Month: August 2013
What’s the point?
The diplomatic action yesterday and today on Syria is focused on getting the Asad regime to allow the UN inspection team, already in Damascus, to visit the nearby site of Tuesday’s horrific early morning massacre to ascertain whether chemical weapons were used. Why so much effort when the regime is likely to deny access or allow it only after it has been able to clean up the site?
Let’s assume for the moment chemical weapons were in fact used, since the Syrian government would have allowed an immediate inspection had they not been.
It will seem to many that we are grasping at straws, that is insubstantial steps that really don’t have any potential for altering a situation that is going from really bad to much worse. But that’s not how I see it. Establishing some common ground between the United States and Russia is vital to ending the war in Syria. If they manage to agree that chemical weapons were used–either because the regime denies the inspectors access or because the inspectors find evidence to that effect–that would help push ahead the search for a diplomatic resolution.
If allowed to visit the site, might the inspectors actually find something? Yes, is the short answer. Cleanup is difficult and the means of chemical detection are highly sensitive. Autopsies might also produce relevant results. If anything even approaching one thousand people were killed, there will be lots of bodies available and a lot of eye witnesses to their deaths.
Even if the inspectors find evidence, how can we be certain that the regime, not the rebels, were responsible? First, there is eye-witness testimony that the rockets came from regime-controlled areas. Second, the rebels are hardly in a position to load and launch rockets with chemical weapons payloads, especially in the immediate environs of Damascus. Third, we can hope that communications intercepts will demonstrate who was responsible. The National Security Agency really does have an important role to play in cases like this one.
Most likely, the regime will stall and delay inspection of the site of the attack and the bodies until evidence has decayed beyond detection. This represents the diplomatic equivalent of pleading nolo contendere, which would be reason enough for the international community to act. The Americans have made no secret of preparations for military action. But they will prefer a diplomatic course in cooperation with Moscow, so long as it includes deposing Bashar al Asad, since his presence in power is inconsistent with ending the violence.
President Obama, who yesterday was worrying about the cost to Americans of going to college, won’t welcome interruption of his focus on domestic issues. But Syria needs decisions that only he can make. Will the United States start down what General Dempsey sees as the slippery slope of more engagement by acting militarily to punish Bashar al Asad for crossing Obama’s red line? Will it act even without UN Security Council authorization? Or will Washington succeed in convincing Moscow to cooperate in a serious diplomatic effort to end Bashar al Asad’s rule?
It is difficult to predict the decisions of a single person, whether he be Barack Obama or Bashar al Asad. Obama’s reluctance to do anything militar is palpable. Bashar al Asad’s inclination to do everything in his power to kill his enemies is likewise palpable.
The priority American interest is in ending the war in Syria as soon as possible, to diminish the likelihood of its infecting the region and further empowering extremists both inside Syria and in the neighborhood. Military action will need to be forceful if it is to compel Bashar to give up. Diplomatic action will need to be much quicker than its pace so far if it is to produce the needed result. The combination might be better than either alone.
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Solid kernels in a not so good idea
My SAIS colleague Ed Joseph and Aaron David Miller earlier this week put forward a proposal for a Union of Arab Democracies that merits examination despite its deep and fatal flaws. There are nuggets therein worth preserving.
The idea in their words is this:
Egypt and its fractious neighbors desperately need a unifying vision that can inculcate respect for democratic norms across glaring differences. Although Arab nations have no interest in joining the European Union or NATO, the Arab world can draw on the model of Eastern European transition, with fledgling Arab democracies devising their own supra-national organization dedicated to advancing democracy. Like the E.U. in its infancy, this Union of Arab Democracies (UAD) could start with limited objectives and evolve toward ambitious goals, including, ultimately, pan-Arab political union.
Waving their magic wand, Ed and Aaron then tell us all the good things that would happen if such an organization were to come into existence, despite the shambolic history of pan-Arab political union proposals.
If Egypt and the other Arab uprising countries were capable of creating such an organization, they wouldn’t need it. The weakness of the proposal is all too apparent when Ed and Aaron get to proposing that Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority (known to me as Palestine) would be the leading democracies, with transitioning countries (Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen) and supposedly “liberalizing” countries (Morocco, Jordan and possibly Oman) tagging along. What a democratic club! Several are more likely to find themselves joining an Islamic union than a democratic one.
Nevertheless, there is a core idea here that is important: transitions need a destination. When the Berlin wall fell, the former Soviet satellites of eastern Europe and the Baltic “captive nations” quickly set their aim on meeting European Union and NATO standards. This gave direction and impetus to countries that would otherwise have wandered as aimlessly as the North African revolutions are doing today.
The way to answer the question “transition to what?” is not to have nascent Arab democracies try to figure it out for themselves. They cannot reasonably aim for membership in NATO or the EU, but they should be able to aim at two easier targets: the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe or, as my Turkish colleague Aylin Unver Noi suggests, the Council of Europe.
OSCE comprises 57 states and plays an important role in the Balkans and the more Asian parts of Eurasia. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia are already among its “cooperating partners.” Several OSCE members are no farther along in democratizing than their Middle Eastern partners. With 47 member states, the Council of Europe regards itself as the continent’s leading human rights organization. It has a human rights court with some real enforcement capacity that could provide minorities in the Middle East with real recourse if their mother countries were to join.
The idea of extending OSCE and the Council of Europe to the southern littoral of the Mediterranean may seem far fetched, but efforts to construct more ad hoc arrangements have not worked well. Neither the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership nor the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative gained much traction before 2011, Aylin says, and their relevance will be further reduced by the Arab uprisings.
Another of the world’s more restrictive clubs, the rich people’s Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) , has opened its doors to newly developed states like Korea and Mexico, much to their benefit and the benefit of the organization. Opening the OSCE and Council of Europe to new Middle Eastern members, who would need to meet clearly defined criteria in order to get in, would be a worthwhile experiment. It would give the Arab uprisings, if they want it, a destination as well as a tough-minded qualification process, which is really what Ed and Aaron were calling for.
So “no” to the Arab Democratic Union. “Yes” to Arab democracy that aims to meet the not too exacting standards of the OSCE and respects human rights as defined by the Council of Europe.
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Chemical reaction
It is difficult to believe that Bashar al Asad’s regime would use chemical weapons in a rural area on the outskirts of Damascus a day or so after the arrival of a UN chemical weapons inspection team. But that is apparently what he has done. Hundreds are reported dead. If this claim proves true, what are the options for the Obama administration?
- Do nothing. The administration has already ignored well-documented reports of chemical weapons use over the past year. Failing to react with anything but verbal condemnation will not stop the practice, but it would avoid a tussle with the Russians and limit US commitments.
- Try to get a UN Security Council resolution authorizing use of force or expanding sanctions. The Russians are unlikely to permit a resolution that goes that far, but it might be possible to get one that denounces the Asad regime and puts it on the diplomatic defensive, whatever good that will do.
- Press harder to convene peace talks. The Administration remains committed to following up the June 2012 Geneva communique by convening peace talks aimed at implementing a negotiated solution in which Bashar al Asad would have to surrender power to an interim government. Prospects for such talks are bleak (and the date has been postponed to the fall).
- Accelerate provision of weapons to the Syrian opposition. Washington, after indicating this spring it would arm the opposition in response to earlier reports of chemical weapons use, seems to have gotten cold feet, largely because of the prospect the arms would fall into extremist hands. Ignoring that prospect is risky.
- Attack Syrian missile and air force assets, even without UNSC authorization. Such an attack could be limited to the facilities thought to have originated chemical weapons attacks, or it could be much wider. Damaging the regime’s capability of reaching out to attack “liberated” areas could help the opposition gain strategic advantage, but doing it without UNSC authorization would trigger Russian responses Washington won’t like.
- Impose a “no fly, no missile” zone over all or part of Syria. This would require constant patrolling by US air assets that would be at risk of attack by Syria’s supposedly strong air defenses (which however have not responded to several Israeli attacks).
None of these propositions are very attractive, especially if you regard Iran’s nuclear program and American withdrawal from Afghanistan as far more important. Both require Russian cooperation that may not be available if the Americans decide to act unilaterally on Syria.
Weighing in favor of US action is the humanitarian situation and its impact on Syria’s neighbors. The US will spend upwards of $1 billion this year on humanitarian relief for the millions of Syrian refugees, internally displaced and needy whom Bashar al Asad has created with his effort to reassert governing authority in a country that has rejected his rule. A billion this year and a couple of billion next year. We are talking real money out of your taxpayer pocket.
More important for US strategic interests is the impact on neighboring countries. Iraq is suffering a sharp rise in Sunni terrorist attacks that stem from revival of Al Qaeda in Iraq, which has extended itself also into Syria. Jordan is facing a colossal burden from hundreds of thousands of refugees, as is Lebanon, whose Hizbollah and Sunni militia forces are battling both inside Syria and sometimes at home. The Kurds of Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey will be meeting August 24 in Erbil to discuss strategy, which for the moment aims at Kurdish federal units within existing states. But if those states start to collapse, can an effort at Kurdish union be far behind?
The notion that Syria is not a priority can only be sustained if the trouble it causes can be contained. It is looking as if that is no longer going to be possible. It is time for the Obama administration to react to the use of chemical weapons, if confirmed. My own preference is number 5 above.
PS: Please do not look at these pictures that purport to be the results of the chemical attack today if you are at all squeamish about seeing dead people.
PPS: To cheer you up, try this from May, via Mike Doran:
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Well managed conflicts are hard to resolve
This makes sense of course. Why bother paying the high price resolution usually entails if the cost of continuing in conflict is relatively low? We see this happening today in many places: Israel/Palestine, Macedonia/Greece, Armenia/Azerbaijan, Cyprus/Turkey. How should the international community behave in such instances?
Generally the approach has been to continue efforts at resolution, almost no matter what. Depending on how you count, the Israel/Palestine conflict is 65 years old, Macedonia’s conflict with Greece over its name has been subject to mediation for more or less 20 years, the Minsk group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been working on Armenia and Azerbaijan’s dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh for as long, and UN peacekeepers have been in Cyprus for almost 40 years. It makes economic sense to continue because the international community efforts are relatively cheap compared to the potential consequences of ending them.
But does it make sense in terms of getting to yes? Is the international community’s willingness to continue mediation or peacekeeping efforts inhibiting a solution rather than encouraging one?
That is a difficult judgment to make, but I have my suspicions, especially in the Macedonia/Greece dispute. On the surface, it is a fairly simple one: Greece refuses to accept what it prefers to call “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (or the FYROM) by its constitutional name (Republic of Macedonia). This wouldn’t make much difference except that Greece can (and does) block the FYROM from entering NATO or getting a date to begin negotiations on EU membership, in violation of a 1995 “interim agreement.” The International Court of Justice has found Greece in violation of that agreement but it does not have the ability to enforce its decisions.
For almost 20 years, now UN envoy Matt Nimetz has tried to find a solution. Greece has appeared at times ready to accept a modifier (for example, “North Macedonia”) but wants the agreed name used in all circumstances, including every time it is mentioned in the Macedonian constitution. This isn’t very attractive to Skopje, which already enjoys a world in which everyone but Greece and international organizations call the country Macedonia. Skopje doubts that even if it accepted the Greek parliament would ratify membership in NATO, much less the EU.
This is one spat the world could do without, but nothing the committed and inventive Nimetz has done in 20 years has gotten rid of it. So the question is, should we get rid of the UN envoy, hoping that will give Athens and Skopje ample incentive to cut a deal directly with each other?
I don’t know. There is little likelihood of a solution unless they do, but that is no guarantee they would.
Macedonia’s prime minister has enjoyed a great deal of popularity as a result of his nationalist rhetoric and building program. The only people in Macedonia really unhappy with the current situation are ethnic Albanians, who regard NATO membership as the ultimate guarantee of security and would like to end a dispute that has nothing to do with their own ethnic identity. But Albanians represent close to a quarter of the population. Macedonia is a fragile state that cannot afford to alienate its largest minority.
The Greek prime minister, who was one of the originators of the dispute in the 1990s, has likewise little political incentive to settle it. While there are certainly some Greeks who would like to see the issue resolved, if only to stabilize a neighborhood in which the country has significant investments, they are relatively few. Most Greeks regard ancient Macedonia as quintessentially Greek and are unwilling to see the label hijacked by Slavs.
I don’t want to minimize the importance of this dispute to those most directly involved. Macedonians and Greeks alike regard the issue as profoundly important, as it affects their identities. But is this something the rest of the world should be investing to solve? There is not risk of armed confrontation over this issue. After 20 years, it seems to me the UN would be more than justified to pack in the effort and let the parties to the conflict try to resolve it themselves, or not.
More on other well managed conflicts in future posts.
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Leverage without a fulcrum
The International Peace Institute published this piece today on its Global Observatory under the title “With Democracy, Security at Stake in Egypt, How Should the West Respond?”:
Diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the confrontation in Egypt have so far failed. The refusal of coup leader Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, now the defense minister, to go along with diplomatic de-escalation, and the excessive force used by security agencies signal that they do not aim at repressing only the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian army is trying to frighten the general population and restore autocratic rule to an Egypt that has tasted freedom and expressed itself repeatedly at the ballot box since 2011.
The US and Europe want to get Egypt back on a more orderly democratic path. This entails restraining the Egyptian security forces, maintaining relative openness, and moving towards an inclusive polity with Islamist, and, if possible, Muslim Brotherhood, participation. It also means restoring a modicum of order and stability so that ordinary Egyptians can go about their business without fear of violence or intimidation.
The security forces are continuing their violent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, which is pledging to continue its protests against the July 3 military takeover. Some Islamists are resisting with arms. About 1,000 people have been killed. What can the United States and the international community do to mitigate the situation?
Analysis
The civilian government the Egyptian army installed after the coup has pledged an amended constitution by the end of the year, to be approved in a referendum and elections early next year. This is a fast timeline. What can the international community do to try to ensure it is met?
The United States has already postponed delivery of F16s to Egypt and canceled joint military exercises scheduled for the fall to protest General Sisi’s crackdown. Inevitably the question of America’s $1.5 billion in aid to Egypt will now arise in Washington. It would make sense to refocus the civilian assistance of about $250 million tightly on democratic objectives. Those most concerned with getting Egypt back on a democratic path are recommending suspension of the military portion ($1.2 billion).
This will be opposed by those more concerned with security issues, including maintenance of the peace treaty with Israel. A proposal in the US Senate to redirect all Egyptian aid to domestic American priorities was defeated last month by a wide margin (86-13), but that was before the worst of the crackdown. The margin would likely be much closer next month.
Even if the US Congress or the Administration acts to suspend military aid to Egypt, the financial impact will not be immediate. This year’s tranche has already been transferred. It will be the better part of another year before money can be blocked. More weapons scheduled for delivery can be delayed, but American industry will spend the year lobbying hard against a funding cut-off, as much of the money is actually spent on US contractors who supply the Egyptian military with materiel and services.
Europe provides much more assistance to Egypt than the United States. Its 5 billion euro (more than $6 billion) mainly economic package is now under review. This was intended to support the transition to democracy, which is now in doubt. Europeans concerned with their own economic problems may well see suspension of aid to Egypt as an opportunity.
The international financial institutions are another important part of the picture. Egypt has been negotiating for many months a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund. The US and Europe can block or delay that loan.
But both Europe and the United States need to consider the broader international context in deciding what to do about bilateral and IMF assistance. They are not the only players on the world stage. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have already pledged $12 billion, dwarfing both the American and European assistance packages. Russia will likely try to take advantage of any opening and provide military aid if the Americans suspend theirs.
Egypt clearly has alternatives to Western assistance, even if the Gulf states are notoriously slow and unreliable, and the Russians significantly less attractive to a military that has been getting advanced American weapons. If they want to see a democratic outcome in Egypt, the Americans and Europeans will need to convince the Gulf states—no paragons of democracy—to back the timeline for a return to democratic governance.
Widening the aperture farther, the Arab and Muslim worlds are watching what the international community does about Egypt. Will it insist on a return to a democratic path and an inclusive polity that allows Islamist participation on the timeline that Egypt itself has defined? Or will it settle for delay or a security solution that allows the army to remain the arbiter of Egypt’s fate? A lot depends on the skillful use of diplomatic and assistance leverage in a context where there are many players with diverse and even conflicting objectives.
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Peace picks, August 19-23
Slowest Washington week for war and peace events in a long time:
1. Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: On Life Support or an Imminent Threat?
A Conversation with Eli Lake, Thomas Joscelyn and Cliff May
Tuesday, August 20, 2013
12:00 pm – 1:30 pm
Registration and lunch will begin at 11:45 am
RSVP below.
Twelve years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and more than two years after Osama bin Laden was killed, how great of a threat is al Qaeda to the U.S. homeland and America’s interests abroad? Has the instability in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and throughout Africa allowed al Qaeda to grow in size and power? How should the latest threats against America’s diplomatic facilities, paired with the recent prison breaks in Pakistan, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere impact U.S. counterterrorism strategy?
Please join FDD for a conversation with Eli Lake, Thomas Joscelyn, and Cliff May.
Eli Lake is the senior national-security correspondent for Newsweek and The Daily Beast. He previously covered national security and intelligence for The Washington Times. Eli has also been a contributing editor at The New Republic since 2008 and covered diplomacy, intelligence, and the military for the late New York Sun. He has lived in Cairo and traveled to war zones in Sudan, Iraq, and Gaza. He is one of the few journalists to report from all three members of President Bush’s axis of evil: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.
Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and the Senior Editor of The Long War Journal. Most of Thomas’s research and writing focuses on how al Qaeda and its affiliates operate around the world. He is a regular contributor to The Weekly Standard and his work has been published by a variety of other publications.
Clifford D. May is President of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He has had a long and distinguished career in international relations, journalism, communications and politics. Cliff spent nearly a decade with The New York Times as a reporter in both New York and Washington, an editor of The New York Times Sunday Magazine and as a foreign correspondent. He is a frequent guest on national and international television and radio news programs including CNN and MSNBC, providing analysis and participating in debates on national security issues. He writes a weekly column that is nationally distributed by Scripps Howard News Service and is a regular contributor to National Review Online, The American Spectator and other publications.
Please feel free to share this invitation.
Open press coverage. Advance RSVP required.
Camera setup at 11:00 am
1726 M Street, NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20036
– See more at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/events/al-qaeda-and-its-affiliates-on-life-support-or-an-imminent-threat/#sthash.BDqNrXD8.dpuf
2. The Coming Asian Arms Race?
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Date / Time
Thursday, August 22, 2013 / 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM
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Speaker(s)
Ely Ratner, Randall Schriver, Barry Pavel
A discussion with:
Dr. Ely Ratner
Deputy Director, Asia-Pacific Security Program
Center for a New American Security
Mr. Randall Schriver
President and Chief Executive Officer
Project 2049 Institute
Moderated by:
Mr. Barry Pavel
Vice President and Director, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security
Atlantic Council
Please join the Brent Scowcroft Center of the Atlantic Council for a panel discussion on the recent uptick in defense spending in the Asia-Pacific region, what it means for US strategy, and what it portends for the future of regional rivalries.
Last year, Defense News published a special report showing that the locus of military spending in the world is shifting to Asia as when European defense budgets are decreasing. According to an IHS Jane’s study, defense spending in the Asia-Pacific will overtake North American defense budgets by 2021. In addition, three of the world’s top five arms importers are in Asia: China (#1), South Korea (#3), and Singapore (#5). In addition, once dormant military powers, like Japan, are remilitarizing, prompting a changing geopolitical landscape that could lead to rising tensions between China and Taiwan, both Koreas, and other regional rivals. These changes in Asian defense have important implications for the United States as its posture looks east during the so-called “pivot” or “rebalance.” To discuss these strategically vital developments, the Atlantic Council has invited prominent scholars and practitioners in this field to discuss what increasing Asian defense budgets mean for the United States, the region, and the world.
Dr. Ely Ratner is the deputy director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. He recently served in the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs at the State Department as the lead political officer covering China’s external relations in Asia. He was an international affairs fellow sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. His portfolio included China’s activities in and relations with North Korea, Japan, Burma, the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Mr. Randall Schriver is the president and chief executive officer of the Project 2049 Institute. He is also a founding partner of Armitage International LLC, based in Arlington, Virginia, and a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, DC. He served as deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2003 to 2005, and as chief of staff and senior policy advisor to then-deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage, from 2001 to 2003.
The moderator for this event, Mr. Barry Pavel, is a vice president of the Atlantic Council and the director of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, he was a career member of the Senior Executive Service in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for almost eighteen years. From October 2008 through July 2010, he served as the special assistant to the president and senior director for defense policy and strategy on the National Security Council (NSC) staff, serving both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama.
This event is part of the Asia Security Initiative’s Cross-Straits series, which examines strategic and current affairs surrounding cross-straits relations.
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