On August 23, Hudson Institute’s South and Central Asia Program will host a panel to discuss the current political climate in Afghanistan. Panelists will include: Omar Samad, former Ambassador of Afghanistan to France and Canada; David Sedney, acting president of American University of Afghanistan and senior associate at the Center for Strategic and international Studies; and Husain Haqqani, former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States and director of the South and Central Asia Program at Hudson Institute.
Month: August 2018
Respect
Hard not to write about John McCain, but most of what needs saying has been said: he was a Vietnam War hero, a stalwart supporter of a strong and democratizing American role in the world, and a flawed presidential candidate who lowered the level of electoral discourse with his choice of a know-nothing vice presidential candidate whose name should be forgotten. I disagreed with many of the Senator’s domestic policy preferences and didn’t vote for him, but give him ample credit for saving the Affordable Care Act at a crucial moment.
McCain liked to be called a maverick, but he only occasionally behaved like one. A Republican loyalist to the end, McCain was critical of President Trump but never quite broke with him completely. This is unfortunate, as he might have led a Congressional rebellion to limit Trump’s worst impulses. But to expect that of someone dying of a malignant brain tumor really is too much. McCain merits a lot of credit, especially for his principled stand on supporting human rights and democracy, at home and abroad.
It is apparently also too much to expect the President to show even minimal respect for a war hero whose entire life is admittedly a condemnation of Trump’s. He managed to issue a pro forma recognition of McCain a day or two after his death and to order flags flown at half mast, after pointedly refusing to answer questions about McCain and having the White House flag raised in a purposeful show of disrespect.
It is hard for me to understand how the US military puts up with Trump, never mind likes him. It is not only McCain he disdains. Trump has failed to visit troops in a conflict zone since becoming president. His most intense personal interest in the troops was on display when he needed them for his now-cancelled parade in Washington. The troops will be grateful that isn’t happening.
McCain’s death represents a big loss for American foreign policy. He was a stalwart of NATO and advocate for a strong American leadership role abroad. Trump thinks the allies are worthless and the leadership role too expensive. His Make America Great Again has amounted to making America alone again, as it was after the first world war when it declined to join the League of Nations. We know how well that worked.
Trump touts his trade deal with Mexico, which updates a small portion of NAFTA. It is only a little more real than his denuclearization agreement with North Korea and his “deal of the century” between Israel and the Palestinians, both of which amount to nothing. Never mind that the Mexicans have refused to pay for his wall and he is stiffing the Canadians over a few million additional dollars of dairy exports, wrecking relationships that the US should be treasuring.
Everyone is looking for a hedge against Trump’s bombast and unpredictability. My own today is to think about the other great American to be buried this week: Aretha Franklin. I saw and heard her at Radio City Music Hall about 1995, but here she is the year I graduated:
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Tags : Canada, Democracy and Rule of Law, Mexico, Trade, United States
Trials and tribulations
President Trump’s former campaign manager and his former personal attorney/fixer yesterday became convicted felons. Paul Manafort’s conviction on eight charges confirmed his financial crimes. He was not acquitted on any charges, but the jury failed to come to a conclusion on ten. Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to financial crimes as well as campaign finance violations associated with paying hush money, at Donald Trump’s direction, to women with whom Trump had had affairs. Nothing like this level of corrupt behavior has come so close to a president in at least 100 years, if not since the founding of the republic.
What significance does any of this have, in particular for foreign policy?
Manafort’s conviction brings enormous pressure on him to cooperate with the Special Counsel in the Russia investigation. Manafort, who seems to me to be a Russian agent, presumably knows a great deal about Trump’s dealings with the Russians. To avoid his spilling the beans, Trump may pardon him, but Manafort would remain vulnerable to state prosecution. That is presumably the reason the President has hesitated so far, though he signaled clearly in his reaction to the verdict (Manafort is a “good man” he said) that he might resort to a pardon. If Manafort talks, many of the details of Trump’s relationship with Moscow are likely to become public, with dramatic impacts: Trump may be soft on Russia, but the Congress has been tough and insisted on increasingly draconian sanctions.
Cohen’s conviction makes it virtually certain that he will cooperate with the Special Counsel to get a lightened sentence. He presumably knows the gory details of Russian investments in Trump real estate, which are manifold and the likely cause of much of Trump’s affection for Putin, in addition to Putin’s help in getting him elected. Trump is terrified Putin will block Russian investments in Trump properties. The day of reckoning on that score is near.
So these convictions, while not directly connected to the Russia investigation, do have implications for its future. I doubt Special Counsel Mueller will act decisively before the end of the month, when a pre-electoral moratorium on major judicial moves begins. The question, which won’t be answered until November 6, is whether Americans will be able to read the handwriting on the wall. Trump’s solid 35% or so is likely to stick with him, but 65% is a lot of potential voters. The big question is whether they will go to vote in sufficient numbers to begin to correct the mistake of 2016.
Many tribulations lie ahead. If the Republicans lose control of the House of Representatives, it will have grounds for impeachment (indictment). The Republicans are likely however to continue their control of the Senate, where conviction is unlikely so long as they remain solid in their support of Trump. The process of impeachment and trial will take months, distracting the Administration from other important issues, including foreign policy.
If the Democrats do not gain control of the House or Senate, impeachment is not possible and they will continue in opposition while the Special Counsel pursues his investigation and decides whether to charge the President. That is unlikely as it contradicts Justice Department policy. Mueller will however file a report that could state boldly what laws the President has violated.
That will happen only if Trump doesn’t fire him or neuter the investigation by taking away its staff’s security clearances. Both are possible, but the political risks involved are significant. It would amount to a presidential guilty plea and would not stop state-level prosecutions that could detail presidential malfeasance and lead to prosecution after Trump leaves office.
So no, we are nowhere near the end of the Trump scandals and their consequences. We face at least two more years of painful revelations and judicial maneuvers, while the Russians, Iranians, Chinese, and others test our mettle in cyberspace, on the high seas, and on land in Syria, Ukraine, Turkey, and elsewhere. Our traditional allies in both Europe and Asia are all hedging their bets, because of Trump’s erratic behavior, his attack on NATO, and his cozying up to Kim Jong-un. And the lengthy Obama recovery is showing signs of aging, in part due to Trump’s tariffs, an inflationary budget, and a giant tax cut for the wealthy.
Neither the trials nor the tribulations are over.
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Tags : Asia, China, Democracy and Rule of Law, NATO, North Korea, Russia, Syria, Ukraine, United States
Peace Picks – August 20 – 26
1. U.S.-Turkey Relations in Crisis: Where Are We Headed? | Wednesday, August 22, 2018 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am | The Wilson Center | Register Here
Please note: Ground Truth Briefings are conducted exclusively by phone. There will be no physical meeting at the Wilson Center.
The U.S.-Turkish relationship is in crisis. The disagreement over the detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson has exposed deeper fault lines in U.S.-Turkish ties that have been building for a decade or more, undermining any sense of confidence and trust. Are the ties that bind Washington and Ankara stronger than those political, economic and regional forces threatening to pull them apart? And is there hope of a pathway back to a more functional relationship?
Join us as four veteran observers and analysts of Turkish politics and U.S.-Turkish relations address these and other issues.
U.S. toll-free number: 888-942-8140
International call-in number: 1-517-308-9203
Participant passcode: 13304
Speakers:
Introduction: Jane Harman – Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center
Moderator: Aaron David Miller – Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center
Asli Aydintasbas – Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations; columnist for the Turkish daily, Cumhuriyet
Henri Barkey – Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Professor in International Relations, Lehigh University; Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; former Director, Wilson Center Middle East Program
Soner Cagaptay – Senior fellow at The Washington Institute and author “The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey”
Lisel Hintz – Assistant Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies
2. The Challenge of Cyber Strategy | Wednesday, August 22, 2018 | 4:00 pm – 5:30 pm | Atlantic Council | Register Here
In the age of cyber conflict, coercion combines with disruption, cyber espionage and influence campaigns to shape the behavior of antagonists. As the character of power evolves, cyber operations are increasingly becoming a modern form of political warfare, with major implications for coercive policy options and cyber strategies.
Join us as we partner with the Marine Corps University Foundation to convene cyber practitioners and academics for a forward-thinking dialogue on shaping policy to account for this changing security environment and maintain US advantage in long-term cyber competition.
Speakers:
Moderator: JD Work – Donald Bren Chair of Cyber Conflict and Security, Marine Corps University
Dr. Benjamin Jensen – Senior Fellow, Foresight Strategy and Risks Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council; Associate Professor, Marine Corps University; Scholar in Residence, American University
Lt. Gen. Loretta Reynolds – Deputy Commandant for Information, Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command
Dr. Brandon Valeriano – Senior Fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council; Donald Bren Chair of Armed Politics, Marine Corps University
Dr. Chris Whyte – Assistant Professor, Virginia Commonwealth University
3. Afghanistan: 17 Years On | Thursday, August 23, 2018 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | Hudson Institute | Register Here
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Tags : Afghanistan, Cybersecurity, Turkey, United States
Academe says “no” to partition
My SAIS colleague Professor Sinisa Vukovic has taken a look at the academic literature on partition as a solution to ethnic conflict, prompted by recent discussions of it in the Balkans. He writes:
I found that contemporary studies unanimously conclude that this solution is suboptimal at best, and extremely unstable compared to all other solutions. Empirical evidence shows that partition:
– Can increase the risk of violence by empowering ethnic elites if there are lingering territorial disputes, by weakening the status of residual minorities and forcing them to rebel, by activating new ethnic or ideological cleavages, by weakening the economic position of the rump or secessionist state, or by forcing contests over the control of the regime in the secessionist state. (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2009-1)
– De facto separation (which you may associate with Dodik’s Republika Srpska de facto status in Bosnia, or the aspiration of Serbian majority municipalities in Northern Kosovo to become a ‘Republika Srpska of their own in Kosovo’) is even more problematic: only 14% of the parties to de jure partition experienced a resumption of violence within 2 years, but this frequency rose to 50% for the parties to a de facto separation, 63% for the parties bound in a unitary state, and 67% for the parties to an autonomy arrangement. And sovereign states created by partition are no more likely to go to war against one another than states created by other means. Belgrade’s insistence on an Association of Serb Municipalities with executive powers is thus a call for further destabilization in the future. (Champan and Roeader 2007)
– Partition does not help reduce the risk of war recurrence. Partitions are in fact positively (though not significantly) associated with recurrence of ethnic war.
Sambanis also has an interesting empirical finding: negotiated settlements, a strong government army, and a lengthy previous war all reduce the probability of war recurrence. Thus, if the international community’s interest lies in preventing new civil wars, it could manipulate some of these significant variables toward desirable goals. It could, for example, take steps to enhance the government’s military and support decisive war outcomes. Or it could support the negotiation of peace treaties, which reduce the threat of new violence. Again, what the international community should not do to prevent future wars is promote partition. (Sambanis 2000)
If I read this correctly, it means that if you want to avoid war in the Balkans, the right approach is to strengthen the existing countries’ armies, avoid autonomy arrangements, and end lingering territorial disputes by means other than redrawing borders along ethnic lines.
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Tags : Balkans
Burden sharing is good, but…
The State Department announced Friday that it was canceling $200 million in assistance for “stabilization” in parts of Syria the US and its allies control and welcomed a contribution from Saudi Arabia and other countries that would amount to $300 million. What could be wrong with that? It sounds like the Administration has succeeded in getting others to share the burden. That’s good.
The devil of course is in the details. First, the money seems to be limited, like the US money that was originally programmed, to “stabilization,” which in the current Administration’s lexicon means things like water, electricity, demining, and the like. Everything short of governance, which is shunned as the much-despised “nation building” the President doesn’t want to do. But there is no way of preventing ISIS, Al Qaeda, or some other extremist group from returning unless the territory is secured and governed.
The Defense Department is training the security forces. I’ve got serious doubts about that, since what is needed is not just counter-terrorism/insurgency, but rather policing, which has dramatically different requirements, including not only investigatory capabilities but also courts and prisons. But let’s assume the Pentagon has learned that and is somehow training a decent police force that will protect the population and not abuse it. If they arrest someone, where will he be tried? According to what procedures? And how will punishments be administered? If a civil case is brought, how will decisions be enforced?
There are other big issues: who will govern and how? Melissa Dalton of CSIS helpfully outlines the complexities of a serious stabilization effort, which would have to include security, greater citizen engagement, more inclusive governance, and a serious communications/outreach effort. There is not sign of any of these things in the Administration’s announcement. We can hope that mission creep will make them happen, but that is hardly a substitute for good planning.
The Kurds who constitute the heart of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the US allies in eastern Syria, are said to be in negotiations with the Assad regime to combine their forces: is the US really prepared to encourage the Saudis to provide hundreds of millions in eastern Syria if the forces that control it are in turn controlled by Damascus? Wouldn’t that be a contradiction of the announced policy of no aid beyond humanitarian assistance for areas under Assad’s control?
In addition, burden-sharing is not a simple matter, as Melissa also emphasizes. How will the money flow? To whom? To be effective, burden-sharing will require leadership and coordination within a coherent and over-arching strategic framework, as well as oversight to ensure that the impacts are positive. We don’t want to be funding warlords or Kurds attacking inside Turkey. There is no sign of any of this in Friday’s announcement, which mentions only a common list of projects. That is nowhere near what will be required to ensure synergy, effectiveness, and consistency with US policy goals.
Friday’s announcement included Jim Jeffrey’s appointment as the Secretary of State’s Representative for Syria Engagement. That’s good news, as he is eminently qualified from his previous positions as Ambassador to Albania, Turkey, and Iraq. His role is said to be focused on the UN-hosted Geneva talks aimed at ending the war with an irreversible political process. But leverage there will depend on how things are going in the part of eastern Syria that the US and its allies now control. What role will he play in the shared stabilization effort? How will US military and civilian presence be translated into US negotiating leverage? Will Jim have the kind of all-of-government authority required to have a decisive impact on the negotiations?
Yes, burden-sharing is good. But it is also complicated and difficult.
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Tags : Saudi Arabia, Syria, United States
Diplomacy for drawdown
Marc Lynch, after describing well the security dilemmas and state fragility that are driving Middle East conflicts, concludes:
US hegemony in the Middle East will never be restored because the region has fundamentally changed. Moving beyond the wars and political failures that followed the Arab uprisings will not be easy. The damage is too deep.
The question is: should Americans worry about that? Marc doesn’t answer that question, but Steven Metz does.
American interests in the Middle East are usually defined along these lines:
- Countering international terrorism
- Ensuring oil and gas can flow without hindrance to world markets
- Supporting friends and allies
- Preventing nuclear proliferation
Steven essentially says the threat of international terrorism is overblown, US energy vulnerability is vastly reduced (“Petroleum will not be weaponized”), and US friends and allies can (mostly) take of themselves. He doesn’t deal with the proliferation issue, but he really doesn’t have to, because he is talking mainly about military commitments. Military action has never been a good option for dealing with nuclear proliferation, since it would provide a very strong incentive for acquiring nuclear weapons.
Steven’s conclusion: the US should withdraw its military from the Middle East and rely instead on “off-shore balancing” to ensure that no rival hegemon is able to control the region and intervene only in the event that one threatens US interests. The savings could be gigantic: RAND estimated that in 2008 12-15% of the Pentagon budget was spent to securing oil from the Persian Gulf.
Washing our hands of the Middle East is an attractive proposition. Unfortunately it is one that President Obama tried, without a great deal of success. President Trump is tempted in the same direction. But withdrawal has left the many of the vacuums that Marc describes so well, generating security dilemmas and military responses that have left Syria, Yemen, and Libya in ruins and erstwhile American friends like Israel, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates at odds and hedging.
It is difficult to see how the United States can withdraw from the Middle East without a focused diplomatic effort to ensure that the region can restore a modicum of stability,or at least remove some of the drivers of instability. Offshore balancing won’t work if there is no balance but only chaos. The Trump Administration is said to be preparing for a Summit to restore some coherence to GCC next month. That makes sense: there will be no serious effort to counter Iran’s behavior in the region so long as Qatar is feuding with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
But the Administration also needs to end its own feuding with Turkey and restore some balance to its policy on Palestine to make it more palatable to Sunni Arab friends. And it needs to reconsider its position on the Iran deal, which threatens to seriously undermine relations with Europe.
So yes, I agree that we should draw down, if not completely out, from the the Middle East. But there is a lot of diplomatic homework required to make that possible. And a very real possibility that the Administration will focus instead on countering Iran, leading it to increase rather than decrease its military commitments in the region.
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