Month: January 2015

Why we are losing the long war

The United States went to war with Islamic extremism in the aftermath of the murder of nearly 3000 people on 9/11, when its adherents were largely concentrated in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration called this the Global War on Terror (GWOT), a term that misleadingly included the invasion of Iraq. The Obama Administration has abandoned that appellation but continued what others now term the “long” war, which has spread throughout the Greater Middle East into Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Mali, Syria, Egypt, Libya and into sub-Saharan Africa, even as it has subsided in Indonesia, the Philippines and other parts of Asia.

Even this rudimentary description suggests we are not winning. It isn’t even clear what “winning” means, but it almost certainly does not entail spreading the enemy to a dozen or more additional countries, where they are challenging established governments. The geographic spread makes this a tougher fight. Our military much prefers to concentrate forces on a center of gravity whose defeat spells the end of the war.

But now it is no longer clear where the center of gravity is: we used to think it was Al Qaeda Central, holed up in Peshawar or somewhere else along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border. But Osama bin Laden’s death did nothing to stem the jihadi tide, even if Al Qaeda Central has lost significance. Today the press would have us believe the center of gravity is with the Islamic State (ISIS), somewhere in eastern Syria or western Iraq. But defeating it there will all too obviously not defeat Al Qaeda-linked terrorists in Yemen and Mali, or the ISIS affiliate in Sinai.

Islamic extremism, despite ISIS’s claim, is still more an insurgency than a state. Insurgencies do not need to win. They only need to survive.

This one is not only geographically resilient but also demographically resilient. I know of no indication that anything we have done for the past decade or more has seriously limited recruitment to Islamic extremism. To the contrary, efforts to repress it using military force seem to make recruitment easier, not harder. New leaders have far more often than not stepped into the roles of those we have killed. Nor have any of our propaganda/psychops efforts worked. There is on the contrary lots of anecdotal evidence that ISIS propaganda efforts do work, at least to recruit cannon fodder.

So we’ve got an enemy that is difficult to locate, whose center of gravity is unclear, and whose psychops are better than ours. What should we do about it?

First is to keep a sense of proportion. For Americans, trans-national terrorism is a vanishingly small threat. The odds are one-ninth those of being killed by a policeman, and comparable to those of being killed by an asteroid. Ninety-nine per cent of the time no American need really fear terrorism outside a war zone, and those who enter war zones do so knowing the risks.

Second is to recognize that if we want to reduce the risk–in particular reduce the risk that the risk will grow in the future–military means are proving massively inadequate and inappropriate. Islamic extremism was far less likely to grow like topsy when confined to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan than it is now, dispersed in at least a dozen weak states. Those cats are out of the bag. We are not going to be able to force Islamic extremists back to where they came from. But we should be cautious about continuing to bombard them with drones wherever they appear. We may think the risks of collateral damage are minimal, but the people who live in Yemen don’t. For those who join extremist groups because of real or imagined offenses to “dignity,” drone strikes are an effective recruiting tool.

This brings us third to the fraught question of countering extremist narratives. I know of no evidence that direct government efforts to counter extremist narratives have been successful. There is evidence that former terrorists and their families can have some influence, working with local communities. But that requires the existence of a relatively free civil society in which religious institutions and private voluntary organizations are at liberty to organize. Community policing is also an effective strategy. But community policing requires the existence of a legitimate and inclusive state that uses security forces to protect its citizens rather than itself.

It is no wonder that we are losing the long war. We are using our strengths, which lie in technology and military action rather than in the far messier (and more difficult) tasks of building civil society and legitimate governance. It is arguable that our technology and military are actually making the task of countering violent extremism even harder. Drone strikes don’t encourage people to think their government is committed to protecting them. Nor do they encourage former terrorists and their families to speak out against extremism, as community-based civil society organizations might.

If the long war is worth fighting, it should be fought to win. For now, we are fighting it in ways bound to make us lose.

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Scraping the bottom of the barrel

With the likes of Josh Landis predicting more of the same (fragmentation, radicalization, impoverishment, displacement) in Syria, it would be more daring than I am to predict improvement. But it is still interesting to ask what could possibly make a difference and turn things in a more positive direction?

There are two propositions on the table at the moment.

One is the UN-proposed “freeze” for Aleppo. This is intended to be more than a ceasefire. It would freeze the warring forces in place, thus preventing them from simply being redeployed to fight elsewhere, as well as initiate local governance on a cooperative basis between the opposition and the regime. Monitoring would initially have to be local, with international observers deployed in due course. In the absence of effective monitoring, the regime would be likely to use any such freeze to redeploy its forces (including intelligence cadres and paramilitaries) to the south, where the opposition is making headway. It is much harder for the opposition to follow suit, because its fighters generally focus on their home areas and its supply and logistical support is far less developed.

The second proposition is a Russian proposal for intra-Syrian dialogue. This will supposedly convene January 26-28 on the basis of the June 2012 Geneva communique, which calls for an interim governing body with full executive powers. Moscow, Tehran and the Syrian regime view this formula as allowing Bashar al Assad to remain in place and preside over a “national unity” government. The opposition and Washington say it means Bashar has to exit, or at least give up all executive power (which if implemented would mean that he would consequently exit sooner rather than later). There is no sign that this difference of interpretation has been bridged.

Separately, neither of these propositions seems likely to succeed. The Americans and Europeans are allowing both to move along, faute de mieux. The question is whether together they might be more likely to produce some sort of positive outcome.

I’m not seeing it yet. The missing ingredient is enforcement. Only if and when the international community gets together behind a UN Security Council resolution that makes it clear Bashar will suffer irreparable damage to his hold on power will he be willing to countenance a serious ceasefire in Aleppo that blocks him from redeploying his forces. This would require the Americans to be prepared to execute air strikes if there is a violation. As for creation of an interim governing body with full executive powers, enforcement would rely heavily on Russian willingness to cut Bashar’s military and financial supply lines if he transgresses. Putin has given no indication he is prepared to do that. Even if he were, Iranian support might keep Bashar afloat.

This brings us back to the inevitable:  there is no diplomatic solution in Syria in the current military situation unless Washington and Moscow come to terms and agree on one, including a mutual commitment to enforcement. They certainly have a common strategic interest in a negotiated settlement. Both capitals want the Islamic State and Jabhat Nusra, the main jihadi extremist organizations, defeated. They differ mainly on whether Bashar al Assad is a bulwark against the jihadis or an important cause of their presence.

Richard Gowan suggests there might be room for the US and Russia to reach a “dodgy”  grand bargain based on a trade-off between Ukraine and Syria: Moscow would temper its support for separatists in eastern Ukraine (and get some sanctions relief) in exchange for Washington backing off its demand for Bashar to step down. The trouble with this idea is that Washington has already backed off, because it gives priority to fighting the Islamic State. It might be more likely the other way around:  Moscow could back off support for Asad and temper support for separatism in Ukraine in return for Washington allowing some sanctions relief.

Like Russia, Iran props up Asad because it sees him as an ally against Sunni extremism, but Tehran has also needed Asad as a reliable link in the “resistance” chain that it has forged with Hizbollah and Hamas. There is no sign Iran is prepared to abandon Damascus. Even under sanctions and with lower oil prices, Tehran is providing ample men, weapons and financing. A nuclear deal this year would make that easier to sustain, as multilateral sanctions are at least partially lifted.

Freeze, intra-Syrian dialogue, grand bargain: we are scraping the bottom of the barrel. There may be something there that will work, but the odds are not good.

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Happy New Year Balkans!

A Kosovar friend provides this New Year’s view of Vienna, expressed through Albanian music:

Trying to be politically correct, I found this Serbian 2013 New Year’s celebration:

Happy New Year to all!

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