Month: May 2017
Peace picks May 8-12
- Cultural Diplomacy to Tackle Today’s Challenges | Monday, May 8 | 4:30-6pm | SAIS | Register Here | Vali Nasr, Dean of the School of Advanced International Studies, and Fred Bronstein, Dean of the Peabody Institute, invite you to join world class violinist and UN Messenger of Peace Midori, and a distinguished panel, for a 360 degree reflection on how cultural diplomacy can help better address today’s most pressing global challenges. Panel includes Jeffrey Brez, Chief of NGO Relations, Advocacy, and Special Events in the Department of Public Information; Ashlee George, Executive Director of the Charlize Theron Africa Outreach Project; and Evan Ryan, executive vice president of Axios.
- Trump’s Middle East Policy: Analyzing the First Hundred Days | Tuesday, May 9 | 11:45-1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register Here | President Trump’s foreign policy has been heavily scrutinized over the course of his first hundred days in office, as his early steps are likely to shape Washington’s interactions with the international community for the next four years. To examine the broader implications of the new administration’s moves in the Middle East, Hudson Institute will host a bipartisan panel featuring Michael Pregent, former intelligence officer and adjunct fellow at Hudson Institute; Marie Harf, former senior advisor for strategic communications to Secretary of State John Kerry; and David Tafuri, the State Department’s rule of law coordinator in Iraq from 2006 to 2007. On May 9, the panel will assess key strategic issues from Trump’s handling of the JCPOA to his decision to launch cruise missile strikes against a government airbase in Syria, and evaluate the long-term outlook for American foreign policy under the Trump administration. Suzanne Kianpour of BBC News will moderate the discussion.
- Iran’s Voters Go to the Polls | Tuesday, May 9 | 12-1:30 | MEI | Register Here | On May 19, Iranians will cast ballots for their next president, choosing between the six candidates authorized by the Supreme Leader’s Guardian Council. Incumbent President Hassan Rouhani, who sought relief from international sanctions by agreeing to constraints on Iran’s nuclear program, faces challengers attacking him on the economy, foreign policy, and his commitment to Islamist revolutionary ideals. Whatever its outcome will be, the election will impact the security landscape of the Gulf and beyond as the Trump Administration develops its regional policy. Middle East Institute (MEI) scholar Alex Vatanka will be joined by author and journalist Nazila Fathi and analyst Alireza Nader (RAND) to discuss the election, its political context, and the potential consequences of the impending vote for Iran, its neighbors, and the United States. Foreign affairs reporter for The Washington Post Ishaan Tharoor will moderate the discussion.
- The Upcoming Aramco IPO: Strategy, Investment, Politics | Tuesday, May 9 | 1:00-2:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register Here | As part of the Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia intends to offer 5 percent of the state-owned Saudi Aramco to foreign investment in what is expected to be the biggest IPO in history. Tentatively slated for 2018, the IPO is highly anticipated—and likely to be highly scrutinized. The Saudi government has estimated that the company, more than twice the size of Exxon Mobil, is worth $2 trillion, making the shares worth a potential $100 billion. However, analysts within the company have warned that Aramco may be worth at least $500 billion less. Amid these questions, Saudi Arabia has undertaken measures to increase the company’s attractiveness to international investors, including slashing Aramco’s tax rate from 85 to 50 percent, attempting to untangle the company’s finances, and exploring potential ventures and investments in natural gas. Please join the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center for a discussion on the outlook for the IPO, its potential impact on financial markets, implications for oil markets, and possible responses from producers. Panelists include Phillip Cornell, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, Ayham Kamel, Director, Middle East and North Africa at Eurasia Group, Jean-Francois Seznec, a nonresident senior fellow in the Global Energy Center, and Richard L. Morningstar, the founding director and chairman of the Global Energy Center at the Atlantic Council.
- Russian and US Roles in the Middle East: the View from Israel | Tuesday, May 9 | 3:00-4:00pm | Wilson Center | Register Here | Israel occupies a unique position in relations with the U.S. and Russia. Israel’s traditionally close ties with the U.S. were undermined by deep differences and growing mistrust during the Obama administration. At the same time, despite profound contradictions in interests and agenda, Israel has developed close relations with Russia. Therefore, Israel serves as a valuable lens through which to view the changing engagement of Russia and America in the region. George F. Kennan Expert Yuri Teper will discuss these shifts and their implications for the new U.S. administration.
- Progress and Challenges for Gulf Women | Wednesday, May 10 | 12:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register Here | Women’s rights in the Middle East, and in the Gulf in particular, have changed greatly in the past decades alongside modernization efforts and the introduction of new technologies such as social media. Though there are still a number of challenges to fully incorporating women into society in the region, positive milestones have likewise been achieved. Please join the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East for a discussion with a panel of Gulf women leaders to explore achievements in this sphere as well as areas where more attention and change is needed. Panelists include Amal Almoallimi, Assistant to the Secretary General, King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue and Board Member, Saudi Human Rights Commission; Hamda Al-Sulaiti, Secretary General, Qatar National Commission for Education, Culture, and Science; and Dr. Lubna Al-Kadi, Founder and Director, Women’s Research and Studies Center, Kuwait.
- Western Policy Toward the Syrian Crisis: Looking Forward | Thursday, May 11 | 11:45-1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register Here | As American and European policymakers search for ways to end the conflict already stretching into its sixth year, a new report by Chatham House explains the need for a comprehensive solution combining political and military components: “The absence of a coherent strategic vision for Syria – or the political will to see it through – on the part of Western governments has contributed to the increasing strength and influence of ISIL and other extremist groups. These groups cannot be countered by military means alone, however. Without a political agreement to end the conflict, tactical measures for fighting extremism in Syria will fail, as they have elsewhere.” The key question is: How do you get there? On May 11, Hudson Institute will host a discussion examining both American and European perspectives on the war in Syria and Western policy. Join us as Hudson senior fellow Lee Smith moderates a conversation with European experts Lina Khatib (Chatham House) and Neil Quilliam (Chatham House) and their American counterparts Tony Badran (Foundation for the Defense of Democracies) and Andrew Tabler (The Washington Institute).
- The Global Counterterrorism Forum | Friday, May 12 | 9:00-5:00pm | GW Program on Extremism | Register Here | The Global Counterterrorism Forum is an international forum with an overarching mission of reducing the vulnerability of people worldwide to terrorism by preventing, combating, and prosecuting terrorist acts and countering incitement and recruitment to terrorism. This event in particular will tackle domestic terrorism in the U.S., radicalization and de-radicalization, and attempt to draw up a best practices document. About 60 State Department members of the Global Counterterrorism Forum will be present throughout the duration.
- Dean’s Forum- Women Who Inspire with Dr. Condoleezza Rice | Friday, May 12 | 2:00-3:30pm | SAIS | Register Here | Dean Vali Nasr, FPI and SAIS Women Lead invite you to join, in a conversation on her new book Democracy: Stories from the Long Road to Freedom, Condoleezza Rice. Moderated by Ambassador Shirin Thair-Kheli, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute.
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Institutional amnesia
I haven’t found a transcript of Secretary of State Tillerson’s remarks at the State Department yesterday, but the New York Times published an account that suggests he was treated to thunderous applause at the end. That makes me wonder who was really in the room.
The problems start with Tillerson’s picture of what the State Department was doing until he took over. He apparently thinks it was mainly promoting economic activity, especially trade with emerging economies. This would be laughable if it weren’t so sad. The main preoccupation of most people at State and most State officers in American embassies abroad is defending US interests, first and foremost in protecting US national security but also including US exports and investment abroad. Though American trade policy is not on the whole mercantilist, I’ve never heard of a generalized instruction to increase economic activity, In any event the State Department is not in charge of the trade agreements the Administration loathes. The separate US Trade Representative negotiates those.
On specific issues Tillerson is equally obtuse and unaware of what has happened until now. On North Korea, he is aiming to pressure North Korea into giving up its nuclear weapons by ratcheting up sanctions and convincing the Chinese to pressure Pyongyang. That has been tried, repeatedly, by his predecessors, without much success. He seems blissfully unaware of that. In other venues, he has emphasized military pressure, but that too has been tried and runs into a big problem: the North Korean conventional threat to South Korea, especially its artillery targeting Seoul.
Tillerson puts a good deal of stock in a high-level dialogue with China. A strategic and economic dialogue with China has been meeting since 2009. The Secretary even now can read about that on the Treasury Department’s website, though I imagine the administration will eventually get to erasing any sign of the previous president’s activity. Tillerson refers to a 50-year time horizon for the focus of those discussions. I’m going to enjoy hearing whether they get past 3 years.
The Administration is already backing off the US Navy freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, in an apparent effort to mollify the Chinese. Those who feared a belligerent attitude towards China, based on Tillerson’s remarks during his confirmation hearing that we should prevent China from accessing their reclaimed “islands” in the South China Sea need worry no more. Or maybe they do, given the Trump Administration’s lack of consistency and coherence.
Acknowledging that relations with Russia are at a low point, Tillerson still hopes for cooperation with them on a ceasefire in Syria. That’s something his predecessor spent the better part of a year trying to make happen in reality (it has existed for some time on paper).
We are now discussing “de-escalation” zones with Moscow, a watered down version of “safe” zones that is unlikely to work simply because they would be target-rich environments requiring not only restraint from the Russians and Syrian government forces but also protection from non-participants in any agreement, like the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. Who is going to do that? If you expect moderate opposition forces to do it, you haven’t been paying attention to whom the Russians and Syrians have been assiduously bombing.
On staffing, Tillerson is defending the Administration’s proposal to cut more than 30% of the State Department/USAID budgets but apparently said that would eliminate only 2300 jobs (by attrition), or 3% of the worldwide employees. What that suggests is that the cut to program funds will be gigantic, leaving both State and AID personnel-rich and money-poor. That’s not a formula for either efficiency or effectiveness.
Tillerson implied the State Department hasn’t adjusted to the post-Cold War era. That really does make me laugh, as I lived through the better part of a decade at State during which the Department rethought its strategy and redeployed its personnel, which then had to done again after 9/11 raised the spectre of international terrorism.
This is a Secretary of State almost as ignorant of what has preceded him as President Trump. Institutional amnesia is not a basis on which to build a coherent and effective foreign policy.
PS: Here is the transcript of Tillerson’s remarks. It takes some of the edge off the New York Times version, but not the institutional amnesia.
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The wrong cuts
The Alliance for Peacebuilding thinks the cuts to civilian foreign affairs agencies (State and the US Agency for International Development) proposed in President Trump’s budget are a big mistake. Here is their explication. Those numbers are the footnotes.
President Trump has proposed cutting State Department and USAID budgets by 28% from FY 17 levels in his FY18 budget. If enacted, this cut would occur in the context of a request for a $54 billion increase for the Pentagon in FY18, and a 15% cut to most other discretionary spending. Meanwhile, the administration is preparing a supplemental request for upwards of $30 billion new dollars for the DOD in FY 17, which could require rescissions from other agencies’ FY17 money already allocated and approved by Congress. These draconian cuts would severely damage the ability of the US to respond to global threats, would weaken our power to prevent deadly conflict and violent extremism, and would ultimately cost the US taxpayer more due to the higher cost of response versus prevention.
Use your voice and reach out to key members of Congress to advocate against the disastrous consequences of a 28% cut to the State Department and USAID. Talking points include:
Diplomacy and Development Prevent and Reduce Violence in Ways the Military Cannot
- Military capacities are ill-suited to address the drivers of violent conflict, especially for violent
extremism. Violent extremism is principally the result of failed politics and development. Across the world, ISIS and other violent extremist organizations recruit by capitalizing on citizens’ grievances based on political failures (wars, corruption) or developmental failures (economic inequality, group alienation). Cutting development spending from the foreign aid budget that prevents terrorism, while increasing spending in the Defense Department budget to counter terrorism, is strategically misguided. - Despite spending nearly $5 trillion in militarized counter-terrorism efforts since 9/11, global levels of violence and terrorism continue to rise. In fact, the House Republican policy blueprint states, “America faces the highest terror-threat level since 9/11.” While the military will lead the fight against terrorism on the battlefield, it needs strong civilian partners in the battle against the drivers of extremism– lack of opportunity, insecurity, injustice, hopelessness, and exposure to violence.
- State Department and USAID programs have proven that “soft power” responses addressing root causes are key for building stability. These agencies have unique capabilities to address root causes of terrorism that the Department of Defense does not and never will have.
- As Senator Graham said, “If you take soft power off the table then you’re never going to win the war.”1 Peace does not just happen in the absence of war; it must be built with strategic civilian engagement.
- Civilian responses to violence can be more effective than military action. Eighty-three percent of terrorist movements ended between 1968 and 2006 were done so through eventual political settlements or improvements in policing.2
- Governments have limited influence over the drivers of violence, and development and
diplomatic actors are uniquely positioned to engage those who can have influence, including influential and credible religious leaders, civilian agencies, youth leaders, and civil society. Focused, stable, and accountable diplomacy is single-best tool to end and prevent the wars that are the primary drivers of displacement, and which create vacuums in which terrorists thrive. - An increase in defense spending that is justified for countering terrorism should be matched by an increase in the international affairs budget, which is critical to supporting American defense priorities. Civilian-led development, prevention and peacebuilding that support locally-led solutions to the root causes of insecurity ultimately keep us safer. An imbalance of prioritizing defense at the expense of development and violence reduction programs will not increase the safety of US citizens, and will require spending significantly more on responding to crises rather
than preventing them. Every budget deal made in Congress for the last five years has modified budget caps with parity between defense and non-defense as a deal prerequisite.3 - Civilian programs prevent terrorism on their own. One example is Mercy Corps in Somalia, where the US has spent billions in countering the violent extremist organization Al-Shabaab. New research found that a USAID education program successfully reduced the likelihood of youth participating in political violence by 13% and of supporting political violence by 20%.4 This landmark study was one of the first of its kind to document tangible reductions in support for a violent group – an outcome US military counter-terrorism spending has never proven. Effective development programs strengthen communities through evidence-based approaches, including
culturally-sensitive peace education5 and gender-inclusive law enforcement and governance.6 - Military Leaders Support a Robust Foreign Affairs Budget
Over 120 retired generals called on Congress to “ensure that resources for the International Affairs Budget keep pace with the growing global threats and opportunities we face.”7 - General Mattis stated: “Of course, we cannot achieve our broader objectives…through military means alone. Our efforts require coordination and a spirit of collaboration between highly integrated civilian military teams. Our civilian colleagues need your full support even in this difficult fiscal environment to undertake their essential role in today’s complex environment.”8
- General Mattis also stated, “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately.”9
Development and Diplomacy Are Cost-Effective - Investing in conflict prevention is a cost-effective method of promoting US national security, since prevention is on average 60 times less costly than response.10
- For every dollar invested in peacebuilding now, the cost of conflict would be reduced by $16 over the long run. Projected forward ten years from 2016 this would save US$2.94 trillion in direct and indirect losses from conflict.11
The International Affairs Budget Supports National Security and Economic Growth Here at Home - Programs funded by the International Affairs Budget create jobs here at home by opening new markets and supply chains to American businesses. They also protect our national security by fighting terrorism and preventing conflicts before they start.
This efficient investment staffs all U.S. embassies overseas, fights pandemic disease, provides emergency response after natural disasters, implements agriculture programs to promote stability and prevent hunger, saves millions of lives with HIV/AIDS medications, and provides essential good governance assistance to newly emerging democracies.12
1 BBC News. Top Republican says Trump’s budget plan ‘dead on arrival’. 28 Feb 2017.
2 Institute for Economics and Peace. 2014 Global Terrorism Index. 2014.
3 DefenseNews. Durbin: Dems would back Trump defense hike with domestic match. 28 Feb 2017.
4 Critical Choices: Assessing the Effects of Education and Civic Engagement on Somali Youths’ Propensity Towards Violence. Mercy Corps. 2016.
5 Teaching Peace, Building Resilience. International Alert. 2016.
6 Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Pakistan: Why Policewomen Must Have a Role. Inclusive Security. 2014.
7 US Global Leadership Coalition. “Over 120 Retired Generals, Admirals on State and USAID Budget: “Now is not the time to retreat””. 2017.
8 General James N. Mattis, Former Commander, US Central Command, testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, March 2011.
9 General James N. Mattis, Former Commander, US Central Command, testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, March 2013.
10 Friends Committee on National Legislation. Preventing war is 60 times cheaper than fighting it.
11 Institute for Economics and Peace. Measuring Peacebuilding Cost-Effectiveness. 2017.
12 US Global Leadership Coalition. Budget Center. 2017.
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Heresies
I’ve been hesitating to write about Donald Trump’s catastrophic 30% budget cut to the State Department and USAID, because I find myself out of tune with most of my deserving Foreign Service colleagues. Not about the size of the cut: it’s ridiculous. Anything even close to 30% in a single year would render most organizations non-functional, because of their fixed costs. The foreign policy establishment is no different: it has rents to pay, buildings to heat, computers to maintain, and payroll to meet that prevent anything like a 30% cut.
My heresies start with Rex Tillerson’s hesitancy to appoint his subordinates until he has had a look at which jobs he wants to keep and which he wants to abolish. No one intent on cutting positions would want to fill them first. And unlike most commentators, I know that professional Foreign Service and Civil Service officers have stepped up as “actings” to fill the shoes of the missing Trump political appointees, who aren’t likely to be as capable (or as much in tune with my preferences). Of course they should in principle have political guidance, but in its absence they will do what I think is likely best: continue doing what they did before January 20.
Nor do I necessarily disagree with the notion that AID might be folded into State. AID was conceived, and continues to regard itself, as a poverty-reduction organization committed to economic development. But it no longer has anywhere near the resources required to make even a minor dent in global poverty. Nor is it clear that it knows any better how to create jobs abroad than the US government does at home. In any event, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the regional development banks have much greater capacity to reduce poverty than AID, as does the US Millennium Challenge Corporation.
What we need AID money for in the early part of the 21st century is something else. Though I am a diehard Obamista, Mitt Romney had most of it right in a speech on AID during the 2012 campaign: we should be using its resources to help our friends abroad build the institutions required for free enterprise, including protection of property rights and rule of law. What the US needs in abroad is socially and environmentally sensitive capitalist development, including strong civil society organizations that will insist on inclusivity, transparency and accountability. In a word: building states and their civil society counterparts.
AID has the amounts of money that could make a real difference in state- and society-building. But in order to be effective in fraught political environments, it would have to operate under close foreign policy supervision. Thus I’d be happy to see AID–or much of it–folded into the State Department, which is capable of giving the kind of politically sensitive guidance that is difficult when the organizations are separate.
This won’t really happen, any more than the 30% cut. AID’s humanitarian and health programs have strong advocates in Congress, who will keep them intact and separate from State. But much of the rest of AID–in particular the money for its regional economic development activities as well as its “transition” and democratization portfolios–should be given over to state- and society-building under State Department supervision, in particular in the war-torn and fragile states of the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.
Look at Latin America and East Asia: with notable exceptions like Venezuela and Thailand, these regions are moving pretty decisively in the democratic, middle income direction, with ups and downs. Brazil is in a trough at the moment, but for those of us who served there 30 years ago, it is vastly improved, both in political and economic terms. The Asia Pacific has developed relatively prosperous, at least semi-democratic states: South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia (with reservations), Philippines (even if I don’t like Duterte). Their relatively peaceful evolution is one of the unsung blessings of our time. It is no accident that these are for the most part not the areas of the world generating terrorist threats to the US.
States are a key element of this evolution, as is regional cooperation among them. Washington, stuck in the poverty reduction rut, has not had the funds needed to back either, though it sometimes does well supporting civil society in fragile states, all too often however as an alternative to government. Yes, fold a large part of AID into State, but change the goals it seeks to be commensurate with US interests and the volume of its resources: build viable states that can elaborate and enforce the norms required for modern economies, support cooperation on a regional basis among those viable states, and make sure that civil society has the resources to monitor, evaluate, and advocate for political and economic reform.
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