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“Il potere logora chi non ce l’ha”

As I am about to risk denunciation for drawing unreasonable parallels, let me state up front that Turkey is not Egypt, Egypt is not Libya, Libya is not Tunisia, Tunisia is not Syria, Syria is not Yemen, Yemen is not Morocco or Kuwait.  If there is one thing we’ve learned from the Arab awakenings, it is that each finds its own course within a particular historical and cultural tradition.  Distinct political, economic, social and religious conditions are like the soil and rocks through which a river finds its way to the sea.  It is difficult to predict the water’s course as gravity pulls it in the inevitable direction.

That said, it seems to me we are seeing in the Middle East a common factor, perhaps a bit like the granite that forces water to find another difficult-to-predict direction.  That common factor is the difficulty all of the “democratically elected” leaders are having in adjusting to politics with an opposition.  Tunisia is struggling with a Salafist opposition that is stronger than many expected.  Islamist militias in Libya have forced its parliament into a harder line on purging Qaddafi-era officials than its leadership found comfortable.  Egypt is facing a summer of discontent as President Morsi runs into criticism and street demonstrations by his erstwhile non-Islamist allies.

Now it is Turkey’s turn, where protest against destruction of a park in Taksim square has turned into a much broader challenge because of overreaction from the security forces and Prime Minister Erdogan’s arrogant response.  Now the theme is “everywhere is Taksim, resistance is everywhere.”  I hardly need mention that in Syria Asad and his security forces managed by overreaction to turn a few teenage graffiti artists into a civil war.

Despite the differences in context, there is a common theme here:  the inability of rulers, even democratically elected ones, to govern in an inclusive way that provides opposition with a legitimate role.  The flip side of the coin is the inability of opposition forces to figure out how to influence those who govern them without resorting to violence, disruption and rebellion.  There is an exception to the rule, but a limited one.  Yemen, of all places, is proceeding with a national dialogue that appears for the moment serious, though it has failed to include the southern secessionists and may eventually fail on that score.

Widening our aperture a bit, I would submit that we are seeing something similar in Iraq, where Prime Minister Maliki has managed to keep a few Sunni elites in the tent but seems to have driven large numbers in Anbar and Ninewa into an increasingly disruptive opposition that extremists are exploiting to challenge the security forces and may lead to further division of the state.  In Bahrain, the monarchy and its opposition have driven each other into mutual polarization.  Only in Morocco, where the king has tried to get ahead of the reform curve, and in Kuwait, where parliament plays a modestly more serious role than in most other Arab monarchies, have we seen the opposition developing as a possible alternative governing elite:  loyal but with its own program and leadership cadres.

So the common problem I see is the failure to develop in many places an opposition that is serious about presenting a governing alternative.  In dictatorships of course the regimes don’t want such a thing to happen and do everything they can to prevent it.  But even in newish democracies that instinct remains.  And opposition behavior all too often confirms that there is no viable alternative, or that there are many, no one of which has enough political omph to merit gaining power in a relatively free and fair election.  Knowing this, fragmented oppositions do little to gain credibility as governing forces but focus instead on gaining adherents and influence through street demonstrations.

It will take time to get past this stage of things.  Maybe a decade.  It is not easy to turn a street movement, even a successful one, into a political force with real governing potential.  In Giulio Andreotti’s immortal words, “il potere logora chi non ce l’ha.”  Power wears out those who haven’t got it.