Month: November 2014
Aye, there’s the rub
A nuclear deal with Iran is looking more likely than ever before. The P5+1 or EU3+3 (either way it is the US, Russia, UK, France, China and Germany) are making progress on issues related to enrichment and plutonium production and reprocessing. Verifying that fissile material, which can be used in an atomic bomb, is not diverted from those processes is a routine responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). If Iran will agree to limits on the number of its centrifuges, the degree of enrichment and the quantity of plutonium produced as well as fulfill its Safeguards commitments, the IAEA can verify that the limits are not exceeded and material is not diverted to a weapons program. If Iran were nevertheless to decide to “break out,” it would require six months to a year for it to do so, leaving time for both diplomatic and military efforts to prevent it from doing so.
The crunch issues lie in a different direction: undeclared nuclear material and the related question of possible military dimensions (PMDs) of Iran’s past nuclear activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been making little progress getting from Tehran clarification of past activities that appear to have aimed at design of high explosives and other research on initiation of a nuclear explosion. Nor has it been able to ascertain that there are no nuclear materials lying outside its purview. The IAEA concluded in September (and repeated Friday, despite recent meetings at which PMDs were discussed):
the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
In other words, a nuclear deal–even one with tight constraints on known facilities–could leave material and activities unaccounted for that are directed specifically at building a nuclear weapon in secret. Construction activity at a suspected site of clandestine nuclear activities (Parchin) has raised suspicions that Tehran is covering up past nuclear weapons research.
Some would like to forget about Iran’s past misbehavior, which reportedly stopped in 2003 in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq (when at least some in Tehran thought the Americans might come their way next). Ignoring past behavior and the possible existence of undeclared nuclear material would be unwise. Judging from past performance in other countries, development of nuclear weapons is far more likely to take place in parallel, secret efforts than in nuclear plants and activities under IAEA surveillance. If Iran wants the rest of the world to believe that it has seriously and permanently foresworn nuclear weapons, it needs to convince everyone that it either never did have a clandestine program or had one and gave it up.
This is difficult for Iran because of its government structure. President Rouhani is responsible for the nuclear negotiations. But the most likely sponsor of a clandestine nuclear program (past, present or future) is Supreme Leader Khamenei, who controls ample resources for such a purpose, including the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). That’s why President Obama writes Khamenei secret letters. The Supreme Leader has reportedly forsworn nuclear weapons in a fatwa:
the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons.
The trouble is Islamic jurisprudence allows a fatwa, which generally has no official written form, to be changed or reinterpreted. This one was published in an official government press release in 2005 that has evaporated from the worldwide web. That does not inspire confidence. So one well-connected Iranian commentator living in the US suggests it be “secularized” as a criminal statute. Of course that could be changed as well, but the notion of getting Iran to pledge formally that it will not seek nuclear weapons could certainly be part of a nuclear deal.
It would not substitute for what some might regard as impossible: proving the negative proposition that Iran does not have clandestine nuclear materials or a clandestine nuclear research program. “Coming clean” about past nuclear activities would certainly help. Continuing to stiff the IAEA on PMDs and the construction (now stopped) at Parchin does not. President Obama is presumably ready to justify to Congress and the American people a nuclear deal with Iran that allows it to continue peaceful activities (including enrichment) under tight IAEA surveillance, but he won’t get far unless he can also persuade them that there are no clandestine nuclear activities in progress. That’s what will give him pause.
PS: Tony Cordesman discusses in detail the difficult issues associated with clandestine research and development for nuclear weapons here.
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Not Saudi Arabia
I arrived back from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) this morning. You can attribute any nonsense in this post to the 14-hour plane ride. I went there with colleagues from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies to contribute to planning for the UAE diplomatic academy, which aims to professionalize training for the small but growing Emirates diplomatic corps. But of course I kept my eyes and ears open to learn as much as possible in an admittedly superficial three-day visit. Those who know the UAE well can skip this post.
Abu Dhabi, the capital, is centered on an island that commands spectacular beaches and an excellent view of the Gulf. Almost everything visible to a casual visitor is new. Independent only since 1971, the seven Emirates rely on Abu Dhabi’s substantial oil resources for pretty much everything in sight: spectacular highrise apartments and offices, opulent hotels, excellent restaurants and a quiescent population of 9.3 million, 85% of whom are non-citizens. Per capita GDP is a bit higher than in the US. English, Urdu, Punjabi, Thai and other foreign languages are at least as common as Arabic. The infrastructure is impressive: the 12-lane highway through Dubai (the business metropole) as well as the Burj al Khalifa skyscraper, air conditioning everywhere, green laws and shrubs irrigated with desalinated sea water, photographic
enforcement of driving regulations that sends you a text message with the amount of your fine within 20 minutes of a violation. Traffic is remarkably calm and disciplined by Middle Eastern standards. In an accident the foreigner is usually at fault.
The social contracts are clear:
- non-citizens get to stay and earn decent salaries that would be unthinkable in their home countries so long as they have employment and behave themselves;
- citizens get subsidies and good jobs if they want them, but the running of the country is left to a small elite.
Worker safety issues, especially for the many foreigners working in construction, have attracted attention. There are consultative mechanisms to allow for individual citizen petitions and complaints, but organized political opposition would be unwelcome. Public discourse values respect, not tolerance, including for the non-Muslim and non-Sunni majority (most citizens are Sunni Muslims). Hospitality is important. If someone serves you tea in a cracked cup, you know you weren’t welcome.
There is a palpable sense of common good, usually attributed to the country’s founder, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan. It was he who decided that Abu Dhabi’s oil wealth would be shared with the other British “trucial states,” which originally included near neighbor Qatar and somewhat farther neighbor Bahrain. President for 33 years after independence in 1971 (elected by the other Emirate Sheikhs), Sheikh Zayed is honored as the “man who built a nation” and began the still on-going engagement of the UAE in “global philanthropy,” which today has the Emirates engaged in supporting the Syrian opposition, the restored military regime in Egypt, the relatively liberal side of the Libyan revolution, the training of a new army for Somalia and other international causes. Whatever we give away, one diplomat told me, will eventually come back in appreciation and good will.
At home, what was until recently a traditional tribal society is changing, but only so much. There are no more bedouins or pearl divers. Men normally wear the kandura, a white robe, and white guthra (headdress). Women are being educated in substantial numbers, but the burqa and niqab are still common. Western women run on the downtown bike paths in Abu Dhabi in sports bras and shorts past completely covered Arab women pushing strollers, but I am assured that in some of the other Emirates things are not so relaxed. Arranged marriages are less frequent than in the past, but they are still sometimes used to settle conflicts between families. Social and tribal status is still an issue. I heard that the foreign ministry, which is keen to recruit women as diplomats, will pay for a male relative to accompany its unmarried employees on trips abroad.
The UAE leadership prides itself on being quick and flexible in reacting to world events. The recent fall in oil prices I was told will cause a quick reaction, presumably to cut public expenditure (the diram is tied to the dollar, so devaluation is not an easy option). Or maybe to cut oil production as well? The country runs its oil sector and its giant sovereign wealth funds with a view to ensuring stability and prosperity over the long term. I was told sovereign wealth was not tapped in reaction to the 2008 financial crisis, which hit Dubai’s rapidly appreciating real estate hard. Abu Dhabi footed the bill. Renewable energy is a serious government interest. Islamic finance is practiced.
The almost total absence of any visible security presence surprised me. People come and go in major hotels without passing through magnetometers. Security examination at the foreign ministry is cursory. At the National Archives it was non-existent. I didn’t see a single policeman or woman on the street and only saw a police car once, at the site of a traffic accident. Crime is virtually unheard of. I was assured that the invisible security presence is extensive. When called the police arrive with startling rapidity. Some rougher parts of the country have seen police abuses. But still: this is the Middle East without the usual uniforms, pat-downs and sirens.
It is easy to pooh-pooh the Emirates as more an airline than a country. The number of Boeing 777s at Dubai airport is genuinely impressive. Or to suggest that it is only the abundance of money that makes UAE what it is. But that is not right. It could be Saudi Arabia, with which it remains tightly allied, but it isn’t. The social contracts are holding, at least for now. The Islam is more moderate than radical. That is a lot better than can be said for much of the Middle East.The Emirates seem to me to have spent their money well, even if the lavishness is sometimes over the top or the taste dubious. Hard for Americans to complain about those faults.
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Russia in the Balkans
Fatjon Prroni of the Turkish Andalou agency asked, so I replied:
– Is Balkans endangered from a rising Russian influence as senator Chris Murphy said after his week-long visit in the region? Do you think that the shift of U.S. focus from Balkans plays an important role?
DPS: I think there is some risk in specific places in the Balkans like Serbia and Bosnia that Russia will do things that America won’t like, including not agreeing to the extension of EUFOR, encouraging South Stream and helping people in Republika Srpska who say they want to secede from Bosnia. The rest of the Balkans is already inoculated against Moscow’s pathologies. Montenegro, Kosovo, Croatia and Macedonia all know that their future lies in the West.
– How far can Russian involvement in the region go and which are the most important sectors that Russia possibly aims to be involved in Balkans?
DPS: Energy is really the only commercial sector in which I see Russian economic involvement in the Balkans as a problem, in particular in Serbia. Europe does not want to proceed with South Stream. For Belgrade to do so will I imagine hurt its European prospects.
– Can we expect changes in NATO’s and EU’s policies (acceleration membership process) toward the region in the face of rising Russian influence?
DPS: So far, NATO has hesitated and the EU has been indifferent, but I think in the future things might change. Russian behavior in Ukraine should make both NATO and the EU move as quickly as possible to make it clear they will expand whenever a state meets the membership criteria and political conditions within the EU and NATO allow expansion. That is already the case for Montenegrin membership in NATO.
– How much important is, in you opinion, the Albanian PM’s visit to Belgrade this month? Are there real chances that this visit to improve bilateral relations?
DPS: There is no reason for relations between Tirana and Belgrade not to improve. The big problems are behind us. It is time for both capitals to look forward. Both are involved now in the EU accession process, which should give them a lot to talk about.
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ISIS strained
The ISIS leadership may at last be beginning to feel the pinch of concerted international efforts against it, both militarily and through diplomatic channels. It seems that the group is facing increasing resistance in the territories it holds: last week it executed fifty Sunni tribesmen and women in a mass killing in al-Anbar province. Meanwhile the Iraqi government claims that 322 tribesmen have been executed in recent days in the north-west provinces of the country.
Losing the tacit support of the Iraqi Sunni tribes would be devastating to the Islamic State. They have been able to take and hold swathes of territory in Anbar province and around Mosul at least in part because of the enmity felt by Sunnis in the north toward the Shi’ite dominated government of Nouri al-Maliki, and the fury in response to their lands effectively becoming occupied by a Shi’ite army comprising soldiers almost entirely from another part of the country. One expert speaking in Washington last week compared the Iraqi army mission in the north to a foreign occupation, noting the difference in religion, ethnicity, and even dialect between the soldiers and civilians.
The docility of the tribes has made administering and holding captured territory much easier for ISIS. It allows resources to be allocated to keeping the pressure on Baghdad, while continuing the siege on Kobani and making advances on Aleppo. If ISIS begins to face trouble in its ‘heartland’ it will find it much harder to maintain its momentum and keep lines of supply and reinforcement open.
In places that momentum is already being halted. It has suffered (and is continuing to suffer) a setback in Kobani, which has turned into a symbolic fight. The town is not strategically important in military terms, but by inflicting defeat after defeat on the ISIS war machine the Kurds (and their western allies) have shown the Middle East that Islamic State is neither invincible nor unstoppable. The jihadis’ determination to not lose the fight for Kobani has dictated the coalition’s strategy in the area: jihadi fighters are concentrating themselves in a tiny area where normally they are dispersed. This makes airstrikes much more devastating. It seems hard to believe that not taking Kobani would be a strategic disaster for ISIS in military terms. However, by continuing to concentrate their forces, ISIS has shown a ‘revealed preference’. It would rather suffer a pyrrhic victory than lose the territory but preserve its military strength.
The preference is understandable. Such a high profile loss will show both potential recruits and sympathizers that an Islamic State victory is not guaranteed. Perhaps more importantly, it will demonstrate to those living inside of the self-proclaimed Caliphate that ISIS might not be here to stay after all.
This comes back to the Sunni tribes. The timing of the Islamic State’s mass executions in Anbar, coinciding as it does with a loss of momentum, points to two possibilities. Either members of the Sunni tribes have realized that ISIS is on the back foot and have become more active in resisting, or the leadership of the Islamic State is afraid they might begin resisting and is attempting to cow any dissent. They have good reason to be afraid: back in 2006 the Sahwa (Awakening) movement pushed al-Qaeda out of Anbar. A second awakening could spell the end of the Islamic State as a viable force in Iraq. By executing tribesmen, ISIS may be risking pushing Sunnis further towards active resistance.
It is clear that cracks are now appearing on the inside of the Caliphate. Now is the time to exploit those cracks to the full. Close support for local forces, both those fighting the jihadis and those living in occupied territory, combined with ongoing military action by the coalition might turn the tide. Fighting the Islamic State can never just be about number of bombs dropped and militants killed. Local peoples must be helped, both to oust the extremists and to rebuild a stable state. Let us hope that moving past the midterms a decisive strategy will be implemented.
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Peace Picks November 3-7
- Kurdistan: From Pawn to Player | Monday, November 3rd | 10:00 – 11:00 | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Falah Mustafa Bakir, head of the Department of Foreign Relations for the Kurdistan Regional Government, will discuss this topic. Note: The question and answer portion of this event will be off the record.
- From Hizbullah to the Islamic State | Monday, November 3rd | 3:00 – 4:30 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | From humble beginnings in the 1980s, Hizbullah’s political clout and public perception have trended upward, thanks to a communications strategy that has adapted to changes in the local and regional environment. There will be a discussion of the recently released book, The Hizbullah Phenomenon: Politics and Communication by Lina Khatib, Dina Matar, and Atef Alshaer. Carnegie Middle East Center Director Khatib will join Carnegie’s Joseph Bahout to discuss how Hizbullah’s strategic communication has influenced other Islamist movements in the region, including the Islamic State. The speakers are Lina Khatib, the director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut and Joseph Bahout, a visiting scholar in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Moderating is Frederic Wehrey, senior associate in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- The Challenges of Chemical Weapons Proliferation and Use | Tuesday, November 4th | 12:30 – 2:00 | Stimson Center| REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is now 17 years old and the recipient of the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize “for its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons”. The OPCW, the United States and other member states explored new territory with the Syrian demilitarization effort, and are still digesting lessons learned. The Syrian government continues to use chemical weapons, and there are other outliers from the CWC and its obligations. Even so, the CWC has helped to strengthen norms against the use of chemical weapons. The panel will discuss chemical weapons proliferation, norm-building, and the challenges ahead. The speakers are Ambassador Robert Mikulak, Andrew Weber, John Parachini, Amy Smithson and Michael Krepon.
- A Time To Act: Combating Sexual Violence in Syria and Iraq | Tuesday, November 4th | 10:00 – 1:00 | Elliott School of International Affairs | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The purpose of this event is to shed light on pressing issues regarding International Humanitarian Law, complex emergencies, and sexual violence, with a particular focus on the atrocities committed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Our goal is not only to bring these issues to the forefront of the public debate but also discuss potential solutions to address them. The speakers are Aisling Swaine, associate professor of practice of international affairs at George Washington, Sucharita S.K. Varanasi with Physicians for Human Rights, Stephen J. Rapp, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues and Sunjeev Bery, advocacy director for Middle East and North Africa issues, Amnesty International USA
- The Islamic State and Beyond: US Military Strategy in the Middle East | Thursday, November 6th | 11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A conversation with General Lloyd J. Austin III who assumed his duties as commander of US Central Command on March 22, 2013. Prior to that, he served as the thirty-third vice chief of staff of the Army from January 2012 to March 2013. He also commanded US Forces – Iraq from September 2010 through the completion of Operation New Dawn in December 2011. Finally, from August 2009 to August 2010, he was assigned to the Pentagon as the director of the Joint Staff.
- Searching for Solutions to the Ebola Epidemic | Thursday, November 6th | 4:30 – 6:00 | REGISTER TO ATTNED | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies| Pia Wanek, director of humanitarian assistance at Global Communities, and Dougbeh Chris Nyan, director of the secretariat for the Diaspora Liberian Emergency Response Task Force, will discuss the international response to the Ebola epidemic, health system capacity, and the broader implications on food security, economic development, and stability in the region.
- Turkey’s Syria Predicament: Finding a Way Forward | Thursday, November 6th | 5:40 – 7:00 | Turkish Policy Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The ongoing civil war in Syria is having a significant impact on its neighbor Turkey: the UN estimates that over 1.6 million Syrian refugees have escaped to Turkey, a tragedy which has resulted in massive social and economic ramifications. Additionally, Turkey’s actions (or lack thereof) vis-à-vis fighters and weapons allegedly crossing its borders have come under scrutiny. Most recently, the developments in Kobane have resulted in Ankara drawing criticism from the international community, and an explosion of violence on Turkish streets, threatening the government’s peace process with its Kurdish population. How will these developments affect Turkey’s relations with the United States? Will there be a Turkish military incursion into Syria? How will Turkey’s standing in the region be affected? What is Turkey’s economic status quo, and how is it being impacted by the Syria crisis? What implications are there for next year’s elections? What is the fate of the Syrian refugees? Is the Kurdish-Turkish peace process stalled, and if so what is the way out? How can Turkey find a way forward with Kurds in neighboring Syria and Iraq? The panel discussion at the Goethe-Institut Washington will focus on developments pertaining to Turkey’s predicament regarding Syria. They will assess economic, political, and foreign policy developments in this context, with a prognosis of things to come.The speakers are Ambassador Robert Pearson, Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Dr. Soner Cagaptay, from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Dr. Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan from the IMF and University of Maryland, Dr. Denise Natali from the National Defense University and Cenk Sidar from Sidar Global Advisors.
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