Month: February 2014
Small states and the power of pragmatism
Kosovo Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj has kindly provided a copy of his remarks prepared for SAIS last week. They seem to me to merit publication in their entirety. I’ll of course be glad to publish the remarks of others as well on the dialogue process between Pristina and Belgrade.
Small States and the Power of Pragmatism: Kosovo’s Approach to the Dialogue with Serbia
ENVER HOXHAJ
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo
A small state like Kosovo is obliged to think how to define its role in international affairs and how to conduct its foreign affairs in a way it can advance its vital interests. For small states that have limited military, economic, and demographic resources, it is essential to adapt a smart and pragmatic foreign policy. Being smart for small states means undertaking actions that increase the likelihood for success, utilize the available resources and capacities. In this context, pragmatism means a combination of realist and practical approaches to foreign affairs with strategic reliance on idealism. Pragmatism is not about being strong or weak, but it is about taking the right decisions in right time. Pragmatism is to adapt but maintain strategic vision and policy coherence. It is about making short-term compromises for long-term triumphs. It is about getting what you want, while also addressing other parties concerns. The current dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia under the EU facilitation is a quintessential example of the pragmatic and smart approach of a small state like Kosovo. The normalization dialogue has been considered historic and a breakthrough achievement. It has been considered a success of EU foreign policy, and a merit of constructive approach of both Kosovo and Serbia.
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Peace Picks February 10-14
1. Iran’s Tumultuous Revolution: 35 Years Later
Monday, February 10 | 11am – 12:30pm
6th Floor, Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Presented by The Middle East Program of the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
PARTICIPANTS
Shaul Bakhash
Clarence J. Robinson: Professor of History, George Mason University
Mehdi Khalaji
Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
John Limbert
Distinguished Professor of International Affairs, United States Naval Academy
Karim Sadjadpour
Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Moderator:
Haleh Esfandiari
Director, Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
There will be a live webcast of this event.
2. Aghanistan Development Goals: 2014 and Beyond
Monday, February 10 | 12:15pm – 1:45pm
New America Foundation, 1899 L Street NW Suite 400
The drawdown of American troops in Afghanistan, together with the forming of a new Government of Afghanistan following the upcoming elections scheduled for this April, will present new challenges for the United States in how it can most effectively deliver assistance in Afghanistan.
What are the challenges and how will the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) approach them? How will USAID build on the successes it has achieved over the past ten years? Furthermore, as USAID assistance transitions to longer-term development with a focus on health, education, gender, and economic growth led by agriculture, how will the agency continue to conduct effective oversight and monitoring in an ever evolving environment to ensure that U.S. taxpayers’ funds are used effectively?
One of the people that can help address those concerns is Donald “Larry” Sampler Jr., who was recently sworn in as the Assistant to the Administrator for USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, officially taking over responsibility for two countries with the largest USAID budgets. Mr. Sampler will make remarks regarding these issues, which will be followed by a panel discussion to explore these and other questions further. For the discussion, Mr. Sampler will be joined by the U.S. State Department’s Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Jarrett Blanc, who works on international partnership, reconciliation, and political transition issues.
The New America Foundation is pleased to host this dialogue about the U.S. government’s development goals in Afghanistan both in 2014, a year of many transitions in the country, and beyond.
PARTICIPANTS
Donald “Larry” Sampler, Jr.
Assistant to the Administrator, Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development
Jarrett Blanc
Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. Department of State
Moderator:
Omar Samad
Senior Central Asia Fellow, New America Foundation
Former Afghan Ambassador to Canada and France
There will be a live webcast of this event here.
3. Champions for Justice: Bahrain’s Prisoners of Conscience
Hosted by Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain and Creative Peace Initiatives
Tuesday, February 11 | 11am – 1pm
Abramson Founders Room, SIS Building, American University; 4400 Massachusetts Ave NW
To RSVP, please e-mail events@adhrb.org
PARTICIPANTS
Moderator:
Dr. Jeff Bachman, SIS Professor and Director of Ethics, Peace, and Global Affairs Program
11 – 11:30am – Q&A segment featuring:
Matar Ebrahim Matar
Political activist, Former Opposition Leader and Member of the Bahraini Parliament
11:45 – 1pm – Panel featuring:
Joshh Colangelo-Bryan, Pro Bono Attorney for Imprisoned Human Rights Activist Nabeel Raja, Consultant for Human Rights Watch
Brian Dooley, Director of Human Rights Defenders Programs at Human Rights First
Dr. Shadi Mokhtari, SIS Professor focused on Human Rights, Middle East Politics, and Political Islam
4. Understanding the Continuing Violence in Iraq
Tuesday, February 11 | 12pm
Hayek Auditorium, Cato Institute; 1000 Massachusetts Ave NW
More than three years after the departure of U.S. combat troops from Iraq, a determined insurgency rages against the government led by Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Violence has claimed thousands of lives. Some question whether the Iraqi government can maintain control of several major cities, including Fallujah, the scene of some of the toughest fighting during the eight-year-long U.S. war in Iraq. Some of Maliki’s critics accuse him of stoking the unrest by refusing to make concessions to minority groups in Iraq, in particular Iraq’s Sunni Arab community. Others say that the prime minister should firmly reassert his authority by going after violent extremism and deterring others from supporting the insurgency. The panelists will consider several questions, including: What explains the continuing violence in Iraq? Can Iraq’s disparate communities unite behind a strong central government? And what role, if any, should the United States play?
PARTICIPANTS
Douglas Ollivant, Senior National Security Fellow, the New America Foundation
Harith Hasan, Author of Imagining the Nation: Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-political Conflict in Iraq
Christopher Preble, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute
Moderated by
Justin Logan, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute.
Watch this event online at http://www.cato.org/live
Luncheon to follow this event.
5. Achieving Greater Inclusion in post-Arab Spring Countries
Tuesday, February 11 | 2pm – 3:30pm
Saul/Zilkha Rooms, Brookings Institution; 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW
The Arab Spring was about political and economic inclusiveness. Three years later, the outcomes of the revolutions have been mixed. In Morocco, the king responded by revising the constitution, carrying out free parliamentary elections and letting the winning party form a new government. In Tunisia, political parties debated on a new constitution for nearly three years and now a neutral government has been appointed to supervise elections. Meanwhile, in Egypt, the struggle between Islamists and secular-nationalists has turned violent, weakening economic growth and increasing unemployment.
On February 11, Global Economy and Development at Brookings will host a discussion on inclusive growth in the post-Arab Spring countries. The discussion will be based on a series of papers on the political economy of the Arab transitions and efforts to foster inclusive growth in the region. The papers are authored by Brookings scholars and their colleagues from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and present case studies from Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia.
PARTICIPANTS
Kemal Derviş
Vice President and Director, Global Economy and Development and The Edward M. Bernstein Scholar
Hafez Ghanem
Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development
Daniela Gressani
Deputy Director, Middle East and Central Asia International Monetary Fund
Akihiko Koenuma
Director-General, Middle East and Europe Department Japan International Cooperation Agency
6. Inside Aleppo: New Tools for Understanding the Syrian Conflict
Thursday, February 13 | 8:30am – 9:30am
American Security Project, 1100 New York Ave NW
REGISTER by Wednesday, February 12th
The American Security Project will host Dr. David Kilcullen and Mr. Nate Rosenblatt of Caerus Associates who will provide a briefing on findings from what may be the most detailed, publicly available assessment of the ongoing conflict in Syria to date.
Findings will be based on four months of in-depth, time-series research from within Aleppo, Syria’s largest, most diverse, and most economically relevant city. Today, Aleppo is one of the most divided cities in the country. Tomorrow, its future may resemble that of other, large, non-capital cities in post-conflict Middle Eastern states such as Libya’s Benghazi or Iraq’s Mosul.
The presentation will examine research findings that suggest that while the national picture in Syria looks bleak, important insights gained at the city-level can help policymakers and scholars think of new ways of examining the trajectory of Syria’s conflict. In addition to findings specific to Syria, the presenters will be joined by Mr. Matt McNabb of First Mile Geo, who will discuss how innovative technologies can be leveraged for collecting, visualizing, and analyzing high-fidelity data from the first mile of conflict affected parts of the world.
Moderated by Stephen A. Cheney, Brigadier General USMC (Ret.)
Breakfast snacks and refreshments will be served at 8:00am
7. Soft Power in Countering Extremism from the Horn of Africa to the Western Sahel
Thursday, February 13 | 9am – 11am
Lindner Commons (Room 602), The Elliot School of International Affairs; 1957 E Sreett NW
The rise of radical Islamism and its ideological force have migrated from Somalia in the early 1990s westward through the northern part of Africa known as the Sahel. Crises related to religious extremism, including jihadism and the application of Shar’ia law, have spread rapidly from Somalia to Kenya and across the Sahel to Nigeria, Mali and Algeria with evidence of propagating radicalizing even diaspora populations living in the West.
The panelists, all experts in the role of communication and soft power in countering radicalization, will discuss and debate the strategic influence of Western powers, in particular the US and the UK, in changing the narrative toward stability, tolerance, and democratization.
About the Panelists
Sir Robert Fry is chairman of Albany Associates and former Deputy Commanding General of Coalition Forces in Iraq of the Royal Marines. He is involved in a number of boards and advisory roles to companies in the security and banking sectors throughout Europe, North America, and the Middle East. Currently, he is a visiting professor at Reading University and a visiting fellow at Oxford University.
Simon Haselock is co-founder and chief operating officer of Albany Associates. From 1995-96, he served as the NATO spokesman in Sarajevo and later as Media Commissioner in Kosovo. He went on to lead the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for Media Development in Iraq.
Alberto Fernandez is the coordinator of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications at the U.S. State Department. Previously, he served as U.S. ambassador to Equatorial Guinea and chargé d’affaires to Sudan. His other posts include senior level public diplomacy positions at the embassies in Afghanistan, Jordan, and Syria. A veteran of the U.S. Army, Fernandez speaks fluent Spanish and Arabic through his training at the Defense Language Institute.
Todd Haskell is the director for Press and Public Diplomacy in the Bureau of African Affairs at the State Department. Previously, he served as a Public Affairs Officer in Santo Domingo, Johannesburg, and Ouagadougou. Other overseas assignments include Pakistan, the Philippines, Israel, and Mexico. He is a graduate of Georgetown University.
8. A Mixed Picture: the Political and Economic Future of the Arab Transitions
Thursday, February 13 | 3:30pm – 5pm
12th Floor, Atlantic Council; 1030 15th Street NW
The last few tumultuous years in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen present a complex picture of progress and setbacks. Three years after Egyptians successfully toppled a thirty-year old dictatorship, there are fears of a return to military-backed rule. In contrast to the bleaker picture from Cairo, Tunisians have successfully navigated political deadlock and approved a new constitution. Yemenis have concluded an inclusive National Dialogue process, and Libyans are gearing up to elect a constitution-drafting body and initiate their own national dialogue. While there are significant challenges ahead and security issues are paramount, citizens of all four countries are unlikely to continue to tolerate the corruption, mismanagement, and exclusion that characterized the pre-revolution era. Given this dynamic, what are we likely to see in the next few years?
Lina Khatib will describe key political trends that will shape the next phase of these transitions and Mohsin Khan will discuss the economic state of affairs and how these economies will fare moving forward. Placing the Arab awakening within the global context, Ellen Laipson will compare the Arab transitions to other previous cases of political and social upheaval.
This event also marks the release of two major Hariri Center publications: Mohsin Khan‘s Issue Brief, “The Economic Consequences of the Arab Spring,” and a report on “The State of the Arab Transitions” by Mirette F. Mabrouk and Stefanie Hausheer.
PARTICIPANTS
Lina Khatib
Director
Carnegie Middle East Center
Ellen Laipson
President and CEO
Stimson Center
Mohsin Khan
Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East
Atlantic Council
Moderated by
Mirette F. Mabrouk
Deputy Director for Regional Programs, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East
Atlantic Council
Please use the West Tower elevators when you arrive.
The event will be followed by a wine & cheese reception.
A live webcast of the event can be seen here.
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Pragmatic Kosovo!
I enjoyed a conversation at SAIS yesterday with two of Kosovo’s finest: Deputy Prime Minister Slobodan Petrovic and Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj. Slobodan has led Serb participation in Kosovo’s government for the past three years, holding also the portfolio for local governance. Enver, a political science professor, has participated in many of the international negotiations that Kosovo has undergone over the past twenty years.
The watchword was “pragmatic.” Both speakers are clear about their goals. Slobodan wants improvement in the lives of Serbs who live in Kosovo. Enver wants the Kosovo state to have a well-recognized place in the international community. They have worked together to achieve these goals, but both are ready to compromise along the way, so long as things keep moving in the right direction.
Enver thinks normalization of relations between Pristina and Belgrade means eventual mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadors, but for the moment Kosovo has taken what it could get: an April agreement that recognized its constitution should govern in all of Kosovo and exchange of liaison officers located in the respective capitals’ European Union missions. Belgrade won’t accept Kosovo passports, but it has accepted its identity cards. The other “technical” agreements are also steps in the right direction.
Slobodan thinks the municipal elections held for the first time under Pristina’s authority in Serb-majority northern Kosovo were far from perfect: intimidation and even assassination determined the outcome, which favored a Belgrade-sponsored Serb list. But Petrovic’s Liberals got more votes than ever before and captured what seats they could. The international community should have taken a stronger stand against irregularities and supported those who have been committed to the political process. Next time, he hopes.
In the foreign minister’s view, Kosovo faces some difficult issues in 2014. It wants to get into NATO’s Partnership for Peace but needs to overcome resistance from the Alliance’s non-recognizing members. Kosovo also needs to decide the size, composition label for its security forces. It has passed the halfway mark in gaining recognitions from members of the UN General Assembly and hopes to make it to the two-thirds mark, but it will still face a veto by Russia in the Security Council. Kosovo hosts too many international missions. The UN has been superfluous for some time; the OSCE is overstaffed and undertasked.
The EU rule of law mission is still necessary to handle sensitive cases like that of the recently arrested mayoral candidate Oliver Ivanovic, but the deputy foreign minister thought it important that the remaining cases of this sort be settled expeditiously. In his view, 2014 will be important for the fall parliamentary elections. A gentleman’s agreement to maintain reserved seats for Serbs and other minorities, which were to be phased out after two election cycles, should be respected, not abrogated.
Asked whether the Pristina/Belgrade agreement and recent election results might presage “Bosnia-ization” of Kosovo into two ethnically identified entities, both Slobodan and Enver think not. The already functioning Serb municipalities south of the Ibar will not want to give up what they’ve gained. The northern municipalities are beginning to see clearly that they will gain from operating under Pristina’s authority, as they will retain a good deal of local control as well as substantial resources. If the agreement is implemented in good faith as written and the EU remains the guarantor, the risks are minimal.
I remember a time when I could not have imagined such a conversation. Enver reminded our audience that the war was fought between the Serbian state and the Albanian population of Kosovo. That may be true, but there were long periods when it seemed you could count on one hand the number of Albanians and Serbs willing to have a civilized conversation with each other. Now more than a handful are using democratic institutions to govern together. I know the challenges are still great, but pragmatic can go a long way with time.
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My Bosnian daydream
Like many of the Bosnians quoted by Reuters, I’ve got mixed feelings about the ferocious protests of the past few days. The violence and destruction are deplorable. The resentment and demand for change understandable. The country has seen little economic, political or social progress for more or less a decade.
Bosnia is stuck in an institutional morass created at the Dayton peace talks that ended the war in 1995 but failed to provide functional governance. My colleague at SAIS Ed Joseph thinks the US and EU should make another push at internal reforms in exchange for acceleration of Bosnia’s EU candidacy. I agree that is a good idea. And as he suggests, there are constitutional proposals left over from past efforts that are worth reviving, revising and returning to parliament for approval.
But little will change unless Bosnians decide it has to. Peaceful continuation of the protests is one way to signal the desire for change. Peaceful protests have a much better chance of mobilizing large numbers of people across ethnic lines than the violence of the past few days, which frightens Bosnians concerned with anything that might return the country to war. Minorities in particular worry that the protests may take an ethnic turn. Even peaceful demonstrations unnerve older Bosnians, who may remember that the war started with one.
Another opportunity comes in next fall’s presidential and parliamentary elections. By then, the Dayton constitution will have kept Bosnia enchained in a strait jacket of ethnically-based parties for almost twenty years. The Americans and Europeans would do well to abandon their usual refrain, “we support the process, not any particular candidates.” They need to support those who are ready to cross ethnic lines to find allies willing to advocate constitutional change that will enable more effective governance consonant with EU requirements. Otherwise, the ethnic nationalists may well succeed once again, electing people who advocate an entirely different kind of constitutional change, including independence for Republika Srpska and a third, Croat entity.
These two ideas are the zombies of the Bosnian war. They never seem to die. Here is my wooden stake: both notions would lead to a three-way partition of Bosnia, with one of the emerging entities a land-locked, non-viable Islamic republic ripe for radicalization and seething with irredentist ambitions. It is hard for me to picture a worse neighbor for Belgrade and Zagreb, or a less welcome development from the US and EU perspective.
Fortunately, the idea of a Bosnian Islamic republic isn’t very attractive to most Bosnian Muslims either. The more common and deeply rooted Bosniak attitude is support for a unified secular state on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with minority protection primarily based on respect for individual (rather than group) human rights and the rule of law. But the Bosniak political leadership has failed to find sufficient Croat and Serb allies to give that vision the votes it needs in parliament, partly because it is so much easier to fish for votes with the bait of Bosniak nationalism.
This is the bad habit Bosnians need to break: the slide back to identity politics because the Dayton political system and long habit make it so much easier to garner votes that way. Someone has to emerge with the capacity to transcend ethnic nationalism and speak effectively for the genuine Bosnian aspirations that put people into the streets this week: jobs, equality, good governance and a European future. When that happens, there will be a rush to cross-ethnic coalitions, because it will be the only way to compete effectively. So far, only Željko Komšić, the Croat member of the presidency, has succeeded at this, which is why he comes in for so much approbation from the nationalists.
Am I day dreaming? Yes. But sometimes daydreams come true.
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Turkey: corruption, media, and power
Yesterday morning, Freedom House hosted a panel discussion about its recent special report on government corruption and freedom of the press in Turkey. The event featured Steven Cook (Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations), Susan Corke (Director of Eurasia programs, Freedom House), and Andrew Finkel (Co-Founder of P24). Carla Anne Robbins, Clinical Professor of National Security Studies at City University of New York, moderated. The video above was shown at the event.
What is your reaction to the report?
Steven Cook: The issue of media censorship in Turkey should have received greater attention in Washington DC long ago. Frequently Turkey has gotten a free pass on this issue and more generally on illiberal politics in the last 4 or 5 years. One could argue that Turkey is more liberal than it was 20 years ago, but it is less open than 7 or 8 years ago. Freedom of the press is a barometer and hallmark of democratization. The fact that Turkey is experiencing these problems is a clear indicator to its illiberal turn. The most important aspect of the report is its focus on journalists who are in prison. That is simply part of a broader systemic problem that has developed over the last decade. Ownership structures of media properties have created an environment where journalists have to self-censor or get fired.
Washingtonians, however, are still in thrall to AKP, the Turkish Justice and Development political party. Yet AKP has a social media policy in which there is a virtual army of Twitter trolls. The government leverages technology to intimidate people. It also intimidates journalists into providing press releases for the government rather than reporting honestly on events.
The Obama administration has been tepid in the way in which it has addressed the situation. In 2011 former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticized the Turkish government for its poor record of freedom of the press. Later, so did Ambassador Ricciardone, who was then silenced. Since then, the US has not spoken up.
What is it like to work with journalists in Turkey and what attempts are being made to get around the media censorship?
Andrew Finkel: At the moment, Turkish society is so polarized between supporters and opponents of the government that sections of the press are becoming more outspoken than they used to be. Media censorship is suppressive. At the same time, voices do get through from the mere nature of modern communication. However, many journalists are not given the opportunity to do their jobs. They are now banding together to try and fight back. With very little resources, we can still reach a large audience through the Internet.
From your experience, the EU has been quite critical – much more so than the Obama administration. Can you talk about what it can do in light of recent events?
Susan Corke: In the last several years I have observed shifting policy relations between Turkey and the European Union. What has changed in particular is where the red lines are. Starting in 2003, the EU served as an engine of reform. It spurred important improvements in Turkey. This continues to be the case today, although it floundered for a few years. Once again, it is a potential driver of reform. The EU should continue emphasizing media liberalization and transparency.
For the US, the problem of not being outspoken about Turkey’s internal democratic problems is not new. The US has concluded that having Turkey as an ally would justify overlooking problems within the human rights sphere. Turkey is critical to current issues in Syria and Iraq and President Obama has fostered a close relationship with Prime Minister Erdogan. In this situation, the opportunity for leverage was missed. Since the Gezi protests, the US does not know how to handle the situation, so it is ignoring its relationship with Turkey. Ignoring these problems will only allow them to fester. The Obama administration should develop a relationship with Turkey that places human rights and democratic issues on par with policy ones.
Steven, do you think Erdogan will listen?
Steven Cook: It is difficult for me to believe that the prime minister can be moved by anything that the US or the EU does. However, the EU could play a crucial role. If there is another prospect of Turkish membership, this could be used as leverage to change the current situation in Turkey. Instead of ignoring Turkey, the Obama administration should have taken a page from the Turks. Good friends speak bitterly to good friends. When looking at the Middle East, Turkey is at odds with every major country in the region. The US should speak up.
As long as AKP remains a potent force in Turkish politics, there will be no real break from it. There is no viable opposition and the press is under assault. Those framing the terms of the debate are those in the pay of the Turkish government. One day we will see a full-blown authoritarian system that does not look like the AKP of 2007.
Carla Anne Robbins: Since the report was released, there have already been updates. On Wednesday, the Turkish parliament approved a legislation allowing the government to block websites without a court order. It also applies if citizens complain of a “violation of privacy.” This law is also intended to enhance web censorship. Blocking proxies prevents Internet users from circumventing the government to access the blocked websites. The Turkish government has worked hard to suppress coverage of tapes that purportedly expose corruption at the highest levels of government. Now that the new legislation is on the desk of President Gül, we fear there are more orders to come. Prime Minister Erdogan is remarkably defiant and tone deaf to criticisms.
The full Freedom House report can be found here.
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It is only a matter of time
Edita Tahiri, the main “technical”-level negotiator on behalf of Pristina with Belgrade and now in charge of implementation of the agreements reached, has issued a report on implementation of the Brussels Agreements that is well worth reading, especially as I need to moderate an event Friday with Kosovo Deputy Prime Minister Petrovic and Foreign Minister Hoxhaj on the subject. While definitively written from a Pristina perspective, the report does an admirable job of maintaining a relatively neutral tone, including by citing various Belgrade positions on the issues.
The main lacunae in implementation that Edita underlines are
- Continued existence of Serb civil protection forces in northern Kosovo;
- Failure to integrate Serb judges and prosecutors into the Kosovo judicial system.
There are many other complaints in the report about this delay or that misinterpretation, and I have no doubt a comparable Serbian report (I don’t know of one, but will gladly receive and post it if someone has it) would include many complaints as well.
But the complaints do not negate the main point: real progress is being made in reintegrating the Serb-majority north with the rest of Kosovo, progress that would have seemed impossible even a few months ago. The progress is not only, or perhaps not primarily, in inter-ethnic relations, which remain tense. But it is impossible to read Edita’s report without recognizing that the Kosovo institutions really do now exist: courts, parliament, police, customs, cadastre, civil registry, etc. There has been enormous advance of institionalization in Kosovo, even if the state remains a work in progress and leaves much to be desired in terms of efficiency and incorruptibility.
By the same token, there has been enormous progress also in Serb behavior and attitudes. The protests that once dogged integration of the north are attenuating. Belgrade deserves a lot of credit for that: Deputy Prime Minister Vucic and Prime Minister Dacic have chosen to favor Serbia’s own European Union ambitions over an empty claim to Kosovo, which two-thirds of Serbia’s citizens already thought specious even before the Brussels agreements were reached. Belgrade’s focus now seems mainly on maintaining and expanding its own influence over the Serbs in Kosovo, which can be used either for or against establishment of Pristina’s authority but will not change the simple fact that Kosovo is independent. And the EU should want to make sure that Belgrade’s influence is used in the right way.
As I’m sure Edita would agree, the task is not fundamentally a technical one. The real issue in this process is legitimate authority. Pristina has been wise to recognize that the north could not be forced into integration with the rest of Kosovo, to allow for transitional arrangements, and to devolve many responsibilities to local (therefore mostly Serb) authorities. None of this will hurt the Kosovo state if Serb citizens in the north accept its legitimacy.
But Kosovo is not yet fully sovereign, as it still relies on the NATO-led KFOR military forces to protect its territorial integrity and on EULEX, the EU rule of law mission, for some judicial functions. Neither mission will still be around in its current form five years from now, so it is time that Kosovo begins to plan for their drawdown.
A US-led security study to be unveiled soon will lay out the parameters for Kosovo’s military forces. Unless Belgrade decides to recognize Kosovo and establish diplomatic relations with it, the threat of a Serbian military incursion will have to be taken seriously and the security forces sized and equipped accordingly. Kosovo will require some combination of its own forces and NATO guarantees to respond. Ensuring that the necessary arrangements are in place five years hence will require fixing the formula soon. Now that NATO has certified Kosovo’s existing security force as fully operational, the process of arming and equipping them appropriately should start with Kosovo entry into NATO’s Partnership for Peace and end eventually in NATO membership.
EULEX is a more complicated question. While the Kosovo judicial system has dealt with many difficult issues–including two constitutional questions regarding the presidency–I don’t know anyone who thinks it is yet up to the admittedly challenging task of trying war crimes or high-level corruption cases. It is not alone in the Balkans in those respects, but the number and complexity of the war crimes is extraordinary. Corruption cases are also particularly difficult in a small country where everyone knows everyone else and witness protection is difficult. Would it have been possible for a Kosovo court without international participation to hold a prominent Serb like Oliver Ivanovic in pre-trial detention without causing major disturbances? Would it have been possible to bring a corruption case against Kosovo judges?
So establishing legitimate authority in the judicial sector may still take time. Better to get it right than to rush the process. The right approach might be to incorporate EULEX into the Kosovo justice system, reducing its role as a separate mission but maintaining the international judges and prosecutors it provides. Another important step will be entry of Kosovo into the Council of Europe, enabling its citizens to avail themselves of remedies in the European Court of Human Rights.
Establishing legitimate authority is a long and difficult process. But Belgrade and Pristina are on the right path and clearly moving ahead. If that continues, it is only a matter of time before they put things right.
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