Month: July 2012
Pristina, again
I’m in Pristina, again. The big question on my mind is about the end of “supervised independence.” Kosovo, according to the International Steering Group that has overseen its progress since independence in February of 2008, has substantially implemented the terms of the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal (Ahtisaari Plan). This will enable the Steering Group to end the supervision conducted by the International Civilian Office, which will go out of business in September.
That is a milestone worth noting. Few international operations of this sort reach a clear end to their responsibilities. The High Representative in Bosnia–the closest equivalent to the International Civilian Office in Kosovo–is still overseeing implementation of the Dayton agreements more than 17 years after they were signed. Kosovo, in order to reach this point, has had to meet a lot of requirements. It has decentralized governance, strengthened legal protection for Serbs and other minorities, improved its legislation and amended its constitution.
Supervised independence is ending, but not the complex regime of limited sovereignty that dates from the end of the war in 1999, well before independence. Kosovo will not be entitled to a proper defense force until next year, and even then NATO will remain essential to the defense of Kosovo’s territory for an undetermined period. An EU rule of law mission will still provide prosecutors and judges, especially in cases of inter-ethnic and organized crime. The UN continues to maintain a mission in Kosovo that plays a limited (I hope diminishing) role in the northern area still under Belgrade’s control. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has helped Kosovo to improve its governance and enabled Serbs there to vote in Serbian elections. Kosovo uses the euro as its currency, thus eliminating the difficult issues that arise from having a sovereign currency of its own.
Some of this chafes, but not all of it. Kosovo is happier to be part of the eurozone than many European Union members. The international prosecutors and judges relieve their Kosovar counterparts of burdensome and dangerous responsibilities. Having the OSCE around is useful if you want Serbs to be able to vote in an election neither Pristina nor Belgrade would feel comfortable arranging.
The more troubling issues concern the north and Kosovo’s defense force. No state can tolerate forever not having control over its entire territory. That is the heart of sovereignty. This applies to both Serbia, which continues to avow (even in its constitution) that all of Kosovo is part of its territory, and to Kosovo, which believes that the north is an integral part of its territory.
This is the kind of conflict that leads to war. It needs to be settled, definitively and peacefully. I can think of no better basis than the Ahtisaari plan, which would provide the Serbs of the north with ample autonomy and self-governance. It is true of course that that is precisely what Belgrade would like to offer the Kosovars, but they were at least 20 years late doing it. It might have been accepted in 1991. Independence, now recognized by 91 other countries, is a film that won’t run backwards.
Establishing Kosovo’s governing authority in the north, even in the weak form envisaged in the Ahtisaari plan, is going to be challenging. Many of the Serbs who live there don’t want it, and Belgrade encourages them to resist. Ivica Dacic, the Serbian prime minister-designate, hopes to hive off the north as compensation for the loss of the rest of Kosovo. No one in the international community wants to see that happen de jure, but no one has been ready to exert the effort to reverse it de facto.
This is related to the question of Kosovo’s future defense forces. A NATO-led force has protected Kosovo since the end of the 1999 war. But what was designed as protection against a Belgrade effort to retake Kosovo is now functioning also as protection against a Pristina effort to retake the north. This is comfortable for Belgrade, but it cannot be expected to last forever. It ties down about 5600 troops, including about 780 Americans.
Supervision is ending. That is to be celebrated. Time to get busy resolving the remaining questions.
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This week’s peace picks
1. Crisis in Syria: What are US Options? Middle East Policy Council, 9:30am-12:00pm, July 23
The Middle East Policy Council invites you and your colleagues to our 69th Capitol Hill Conference. Live streaming of this event will begin at approximately 9:30am EST on Monday, July 23rd and conclude around noon. A questions and answers session will be held at the end of the proceedings. Refreshments will be served. If you are watching the livestream and want to submit a question for one of the speakers, email MEPCQuestions@gmail.com. Please be sure to be concise and specify the speaker you are addressing.
Speakers:
|
Spokesperson, Syrian National Council |
Professor, George Mason University; Author,Leaving without Losing |
|
Senior Adviser, Middle East Initiatives, USIP; Adjunct Professor, Georgetown |
Senior Analyst, Wikistrat |
Moderator:
Executive Director, Middle East Policy Counci
Location: Rayburn House Office Building, Room B338/9
RSVP Acceptances only: (202) 296-6767 or info@mepc.org
Website: http://mepc.org/hill-forums/crisis-syria
2. Police Reform in Pakistan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3:00-5:00 pm July 25
Pakistan’s police force faces formidable challenges, ranging from rising crime rates and sustained terrorist campaigns, to limited resources, inadequate training, and poor management. Despite this reality, policymakers have yet to include the law enforcement sector as a top priority for investment and reform.
In this context, Asia Society Senior Advisor Hassan Abbas and experts from both Pakistan and the United States have collaborated to provide a framework for law enforcement reform throughout the country. The culminating report by the Independent Commission on Pakistan Police Reform is the result of extensive interviews conducted throughout Pakistan with experienced police officials, security analysts, and legal experts, in addition to articles contributed by experts in the field. The report is also informed by Dr. Abbas’s service in Pakistan’s police force in the 1990s and his subsequent research and work on counterterrorism during his academic career in the United States.
In conjunction with the launch of the report, Commission members will discuss the current state of Pakistan’s police force and offer recommendations for enhancing the capacity of police to check the growth of organized crime and conduct critical counterterrorism operations throughout the country.
This event is being held in partnership with the Middle East Institute.
SPEAKERS: Hassan Abbas is a Senior Advisor and Bernard Schwartz Fellow at Asia Society and Professor of International Security Studies at National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs. As a former government official in Pakistan, he served in the administrations of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1995–1996) and President Pervez Musharraf (1999–2000).
Aitzaz Ahsan is a Barrister-at-Law and a Senior Advocate at the Supreme Court of Pakistan. He is a former Federal Minister for Law and Justice, Interior, Narcotics Control, and Education. Elected to the Senate of Pakistan in 1994, he then served as the leader of the House and the leader of the Opposition. He was previously the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association.
Arif Alikhan is Deputy Executive Director for Law Enforcement and Homeland at Los Angeles World Airports and a former Distinguished Professor of Homeland Security and Counterterrorism at National Defense University. He previously served as Assistant Secretary for Policy Development at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and as Deputy Mayor for Homeland Security and Public Safety for the City of Los Angeles.
Wendy Chamberlin (moderator) is President of the Middle East Institute. She previously served as Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees from 2004 to 2007. A 29-year veteran of the U.S. Foreign Service, she was Ambassador to Pakistan from 2001 to 2002.
Location:
1779 Massachusetts Avenue Northwest Washington, DC 20036
Website: http://asiasociety.org/calendars/polic…
3. Bearing Witness to Syria’s Tragedies, New America Foundation, Tuesday, July 24, 2012, 12:15pm-1:45pm
The New America Foundation’s Middle East Task Force and the Syrian American Council invite you to a discussion with Rev. Paolo Dall’Oglio on the situation inside Syria and future prospects for the country.
A month ago, Father Paolo, an Italian Jesuit priest, was expelled by the Syrian government for his work on behalf of the opposition and his outspoken criticism of the government’s repression. Father Paolo left behind a 30 year long legacy of promoting interfaith dialogue, having helped to restore a 1,000 year old monastery in Nebek, north of Damascus, which became a site of Christian and Muslim understanding and welcomed all faiths.
What are the prospects for political and religious unity among the opposition? What is the likely impact of a new Syrian government with much broader ethnic and religious representation should the current Regime fall? What avenues for action does the international community have so long as Russia and China remain opposed to pressure? Father Paolo will speak about the dynamics between different minority groups, the current state of play on the ground, and focus especially on what lies ahead.
PARTICIPANTS
Featured Speaker
Father Paolo Dall’Oglio
Italian Jesuit Priest
Moderator
Leila Hilal
Director, Middle East Task Force
New America Foundation
Location: 1899 L Street NW Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036
Website: http://www.newamerica.net/events/2012/bearing_witness_to_syria_s_tragedies
4. IISS-US Roundtable Discussion-Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Tuesday July 24th, 2-3pm
Michael Elleman is Senior Fellow for Regional Security Cooperation at the IISS-Middle East, located in Bahrain. He previously worked at Booz Allen Hamilton, where he supported Department of Defense, Department of Energy and Defense Threat Reduction Agency programs. Prior to that, he worked for the United National Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission as a missile expert for weapons inspection in Iraq and Lockheed Martin’s Research and Development laboratory. He is a graduate of physics from the University of California, Berkeley.
This meeting was moderated by Andrew Parasiliti, Executive Director, IISS-US and Corresponding Director, IISS-Middle East.
IISS-US events are for IISS members and direct invitees only. For more information, please contact events-washington@iiss.org or (202) 659-1490.
Location: IISS-US, 2121 K Street NW, Suite 801, Washington, DC 20037
Website: http://www.iiss.org/about-us/offices/washington/iiss-us-events/irans-ballistic-missile-capabilities
5. Israel and Egypt: In-Depth Reports from a Changing Region, July 25th, The Washington Institute, 12:30pm-2:00pm
Egypt and Israel, whose chilly peace has long provided an anchor of stability in a troubled area, are responding politically and strategically to powerful forces within their countries and from abroad. Egypt’s new government is a dynamic work in progress. Israel’s broad new coalition government confronts domestic tensions as well as potential threats from the north, south, and east.
During his recent visit to Israel and Ramallah in the Palestinian Authority, David Makovsky interviewed top political and military leaders who shared their thoughts on the Arab Spring, Syria, Iranian nuclearization, and peacemaking. Eric Trager spent the past month in Egypt, where he met with the emerging leadership of the Egyptian government, opposition members, diplomats, and academics.
Makovsky and Trager will provide a detailed account of evolving events and highlight potential hotspots for U.S. policymakers on July 25, 2012, in Washington DC. The discussion begins at 12:30 p.m.
Request an invitation to this event.
Location: 1828 L Street NW Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036
6. The Obama and Romney Foreign Policy Agendas: A Discussion with the Candidate’s Leading Advisors, Brookings Institution, 2:00pm-3:30pm, July 25th, 2012
On July 23 and July 24, President Barack Obama and Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney will address the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention, laying out their foreign, defense and national security agendas just weeks before the national political conventions. Following his speech, Governor Romney will depart on a multi-country overseas trip, with stops in Britain, Israel, and other possible destinations in Europe. These campaign events come as the crisis in Syria dissolves into civil war, the European economic crisis continues to unfold, and U.S. troops prepare to leave Afghanistan.
On July 25, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host a discussion examining the foreign policy, defense and national security agendas of candidates Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, featuring Michele Flournoy, co-chair of the National Security Advisory Committee for Obama for America and Rich Williamson, senior adviser for foreign and defense policy for Romney for President, Inc. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, will provide introductory remarks. Brookings Guest Scholar Marvin Kalb will moderate the discussion.
After the program, speakers will take audience questions.
EVENT AGENDA
- Introduction
Vice President and Director
Foreign Policy
- Moderator
Guest Scholar
Foreign Policy
- Featured Speakers
- Michele Flournoy
Co-Chair, National Security Advisory Committee
Obama for America
- Rich Williamson
Senior Adviser for Foreign and Defense Policy
Romney for President, Inc.
Location: Brookings Institution, Falk Auditorium, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Website: http://www.brookings.edu/events/2012/07/25-obama-romney-adviser
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What if Syria needs peacekeepers?
With each deterioration of the situation in Syria, I wonder how we could possibly see a democratic transition there–or any kind of transition that isn’t catastrophic–without an international peacekeeping presence. Then I take a glance at Jim Dobbins’ cheat sheet for calculating the size of a peacekeeping mission.
I blanch. Assuming the heavy peace enforcement model will be required–because there are well-armed and active warring parties on the ground–Syria would require upwards of 300,000 international personnel (more than 80% of them military) in an operation costing about $60 billion per year. This is a lot of people and a lot of money. Even the light peacekeeping model would require upwards of 35,000 internationals and over $6 billion per year. That’s still a lot of people and money, though far more feasible than the heavier version.
Peacekeeping for Syria is something we need to be thinking about. Sure, Libya got off without it. But Libya is a far smaller and richer country in which the army evaporated rather than fight Qaddafi’s battles. Egypt didn’t need it either, because the revolution turned the transition over to the army. The Syrian army is not evaporating, and it is unlikely to inherit the revolution except by coup d’etat.
Once Bashar al Assad is gone, it and its paramilitary adjuncts will have to be separated from the Free Syrian Army and other assorted revolutionary fighters. Then both will need to undergo the painstaking processes known as DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) and SSR (security sector reform), shrinking their numbers, unifying their command and improving their responsiveness to civilian authority. International peacekeepers will, well, keep the peace in the meanwhile, hoping to see the quick emergence of a disciplined Syrian police force and military the population will appreciate.
The likely need for peacekeepers is one of many reasons why it is important to keep the UN monitoring mission (the UN Supervision Mission in Syria, or UNSMIS) in place. As of the end of June, UNSMIS had 278 military observers, 81 international civilian staff and 40 Syrian staff in place. They have not been able to supervise a ceasefire that has never taken effect or monitor implementation of the Annan peace plan, which is a dead letter. But they have greatly enhanced the visibility of what is going on in Syria and assigned responsibility for some of the worst abuses to the Asad regime.
They would also be a good advance party for an international peacekeeping force. The UN is a relatively effective and economical mechanism for peacekeeping, but its deployments are notoriously slow. Keeping UNSMIS in place would enable a much faster deployment than usual, even if the UN is not put in charge. The UNSMIS personnel could be “rehatted” to another organization (Arab League?) or a coalition of the willing.
The UN Security Council this week extended UNSMIS for a month, with the fairly clear intention of terminating it if progress is not made in implementing a ceasefire and the Annan plan. Many are arguing that its inability to perform its mandated tasks means it should be withdrawn. Carne Ross tweeted yesterday:
Extension of
#Syria UN monitoring mission a mistake; plays to Russian game; better 2 do nothing than pretend 2 do something
I don’t see it that way. In fact UNSMIS has been useful, especially in assigning responsibility for atrocities. The Asad regime will not be unhappy to see UNSMIS withdrawn. Let’s see how the situation evolves, but keeping UNSMIS in place to provide whatever visibility it can and hasten deployment of a larger peacekeeping contingent sounds wise to me.
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The Swiss cheese plan for Syria
I’ve been remiss in not discussing the final statement for the Syrian opposition conference, issued in Cairo July 3. This includes two documents:
- a “national compact” that attempts to lay out in very general terms the constitutional basis for a pluralistic, republican and democratic Syria;
- a “compatibility document” that addresses the challenges of the transition period.
The translation leaves a great deal to be desired, but some of the essentials are clear enough:
- the opposition is united in seeking a democratic transition;
- the Asad regime will have to step down, aside or wherever before the transition begins.
The 210 participants in the conference included but were not limited to the Syrian National Council, whose utility has come increasingly into doubt. It simply does not appear to represent all the indigenous forces at work in Syria, where local coordinating committees, the Free Syria Army and various other political forces are driving the rebellion that has left Bashar al Asad hanging on by a thread.
There is not much to elicit comment in the national compact. It is unimpeachable as far as it goes, including in dealing with sensitive issues. All Syrians are created equal, including especially women. The people are the source of legitimacy and sovereignty. Kurdish nationality is recognized, “within the framework of the unity of the Syrian nation.” Ditto Assyrians and Turkmen. Syria is nevertheless part of the Arab world. The state will be decentralized (not federalized), protect private property, safeguard public funds, provide many services at affordable prices…. As aspirational documents go, this is a good one, though it leaves to be settled in the future all the difficult issues of how power is to be distributed, rights guaranteed and abuses punished.
The document on the transition period offers a clearer idea of what the opposition has in mind for the next phase than has been available so far but leaves a lot still to be decided.
The “removal” phase envisages no negotiation. Bashar al Asad is to be toppled by force and the regime (not clear exactly how deep this is to go) held accountable for its crimes.
In the transition phase that follows the decapitation of the regime, a caretaker government is to be formed, the ruling Ba’ath party is dissolved, the parliament dismissed. A national conference of some sort then ratifies a new but temporary legislative body (not clear how selected), and a technocratic transitional government formed. The temporary legislative body issues a constitutional declaration for the transitional period. The transitional government and the temporary legislative body hold elections for a constituent (constitution-writing) assembly within one year. It forms a new government, somehow writes a new constitution and gets it approved in a referendum within six months.
This Swiss cheese plan has a lot of holes. Who attends the national conference that ratifies a temporary legislative body chosen by whom? Who writes the constitutional declaration and the new constitution? What sort of majority is needed to approve the constitutional referendum? This is far less complete than the plan prepared by the Libyan Transitional National Council, a plan that has helped to stabilize a country many thought would have great difficulty transitioning towards democracy. Some things–the rules governing the election, for example–can be left open for later decision. But it is hard to see how this plan even begins if there are not clear ideas about who is to participate in the initial national conference. And it is easy to see how it could falter, even degenerating into to internecine violence among different revolutionary factions competing for primacy.
Let’s hope I am wrong. Clarity about the democratic objective is helpful, as is unity in the demand that the regime be decapitated before the transition begins, even if it ensures for the moment continuation of the regime’s horrendous effort to suppress the rebellion. But I hope someone is using the time this provides to fill in all those holes.
I hope also someone is making sure that Syrians in Syria feel comfortable with this plan. It won’t be worth the electrons it uses on the internet unless it is truly owned by those who are conducting this revolution.
PS: One can hope that the nongovernmental “day after” project does better than the more “official” opposition plan in defining the how of the political transition, but we’ll only know when we see this hyped but not published document.
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You know things are bad
You know things are bad when you lay siege to your own capital. They are worse if the rebels seize border posts. The worst is if you flee to your ancestral homeland, with the apparent intention of making a last stand there. It’s even bad if no one knows where you are. And its over the top bad if you start moving your chemical weapons, either to use them or to prevent them from falling into rebel hands.
Yes, Bashar al Asad’s days are numbered, but it is still unclear how many people he will kill before he meets his end. Even after he is gone, Syria could implode in a frenzy of violence. Bashar’s Alawite co-religionists are trying to carve out an enclave in the west, bombarding and murdering nearby Sunnis in the process. Damascenes are leaving for safer ground. Kurds are organizing themselves. Christians and Druze face a risky choice: Bashar, who has tolerated them, or a rebellion that may be far more Islamic than they will be able to tolerate.
An implosion inside Syria will necessarily have a broad impact in the region. Turkey is already hosting upwards of 100,000 refugees and supplying the rebels inside Syria. Jordan and Lebanon are also burdened with Syrians fleeing the violence. The refugee presence has aggravated sectarian tensions inside Lebanon, where Sunnis are anxious to support the Syrian rebellion while Shia (and Hizbullah) are standing by Bashar. Iraq has closed its border posts where the rebels have taken over, in an apparent effort to prevent the Sunni population of western Iraq from aiding the rebellion in Syria. The impact will be minimal: that border is like a sieve.
The Russian and Chinese veto yesterday of still another modest Security Council resolution has guaranteed that Bashar will not hear a unified international community voice asking him to step down. The Russians have doubled their bet on the regime and now stand to lose alliance, port and arms sales if the rebellion succeeds. The hopes of many, including me, that they would abandon ship when it became apparent that it was sinking are not being realized.
The Americans are providing both rhetorical and real, covert support to the rebellion, whose success would be a major blow against American enemies Hizbullah and Iran. But they have done little to prevent the kind of chaotic implosion that would spoil the triumph. They seem concerned mainly with the possible use of chemical weapons. My own guess–but it is only a guess–is that Bashar will find it hard to convince his soldiers to use them. It is difficult for soldiers, especially in 100+ degree weather, to protect themselves from chemical weapons. The soldiers will know how indiscriminate the effects are.
It is not clear how the international community would react to the use of chemical weapons. I might hope that would change some minds in Moscow and Beijing, but I’ve begun to wonder. It looks as if this is a challenge the current international system will fail to meet. The outcome will be decided by violence inside Syria. It is not going to be pretty.
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The end of Asad
The Daily Mail, admittedly not my favorite source, reports that Syrian President Bashar al Asad is in Latakia, as the Washington Post’s Liz Sly also confirmed this morning, and that his wife Asma has fled to Russia. If true, we are close to the end of the Asad regime, which is not going to be able to hold Syria from the hinterlands of its fifth largest city. Even there, the urban population is majority Sunni. Only its rural districts are majority Alawite.
But that does not mean Syria is at the end of its travails. Disorder, even chaos and sectarian war, could make what we’ve seen so far pale. Refugees are reportedly pouring across Syria’s borders. The country is broke. Its army and paramilitaries are bristling with arms and lashing out against their opponents. Rumors that the regime is about to use chemical weapons are unsettling, even if untrue. If true, the results could be catastrophic and precipitate an abrupt international military effort. The Syrian state could crumble and fragment even as its territory is divided among religious and ethnic groups.
Neither the Syrian opposition nor the international community seems well-prepared for the moment. The Syrian National Council lacks a clear vision. The Free Syrian Army, while claiming the bombing that killed the defense minister and other Asad regime luminaries, is not a single, coherent force but an agglomeration of franchisees. The UN Security Council has been unable for weeks to come up a unified reaction to the Asad regime’s blatant violations of the Annan plan, despite ample testimony from the UN observer team on the ground in Syria. Russian support for Asad has been faltering, but Moscow has been unwilling to tell him he has to step down. The Americans have offered rhetorical and covert support to the revolution but have stopped short of bucking the Russians with overt military intervention.
There are two places to watch today: New York and Damascus.
The Security Council has an opportunity to mend its rift and speak with a single voice in favor of a political transition that begins with Bashar al Asad stepping down. Sanctions should be stiffened, with a clear commitment to ending them quickly if a democratic transition is begun. The UN observers should be authorized to stay and a commitment made to increasing their number if conditions permit. The Secretariat should be asked to begin preparations for a possible peace keeping operation.
In Damascus, the issue is whether the regime will hold or implode. If it implodes, the Free Syria Army should show its mettle by restoring order quickly. They won’t be able to prevent a big celebration, but they should try to get the city back to something like normal in a day or two, without the revenge killing and sectarian cleansing that some will want to indulge in. If the regime holds in Damascus despite the odds, we are in for an unpleasant siege that could leave many thousands of Syrians dead and wounded before order is restored, who knows how.
The odds of an even remotely orderly transition in Syria are low. But best to try.
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