Month: November 2020

Stevenson’s army, Novemberr 27

WaPo reports closure of 10 US bases in Afghanistan.
China escalates trade war with Australia.
Fight in Taiwan parliament over allowing US pork imports.
David Brooks on US political divisions.
Puzzling purge of Defense Policy Board.
Former APSA Fellow Paul Musgrave reviews IR theory in light of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
You don’t have to know details of the Amendment Tree in the Senate, only that it is the way the majority leader can block consideration of any amendments. Here’s a detailed example from last year. 
And attached is an excerpt from a CRS paper that shows how often it has been used lately.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Forty-five years is too long to wait for a referendum

Bouela Lehbib, who was a Middle East Institute research intern with me in 2019 during his time as the first Fulbrighter from Western Sahara, writes:

The 29-year UN-brokered ceasefire that had been in place since September 1991 between the Polisario Front and Morocco has collapsed. Morocco’s military incursion on November 13 in the Guergarat’s buffer-strip — a UN- designated demilitarized zone in the south-western corner of Western Sahara — prompted the Polisario Front, a liberation movement seeking independence, to resume armed struggle.

Morocco claims its operation comes as a response to “restoring free circulation and commercial traffic” towards sub-Saharan Africa. It had been blocked since October 21 by dozens of Saharawi civilians protesting peacefully against what they consider Moroccan occupation of their land and plundering of their natural resources.

The Polisario Front sees Morocco’s move as a violation of the ceasefire and a bid to alter the status quo in its favor. Both parties had agreed according to the UN peace plan of 1991 to keep maintain the status quo until the final status of the territory is decided.

Tensions have been on the rise in Guergarat since 2016, when Morocco tried to asphalt an approximately 5-km road in Western Sahara, across the buffer strip and into Mauritania near Nouadhibou. The Polisario interfered with the work, claiming it was illegal. The military agreement No.1, signed in the late 1990s, forbids any military presence in the buffer strip. It allows, though, Saharawi civilian circulation under Polisario Front control. 

There was no crossing point at the time of the ceasefire agreement. It was introduced by Morocco on March 2001. Although MINURSO, the UN mission for the referendum in Western Sahara, warned Morocco the road construction and change of the status quo “raised sensitive issues and involve activities that could be in violation of the ceasefire agreement,” the latter went ahead with the work.

For Rabat, ensuring a crossing point and an asphalted road in Guergarat is strategically and economically significant. Since 2010, Morocco has invested widely in West African countries, becoming the first investor in the region and the third in all Africa, with its communication, construction, and bank enterprises leading the market. In 2017, it had officially requested to become a member of ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States. Though admission was blocked, Morocco still has political and economic clout in the region and seeks to neutralize the Saharawi Republic in the African Union, which it joined on January 2017. An asphalted road in Guergarat would link Morocco to ECOWAS economically but, most importantly, it contests the Polisario Front in the 20% territory it considers liberated.

Pundits blame the UN for the region slipping into tension. MINURSO has not fulfilled its mandate of holding a self-determination referendum according to Security Council resolution 690. Nor has it maintained a neutral position as an independent entity. Its vehicles carry Moroccan plates and its staff passports carry Moroccan stamps. The UN is playing a waiting game.

Security Council members, including the US, bear some of the blame. Its do-nothing policy and effort to ignore 45 years of low-intensity conflict have allowed the return of war. Joe Biden’s victory has raised the possibility that a shift in US policy towards Western Sahara could fix past mistakes. A self-determination referendum that both Morocco and the Polisario Front accept and the UNSC ratifies remains by far the best way out of this long-standing dispute.

With war in Libya and chaos in Mali, the new conflict in Western Sahara is likely to expose the region to much more instability. But it can also be an opportunity for the new Administration, as the moment looks ripe to bring a just solution to what many see as the last colony in Africa.

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Eighteen good things to be thankful for

Credit to Iraqi Ambassador Fareed Yasseen for sending this Thomas Nast drawing, published in Harper’s Weekly, November, 1869

It’s Thanksgiving in the US, when usually we gather in extended families, quarrel vociferously, and eat and drink far too much. No gathering this year due to the corona virus, but lots of good things to be thankful for:

  1. A peaceful election with a clear result and a decent man as winner.
  2. The recommitment of my country to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.
  3. All the poll workers and election boards that prepared well and executed to virtual perfection.
  4. The courts that have dismissed frivolous lawsuits, in defiance of the President.
  5. The voters who turned out (or in the case of mailed ballots turned in) in record numbers to make their will known.
  6. The media who didn’t fall for lies and Russian-, Chinese- or Iranian-sponsored memes.
  7. The health care workers who have tried so hard to keep us safe and cure us when we get ill.
  8. No serious symptoms among a few infected colleagues.
  9. Whoever published the genome of the corona virus, thus enabling quick work to develop a vaccine.
  10. The scientists who labor to invent vaccines and develop treatments for Covid-19.
  11. The millions of essential workers who have been delivering our food and mail, picking up our trash, guarding our workplaces, running the internet, and doing all the rest that makes staying home and social distancing possible.
  12. My students and fellow professors, who have risen to the challenge of remote learning with willing spirits.
  13. My colleagues all over the globe, who are hosting meetings and engaging across borders as never before.
  14. Health institutions worldwide that have refused to cave even under enormous strain.
  15. The political leaders who have shown that vigorous, early action can limit spread of the virus.
  16. Fellow citizens who wear masks and keep their distance.
  17. A city that has taken the epidemic seriously and continues to do so.
  18. Two wonderful sons, two equally wonderful daughters-in-law, three fantastic grandchildren, and a wife who also loves them all.

I’ll stop there, as 18 is also a good number signifying “life” in Hebrew. May all my readers be as fortunate as I am in this unsettled and risky world!

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Restoring individual rights and hope in Bosnia

I joined happily with knowledgeable colleagues in signing Fixing Dayton: A New Deal for Bosnia and Herzegovina, published yesterday by Dan Hamilton of the Woodrow Wilson Center. But my own thoughts go beyond that paper in some respects. Here is what I would advise the Biden Administration about what Dan Hamilton calls the “why, what, and how” of fixing Bosnia and Herzegovina:

Why: The Dayton agreements that ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina were a striking US foreign policy success in 1995, but the country risks becoming a disaster in the 2020s due to growing inter-ethnic strife. State failure in Bosnia would spew refugees into the EU and bring an end to a successful NATO effort to protect a vulnerable Muslim population. Breakup of the Bosnian state would strengthen Russian-sponsored secessionists not only in the Balkans but also in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia and cause further fraying of the NATO Alliance. The US needs to re-assert it leadership, in partnership with the EU, which is unable for now to proceed expeditiously with enlargement. Europe whole, free, and democratic is still a worthy vision, but the Europeans need America to help make it happen.

What: The objective in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be a functional, effective, and united state within its current borders capable of meeting the requirements for entry into NATO and the European Union. This will require elimination of the elaborate governing architecture created at Dayton that froze in place the warring parties (Republika Srpska and the Federation) and rewarded their commitment to ethnically based control of territory. Bosnia and Herzegovina should be governed in the future by a government in Sarajevo capable of negotiating and implementing its obligations to the EU as well as municipalities delivering services to citizens, with equal rights for individuals and vigorous legal and judicial protection for minorities.

How:

  1. Diplomatic: US/EU agreement on initiating a process of constitutional and other reforms, Zagreb and Belgrade convinced to support the effort, re-empowerment of the High Representative, deployment of additional NATO (read British and American) troops to Brcko to prevent either Serb or Muslim seizure of this vital chokepoint, pressure on Russia and Serbia to halt financial assistance Repubika Srpska.
  2. Legal: preparation by Bosnians of a new constitution that eliminates or drastically curtails the entities, full implementation of European Human Rights Chamber and Constitutional Court decisions, professionalization of the judicial sector, restoration of international prosecutors and judges in the court system, and prohibition of heavily armed police and paramilitary forces.
  3. Economic: an end to IMF and World Bank assistance to the entities and instead resources shifted to the municipalities and the “state” government (Sarajevo), vigorous enforcement of anti-corruption laws with European Union assistance, personal sanctions on corrupt officials levied by the US and EU in tandem, recovery and return to worthy causes of ill-gotten gains stashed in Europe or the US, strict conditionality on international financing requiring in response support for political and legal reform.
  4. Political: reform of the electoral law to disempower the ethically based political parties, election in parliament of a single president and two vice presidents, strict limits on the vital interest veto and the power of the House of Peoples, adoption of a law rendering all financing of political parties transparent and requiring democratic procedures for election of party leaderships.
  5. Public affairs: VoA/RFE/DW programming to counter Russian disinformation, redoubled international support to civil society and political forces that support serious reforms, diplomatic protection for citizens demonstrating against corruption and police abuse, and a concerted effort to publicize corruption among politicians and officials.

The obstacles to an effort of this sort are substantial. Those who govern today in Bosnia, who come to power in unfree and unfair elections conducted within a constitutional system that favors ethnic nationalists, have no interest in seeing serious reform or in preparing the country to become a serious candidate for NATO or EU membership. They will seek to use any reopening of the Dayton agreements as a means of increasing their own power and possibly breaking apart the state. The US and EU will need to be prepared to act vigorously against strong resistance by those who seek secession, ethnic separation, or ethnic domination by one group over others.

The rewards of success would be substantial. Making Bosnia into a serious candidate for NATO and EU accession would have a demonstration effect worldwide. It would restore American and European soft power, weaken ethnic nationalists in the Balkans and elsewhere, and illustrate the unmatched capacity of liberal democracy to govern effectively.

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The migrant specter: scary or not?

Jade MacRury, a content writer and correspondent for the Immigration Advice Service, an immigration law firm based in the UK & Ireland that provides invaluable legal support to migrants, writes:

The idea that immigration is a burden on the public purse is often heard, but is it correct? The intersection of immigration and the economy is deeply complex. In an issue of such significance, it vital for truth to prevail.

But for this to happen, the issue must be looked at closely and objectively. Does immigration truly bring no benefits to the host country at all? Do overseas nationals do nothing but take from British public services without ever contributing a single penny? Do they really exacerbate a budget deficit that is already unsustainable? Or are we viewing a chicken-and-egg scenario? Instead of the government creating the hostile immigration policy in response to the “migrant threat,” is it possible that it actually fans the flames of untruths in order to support harsh immigration policies?

The only way to answer such questions is to examine the evidence, which paints a more complicated picture than the one-sided narrative that dominates vast swathes of political discourse. Different studies and researchers use different methods, as they should, in order that the flaws of one study can be addressed by another. However, there is one deterrent to figuring out the truth: the fact that researchers cannot seem to agree on a basic definition of the word “migrant.”

Is a migrant anyone foreign born? Yes, that’s the simplest answer, isn’t it? Someone is a migrant because they migrated from one country to another. But what of their children born in the UK? Are they migrants too? They would never have arrived here if their parents hadn’t migrated but they didn’t actually migrate because they were born here and knew no other home.

And which migrants are we talking about? Are we focusing on those coming from the EU/EEA, outside the EU/EEA area or perhaps both? Did we want to study migrants who are in the UK as students? Or those who came here to work jobs that the UK can’t fill, such as fruit pickers or NHS carers? Or perhaps we want to know what contributions, if any, asylum seekers and refugees make to the British economy? Or are we looking at all of them?

Are we studying just one fiscal year? The entire life cycle of a full generation of migrants – maybe even two generations (if we’re counting even UK-born children as part of the migrant category)? Are we using actual data or extrapolating from them and jumping into the realm of assumptions and educated guesswork?

Also, how are we calculating contributions and costs? Yes, we always include income tax, National Insurance and VAT on purchases within migrants’ fiscal contributions, but sometimes we also include shares of taxes paid by UK businesses. In the same way, fiscal costs always include public services such as NHS care and education, but then sometimes we include government spending on defense as well, which wouldn’t change even if immigration were to stop instantly.

Finally, are we looking at any results for migrants on their own and treating them as absolutes? Or are we examining their fiscal impact relative to the UK-born population? Or perhaps we’re comparing one segment of migrants against another, as we do when we look at studies that compare the contributions of EU/EEA migrants against non-EU/EEA migrants as well as those of students against refugees and asylum seekers?

Different starting points naturally produce different results. For example, a 2018 Oxford Economics study showed that, relative to the UK-born population, migrants from the European Economic Area (EEA) actually had a positive financial effect. During the 2016/2017 fiscal year, the UK born population generated a net fiscal cost of -£41.4 billion whereas the EEA migrants made a net fiscal contribution of £4.7 billion–a clear difference and a strong point in favor of migrants.

On the negative side of the spectrum, however, is a 2014 Migration Watch study which focused on the 2014/15 financial year. This study revealed that migrants actually cost the UK government rather than contribute to it. EEA migrants generated a loss of -£1.1 billion whilst non-EEA migrants generated a loss of -£15.6 billion. And the UK-born population? They didn’t include it in the study so no comparison could be made.

So, do migrants contribute to or cost the UK government? It’s hard to provide a single accurate answer but the truth is likely somewhere in the middle. And our response must reflect that reality. Any rhetoric that scapegoats migrants for all the ills Britain is going through must be tempered. We need none of Nigel Farage’s consistent demonizing of an entire group of people, none of the relentless xenophobia that was so closely tied to the Brexit vote. We need truth and objectivity to prevail.

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Stevenson’s army, November 25

There hasn’t been much news about Congress lately, but today there is.
The appropriators have agreed on ceilings for the different bills, making passage likely before the Dec 11 deadline.

HASC chairman says USAF is playing runoff politics in Georgia.
Walter Oleszek, co-author of Congress & Its Members and a longtime CRS analyst, has a long paper explaining why the “regular order” of congressional business has fallen out of favor.  FYI, I still favor it. This is a good summary of the reent evolution of lawmaking.
Happy Thanksgiving, wherever and with whomever.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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