Month: April 2015
What’s wrong, and not, with the nuclear deal
I don’t know any honest analysts who don’t credit the “framework” agreement outlined in a White House fact sheet with going further than in restraining Iran’s nuclear program than most expected. It is truly unprecedented in several respects: it would reduce the amount of enriched uranium in Iran, limit the production (and prohibit the reprocessing of) plutonium, and put out of commission most of Iran’s enriching centrifuges for 15 years. It would also provide for intrusive inspections beyond those any other state is obligated to.
But there are still aspects to be questioned. It is at best unclear who has signed up to the items in the fact sheet. The Iranians deny they have, and the French have their differences as well. In light of the controversy following its publication, it is best to regard the White House version as an American wish list, based on the current state of the negotiations. I imagine the American negotiators had some basis for believing the Iranians would sign up to these things, because otherwise the White House has made John Kerry’s job extraordinarily difficult. But it is also fair to say that the fact sheet was intended to fend off calls in Congress for tighter sanctions and Congressional approval of any final deal. We’ll just have to wait and see whether the American negotiators can deliver what they have promised.
The single most glaring weakness in the fact sheet is the failure to make any visible progress on “possible military dimensions” (PMDs). The International Atomic Energy Agency has been asking for explanations of these apparently nuclear-weapons-related activities for years, without making significant progress. The Iranians are stonewalling, presumably because the explanations will suggest that Iran really did have a nuclear weapons program at one time. Proving that it no longer does is difficult. The IAEA questions are the nuclear equivalent of “have you stopped beating your wife? Can you prove it?”
It is difficult and embarrassing to reply, but the answers are important, as no nuclear weapons state has achieved that status in an overt, IAEA-safeguarded program, or by diversion of material from such a program. Clandestine is always the preference. Why would Iran be different? Secrecy is far more difficult if you have admitted cheating once before.
A third shortcoming of the framework agreement outlined in the fact sheet is time frame. The unprecedented constraints would expire, even if verification provisions do not. But this critique doesn’t hold up. Surely it is better to face an Iran that is unconstrained in a decade or more rather than one that is unconstrained right now and could produce the material for a single nuclear weapon within two or three months.
But critics of the framework don’t want to compare the agreement with no agreement. They want to compare it with Prime Minister Netanyahu’s imaginary “better agreement,” which would eliminate Iran’s nuclear infrastructure entirely. I admit it is possible John Kerry and his team could have negotiated a better agreement, but there is no reason to believe that anything like Netanyahu’s dream could come true. Iran has only amped up its nuclear program during the many years in which we insisted on its giving up its nuclear program and imposed sanctions. If the framework agreement fails, I expect them to continue in that direction.
Tightened sanctions are Netanyahu’s answer. What he and his supporters fail to explain is how sanctions can be tightened. Will Russia, China and the Europeans go along? Sanctions brought Tehran to the table because they were multilateral. Any unilateral sanctions move by the US at this point would destroy the negotiations and push the other members of the P5+1 in the direction of ending the existing sanctions, or at least failing to enforce them as fully as has been the case in the recent past.
Domestic critics want President Obama to threaten use of force. But overt threats of force don’t always help at the negotiating table, because they elicit responses in kind. Iran is already doing harm to US interests in the Gulf, Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon. Even the threat to do more would cause oil prices to rise (to Tehran’s own benefit and to the detriment of the US economy).
Even if the Iranians don’t believe Obama would ever use force, they can be pretty sure his successor (of either political flavor) will be more likely to do so. The US will be far better off if force is triggered some day by Iranian violations of something like the framework agreement, not by a unilateral decision undertaken in desperation as sanctions fray.
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Bridging the Gulf
Cinzia Bianco, an analyst for the “Mediterranean and Gulf” programme at NATO Defence College Foundation whom I met on a recent visit to Rome, offers this guest post, based her “The Changing US Posture in the Gulf as an Opportunity for Regional Cooperation. The role of the EU,” paper presented at the Fifth Gulf Research Meeting (GRM), University of Cambridge, 25-28 August 2014. Her full paper will be published with others from the GRM by the Gerlach Press.
The commitment of the United States in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as well as Al Qa’eda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has silenced rumors about imminent American disengagement from the Gulf in order to pivot to the Asia Pacific. This commitment stems chiefly from the proliferation of terrorist groups in the Middle East and North Africa, which poses a threat to the US national security.
Nonetheless it has become clear that the US shows fatigue in managing unilaterally this ever-boiling, resource-consuming region. In favoring a “leading from behind” approach, the Obama administration has demonstrated a lack of coherent leadership in navigating the regional challenges, which include state failures in Syria, Yemen and Iraq as well as the consequences of a nuclear agreement with Iran. The US needs to find a way to prevent leaving a hazardous vacuum by relying on an ally to try and build a more stable, long-term strategic outlook in the Gulf. Despite all of its well-known weaknesses, that ally might be the European Union (EU).
The EU has the the potential and interests to step forward. Despite ups and downs, the EU has been involved for decades in direct dialogue with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), made a big commitment in post-war Iraq and has almost uninterruptedly maintained communication open with Iran. Conflicts in the Gulf would directly affect Europe, whose geographic proximity raises the stakes. Europe is much more dependent than the US on the Gulf for oil and gas supplies. Its trade and investments volume could be hugely disrupted, as Gulf ports are Europe’s gateways to Asia. EU-GCC investments are far more significant than that involving the US.
These motives should be sufficiently compelling to encourage the EU to take on a more proactive role in the region, which would also consolidate its place as a global strategic player.
The presence of a heavy-weighted American military umbrella has not sufficed to protect the region from the emergence of the unconventional threats that are tearing it apart. The regional problems are, at their roots, not military but political and require courageous political responses. Since grievances and conflicts in the Gulf are mushrooming along sectarian fault lines – empowering Sunni and Shi’a extremism in a way that endangers internal as well as external stability of almost all regional countries–it is sectarianism that needs to be addressed head-on, by putting all Gulf countries around the same table. A truly effective dialogue on security in the Gulf needs active participation from Saudi Arabia, and cannot be built without or in spite of Iran and Iraq. Given the considerable distrust between the Sunni and Shi’a in the region, only the EU and the US together have enough political capital to entertain such a challenging enterprise.
The approach in the Gulf should start with limited cooperation on practical issues, in an incremental process of confidence-building focusing on many shared challenges and opportunities. All parties share critical resources, not only oil and gas fields but also water, whose management is strategic in such an arid region and needs to be coordinated. Joint patrolling of regional waters, under the umbrella of existing international initiatives, to fight the transnational criminal networks that engage in illicit trafficking and piracy, might be one step towards normalization.
Nothing can be done without a structured regional dialogue on the sociopolitical front, supporting existing fora of inter-sectarian dialogue and fighting extremist narratives. Tuning down the sectarian narrative at all levels, from leadership to population, might be the only way to prevent spillover from Syria, Iraq and Yemen into the broader region. The most concerned countries should in fact be Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Frameworks of this sort have failed to prosper in the past, but always in the presence of huge level of hostility between the US and Iran. The main GCC fear is that Iran always works to extend its influence in the Gulf, by playing the Shia communities against the Sunni rulers. Arguably, however, critical engagement rather than classic deterrence would the most effective approach to prevent this behavior.
As much as this idea may seem daunting, neglecting the challenge of sectarian-based extremism and allowing deep-seated conflicts to escalate would put national and international strategic interests at great risk. In order to return the Gulf to long-lost stability, bold steps are required, as well as the ability to adapt quickly to a changing strategic outlook, that might soon include the rehabilitation of Iran in the international arena. A visionary plan for a regional rapprochement based on shared challenges and shared opportunities might in the upcoming future become the best possible option.
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A better place to start from
More or less half of American voters will cast their ballots for the Republicans in 2016, so it behooves us to examine seriously what they propose to do about Iran’s nuclear program. Jeb Bush has been inaccurate and hazy. Rick Perry is clearer. So let’s consider his proposition, which consists of sanctions, regime change and war.
The problem with ratcheting up sanctions is getting others to follow the US lead. Russia, China and the Europeans have gone along with the Obama Administration’s strengthening of sanctions because they saw it as part of a broader diplomatic effort intended to reach an agreement with Iran. The Obama Administration made it clear war was an option only if negotiations failed. No one would be under that impression if Rick Perry becomes president. He aims to compel Iran to give up its nuclear program, which would lead quickly to the other members of the P5+1 (that’s UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) deciding to abandon the effort. Unilateral US sanctions, as we’ve seen with Cuba, are destined to fail.
If sanctions fail, Perry suggests a push for regime change. That would revive a longstanding American ambition, one that failed for 35 years until President Obama put it on ice. Of course Perry might be better at it than Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush (41), Clinton, Bush (43) and Obama, but the odds on that proposition are not good. The Islamic Republic will fall some day, because it is incapable of meeting the aspirations of the Iranian people. But when that might happen is anyone’s guess. In the meanwhile, supporting the aspirations of Iran’s Kurdish or Baloch separatists, as has been done at times in the past, is frighteningly risky in today’s Middle East, where state structures are already at risk in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya.
Then there is war, aimed at destroying Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. But in order to do that, the US will need also to destroy its air defenses and somehow prevent Iranian attacks on shipping in the strait of Hormuz. With no prospect of a negotiated solution, Russia is bound to export modern air defenses to Iran. Weeks if not months of bombing would be required. The only really reliable way to protect shipping is to seize the Iranian side of the strait, an option no doubt included in US planning. In the meanwhile, oil prices would spike back to $100 and more per barrel. Any multilateral effort to negotiate an end to Iran’s nuclear program would die an ignominous death.
The net result of the military effort by most estimates would be no more than a two or three year setback for Iran’s nuclear program, which would be redoubled in the aftermath. While some may hope for regime change after a US attack on Iran, experience suggests that the initial reaction will be for Iranians to rally around the flag. The government would squelch any nascent pro-democracy efforts as treacherous and hardliners would be buoyed. That might change later, but there are no guarantees.
Let’s ignore for the moment the possibility–a real one–that Iran will cheat on its obligations under an agreement along the lines of the one already outlined. Can anyone seriously argue that setting the Iranian nuclear program back 10 or 15 years, as provided for in the “framework” agreement, is not better than the Perry formula of sanctions, regime change and war?
I think not, but that still leaves the verification issue. The agreement is strong on verification, but not fool proof. Iran could conceivably establish an entirely separate nuclear program, starting from uranium ore, that would escape the scrutiny of international inspectors and the import controls provided for in the framework agreement. It could also renounce the agreement and expel the inspectors, or even withdraw from the Non Proliferation Treaty, as North Korea did.
But if it did so, we would be much more likely to get cooperation from others on sanctions, regime change and war. The framework agreement looks like a far better place to start from than no agreement at all.
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Iraq’s Sunnis
Someone asked me last week to introduce a discussion of Iraq’s Sunnis. Here are the speaking notes I used:
1. For much of the time since 2003, Iraq’s Sunnis have been the proverbial puzzle piece that didn’t fit for the Americans.
2. We knew and liked the Kurds because of the no-fly zone we imposed on northern Iraq in 1991 and their gradual political evolution in a relatively democratic direction, not to mention their good relations with Israel and their now improved relations with Turkey.
3. We knew the Shia and ignored their Iranian connections, because they were inevitable winners in a democratic Iraq.
4. The Sunnis were the odd ones out: they had pretensions and grandiose ideas but little clout. They didn’t like to be called a minority. They resisted the American invasion and lynched American operatives. Only during the relatively brief period of the Awakenings did we have a clue how they might fit.
5. The Sunnis were also divided: some clung to Saddam and manned a persistent stay-behind operation, others were attached to religious organizations that lacked the clarity and hierarchy of the Hawza but still mounted a serious insurgency, others were tribal, whatever that meant.
6. I’ve always been struck by the opening sentences of the 2005 Iraq constitution: “We are the people of the land between two rivers, the homeland of the apostles and prophets, abode of the virtuous imams, pioneers of civilization, crafters of writing and cradle of numeration. Upon our land the first law made by man was passed, the most ancient just pact for homelands policy was inscribed, and upon our soil, companions of the Prophet and saints prayed, philosophers and scientists theorized and writers and poets excelled.”
7. Those are the only words in the constitution intended to warm Sunni hearts. For the rest, they were losers. The Kurds got recognition of their language and their regional government as well as the presidency. Shia gained control of the Baghdad government, upending more than 80 years of Sunni rule.
8. The Sunnis got the parliament speaker and three provinces in which they were the clear majority: Ninewa, Anbar and Salaheddin. Those three provinces came close to rejecting the constitution, but missed by a few thousand votes according to the official count. They are the three provinces that led the protest movement against Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki in 2011/12. They are the three provinces that fell easily to Islamic State control in June 2014.
9. We’ve got a Sunni problem. What happens to it next?
10. Sectarian tensions have certainly heightened dramatically in Iraq since the fall of Saddam, who was a Sunni nationalist but made sure that Shia participated and benefited from his dictatorship.
11. Today, a good number of Sunnis loathe and fear Shia domination. While many Sunnis still claim to identify as “Iraqi” and say they are not sectarian, we should not be fooled. Sectarianism is strong when it comes to how power and status should be distributed in the society.
12. Most of those who welcome ISIS into their communities did not do so because they liked its religious discipline and brutality. According to the Iraqi pollster Munqith Dagher, support for ISIS among Iraqi Sunnis is low and support for the anti-ISIS coalition is high. But Sunnis felt the need to protect themselves from what they viewed as a sectarian, Iranian-dominated government bent on repression of Iraqi identity. They prefer ISIS to Shia militias.
13. Some would conclude from this that partition is a good idea. It is not. I don’t know any Iraqi Sunnis who want a future state of their own without Baghdad, which is now predominantly Shia. Nor are there sufficient resources in the Sunni provinces to finance a serious state.
14. There is no agreement on the lines that partition would necessarily draw between Sunnistan and Shiastan, or between Sunnistan and Kurdistan. Those lines, if they are to be drawn, will be drawn by war, especially as there is oil and gas at stake. Partition is a formula for another 10 years or more of armed conflict.
15. What other scenarios can we contemplate for Sunni Iraq?
16. It might still be possible to reintegrate Sunnis into Arab Iraq, but only if they were to get an equal share of power with Shia in Baghdad. Such things have been done—in the Balkans, where ethnic powersharing built on the Ottoman millet system is the rule in Bosnia, for example.
17. The Federation Council—the upper house of the Iraqi parliament included in the constitution but never created—could provide a power-sharing mechanism of this sort, with mutual vetoes, which is what powersharing of this sort requires.
18. The advantage is inclusion. Nothing could be accomplished without Sunni support. The disadvantage is dysfunctionality. In my way of thinking, the disadvantage outweighs even the very considerable advantage, but that is largely because I’ve seen how mutual vetoes have rendered the Bosnian state virtually useless.
19. I also am at a loss to explain how to convince Shia to yield veto power to Sunnis at the national level. It would imply a virtual reversal of everything they have gained since the fall of Saddam.
20. More reasonable is devolution to geographically defined units. There are two obvious options: one is a Sunni Regional Government analogous to Kurdistan’s, which was one of the demands of some Sunni protesters. The procedures for creating a region are outlined in the constitution and relatively easy to fulfill, though how three provinces join into one is not so clear. Read more
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Peace picks April 6 – 10
- The Kurds: Strategic Partners in the Fight Against ISIS? | Monday April 6 | 9:00 – 11:00 | Bipartisan Policy Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Although the terrorist group calling itself the Islamic State (or ISIS), has been the focus of U.S. military operations in Iraq and Syria, this is far from a monolithic war. Instead it is a patchwork of overlapping conflicts between myriad groups in which today’s tactical allies might be tomorrow’s enemies. The challenge for U.S. policymakers now is finding reliable partners amid this jumble of factions. In the long run, however, it will be how to help the region recover from both the humanitarian and political crises created by these internecine conflicts. In both these aspects, the region’s Kurds are emerging as important players. Kurdish groups, from the peshmerga of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), to the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units, and even Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party, have been on the front lines in the fight against ISIS. Kurds are also playing an important role in sheltering refugees and protecting other minorities in the region. To learn more about the challenges facing the region, the role of the Kurds, and the implications for U.S. policy, BPC invites to remarks and a discussion with Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, the KRG representative to the United States, followed by an expert panel. The panel includes John Hannah, Former Assistant for National Security Affairs to the Vice President and Member, BPC Turkey Initiative, Kenneth Pollack, Former Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs and Director for Persian Gulf Affairs, National Security Council, General (Ret.) Charles Wald, Former Deputy Commander, United States European Command and Vice Chairman Senior Advisor, Deloitte Services LP.
- Tracking Arms In Conflict – Lessons From Syria And Iraq | Tuesday April 7 | 11:00 – 12:00 | The Stimson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Identifying and tracking weapons being used in armed conflicts is a dangerous but vital task. At times this is done by investigators on the ground, but often relies on footage and other evidence viewed from afar. On April 7, experts will discuss how they are tracking weapons used in Syria and Iraq, and share some of their recent findings. Jonah Leff, Director of Operations, Conflict Armament Research, will report on findings based on documentation of nearly 40,000 weapons and ammunition as part of field investigations and the new iTrace system. He’ll discuss the prevalence of U.S. weapons found among Islamic State fighters; findings of newly manufactured Russian, Iranian, and Sudanese ammunition; evidence of supply to Syrian rebels from Saudi Arabia; and large scale industrial production and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Syria and Iraq. Matt Schroeder, Senior Researcher, Small Arms Survey, will share examples of using YouTube and other footage to track the increasing complexity of use of MANPADS (aka shoulder-fired missiles) by fighters in the Middle East. The discussion will be moderated by Rachel Stohl, Senior Associate, Managing Across Boundaries, Stimson Center.
- Ambassador Lukman Faily on the Future of Iraq | Tuesday April 7 | 3:00 – 4:30 | Johns Hopkins SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As Iraq tries to re-take territory from ISIS, what are the challenges it faces? How are efforts to re-integrate Sunni fighting forces proceeding, and what steps have been taken toward a more inclusive government? Baghdad’s relations with Iraqi Kurdistan are still fraught. Oil prices are dramatically lower than once expected. The country’s most important friends – the United States and Iran – are trying to reach a nuclear deal even as they support opposing forces in Syria and Yemen. How will lraq manage in this turbulent and challenging environment? The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Conflict Management Program at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) are pleased to host the Ambassador of Iraq, His Excellency Lukman Faily, and Abbas Kadhim, Senor Foreign Policy Fellow, SAIS, in a discussion about Iraq and its future. The discussion will be moderated by Daniel Serwer, Senior Research Professor of Conflict Management, SAIS and Scholar, Middle East Institute.
- Morocco’s Contribution to Countering Violent Extremism in Africa and the Middle East | Wednesday April 8 | 10:00 – 11:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The recent terrorist attack on the Bardo National Museum in Tunis underscores the growing danger extremist ideologies and violence pose to the North African region and beyond. Countries still unsettled by the tumult of the Arab Spring are now confronting the radicalizing influence of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and other extremist organizations as thousands of North Africans flock to join the militants. The Kingdom of Morocco has not been spared the challenge of radicalization as one thousand or more of its citizens have joined terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria in recent years, but the innovative counter-radicalization program it launched in following terrorist attacks in the early 2000s and which it continues to expand, offers hope to the entire region. H.E. Salaheddine Mezouar, Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, will provide insights into the political context that led to Morocco’s creation and continuing commitment to its program of combatting violent extremism at home and abroad. The Foreign Minister’s remarks will be followed by a panel discussion on the religious approach to deradicalization featuring Ahmed Abbadi, Secretary-General, Rabita Muhammadia of ‘Ulamas, Geneive Abdo, Fellow, Middle East Program, Stimson Center and Stephen Grand, Executive Director, Middle East Strategy Task Force, Atlantic Council. The panel will be moderated by Peter Pham, Director, Africa Center, Atlantic Council.
- Cyber Risk Wednesday: The future of Iranian cyber threat | Wednesday April 8 | 4:00 – 5:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Few other events have so far dominated 2015 as the P5+1 negotiations to limit Iranian nuclear capabilities. Against the backdrop of the negotiations, it is likely that Iran, Israel, and the United States are gathering their strength for a renewal of cyber conflict of the past several years. The confrontations include attacks both from Iran, such as disruption of the US banking sector and against Gulf energy companies, and against Iran, such as Stuxnet and the Wiper worm. Should the talks fail, what are the chances of an escalating cyber conflict? The moderated panel discussion will analyze the latest developments in Iranian cyber capabilities and discuss the chances of larger cyber conflict. The panel will feature Neal Pollard, Director, Forensics Technology Practice, PricewaterhouseCoopers, General James L. Jones, Jr., USMC (Ret.), Founder, Jones Group International, David Sanger, Chief Washington Correspondent, New York Times, Barbara Slavin, Nonresident Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council and Andretta Towner, Senior Intelligence Analyst, CrowdStrike. The discussion will be moderated by Paul Kurtz, CEO, TruSTAR Technology.
- The Search for International Consensus on Syria and Beyond | Thursday April 9 | 10:00 – 12:00 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In 2013, the international community came together to protect the Syrian population by committing to the elimination of Syria’s declared stockpile of chemical weapons, a feat achieved the following year. Together, the United Nations and the Nobel Prize-winning Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) are credited with achieving one of the few breakthroughs in containing the ongoing crisis in Syria. What lessons can be learned for application in other conflict areas, especially as OPCW continues its work destroying chemical weapons facilities in Syria this year? On April 9, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings and The Hague Institute for Global Justice will host OPCW Director General Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü for a discussion about the process of dismantling Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile and implications for peace, security, and accountability. Brookings Executive Vice President Martin Indyk will introduce Ambassador Üzümcü. Deputy Mayor of The Hague Ingrid van Engelshoven will provide brief opening remarks, and Abiodun Williams, president of The Hague Institute for Global Justice, will moderate the discussion. Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute Robert S. Ford (U.S. ambassador to Syria, 2010-2014) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mallory Stewart will join the discussion with Ambassador Üzümcü, following his keynote address. After the program, the speakers will take audience questions.
- Burma’s Peace Potential: Portraits of Diversity | Thursday April 9 | 2:00 – 3:30 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Every day in Burma, monks, doctors, teachers, even a popular reggae singer from Yangon, set examples of unity and cooperation, in contrast to headlines about violence between Buddhists and Muslims. U.S. Institute of Peace, in partnership with the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, invites to a screening of a film series highlighting such stories, Portraits of Diversity, followed by a discussion of how these examples can inform support for the country’s transition. The question-and-answer session following the screening will feature Venerable Tayzar Dipati, a monk portrayed in the film whose chief role is to care for patients with HIV and to run the monastery of young monks. He will be joined by Dr. Emma Leslie, Executive Director of the Cambodia-based Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies who has led and supported initiatives for conflict transformation, peace and development throughout Asia since 1993. The Rev. Susan Hayward, Interim Director for Religion and Peacebuilding, USIP, will act as moderator.
- Israel and the EU: Perceptions in a Complex Relationship | Friday April 10 | 12:00 – 1:00 | The Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Institute is pleased to host Professor Sharon Pardo for a presentation on Israel’s vital relationship with the European Union (EU). With over half a billion people in its 28 member states, the EU is Israel’s largest trade partner. EU countries and Israel enjoy rich cultural exchanges as well as close security cooperation treating the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, the EU is a significant donor to the Palestinian Authority, and public sentiment in Europe regarding Israel’s settlement and occupation policies is broadly negative. Pardo and co-author Neve Gordon recently examined the complexities of the relationship in an article published by MEI in The Middle East Journal. He will discuss Israeli perceptions of the EU and paths the relationship may take in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s new term. Kate Seelye, Senior Vice President, Middle East Institute, will serve as moderator.
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Tighten your seat belts
Yesterday’s unprecedented framework for a nuclear accord with Iran sets back the clock in two different ways: it would put Iran a year away from accumulating the fissionable material needed for a nuclear weapon (as opposed to the current two-three months) and it would maintain tight constraints for at least 10 years (and in some areas 15), in addition to permanent verification procedures. In return, Iran would get still unspecified sanctions relief, presumably timed to implementation of the nuclear parts of the agreement.
What does this mean for US/Iran relations, the region and the rest of the world?
It puts the US and Iran on course for intense interactions for a decade or more to come. This is a sharp break with the sporadic and often hostile relations they have endured for more than 30 years. Negotiation of the final details and implementation of the nuclear agreement will not necessarily be a friendly affair. There is lots of room for frictions and misunderstandings to develop over one or another aspect of Iran’s far-flung nuclear program. But we are going to need a dedicated group of nuclear and Iran savvy diplomats to ensure that all the t’s are crossed and the i’s dotted. It would clearly be best if these people were located in Iran or nearby, which raises the question of reopening an American diplomatic facility in Tehran. A bridge too far for the moment, but something to keep in mind.
Iran’s regional behavior will ensure that future relations with Washington are not entirely friendly. Tehran vaunt strong influence over four Arab capitals today: Damascus, Sanaa, Baghdad and Beirut, in addition to Gaza. This influence has been acquired by force of arms, mainly through aggressive action by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its proxies.
The IRGC and other Iranian security agencies do what they think they can get away with to subvert the Sunni Arab monarchies in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Iranian threats against Israel continue unabated. While claiming to be non-sectarian in outlook and providing support to Hamas (a Sunni Arab organization), Tehran has done a good deal to polarize the Middle East between Sunni and Shia, in particular by supporting Shia militias in Iraq, Hizbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and the nominally Shia Alawite leadership in Syria.
At the same time, Iran is a serial human rights violator at home, where it keeps a tight lid on dissent. It is an autocracy, not a dictatorship, one that relies on elections in which candidates are screened and debate is circumscribed even if vigorous. The country’s biggest internal threat is ethnic strife, since barely more than 50% of the population identifies as Persian. Just yesterday there was trouble from Arab separatists in Khuzestan, a particularly sensitive area on the Gulf adjacent to Iraq. But Iran has also seen a broad-based, non-ethnic, pro-democracy movement that it crushed violently in 2010.
The US and Europe cannot ignore the misbehavior of Iran both at home and abroad. As sanctions are lifted, Tehran’s capacity for trouble making will increase with its oil exports, though perhaps not as much as expected because Iran’s renewed production may drive prices down further. Iran would be wise to spend any increased revenue on improving the lot of its own population, which has suffered big declines in standard of living.
But if Tehran chooses instead to unleash the IRGC even further to help Bashar al Asad, to counter the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen or to make trouble for Israel, the West needs to be prepared to respond. It may have been wise to isolate these issues from the nuclear talks until now, but it would be a mistake to allow Iran to use the resources it gets from the nuclear deal to further roil the region.
America’s friends and allies in the region, both Sunni Arab and Israeli, will rightly not let us forget that Iran continues to try to export its Islamic revolution. They regard the end of sanctions on Iran and its return to a more normal international status as strengthening the Islamic Republic. They at times seem more concerned with this return to normality than with the far greater strengthening that would result from Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. But there are real issues: Russia, for example, may transfer advanced air defenses to Tehran once sanctions are lifted. The conventional military balance in the Gulf favors the Sunni Arabs and Israel, but the end of sanctions may enable Iran to improve its standing.
No good deed goes unpunished. Iran and the US are at best at the beginning of a long road. It is not clear where the road leads. There will be many bumps along the way. Tighten your seat belts.
PS: Here is President Obama’s defense of the pending agreement.
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