is rational in light of what has happened with North Korea on the one hand and Libya on the other.
I have no doubt President Obama is not bluffing, even if he is also trying to leave the door open to a diplomatic denouement. But of course Khamenei could come to the opposite conclusion. Even a successful bombing of its nuclear program will increase Iran’s commitment to getting nuclear weapons, without setting it back more than a year or so from the goal. Let’s hope one or the other–better both–decide to blink and cut a deal that ends Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions definitively and avoids a military effort that will have to be repeated at shorter intervals for a long time to come.
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The revolution needs better terrain
How do you know when the revolutionaries are losing? When the world starts lining up to arm them. The latest to join this parade is the respected former National Security Advisor Steve Hadley, who rightly argues that the moral argument is overwhelming. The problem is that the strategic argument is not.
To his credit, Steve recognizes the counterarguments:
Arming Syrians seeking their freedom would have its costs. Bashar al-Assad will brand it as outside intervention and wrap himself in the Syrian flag. His efforts to rally especially uncommitted Syrians in defense of Syrian sovereignty will further divide an already-riven society. And it may not force the Assad regime from power anytime soon.
He even adds:
Saying that Assad has lost legitimacy and ultimately will fall is cold comfort. The longer this struggle goes on, the more militarized it will become. The more militarized it becomes, the more Syria’s future will be dictated by who has the most guns, not who gets the most votes. Look at the Libyan Transitional National Council’s struggle to control that country’s militias, and contrast that with the more democratic evolution in Tunisia.
And the more militarized the Syrian struggle becomes, the greater the opportunity for al-Qaeda. Events in Somalia and Yemen show how al-Qaeda thrives on chaos and violence. For the sake of preserving human life and a democratic future for Syria, the Assad regime needs to go now.
I agree with all of that, but the fastest and most effective way of making him go quickly is not arming the opposition. That would take years and at best create an insurgency, one that will frighten away the business and minority support that is so vital to the revolution’s success in Syria. There is no sign yet of NATO, U.S. or EU interest in intervening militarily to support it. Historically, most insurgencies are defeated, though it takes a long time for that to happen. That is the worst of all possible worlds for the United States: a lengthy military contest, increasingly fought along sectarian lines, with likely spillover to Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan.
What is the alternative? Those who want to displace Bashar al Assad need to shift the contest from the terrain on which he is strong–the military battlefield–on to the terrain where he is weak: political legitimacy and authority. This requires massive shows of popular support for displacing him, which are impossible under the wartime conditions the regime created in Homs over the past month.
The first requirement is a ceasefire. But a ceasefire is meaningless without neutral observers. The 160 or so Arab League observers/peacekeepers who have been withdrawn since the defeat of the UN Security Council resolution are nowhere near sufficient. Thousands will be needed. Why would Bashar let them in? Because he does not want the responsibility and expense of maintaining law and order, or feeding and housing people in the neighborhoods his forces have battered. He’ll want to keep close tabs on the effort and complain repeatedly about its ineffectiveness.
That’s all right so long as the international presence creates a relatively safe space for the citizens of Syria to begin governing themselves without respecting the authorities in Damascus. There will be less need for strikes or demonstrations–far better to focus on establishing and operating education and health systems that deliver services more effectively than the regime’s, which will have all but disappeared in the most ruined areas. Essentially, the internationals would be helping to create liberated areas. Bashar could object and even attack them, but if he does so he runs a far greater risk of international intervention than he has so far.
International legitimacy is another area in which Bashar is vulnerable. The Russians are the key in that sphere. Here is Putin’s latest:
“We don’t have a special relationship…It is up to the Syrians to decide who should run their country. We need to make sure they stop killing each other….”
Asked if Mr. al-Assad can survive, he said: “I don’t know. I don’t know. It’s obviously a grave problem. The reforms are long awaited and should be carried out. Whether the Syrian government is ready to reach a consensus, I don’t know.”
It is almost quaint for Putin to be talking about an autocratic government needing to reach a consensus, but apart from that false note this gives Bashar al Assad something important to worry about: whether he can hold on to the Russian veto in the Security Council after this weekend’s Russian presidential elections.
Internal and external legitimacy: that is the terrain on which Syria’s citizens need to contest Bashar al Assad.
PS: If you mix demonstrations with regime force, this is what you get (allegedly today in Homs):
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