Month: February 2013
This week’s peace picks
Three Afghanistan events in within two days, two Iran events on successive days. Hard to believe the thinktanks are thinking hard about audience, but it’s an ample week:
1. Does Afghanistan’s Reconstruction Have a Future?, Monday February 4, 9:30 AM-10:30 AM, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, B1 A/B Conference Room, 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006
Speakers: John F. Sopko, Robert D Lamb
The CSIS Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation (C3) invites you to the launch of SIGAR’s Quarterly Report: “Does Afghanistan’s Reconstruction Have a Future? Hard Questions” by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Please join Special Inspector Sopko for a discussion about his recent visit to Afghanistan and SIGAR’s Quarterly Report launch to Congress. The observations from his trip mirror the message of the report: the United States faces very tough questions about the future of its reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. As the United States and allies prepare to transfer security and other responsibilities to the Afghan government, will civilian reconstruction efforts have the same security they need to continue? How will projects be monitored and progress measured? Above all, what are the objectives of civilian reconstruction and can the United States provide the support needed to achieve them?
To RSVP please email csima@csis.org
Follow live tweeting from @CSISC3 #SIGAR
Website: http://csis.org/event/does-afghanistan…
2. Afghanistan 2014: Planning for the Transition, Monday February 4, 12:15 PM-1:45 PM, New America Foundation
Venue: New America Foundation, 1899 L St., NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: Saad Mohseni, Peter Bergen
Many wonder if Afghanistan can succeed as a stable, self-sustaining country when NATO completes its combat mission at the end of 2014. Afghanistan continues to rely on massive amounts of foreign aid, and its fledgling security forces are now taking the reins of a tough military campaign against well-entrenched insurgents. But some Afghans remain confident that their nation will pull through. Saad Mohseni, Chairman of the Moby Group, is among those who are confident in the country. His company’s portfolio includes Tolo TV, the leading broadcaster in Afghanistan, and he has been described as Afghanistan’s first media mogul. Please join the New America Foundation’s National Security Studies Program for a conversation with Mohseni about the reasons for his bullishness on Afghanistan’s future.
Director, National Security Studies Program, New America Foundation
Website: http://www.newamerica.net/events/2013/…
3. The United States and Central Asia After 2014, Tuesday February 5, 4:00 PM- 6:00 PM, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Basement Level Conference Rooms A & B, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K St, NW, Washington, DC, 20006
Speakers: Jeffrey Mankoff, Thomas E. Graham, Frederick Starr, Andrew Kuchins
With the drawdown of international forces from Afghanistan in 2014, Central Asia will cease to be a region of pressing strategic focus in U.S. global strategy. This shift threatens to undermine the region’s precarious stability, which could in turn create new problems for the United States and the broader international community. Thus the United States must recast its strategy in Central Asia to address potential threats from within the region while also seeking productive engagement with other external players, including Russia and China.
The new report from the CSIS Russia & Eurasia Program, “The United States and Central Asia After 2014,” offers a number of useful recommendations grounded in regional realities that can help advance U.S. engagement in Central Asia and promote security cooperation, political stability, and sustainable regional economic growth.
Dr. Jeffrey Mankoff
Deputy Director and Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program at CSIS
Discussants:
Thomas E. Graham
Managing Director, Kissinger Associates, Inc.
S. Frederick Starr
Chairman, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
Senior Research Professor, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Moderated by:
Dr. Andrew Kuchins
Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program at CSIS
Website: http://csis.org/event/united-states-an…
4. Dealing with a Nuclear Iran, Wednesday February 6, 8:30 AM- 12:30 PM, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K St, NW, Washington DC 20006
Speakers: John Hamre, Olli Heinonen, James Cartwright, Jon Alterman, Andrew Kuchins, Haim Malka and more
Both the Bush and Obama administrations have attempted to end the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program. Most outside parties fear the implications of Iran growing closer to a real nuclear weapons capability, including how security is calculated throughout the Middle East. The prospect of an Iranian bomb is so daunting that several countries-including the United States-have indicated a willingness to use military action to set back the Iranian effort, and the consequences of such a strike could themselves shake the foundations of diplomatic and security relationships throughout the Middle East.
With the U.S. and Israeli elections over, and with Iranian elections looming, are there alternatives to a steady Iranian march toward a nuclear weapons capacity? Is it possible to envision a solution or process that could be acceptable to Iran, the United States and its allies, other permanent members of the UN Security Council and Iran’s neighbors? If so, what would it look like and how should it be pursued? What steps should be taken to make it more likely that it is part of a genuine process of de-escalation rather than merely marking time until Iran acquires a weapon?
Please join us on Wednesday, February 6th for a half-day forum with CSIS experts to consider what successful solutions might require from Iran, the United States and other key states.
Please RSVP to the Proliferation Prevention Program at PPP@csis.org or (202) 457-8768.
8:30am-8:45am
WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION
Dr. John Hamre, President and CEO, CSIS
8:45am-9:15am
A conversation with Dr. Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University and Sharon Squassoni, Director, Proliferation Prevention Program
9:15am-9:45am
A conversation with General James Cartwright (USMC, Ret.), Harold Brown Chair in Defense Policy Studies and Dr. Jon Alterman, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and Director, Middle East Program
BREAK
10:00am-11:00am
Middle East Equities (Moderated by Dr. Andrew Kuchins, Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program)
The view from Israel, Mr. Haim Malka, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, CSIS
The view from the Gulf, Dr. Jon Alterman, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and Director, Middle East Program
11:00am-12:30pm
Allies and Others (Moderated by Sharon Squassoni, Director, Proliferation Prevention Program)
Panelists:
European interests, Ms. Heather Conley, Senior Fellow and Director, Europe Program
Russian interests, Dr. Andrew Kuchins, Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program,
Sanctions impact and oil markets – Mr. David Pumphrey, Co-Director and Senior Fellow, Energy & National Security Program
Website: http://csis.org/event/dealing-nuclear-…
6. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Economic Reform to Prosperity for Fiscal Collapse and What to Do About It?, Wednesday February 6, 10:00 AM- 12:00 PM, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Venue: Bernstein-Offit Building, Johns Hopkins SAIS, 1717 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington DC 500
Speakers: Enes Cengic, Mujo Selimovic, Goran Nedic, Dominik Tolksdorf, Jonathan Moore, Daniel Serwer, Zivko Budimir
Enes Cengic, CEO of Energoinvest; Mujo Selimovic, CEO of MIMS Group; Goran Nedic, executive board member of the America-Bosnia Foundation; Dominik Tolksdorf, TAPIR and Security Fellow at the SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations (CTR); Jonathan Moore, director of the Office of South Central European Affairs at the U.S. Department of State; and Daniel Serwer (moderator), SAIS CTR senior fellow and senior research professor in the Conflict Management Program, will discuss this topic. Zivko Budimir, president of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, will deliver opening remarks.
Website: http://sais-jhu.edu/events/2013-02-06-…
7. Moving to Decision: US Policy toward Iran, Thursday February 7, 12:00 PM- 2:00 PM, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Venue: Stern Library and Conference Room, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW Suite 1050, Washington DC 20036
Speakers: Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Ambassador James F. Jeffrey
All signs point to 2013 being a year of decision on Iran. In particular, the Obama administration must crystallize its diplomatic and military options for confronting the challenge, which includes making the president’s “prevention” threat credible in the absence of clear redlines and addressing concerns that a pivot to Asia could leave America militarily exposed in a confrontation.
To help U.S. policymakers prepare for the weighty choices that will emerge in the coming weeks and months, The Washington Institute will release a new report assessing the diplomatic, military, and broader strategic response to Tehran’s nuclear activities.
To mark the publication of this study, the Institute will host a Policy Forum luncheon with Ambassador Thomas Pickering and the report’s author, Ambassador James F. Jeffrey.
Thomas Pickering is a former career U.S. diplomat who served with distinction for five decades. His many posts included undersecretary of state for political affairs and ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Nigeria, Jordan, and El Salvador, among other key assignments in Washington and abroad. Currently, he is vice chair of the international consulting firm Hills & Company.
James F. Jeffrey is a distinguished visiting fellow at The Washington Institute and former U.S. ambassador to Turkey (2008-2010) and Iraq (2010-2012). He also served as assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor in the George W. Bush administration.
Website: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pol…
8. The Battle for Syria, Friday February 8, 12:15 PM- 2:00 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave, NW Washington DC, 20036
Speakers: Karim Sadjadpour, Paul Sham, Frederic Hof, Henri Barkey, Emile Hokayem
As Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad mercilessly clings to power, proxy battles among neighboring countries-namely Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and Qatar-are helping determine which armed factions will emerge victorious from the rubble. What role are external powers playing in Syria’s political and humanitarian crisis, how is Assad’s unraveling affecting regional power dynamics, and what are the implications for U.S. policy?
Website: http://carnegieendowment.org/events/?f…
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Adagio
There is slow movement, adagio not andante, on two fronts, Syria and the Iran nuclear issue:
- Syrian opposition leader Moaz al Khatib’s proposal for conditional talks with the regime has elicited some interest on the part of Syria, Iran and Russia.
- The P5+1 (that’s the US, UK, France, Russia and China + Germany) have agreed to meet with Iran to discuss nuclear issues February 25 in Kazakhstan. The US and Iran are indicating willingness to meet bilaterally as well.
There is no breakthrough here. These are small steps forward at the glacial pace that often characterizes diplomatic moves. But given how frozen things seemed on both fronts even a few days ago, this is progress.
On Syria, Khatib’s proposal was a personal one, made initially on his Facebook page without approval of his Coalition. It reflects in part the view of the National Coordination Committee, which is an inside Syria opposition group that has long wanted to start a dialogue with the regime. The expatriate opposition was not pleased with the proposition. My guess is that the Americans are okay with it, even though they continue to insist that Bashar al Asad step aside.
Dialogue could lead to a split in the regime between hawks who want to continue the crackdown and doves who see promise in talking with the opposition. Of course it could also lead to a similar split in the opposition, with hardline Islamists opting to continue the fighting and relative moderates interested in talking. The key issue is whether Bashar is prepared to leave power. If not, dialogue with the regime is likely to become a snare and a delusion, wrecking the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces that Khatib leads.
On Iran’s nuclear program, the outline of a deal is increasingly clear:
- limits on uranium enrichment (e.g., an end to Iranian enrichment above 20%, shipment out of the country of stockpile uranium enriched beyond 5%, and likely also something restricting plutonium production, which has not been much of a public issue so far);
- a serious, verifiable and irreversible commitment not to develop nuclear weapons (including “coming clean” on past nuclear weapons-related activities);
- an end to American and multilateral economic and financial sanctions.
It is the sequencing of the many steps that need to be taken to get to this result that has caused so much difficulty. The Americans and Europeans want the nuclear commitments implemented up front. The Iranians want sanctions relief first. Lack of trust makes compromise difficult, but it would not seem completely out of reach, provided Iran is prepared to make a serious and verifiable commitment not to develop nuclear weapons.
What we’ve got here are two instances of coercive diplomacy, where outside powers are bringing pressure to bear in order to end one regime and to curtail fundamentally the options available to another one. The odds of success are not high, since the regimes involved have a good deal at stake (and are allied with each other). Bashar al Asad would have to come to the conclusion that his life is worth more than his position. Tehran would have to come to the conclusion that regime survival is more likely if it accepts limits on its nuclear program than if it rejects them.
On the other side, the key ingredient is credibility.
The Americans and Europeans need to convince Bashar that they are fully committed to end his rule. To do so, they need to back more fully and visibly Khatib’s Coalition, making it a serious governing alternative to the Syrian regime. This is more important now than arms supplies, which seem to be reaching the rebellion in substantial if not overwhelming quantities.
Washington and Brussels also need to convince Tehran that they will tighten sanctions further if there is no nuclear deal. And Washington needs to make the threat of military force more credible than it appeared at former Senator Hagel’s confirmation hearing last week.
Even if talks with the Syrian regime and with the Iranians begin soon, at this pace we still have a long way to go before we can be certain of acceptable outcomes on either front. But slow movement is better than none.
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Straight shooting
The White House wants you to know the President can shoot straight:
I take the occasion to confess that I enjoy shooting guns too. I learned to shoot as a pre-teen at summer camp. Somewhere I’ve got the National Rifle Association marksman medals to prove it. A few years ago I had an opportunity during a State Department security course to try it again. Squeeeeeze. Definitely fun.
But learning to shoot, knowing how to shoot and enjoying shooting do not translate into owning a gun. Why not? Because
a) having one around the house is a big responsibility;
b) there is only a miniscule probability that I would be able to use one to good effect when faced with a threat.
I don’t really mind if well-trained and reasonable people have them around the house, provided they are more confident they can use them effectively than I am. But a gun is at least as dangerous as a car. It should be kept locked. You should have a license that requires you to meet some minimal criteria: sanity and competence in gun safety would be my primary candidates. There should be no loopholes.
I am a good deal less comfortable with people carrying guns around town, whether in the open or concealed. I can find no substantial evidence for the assertion that this reduces crime. And it makes life for law enforcement personnel far more difficult. In recent mass shootings, I don’t remember an instance of someone intervening to good effect with a weapon they happened to be carrying. Even if you are carrying a gun, using it against someone during a crime is not a sure thing: it will attract the criminal’s most homicidal instincts and it may even bring a hail of gunfire from law enforcement, mistaking the gun toter for a miscreant.
The issue of “carrying” is one on which people in different parts of the United States tend to disagree. There are big east/west and urban/rural divides. I really don’t care if people in Texas want to carry guns. But then I find it difficult to understand why they should care if here in DC we don’t want people carrying guns. This is something that states should regulate.
But that leaves open the question of what kind of gun should be allowed. If people start driving around in battle tanks or “technicals,” claiming that they have the right under the second amendment, I’m pretty sure the authorities (even in Texas) will find a way of limiting the firepower a citizen can appear with on the street. Assault weapons are lower on the firepower spectrum. I don’t really see any reason why all the states should necessarily choose the same limit, but there are obvious practical advantages if they do. Assault weapons aren’t going to stay only in the states in which they are legal.
There are so many guns already in circulation in the United States (upwards of 300 million) that it is going to be hard to keep them out of the wrong hands and hard to keep them out of some states and not others. There are good reasons in some places for people to keep guns, provided they do so meeting some safety standards. But I sure would like to be able to trace a gun used in a crime back to its owner. We make that relatively easy with cars by requiring license plates. Ballistic fingerprinting of bullets, or marking them so that they are identifiable, is possible. I can hear the outcry from the gun lobby already, but think about a world in which cars did not carry license plates. There would be an outcry against the requirement, but it would certainly be fully justified.
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Afghanistan’s economic transition
Laurentina Cizza reports:
“Transformational development” is not something we generally associate with Afghanistan. Yet that was the term Alex Thier, Assistant to the Administrator and Director of the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs at USAID, used to describe Afghan social and economic development over the past decade.
Thier opened the Center for American Progress panel on “Afghanistan’s Economic Transition,” which focused on the role of the US and the international community in the transition toward a sustainable political outcome that safeguards its development progress. The panel, composed of the former Afghan Ambassador to the US Said Jawad and Clare Lockhart, Co-Founder and CEO, Institute for State Effectiveness, concluded that to help safeguard Afghan stability, the US and it’s allies should shape economic assistance to reduce dependence on foreign aid and foster a sustainable, private-sector led economy.
Thier’s keynote speech made three main points:
1) US and allies’ investments in Afghan civilians fostered tremendous development in a mere ten years.
Since 2001 Afghanistan’s GDP increased ten-fold from $2 billion to $20 billion. Although poverty in Afghanistan still runs deep, this rise in GDP brought the country’s per capita income up from $100 a year to $600 a year. Ten years ago life expectancy in Afghanistan averaged about 42 years, one of the lowest ranking countries in the world. Any form of basic health care could reach a mere 6% of the population. In this past decade, life expectancy rose 15 to 20 years and investment in low-cost distributive health care increased access ten-fold, now reaching 64% of Afghans.
Education also underwent a transformation. In 2002, a mere 900,000 boys attended school. Today, of the 8 million children that attend school, 37% are girls.
2) Maintaining these gains is critical for the future stability of Afghanistan.
Although flaws permeate the political, economic, and educational systems, millions of Afghans are now stakeholders in a government responsible for the successful delivery of many services. A USAID fragility analysis found that abrupt interruption of global resources to Afghanistan would increase the risk of a return to conflict by 15%. Although politics and security remain more decisive factors in Afghanistan’s stability, economic growth plays a fundamental role as Afghans attain unprecedented degrees of agency.
3) USAID today has changed its investment strategies to amplify the impact and sustainability of its efforts.
USAID’s new approach involves three main tenets: promoting economic growth with a strong emphasis on agriculture, maintenance of the gains made in the past decade, and developing Afghan capacity to sustain these gains. However, the “how” trumps the “what” in this new investment approach. Thier emphasized USAID’s focus on cost-effectiveness and accountability.
Today, the Afghan government delivers 50% of USAID development resources. Agreements like the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework hammer out the details of what Afghans and the international community must continue delivering to keep the investment and aid forthcoming. USAID programs like the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan Initiative vet partners and limit subcontracting to ensure US taxpayer dollars don’t go to waste. This investment strategy aims to create a path for Afghanistan, alleviating the uncertainty the country faces in 2014 and beyond.
Jawad’s overall message was simple: the Afghans need assurance. Assurance that 2014 will not represent an abrupt break. Uncertainty more than insecurity represents Afghans’ more immediate fear. Reducing dependence on foreign aid and transitioning toward a private sector led economy should be the priority.
Lockhart insisted that the paradigm in Afghanistan should shift from aid to development. Although US support will remain critical, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank will take on increasingly critical roles. She warned that getting the right design for aid is of fundamental importance. Continued investment in human capital that helps the private and social sectors get on their feet is crucial for creating an environment that doesn’t drive citizens to destabilize the state.
Development cannot be forced, and Afghans must want it more than we do. Afghan ownership of the challenge is the only path toward endogenous growth. Our role now is to re-assure Afghans that the world will not abandon them come 2014.
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Grasping at last straws
UN Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi is said to have offered the UN Security Council on Thursday a “Plan C” for Syria along the following lines:
1. Syria’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity must be preserved.
2. A recognition that ultimate objective is for Syrians to have a full say in the way they are governed.
3. The formation of a transition government with “full executive powers.” Brahimi says he believes that means President Bashar al Assad “would have no role in the transition.”
4. Both sides would need to be represented by broad group of opposition leaders and strong military-civilian delegation from the Syrian government.
5. Negotiations should occur outside of Syria, and conform with a timetable setting out a speedy path towards elections, constitutional reform, and a referendum. He raised the prospect of moving from a presidential system of government to a parliamentarian system.
6. He urged the U.N. Security Council to unequivocally express support for the right of each citizen in Syria “to enjoy full equality before the law irrespective of gender, religion, language or ethnicity.”
This is more a slight elaboration last June’s Geneva communiqué than it is a new plan.
The leader of the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, Moaz al Khatib, appeared open to this when he let it be known that he would be prepared to meet with Syrian government representatives in one of a number of Middle East capitals, provided political prisoners were released and Syrians abroad permitted to renew their passports. His Coalition was not happy though and has instructed him not to agree to anything without their approval.
So it is no surprise that meetings of some sort will occur on the margins of the “Wehrkunde” (Munich Security) conference on Saturday involving the al Khatib, Brahimi, the Russians and the Americans. But it would be foolish to express any optimism that a political solution will be found. The disappointments–Kofi Annan’s as well as Brahimi’s–have been many.
The vital question remains whether the Russians are willing and able to push Bashar al Asad aside and open the door to a democratic transition that he does not control. There are doubts on both scores. While Moscow officials often claim they are not trying to protect Asad, President Putin seems unwilling to give him a shove. This could reflect incapacity, or at least fear of it. But I doubt that. If the Russians were to cut off arms supply, financing and diplomatic support, Bashar would be unlikely to last long. More likely, it reflects Russian unwillingness to let the transition in Syria get out of Moscow’s grasp.
While nominally there is still a debate in Washington about intervention, I am still not seeing signs that the Obama Administration is seriously considering upping its game in Syria. I suppose we really need to see the new Secretaries of State and Defense in place before we can be sure, but both have given every indication in their confirmation testimony that they are likely to be at least as cautious about U.S. military action as their predecessors. Boots on the ground have long been ruled out, but Kerry and Hagel don’t seem likely to me to go for a no fly zone or even direct U.S. military supplies.
I still hope they will however see their way to strong political and financial support for the Syrian Coalition. Al Khatib has stuck his neck out in an effort to give Brahimi something to work with. The Americans and Europeans should be helping him to preserve his leadership role by giving him the resources needed to set up a transition government that can carry out the dialogue he said he was open to. If we fail to support him, we’ll regret it. The alternatives are far more hardline. And continuation of the war in Syria is not in our interest.
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Copts at risk
With the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power, the fate of Egypt’s non-Muslim minorities, especially the substantial Coptic minority, is uncertain. This week the Institute of World Politics discussed “The Rise of Islamists: The Challenges to Egypt’s Copts.” Samuel Tadros and Nina Shea discussed discrimination against Copts in pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary Egypt as well as the future perils, as manifested by the experiences of other religious minorities in the region.
Samuel Tadros, Research Fellow at the Center for Religious Freedom of the Hudson Institute, is an Egyptian Copt. He focused on the situation within Egypt, where in the Mubarak era the interaction of four factors ensured discrimination against Copts:
- the Egyptian state, while claiming to protect minorities, treated the Copts as a collective rather than as equal citizens;
- the Islamists viewed Copts as a challenge to Egyptian identity;
- the Egyptian religious establishment;
- society at large.
Post-revolution, exclusion from positions of authority in the police, the army, and intelligence service has continued. New factors include collapse of the state, which has removed constraints on anti-Copt behavior, the rise of emboldened Islamists, the filing in court of blasphemy cases, and an increase in attacks on Christians. The country’s new constitution, with its many loopholes and Sharia-based limitations to freedoms, will make religious minorities worse off than before. Tadros concluded his discussion:
It is not Christians as individuals who are being attacked. It is any manifestation of Christianity.
Nina Shea, Director of the Center for Religious Freedom of the Hudson Institute, focused her attention on discrimination against religious minorities and sectarian-related violence in the region. The situation is not just a human rights issue but also a security issue. The Islamists could pose additional security threats to the region if members of Al Qaeda find a place among radical Salafis. Shea also said:
If Copts disappear, the region will be Islamized for the first time in history.
In her view, it is the responsibility of the US government to ensure the well-being of religious minorities. It should halt its military aid to Egypt until it can ensure that no massacres like the Maspero killing of Christian protestors by the military forces in 2011 will occur again. Shea thought there might be systematic violence against the Copts, suggesting that another Iraq may develop in Egypt and that the Copts might even “disappear.” Any sectarian strife in Egypt would destabilize the country and have spill-over effects throughout an already turbulent region. Tadros thought that genocide would not occur but that mass emigration may take place. A Coptic exodus would undermine pluralism in the Middle East.
It went unremarked, but is important to note, that the Islamists are not only a threat to the Coptic community. They also represent a threat to Muslims who have different interpretations of Islam or seek to incorporate Islamic norms with non-Islamic ones. Egypt’s Islamists seek to monopolize the right of interpreting and defining what is and what is not Islamic. Their rise is not only a threat to a certain community or group of Egyptians, but rather to Egyptian identity as developed over more than 7,000 years of history.
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