Landslide

According to exit polls, Ukrainians Sunday gave Petro Poroshenko a landslide mandate in the presidential poll.  While voting in the eastern provinces of Donbas was sparse, turnout elsewhere was high and the margin over also-ran Yulia Tymoshenko was so wide that it is difficult to see how even Russian President Putin could question the legitimacy of the result.  The Ukraine crisis is not over, but Poroshenko’s election could open the way to a negotiated political settlement, which is his often expressed preference.  Poroshenko has not favored NATO membership for Ukraine and has pledged to protect the rights of Russian speakers, but he also favors stronger ties to the European Union.

Russian President Putin has reason to be content.  His red line is NATO membership for Ukraine.  Poroshenko has indicated he will not cross it, though he occasionally suggests Russian intransigence will make him reconsider the proposition.  Putin will plump for maximum self-governance in Donbas, to allow Russian speakers the kind of de facto ethnic independence Serbs have in Bosnia.  He will also want Poroshenko to attract lots of money from the EU and the International Monetary Fund, so that Russia will get back the money it loaned Poroshenko’s predecessor.

While likely to oblige Putin’s interest in getting his money back, Poroshenko has his work cut out for him.  He has pledged to visit Donbas first, including to thank the Ukrainian security forces who have tried–without much success–to restore order there.  Parliamentary elections are not due until 2017.  There appear to be no plans to bring that date forward.  The parliament has been an important player since previous President Yushenko abandoned his post.  Its slate of priorities will be daunting:  Ukraine needs to phase out its expensive energy subsidies, attract private investment, end oligarchical cronyism and cut back on corruption.

Europe has some serious thinking to do in light of the Ukraine crisis.  Its dependence on Russian natural gas, its weak military forces and its diplomatic clumsiness–all closely related–should make not only Brussels but the 28 member state capitals think harder about what it takes to sustain a coherent and successful foreign and security policy.

If in fact the Ukraine crisis now heads in the direction of a peaceful denouement, the Obama administration will have reason to boast that its low-key diplomatic approach has produced a decent result.  Particularly important was the decision not to listen to experts who advised agreeing with Putin to postpone the election.

But even if things go well now with Ukraine, Washington needs to rethink policy towards a Russia bent on expanding its hegemony in what it considers its “near abroad.”  NATO expansion in particular needs presidential attention:  Montenegro and Macedonia are technically qualified and could be admitted at the Summit in Cardiff, Wales in September, but Macedonian membership will require President Obama to deliver bad news to Athens.  A broader package of moves closer to NATO would be ideal, one that includes Kosovo, Bosnia, Sweden and Finland.  I am hesitant about Georgia, a country NATO is in no way capable of defending.  But letting Putin know that NATO is determined to expand to those countries that it can defend, that meet the membership criteria and that want to join will limit his ambitions and encourage those who seek a democratic future.