Month: August 2016
Hezbollah in Syria
The Washington Post piece I published July 28 on forcing Hezbollah out of the fight in Syria either diplomatically or, if that fails, militarily has gotten mixed reactions, at best. Here are some criticisms I care to reply to:
- Many retweeted the false allegation that I had advocated bombing Lebanon (even that I had advocated bombing civilians in Lebanon). The op/ed was clearly directed at Hezbollah’s presence inside Syria and advocated getting its forces to withdraw to Lebanon. At no time did I advocate bombing civilians either in Lebanon or in Syria. This false allegation was clearly intended to obscure the main point I had made: that Hezbollah is itself a terrorist group that should not be in Syria, even if you think it has an appropriate role in Lebanon.
- Quite a few interpreted my piece as pro-Israel, some explicitly referring to my being Jewish. This of course ignores the fact that Israelis might not appreciate the Hezbollah retaliation I mentioned as likely. It also helps anti-Semites to put people in predetermined boxes, making further thinking or discussion unnecessary. The fact is Hezbollah would represent more of a threat to Israel if it were not fighting against Syrians. It will emerge from Syria significantly diminished in manpower and political traction in Lebanon, though with enhanced military experience.
- Some thought my proposition would be not be consistent with international law. This is a more worthy critique. International law does permit self-defense, but it has been some time since Hezbollah killed Americans, so far as I know. There is, however, no international statute of limitations, in particular on mass murder. Is the US not entitled to respond to the murder of 241 Marines because more than 30 years have passed? The US killed Osama bin Laden more than 9 years after 9/11. How many more years before we forget about mass murder? Hezbollah has sworn enmity to the US. Are we not permitted to take them seriously and try to prevent further harm to our citizens?
- Others alleged that my proposal would spread the Syrian war. This too is worthy of consideration, but I fail to see how my proposal would necessarily make things worse. If Assad and his allies continue to make progress and in particular if opposition-held neighborhoods in Aleppo were to fall, more Syrians would flee to neighboring countries, not fewer. It is certainly arguable that some significant portion of the 7 million and more Syrians who have already become refugees are attributable to Hezbollah. How many more will Hezbollah cause to flee if it is not prevented from assaulting civilians?
- Some asked whether we shouldn’t be happy Hezbollah is fighting the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. While Hezbollah does fight jihadis associated with both the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, its presence in Syria is also an important recruiting tool for Sunni extremists, who are delighted to have the civilian population Hezbollah attacks mobilized to take up arms in self-defense. Killing civilians and calling them terrorists is not a viable strategy to counter violent extremism.
Assad helped to create the Islamic State in Iraq after the 2003 American invasion, when he funneled jihadi fighters into Iraq to resist the Americans. Early in the 2011 revolution, he also released extremists from Syrian prisons, in an effort to ensure that the only choice Syrians and the international community would have was between him and the terrorists. He is close to fulfilling that prophecy. The longer the war goes on, the less space there is for non-extremists. Allowing Hezbollah to continue to fight in Syria helps not only Assad but also the most extreme elements opposing him. It also postpones any political settlement, which is what is really needed.
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Peace Picks August 8-12
- Technology: Improving Elections One Bit Or Byte At A Time? | Tuesday, August 9th | 3:15 pm -4:45 pm | Pew Charitable Trusts – Research Facility| Click HERE for more information | Election apps, online tools, electronic poll books, and more, are changing every aspect of the elections process. What role do legislators play in adopting new technology? What is the price for implementing new voting tools? And what about the human factor—how does all this impact voters and poll workers? Speakers will include David Becker of the Pew Charitable Trusts, Washington, D.C.; Matthew Mastersonof the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Maryland; and Amber McReynolds, Denver Elections Division, Colorado
- Women And The SDGs: Partner Perspectives | Tuesday, August 9th | 4:00pm -6:00pm | Woodrow Wilson Center| Click HERE to register | Please join Plan International USA and the Woodrow Wilson Center for a practical discussion on how various partners can and should work together to move the SDG needle for women and girls. The panelists will share their perspectives and the challenges they face, and discuss what the SDGs really mean for women globally. To enhance the conversation, 26 women leaders from 18 countries participating in Plan’s Global Women in Management program will also be in attendance to share their views from the field. Speakers include Tony Pipa, Chief Strategy Officer at USAID; Natalie Co, Senior Manager at Accenture Development Partnerships; Roger-Mark de Souza, Director of Population, Environmental Security, and Resilience, Woodrow Wilson Center; and Xolile Manyoni, Project Coordinator/Co-founder, Sinamandla, South Africa (Global Women in Management participant, Plan USA). The discussion will be moderated by Ann Hudock, Senior Vice President for International Programs at Plan International USA. The discussion will be from 4-5pm, with a reception to follow from 5-6pm
- Teaching The Middle East Through Art, Music, And Culture | Wednesday, August 10th | 9:00am -3:00pm | Elliott School of International Affairs| Click HERE to register | This workshop will help K-12 educators develop strategies to look beyond the dominant narratives of conflict and violence in the Middle East and instead teach students about the region through its wide array of peoples and cultures. Along with presentations from leading scholars, we will engage discussions and activities, and distribute information to help educators access resources on teaching about the Middle East. Speakers include Ted Swedenburg, Professor of Anthropology, University of Arkansas and Hisham Aidi, Lecturer, Columbia University.
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Stronger Erdogan, weaker Turkey
The July 15 Turkish coup attempt was swiftly quashed. Just as swiftly came President Erdogan’s fulfillment of his promise that those responsible “will pay a heavy price for their treason to Turkey.” Why the coup failed, who was behind it, and what is the future of US-Turkey relations were the main questions explored at the Atlantic Council event last Tuesday “Ten Days after Quelling the Coup: Where is Turkey Headed?” Moderated by Aaron Stein, Senior Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the event featued Elmira Bayrasli, Visiting Fellow at New America, and Steven Cook, ENI Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Cook offered four reasons for the coup failure. The first and most important was the divided Turkish military. The coup was a factious scheme, not a unified undertaking. Second, the plotters underestimated Erdogan’s hold on power, which he has held since 2003. Third, the Turkish military is not as strong as it seemed. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Fethullah Gulen — whom Erdogan regards as the main culprit of the coup attempt — used to be partners and worked in parallel to weaken and subordinate the military. Lastly, Turkish society appears no longer willing to accept military rule.
Bayrasli clarified that Fethullah Gulen is a US-based cleric who founded the Hizmet movement. Rooted in moderate Islam, Hizmet has attracted millions of followers and has funded hundreds of schools, think tanks, and media outlets around the world. Erdogan accuses Gulen of orchestrating the coup and has urged the US to extradite him. It is possible he was behind the coup, but it is also true that Gulen has become Erdogan’s “default scapegoat.” Until Turkey provides solid evidence, the US cannot extradite Gulen, but the claim of his involvement advances Erdogan’s effort to concentrate power.
Bayrasli noted that the AKP came to power with technocrats who delivered. Turkey has seen enormous economic growth since Erdogan came to power. But economic prosperity hasn’t been matched with political and social advancement.
Cook and Bayrasli believe that Washington and the EU are positioned as mere spectators, with little leverage over Turkey’s internal affairs. The implicit Turkish threat to send a large number of refugees in the direction of Europe means that the EU will remain mute over Erdogan’s purge. According to Cook, “Turkey has the EU over a barrel.” Turkey’s paramount importance in the fight against ISIS will silence Washington too.
With its military in chaos, with police and the ministry of interior decimated by purges, Turkey may not remain an effective partner in the fight against ISIS, either in controlling its borders with Syria or working with the US at Incirlik. Who is going to substitute thousands of judges and teachers, and tens of thousands of policemen and army personnel? The purges are weakening Turkey and are undermining its capacity for effective governance. Turkey might have the EU over a barrel, but at least Washington should not be a mere spectator.
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The story will not end with Mosul’s liberation
A former Middle East Institute research assistant still working on Iraq offers this:
The dust is settling in Fallujah, where the Iraqi army is digging in. The center of gravity in the fight against Da’esh (ISIS) is now moving north. Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city and a Da’esh stronghold since June 2014, will now become a battleground again. D-Day remains unclear, though on Sunday Nineveh’s former governor predicted a mid-September start date for the Mosul offensive.
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi Federal Government in Baghdad – alongside international partners – have held months of discussions and planning sessions to prepare for what is to come. At times the discussions have been less than amicable, but it is generally understood that Kurdish Peshmerga and the Iraqi Army will work together closely to liberate the city.
The humanitarian situation arising from that liberation will be bleak. Contingency planners in Iraq and Kurdistan believe there are around 1.2 million civilians trapped inside of the city, with another 800,000 in the surrounding districts and villages in Nineveh province. This population will be directly exposed to the fighting.
This will present an unprecedented challenge for authorities. KRG reports predict that the number of new IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) will reach around 420,000 individuals (72,000 families). The vast bulk of these IDPs will flee north and east, into the Iraqi Kurdistan.
This could spell disaster for the KRG. The region is already suffering from the effects of years of fighting, a severe economic downturn, and a bitter ongoing dispute with the federal government in Baghdad over its share of the nationwide budget. Despite all this, Kurdistan has become a comparatively safe haven for those displaced by regional turmoil (and for economic migrants from the south). As a result the KRG now hosts close to 1.3 million IDPs, plus 245,000 Syrian refugees – around a quarter of the region’s total population.
Moreover, the 420,000 IDP figure does not represent the worst-case prediction. One briefing document produced by a KRG department presents three possible scenarios for the Mosul offensive’s IDP fallout. In the first, best-case scenario, the operation lasts only a few weeks. In this case, the number of IDPs will remain comparatively low, as Da’esh bans freedom of movement, and Mosuli civilians attempt to weather the conflict at home.
The second, middle-case, scenario gives the 420,000 IDP contingency figure. It assumes an offensive lasting more than several weeks, in which shelling and airstrikes become more intense, and the battle descends into block-by-block street fighting.
In the third, worst case scenario the offensive lasts several months. Bitter street fighting, increasing shortages of food and supplies, and inner-city chaos ensue as Da’esh slowly loses control. In this scenario, the number of people fleeing the fighting may rise to more than a million.
This third case scenario warrants being taken seriously. The operation to retake Fallujah lasted a month. The Mosul offensive could well last much longer. Mosul city is considerably larger than Fallujah, at approximately 250 square miles to Fallujah’s four square miles. Mosul’s still-resident population is also vastly larger than Fallujah’s, making it harder and more time-consuming for attacking forces to avoid collateral damage (it can be assumed that the defenders will have no such qualms). Further, Da’esh has had more than two years to entrench. The loss of Mosul, the jewel in its crown, will be a more symbolic defeat than any previous loss. Da’esh is likely to put up a determined defense.
Any of the three scenarios will put an incredible financial and logistical burden on already struggling Kurdistan. Five new IDP camps are planned, but the KRG already struggles to care for the numerous IDPs already in-region. Meanwhile, the stagnant economy has forced the domestic population to undergo painful belt-tightening.
While Iraqi Kurdistan remains relatively stable for now, tensions and resentments bubble barely below the surface. Civil service salaries have been slashed and frequently have not been paid at all. President Masoud Barzani has clung to power, even as his presidential term (and the extension he gave himself) has expired. The Kurdish parliament has ground to a halt as party relations between former coalition partners, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Gorran, have deteriorated to non-speaking terms. Politics between the major parties has become increasingly violent.
Conversations with Kurdish citizens in the region suggest that the failures of their leaders have not gone unobserved, but rather are currently being tolerated for the greater good. Popular grievances will resurface once the common enemy is defeated. Kurds will expect speedy redress from the government in return for their patience these past two years, starting the moment Da’esh is beaten.
Mosul’s fall may be seen as that moment. The domestic and international press will see it as the moment the international coalition broke the back of Da’esh in Iraq. Even as it falls, Erbil will be facing a vast influx of IDPs. It is doubtful the KRG will have the capacity or resources to process and provide for this new population, while also caring for its own.
But even if the liberation of Mosul goes smoothly, other risks will follow: ISIS fighters are likely to escape and pose as IDPs, Arabs fleeing to Kurdistan may therefore be distrusted and even mistreated. Disputes between the KRG and Baghdad will intensify, especially if the Kurds try to keep the eastern bank of the Tigris in Mosul as well as the Nineveh plain, which has a mixed Yazidi, Assyrian Christian, Kurdish, Shabak, Arab population of about 400,000.
This story will not end with the liberation of Mosul.
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